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ABSTRACT
RENOVATIO
MARTIN LUTHER’S AUGUSTINIAN THEOLOGY OF HOLINESS
(1515/16 AND 1535—46)
by
The Reverend Phillip L. Anderas, B.A., M. Div.
Marquette University, 2015

In this book I argue that much of mainstream Luther scholarship (and
Lutheran theology) is quite wrong to think that Martin Luther downplayed, denied,
derided, or just plain ignored “the holiness without which no one shall see the Lord”
(Heb. 12:14). In fact, from the first inklings of his “Augustinian turn” c. 1514 to his death
in 1546, Luther held and taught a robust theology of progressive renewal in holiness,
carefully calibrated to the sober reality of residual sin and the astonishing gospel of
grace in Jesus Christ. As it is set forth in the works that embody his most considered
judgments (c. 1535—46), this gospel-centered and irreducibly trinitarian dogmatics of
real renewal in holiness is “Augustinian” and “evangelical” in equal parts. As such, it
commands the regard of theologians who stand in the tradition of the Church’s doctor
gratiae. The argument proceeds in three steps: first, an exposition of the mature
Reformer’s dogmatics of sin, grace, and holiness; second, an investigation of the roots
of this dogmatics in the theology of the “420s Augustine,” with whom a younger
Luther was busily engaged c. 1514—16; third, an account of the continuities and
discontinuities that characterize the development of Luther’s theology from its
embryonic state in the mid 1510s through the breakthroughs of the 1518—21 period to
the settled position of the old Doctor.
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but the LORD was my support.
He brought me out into a broad place:
He rescued me,
because he delighted in me.
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courageous and beware of giving up! For God calls all things from the dead
and from nothing. When no resource or hope at all is left, then at last God’s
help begins.
Luther on Gen. 25:23, late 1539
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THE GIST OF THIS BOOK

τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου, ἐν ᾧ ἠσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός, ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ
υἱὸν πέμψας ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτίας κατέκρινεν τὴν
ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἵνα τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου πληρωθῇ ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς μὴ
κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα.
St Paul, Rom. 8:3-4

… gratia saluatoris Christi crucifixi et dono spiritus eius…
… nec de verbis, cum res constet, controuersia facienda.
St Augustine, nat. grat. 60.70 & retr. 1.15.4

Schwerwiegende Worte, die ganz nach Augustin hinüberklingen!
Man darf sich auch nicht von Luthers »augustinischer« Redeweise
in die Irre führen lassen.
Rudolf Hermann and Leif Grane
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INTRODUCTION
“LUTHER ON HOLINESS? THAT WILL BE A SHORT BOOK”
Deep into his trenchant 1525 reply to Erasmus of Rotterdam on the great themes of
Reformation theology—sin and grace, bondage and freedom, human choice and
divine election, law and gospel, justification by faith, claritas scripturae, etc.1—Martin
Luther took up a challenge which many would assume did not quite strike at the heart
of the matter. For Erasmus had asked Luther this:
If the whole man, even when born again through faith, is nothing but ‘flesh,’
where is the ‘spirit’ that is born of the Spirit? Where is the child of God? Where
is the new creature?2
—and is not the very asking of this question all the evidence a convinced Lutheran
needs to prove just how little this moralizing humanist grasped the radical nature of
the gospel? For in the form of this question, Europe’s leading man merely renews the
familiar charge that Luther’s theology militates against real renewal of life, reformatio
morum, piety, virtue, good works, sanctification, holiness. But this misses the whole
point of the Reformation, cheapens grace by making discipleship costly, and cuts the
nerve of evangelical freedom. For the Reformation gospel of free justification leaves
the forgiven sinner just that—a sinner, “flesh” in St. Paul’s terms, in the Reformer’s
peccator totaliter et totus simul iustus. And this principled disregard for the
cultivation of morals and the eradication of vice is the gospel’s special virtue, the
paradoxical proprium that sets it apart from every scheme of moral betterment,
1

“My good Erasmus! … You, and you alone, have seen the hinge on which all turns, and aimed for
the jugular.” WA 18.786.21, 30, cf. Packer, 319. Cf. Hans Joachim Iwand: “Whoever puts this book
down without having realized that evangelical theology stands or falls with the doctrine of the
bondage of the will has read it in vain.” In Bruno Jordahn, ed., Vom unfreien Willem (Munich, 1954),
cited and translated by Packer, p. 58.
2
WA 18.744.30-1, cf. Packer, 254.

2

ascetic ascent, and metaphysical advance which the fallen filii Adae have ever devised,
from Babel to Rome, Plato to Pelagius, Eckhart to Oprah. The law only makes matters
worse! But where sin abounded, grace abounded all the more. Once justified, the
righteous sinner has nowhere to go—for there is nowhere he needs to go. The way of
the pilgrim is over; Christ is the end of the law for everyone who believes. The ladder
to heaven need no longer be scaled to the heights, for the Son of God climbed down it
himself to meet us here in the depths. By faith in this Christ, the believer has already
reached his destination, already tasted the powers of the age to come, already passed
out of death and judgment into eschatological righteousness and life.
In short: Erasmus’ question is flawed, as modern theologians like to say, by a
“category mistake,” for the gospel of Jesus is sui generis and so is Luther’s evangelical
theology.3
If, then, there is no real space in Lutheran theology for the doctrines of new
creation, regeneration, renovation, sanctification—that is, for holiness—that is only
because there is no longer any need for them. To be sure, a locus de operibus bonis
might smuggle its way back into the Lutheran Confessions, Orthodoxy, and Pietism;
and misplaced regard for holiness will always afflict Roman Catholics and the
Reformed. But for his part, Luther did not trouble himself with trying to fit together
something as pedestrian as progressive sanctification with the volcanic

3

“Luther’s approach to sanctification is unlike any other, sui generis.” So Robert Kolb and Charles
P. Arand, The Genius of Luther’s Theology: A Wittenberg Way of Thinking for the Contemporary
Church (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 125. Kolb and Arand acknowledge their dependence
upon Gerhard O. Forde, “Forensic Justification and the Christian Life: Triumph or Tragedy?” in A
More Radical Gospel: Essays on Eschatology, Authority, Atonement, and Ecumenism, ed. Mark C.
Mattes and Steven D. Paulson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004) and, behind him, Wilfried Joest,
Gesetz und Freiheit. Das Problem des tertius usus legis bei Luther und die neutestamentliche
Parainese (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968 [1951]).

3

Rechtfertigungslehre of genuine Reformation theology. Besides, at the end of the day
his heart just wasn’t in it, overflowing as it was with the liberating truth of the gospel.
“Be a sinner and sin boldly, but believe and rejoice in Christ more boldly still!” That’s
the real Luther, uncut, unapologetic, bold. No offhand remark, the pecca fortiter
possesses the force of an axiom in evangelical ethics,4 for it embodies the pith of the
Reformer’s insights into the boisterous freedom of the Christian sine lege et supra
legem.5

4

Luther to Melanchthon, 1 August 1521, #424, WA Br 2.372.82-93: Si gratiae praedicator es, gratiam
non fictam, sed veram praedica; si vera gratia est, verum, non fictum peccatum ferto. Deus non facit
salvos ficte peccatores. Esto peccator et pecca fortiter, sed fortius fide et gaude in Christo, qui victor
est peccati, mortis et mundi. Peccandum est, quamdiu hic sumus; vita haec non est habitatio iustitiae,
sed exspectamus, ait Petrus, coelos novos et terram novam, in quibus iustitia habitat. Sufficit, quod
agnovimus per divitias gloriae Dei agnum, qui tollit peccatum mundi; ab hoc non avellet nos
peccatum, etiamsi millies, millies uno die fornicemur aut occidamus. Putas, tam parvum esse pretium
redemptionis pro peccatis nostris factum in tanto ac tali agno? Ora fortiter, etiam fortissimus
peccator. In my mind, Pfarrer Martin’s counsel to scrupulous Master Philipp is an obvious case of a
skilled pastor using exaggeration to drive home a point, not unlike the rabbinic hyperbole we hear
in the Lord Jesus’ command to pluck out the lustful eye. Luther is not telling Melanchthon to go
ahead and begin fornicating and murdering with impunity in the name of the gospel any more than
Jesus intends his lustful disciples to actually gouge out their eyes. Rather, his ramped-up rhetoric is
intended to magnify the glory of the Lamb, who died precisely to take away the most grievous sins
imaginable. This is wise and indeed sober counsel for the kind of soul Melanchthon suffered from,
inclined as he was to think too much of his sin and too little of Christ’s redeeming blood. Certainly,
what was medicine for Melanchthon would become poison for a different kind of soul. The best
interpretation of the pecca fortiter remains Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s in his 1937 Nachfolge: “If we are to
understand this saying of Luther’s, everything depends on applying the distinction between the
data and the answer to a sum. If we make Luther’s formula a premise for our doctrine of grace, we
are conjuring up the specter of cheap grace. But Luther’s formula is meant to be taken, not as the
premise, but as the conclusion, the answer to the sum, the coping-stone, his very last word on the
subject. Taken as a premise, pecca fortiter acquires the character of an ethical principle, a principle
of grace to which the principle of pecca fortiter must correspond. That means the justification of
sin, and it turns Luther’s formula into its very opposite. For Luther ‘sin boldly’ could only be his
very last refuge, the consolation for one whose attempts to follow Christ had taught him that he
can never become sinless, who in his fear of sin despairs of the grace of God.” The Cost of
Discipleship, trans. R. H. Fuller (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 52.
5
WA Tr 1.204.30-205.3, LW 54.78 (#469, spring 1533): “Almost every night when I wake up, the
Devil is there and wants to dispute with me. I have come to this conclusion: when the argument
that the Christian is without the law and above the law doesn’t help, I instantly chase him away
with a fart. The rogue wants to dispute de iustitia although he is himself a knave, for he kicked God
out of heaven and crucified his Son.”
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This “Lutheran”—and at the same time oddly “Erasmian”—interpretation of
Luther as theologian of justification sans holiness makes for real ecumenical
convergence. Simul iustus et peccator, after all: this is the Luther known in the
churches, and this is the Luther assumed in much historical and most dogmatic
theology.6 To be sure, Catholics, Calvinists, Pietists, Anglicans, and Wesleyans side
with Erasmus’ criticisms and censure the lawless Luther for abandoning the pursuit of
holiness.7 Others, mainly though not exclusively Lutheran,8 hail the evangelical Luther
as God’s chosen instrument for the abolition of legalism hapax, indeed, as the angelic
bearer of the eternal gospel.9 But regardless of whether the great Reformer plays the
villain or the hero, the heretic or the saint, in one’s ecclesiastical history, most all tend
to agree with Alister McGrath’s high-profile judgments in The Oxford Encyclopedia of
the Reformation about Luther’s “aversion to the language of renewal and spiritual
growth,” his “suspicion of the concern for personal holiness,” and his “reluctance to
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Wolf-Dieter Hauschild, “Die Formel ‘Gerecht und Sünder zugleich’ als Element der
reformatorischen Rechtfertigungslehre – eine Entdeckung des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Theodor
Schneider and Gunther Wenz, eds., Gerecht und Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen
(Freiburg: Herder and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 303-349.
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doctrine of sanctification. Who has wrote more ably than Martin Luther on justification by faith
alone? And who was more ignorant of the doctrine of sanctification, or more confused in his
conceptions of it?” In the same vein, alas, is the 1947 report to the Archbishop of Canterbury,
written by the likes of Gregory Dix, T.S. Eliot, Austin Farrer, Michael Ramsey, and Lionel Thornton,
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Love: Inexhaustible Grace for an Exhausted World (Colorado Springs: David C. Cook, 2013), esp. 2245.
9
St. John’s vision of “an angel flying directly overhead, with an eternal gospel to proclaim to those
who dwell on earth” (Rev. 14:6) figured in hagiographic representations of Luther as early as 1522.
See Robert Kolb, Martin Luther as Prophet, Teacher, and Hero: Images of the Reformer, 1520—1620
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employ any form of terminology that suggested a ‘growth in holiness’ or ‘being made
righteous.’”10 To his great credit or his everlasting shame, holiness wasn’t Luther’s
strong point. On this point at least, Erasmus’ polemics hit the target.
The trouble with this “Lutheran” and “Erasmian” interpretation of Luther’s
theology as a theology indifferent to or even inimical towards holiness is that Martin
Luther himself was revolted by it. Here is his reply to Erasmus in de servo arbitrio:
I myself would be glad of information as to when I ever taught what you thus
freely and publicly lay to my charge. Who would be so crazy as to say that he
that is born of the Spirit is nothing but flesh? Manifestly, I myself separate
“flesh” and “spirit” as things opposed to each other, and I say, with the divine
oracle, that the man that is not born again through faith is flesh. But one that is
born again I no longer call flesh, except in respect of the relics of the flesh
which oppose the firstfruits of the Spirit that he has received. I do not think
that you meant to fabricate this charge with a view to raising prejudice against
me; otherwise, what could you accuse me of that would be more wicked?
Either you understand nothing of my position, or else you find yourself
unequal to matters of such magnitude.11
In this book, I have set myself to argue that much of twentieth-century Luther
research has misunderstood the Reformer’s position along just these “Erasmian” lines.
Luther was not, in fact, so “crazy”—or so wicked—as to say that those reborn of the
Spirit were nothing but flesh. Ego carnalis sum, totus caro, totaliter peccator, the
“simul,” and the like are vital but rhetorically-charged phrases that stand in need of
careful interpretation. Whatever exactly these phrases may mean—and determining
their real significance lies at the heart of my argument in this book—by Luther’s own
testimony in de servo arbitrio (!) they do not mean that the regenerate Christian nihil
nisi carnem esse. Indeed: to take his paradoxes to mean that the baptized saint is a
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Alister E. McGrath, “Sanctification,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation, vol. 3, ed.
Hans J. Hillerbrand (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 480-482, here 480f.
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WA 18.745.4-12, cf. Packer, 254-5.
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total and categorical sinner and the spiritual man nothing but flesh is to take Luther
not just for an erroneous but for an evil teacher in the Church. “What could you
accuse me of that would be more wicked?” In that case, Luther would be one of the
“ungodly people” in Jude’s prophecy, “who pervert the grace of our God into sensuality
and deny our only Master and Lord, Jesus Christ” (v. 4); or, as in St. Peter’s
admonition, one of the false teachers who “twist” Paul’s hard-to-understand writings
to their own destruction by the false doctrine of lawlessness cloaked as free grace (2
Pet. 3:15-17; cf. Rom. 3:5-8, 6:1-2). This is, of course, how Erasmus, John Tetzel, John
Eck, John Cochlaeus, and other Roman Catholic theologians interpreted Luther as a
man and as a theologian in the sixteenth century, and how Heinrich Denifle read him
in the early twentieth. But Luther will have nothing of it. He asserts that not he but
Erasmus is the anemic theologian of holiness: “What rebirth, renewal, regeneration,
and the whole business of the Spirit are, he does not see at all.”12 And to be bleary-eyed
in regards to matters as great as these is nothing to joke about. In 1539, engaged in
protracted controversy with John Agricola—arguably the first “radical Lutheran,” and
as such a theologian whose misadventures tended in just the opposite direction of
Erasmus’ moralism—the Christian “should either have the Holy Spirit and lead a new
life, or know that he has no Christ.”13
No Holy Spirit, no renewal of life, no Christ. What happened to pecca fortiter?
Is this a flash in the pan? Or a failure of nerve? No, in fact it is neither. In his sermons
12

WA 18.693.8-9, cf. Packer, 180. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for scholastic theologies which
affirm the integrity of fallen humanity’s natural faculties and eo ipso reduce nature-renovating
grace to an alien gift superadded on top of one’s intact capacities: Item, regenerationem et
innovationem spiritus premunt, ac velut externe auxilium illud alienum illi affingunt. WA 18.666.1011, Packer, 143. Farther on this point below in chapter 1.
13
WA 50.600.11-12, LW 41.115.

7

of the 1530s and 40s, Luther increasingly urged upon the largely impenitent flock at
Wittenberg the utter inseparability of redemption by the blood of Christ and renewal
through the work of the Holy Spirit, the latter manifested in lively faith, deep
repentance, and concrete acts of obedience and love. For example, taking up 1 Thess.
4:1-7 in March 1539, Luther proclaimed: “Know what Christ ought to mean for you,
who has set you free from death. He is called the Savior, who has set his people free
from sins for righteousness. Therefore, Christians should not remain in sins but be
intent on living in chastity and holiness (heiligkeit), with kindness toward the
neighbor.”14 He continued: “Christ did not come to set you free so that you could cheat
and steal. If you do, this preaching that Christ died for sinners, etc. does not help you.
People who do such things are like the heathen who do not know God.”15 Likewise:
“Christ died for those who let their sins be forgiven, cease committing them, and then
become daily more perfect. Otherwise this sweet preaching is a vain, lost word, since
those who hear it say, ‘Indeed! He is a comforting preacher,’ just so he doesn’t add: ‘If
you are in sins, you will be damned,’ etc.”16 Yes, you read that right. Redeemed
Christians must repent of their sins and become intent on holiness. Failing this, the
gospel is of no use to them. In the end they will be damned, for Christ only died for
the sins of those who seek daily increases in perfection. It would seem the old Prediger
is full of surprises! He certainly wasn’t pulling any punches.
In 1544, preaching Matt. 3:13-17 on Epiphany I, Luther reiterated essentially the
same doctrine in relation to holy baptism:
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When we preach, baptize, pray, the Son is there among us, the Father speaks,
the Holy Spirit hovers. There we learn to fear our Lord God. Why do you want
to lie? Do you not believe that Christ is with you, that the Holy Spirit, the
Father is present? “No, but because of him who so richly graces me and always
forgives sins.” If you believed this, you wouldn’t commit so many sins as
otherwise. But where does this license for sin come from? It’s because we don’t
believe that these things happen every day, that the Trinity is present. These
people who do not acknowledge their baptism are not Christians. They forget
baptism and wallow in sin like pigs. There are few who rightly value their
baptism and keep in mind that God is present. Therefore learn your holy
baptism and your glorious name [i.e., den Christlichen namen] in your own
person! We have been clothed with sheer grace and mercy, with freedom from
sins and an evil conscience—precious garments indeed. Do not lie down in
filth wearing such a garment! If you can protect your fine silk and velvet
garments, can you not do the same for your heavenly garment? If you do
otherwise, know that you have lost all grace and mercy.17
Die Antinomer have become die Sawtheologen! This, as students of Luther’s 1515
scholia on Rom. 4:7 are well aware, is a deep irony indeed.
Consider one last sermon: the 7 June 1545 exposition of 1 John 4:16-21. About six
weeks before he left town, decided he’d had enough of Wittenberg’s avaricious
burghers and promiscuous youth, and wrote Katie to pack up their things and prepare
to move18—“Just away, out of this Sodom! … I would rather eat the bread of a beggar
than torture and upset my poor old age and final days with the filth at Wittenberg”19—
Luther did his unambiguous best to admonish his sinful sheep about the great danger
they were in if they kept on sinning boldly while claiming to believe more boldly still:
Not all are Christians who boast faith. Christ has shed his blood. Sola fide,
without works, we are justified. “I believe this.” Ja, that’s hellfire! You’ve
learned the words you’ve heard the way mockingbirds learn to repeat things.
Where are the fruits showing that you believe? You remain in sins; you’re a
usurer and more. Surely Christ did not die and shed his blood for the sins that
17
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you are intent on committing continually, but so that he might destroy the
works of the devil (1 John 3:8). If you were a usurer, say like Zacchaeus: “I will
give half of my goods, and if I have defrauded anyone, I will restore it fourfold”
(Luke 19:8). The blood of Christ kills sin; it does not make it alive, which is the
work of the devil, who inflames the desire that makes human beings murderers
and adulterers. Christ did not die so that you might remain such a sinner, but
so that sin, having been slain, might be blotted out, and you might henceforth
love God and your neighbor. Faith takes away sins and puts them to death, so
that you might not live in them but in righteousness. Therefore, show by your
works and your fruits that there is faith in you. If not, the blood of Christ
doesn’t help. If you are a usurer, disobedient, negligent in your station, you’ll
see whether you believe. For faith is victorious, triumphant, conquering the
world (1 John 5:4). If you truly believed, you would not commit usury or
adultery; you would not be disobedient. Let each one think: “I became a
believer, washed in baptism with the blood of God’s Son, so that my sins might
be dead. I will not be disobedient and I will declare this with my deeds.”
Otherwise, give up the boast of being a believer. You know that you are a
disobedient son, an adulterer; do not boast about faith and the blood of Christ.
You’re the devil’s, the way you are going, etc. Ja, you’re putting your own self to
shame and Christ himself, you who say you believe, and you’re bringing the
name of the LORD into shame and yourself to eternal damnation. Love follows
true faith … If you will reform yourself, good; if not, then in truth I cannot
tolerate it, for you are acting contrary to the Word. Thus there must always be
rebuking, ja, not one daily sin is to be endured.20
Not one daily sin! Christ’s blood avails nothing for usurers, adulterers, and unruly
children, whose hard-hearted continuance in concrete, plain, visible sins shows that
they belong to the Devil not Christ and forebodes their eternal perdition in hell. This,
despite the fact that they are well-catechized, gnesio-Lutherans in their “faith”: solus
Christus, sola fide, etc.—hellfire! What are we to make of this? What has become of
the joyful freedom of a Christian man? Has the senescent Luther degenerated into a
curmudgeon—a kind of pious Walter Matthau, an old man grumpy about “the way the
girls were wearing their blouses cut so low and twirling their skirts at the dances”?21
Has he lost confidence in the power of the gospel? Pressured under mounting waves of

20
21

WA 49.783.21-784.16 [A], 786.13-15 [A], cf. LW 58.237-8, 240.
Haile, Luther, 317.

10

popular lawlessness, nascent capitalism, greedy noblemen, and theological
antinomianism, has the miles emeritus effectively admitted that the exuberant
evangelical faith of his youth was unrealistic, changed the course of his Reformation,
and altered his theology? Kierkegaard, enraged by the complacency of his age, once
claimed that if Luther had lived to see the decadence of nineteenth-century Denmark
he would have preached just the reverse of the doctrines he fought for in sixteenthcentury Saxony. Did the exasperated Reformer beat him to the punch in the 1540s?
Exhausted and disillusioned as he may well have been, in this book I argue that
the sort of practical admonitions and dire threats issued in these late sermons cohere
tightly with the mature Luther’s deepest theological convictions about the gospel (not
just the law!) and about the nature, necessity, source, means, course, and ends of
evangelical holiness. The argument proceeds in three steps. In the first Part of the
book, I exposit what I refer to as Luther’s “dogmatics of holiness” as he sets it forth in
the works of his maturity c. 1535—44. Chapter 1 sets the stage for my main object by
studying the doctrines of creation, fall, and promised redemption as the old Doctor
unfolds them in his 1535 lectures on Gen. 1-3. This is essential for understanding
Luther’s theology of holiness, for the Spirit’s gift of holiness in Jesus Christ consists
principally in the restoration of fallen and vitiated human creatures to the original or
“natural” perfections which the unfallen Adam and Eve once enjoyed in the
gladdening presence of God. This foundation laid, I proceed in chapter 2 to exposit
Luther’s creedal dogmatics of residual sin, grace in Jesus Christ, and the gift of renewal
by the Holy Spirit on the basis of four signal works from this period: the Smalcald
Articles (1536/7-8), the first, second, and third Disputations against the Antinomians
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(1537-8), On the Councils and the Church (1539), and the lectures on Genesis 24:1-4
(1540) and 42:7 (1544). This I take to be the first major contribution of this book: a
careful exposition of Luther’s enduringly “Augustinian” theology of holiness, set in
intimate relation to his doctrines of “sin” in the saints and of free grace and
justification through the blood and righteousness of Jesus Christ.
In Part II, I justify the adjective “Augustinian” through close readings of
passages from the 1515/16 Lectures on Romans that feature Luther’s appropriation of
extracts from the old Augustine’s works against Julian of Eclanum. I refer to the
definitively orthodox theologian whom Luther discovered in these late anti-“Pelagian”
works by the device, “the 420s Augustine,” in subtle but significant contrast to the
earlier and in comparison relatively underdeveloped “410s Augustine” who wrote
against Pelagius and Caelestius. (I will explain this distinction farther in its place
below.) In chapter 3, I study the emergence of the young Luther’s “Augustinian simul”
in the scholia on Rom. 7. Then in chapter 4, I examine the interrelation of residual
affective sin, renewal through healing grace, and the mercy of non-imputation as it
stands in the scholia on Rom. 4:7. The reversed order is important. To grasp Luther on
Rom. 4:7, one has first to understand the Augustinian doctrines of affective “sin” and
healing grace which he sets out in full in the course of exegeting Rom. 7. In practice,
Luther scholars who start out in Rom. 4 never quite make it to Rom. 7: the Totalaspekt
that imbues the former overwhelms the Partialaspekt of the latter; and then the latter,
together with the theology of embattled renewal it comprises, is dismissed as a
remnant of Luther’s Catholic past that doesn’t really fit with his radical new insights
into total sinfulness and relational justification. On the other hand, if we start with the
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Catholic/“Augustinian simul” in Rom. 7, the Protestant paradoxes of Rom. 4:7 (and Ps.
32!) fall nicely into place as well, without being swallowed up. This increased
explanatory power is enough, I think, to justify the reversal in order; but if you prefer,
read chapter 4 first and then come back to chapter 3—I take no offense. Regardless,
my aim in Part II is this: against the scholarly mainstream, which tends to assume the
“410s Augustine” as the standard by which to assess the adequacy of Luther’s
interpretation of the Church’s doctor of grace and love, I argue that the young
Augustinian read the old Augustine’s works contra Iulianum quite well, and
appropriated them fairly in the formation of his own dogmatics. This, I hope, will
prove to be the second major contribution of this book.
In Part III, the “big picture” comes into view as I put the pieces together and
assess how the mature, Augustinian, and evangelische dogmatics of sin, grace, and
holiness essayed in Part I relates to the embryonic, Augustinian, but not-yet-fullyevangelical dogmatics set forth in Part II.
I am thus undertaking a twofold venture: in one respect more “systematic” (in
the German sense current within Lutherforschung) vis-à-vis Luther’s mature
dogmatics of holiness, in another more “historical” and aiming to specify the nature,
extent, and depth of his dependence upon Augustine. Neither side of the argument
can stand apart from the other; but then, the soundness of this intuition is itself part
of what I need to demonstrate in the argument. I will unpack this twofold claim in
greater detail briefly here, but I’m afraid it will take a bit longer to prove in the rest of
this book.
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My twofold, systematic-and-historical argument about the nature of Luther’s
mature theology of sin, grace, and holiness comes to this:
(1.a) First, I argue that the mature Luther taught a robust doctrine of
progressive renewal into real holiness of life through the “gift” of the Holy Spirit. He
alternately names this spiritual reality sanctification, “justification” (Gerechtmachung),
the healing, renewal, or restoration of nature, new creation, the firstfruits of the Spirit,
deification, and so forth. But since the words (verba) Luther uses to describe the
reality of this gift vary freely, it is more useful to attend to its dogmatic substance
(res). This centers on the restoration of vitiated human nature in the saints to its
original perfections through Jesus Christ, the Last Adam, by the renewing operations
of his Spirit.22 Hence the title of this book: renovatio. For Luther, this Spirit-given
renewal of life in Christ is real, inchoate, progressive, and unfinished, i.e., it begins in
baptism/regeneration and advances in fits and starts over the course of the Christian
life. Perfection in holiness, or the complete restoration of Adam’s fallen children to
radiant and eternal life with God in Christ by the Spirit, is increasingly approximated
but never attained this side of eschatological glory.
22
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(1.b) But if I were to argue this thesis alone, the presentation of Luther’s
teaching about renewal and holiness of life would be incomplete to the point of
obscuring it entirely. For his doctrine of renewal by the Spirit’s “gift” (donum) cannot
be rightly grasped apart from its intimate correlation to the doctrine of the “grace”
(gratia) which is in Jesus Christ, on the one hand, and on the other to his teaching
about the nature of residual affective “sin” in the saints of God (the “simul”). When it
comes to calibrating these three doctrines, historical Luther-interpretations and
dogmatic theologies of all stripes both tend to err in opposite directions. Some so
emphasize the necessity of renewal in holiness that the humbling reality of enduring
sinfulness in the Christian is obscured, and with it the infinitely greater reality of grace
and forgiveness in Christ. Others so exaggerate the sinfulness of the Christian, and so
separate the grace of free justification from the gift of that repentance which leads to
life (Acts 11:18, 2 Tim. 2:25), that one would think St. Paul expected an affirmative reply
to his leading question, “Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound?” (Rom. 6:1).
St. Paul and the fishermen, in concert with the prophets of old, steer a middle course
between these imbalances, which seem to afflict the theologians of the Church in
every generation. For, on the one hand, in point of the evangelical facts God’s grace in
Christ is so infinitely perfect and strong that where our sin increases, his grace does
indeed abound all the more (Rom. 5:20). The saints of the Church are the first to
confess that real growth in holiness is ever attended by an increasing sense of utter
dependence upon the miracle of this free and strong grace:
In the evening of this life, I shall appear before You with empty hands, for I do
not ask you, Lord, to count my works. All our justice is blemished in your eyes.
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I wish, then, to be clothed in your own justice and to receive from your love the
eternal possession of yourself.23
But to confess this, as all true saints do, is not to deny the reality of the newness of life
which the Holy Spirit works within them. Buried with Christ in baptism into death,
and buried ever more till the final day they die,24 the saints are united with Christ in
his resurrection life (Rom. 6:3-11). Therefore, what remains of the first Adam’s sin in
their flesh need not reign over them as it once did: and, having been set free from sin’s
enslaving power, the saints of God present their members as slaves of righteousness
leading to sanctification. This is the good fruit they get, and its end is the free gift of
God in Christ Jesus our Lord—eternal life (Rom. 6:12-23). So far the Apostle: and I will
argue in this book that upon close inspection, Luther’s mature teaching appears to be
every bit as rich, multi-dimensional, nuanced, sober-minded, hopeful, and glad as St.
Paul’s, Peter’s, John’s, David’s, Isaiah’s, etc., and as such a faithful rendering of
apostolic doctrine. Taken together, the “systematic” exposition of these dogmatic
themes in Luther’s mature theology is the grand object of the first Part of this book.
(2) In the second place, I contend that the mature Reformer’s theology of sin,
grace, and holiness is rooted in the young Luther’s sound interpretation of the late
Augustine’s writings against Julian of Eclanum. In a real way, this is the heart of this
book’s historical-theological argument: if it fails, all the blood and vigor that might
otherwise pulsate through the rest of the book will be drained. In my judgment, the
mature Luther’s theology of holiness is unintelligible apart from a solid grasp of its

23

Thérèse of Lisieux, “Act of Offering,” in Story of a Soul, cited in the Catechism of the Catholic
Church § 2011.
24
Switchfoot, “Where I Belong,” #12 in the album Vice Verses (lower case people records/Atlantic,
2011).

16

roots in the theology of the old Augustine. But in the works of Luther’s maturity, those
roots are for the most part hidden beneath the surface, as are all good and strong roots
in ordine naturae. By contrast, in the 1510s the Augustinian roots of Luther’s theology
lie open to view in the form of explicit (and often quite long) quotations from the
newly produced 1506 Amerbach edition of Augustine’s works.25 In fact, if I may extend
the image of a tree and its roots it will, I think, prove fruitful here for explaining what
is going on in Luther’s dogmatics, exegesis, and spiritual teaching c. 1514—16.
Imagine an uprooted tree transplanted from a nursery and in process of being
replanted in new soil. The tree is Augustine’s mature theology of sin and grace; the
material nursery is the new edition of his works; the rather rich soil is composed of
Luther’s own spiritual life as a struggling monastic disciple of Jesus and as a fledgling
pastor and teacher in the Church. Brother Martin’s bitter Anfechtungen dug a deep
whole in his soul (cf. Ps. 40:6). The Psalter, John Staupitz, and the Bible—I suspect in
that order, but how would one prove this? or disprove it?—provided life-giving
streams of water for the sapling. But the theology of the “420s Augustine” that Luther
read out of the eighth volume of the Amerbach edition is itself the tree that will be
planted in the young Luther’s mind and heart and then nourished by these other
streams of influence for the rest of his life. Since the fragile plant is still being set in
the soil in the 1510s, the roots are exposed: and for this reason, the Romans lectures
especially are an indispensable resource for understanding not just the young, but the
mature Luther’s theology. For later on, when the young sapling has grown up into a
sturdy old “Lutheran” oak (cf. Isa. 61:3), its Augustinian roots are for the most part
25
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hidden from the eye. A surprisingly great number of readers, who apparently don’t
know much about trees, have inferred from their inability to see any roots that
Luther’s Reformation theology stands all on its own. Not so, I will argue, not so! For
much, much of the strength and vigor of the old oak lies in the depth and extent of its
subterranean roots.
This spade-work is the task of Part II. Then, having confirmed the permanent
impact of Luther’s readings in Augustine upon his mature “Augustinian” theology of
holiness at the start of Part III, I attend to a handful of major points of development in
Luther’s teaching from 1518 on. In this panoramic account of the discontinuities-incontinuity that characterize Luther’s theology over time, I aim to show how he carries
forward the old Augustine’s central insights about sin, grace, and renewal in holiness
in a fresh, creative, and “evangelical” way. This, too, is a primarily “historical”
endeavor, which assumes the argument about the mature Luther’s dogmatics in Part I
with an eye to making sound judgments about how the old Doctor’s theology draws
on, departs from, and advances the positions he arrived at in the mid 1510s under the
tutelage of the “420s Augustine.”
In sum: I shall argue that much of mainstream Luther scholarship (and
Lutheran theology) is quite wrong to think that the Church’s great doctor
iustificationis downplayed, denied, derided, or just plain ignored “the holiness without
which no one shall see the Lord” (Heb. 12:14). In fact, from the first inklings of his
“Augustinian turn” c. 1514 to his death in 1546, Luther held and taught a robust
theology of progressive renewal in holiness, which he carefully calibrated to the sober
reality of residual sin and the astonishing gospel of free grace in Jesus Christ. As it is
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set forth in the works that embody the Reformer’s most considered judgments, this
gospel-centered and deeply creedal theology of holiness is Augustinian and
evangelisch in equal parts. As such, it commands the admiration and regard—if not
the total assent; I for one disagree with Luther in a few major points—of those catholic
and evangelical Christians, pastors, and theologians who read the Bible, pray, think,
teach, preach, write, and confess in the tradition of the doctor gratiae.
Theology is, of course, a great and ongoing conversation; and it behooves those
of us who join in later on in the evening to listen quietly before we speak, and then,
when we dare open our own mouths, to give some indication that we have been
paying attention rather than boorishly suffering our friends’ company and impatiently
waiting our turn. In historical-theological scholarship, this means careful interaction
with the work of my teachers and peers, and good footnotes; and in what follows I will
try not to disappoint the reader on this score. I have found it more suitable to my aims
to engage the work of other scholars en route, rather than supplying a long and
tedious review of the massive body of research on the major themes of this book, e.g.:
Luther’s dogmatics of creation, sin, grace, justification, and holiness; the nature of his
debt to Augustine and, therefore, the nature of Augustine’s own theology; the nature
of his spirituality; the relative weight of patristic, monastic, scholastic,
Frömmigkeitstheologische, philosophical, and humanistic influences on his thought;
the development of the Reformer’s theology over the course of his career; the “young”
and the “old” Luther; und so weiter. That being said, I think it fitting to say a brief
word here about my major opponents in this contest, and also about a few my closest
friends.
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As for my opponents: at first, not having read too deeply in twentieth-century
Luther scholarship, I was aware of the “problem” of holiness in Luther’s theology
mainly by hearsay, through the ignorant prejudices of Anglican theologians and
church historians, and then the popular work of Gerhard Forde. (I first learned of the
pecca fortiter as a freshman at Wheaton College, when the rebellious coxswain of my
rowing shell used it to justify his plans for that Friday evening.) But a quick glance at
the footnotes shows the extent of his dependence on the 1951 book by Wilfried Joest,
Gesetz und Freiheit.26 Forde even copies out Joest’s little diagrams of the Christian
oscillating, tennis-ball-like, between total sinfulness, total righteousness, and back
again.27 Through a few pointers from Michael Root and David Yeago, I read Joest, and
much about modern Lutheran theology began to make sense. Any given paragraph in
Joest’s book may shift effortlessly from WA 56 to WA 39/1 and back again—a flaw by
no means limited to the Finns—but I attend mainly to his interpretation of a few
passages in the Disputations against the Antinomians which have set the tone for the
“total simul” and its ascendancy in the interpretation of Luther’s theology of holiness,
or lack thereof. In the presentation of Luther’s mature dogmatics, Joest is my main
opponent: but the reader is advised that in challenging Joest, I am challenging Forde
too.

26

Wilfried Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit. Das Problem des tertius usus legis bei Luther und die
neutestamentliche Parainese.
27
Gerhard Forde, “Eleventh Locus: Christian Life,” in Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, eds.,
Christian Dogmatics vol. 2. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 391-469, here pp. 432, 435, and 437. Cf.
Robert Kolb and Charles P. Arand, The Genius of Luther’s Theology, 123-6—but better on pp. 127-8.
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In regards to the Luther—Augustine problem, my main nemeses are Rudolf
Hermann28 and Leif Grane,29 and behind them both, Heinrich Denifle.30 In the
introduction to Part II, I argue that the very Lutheran Hermann’s Lutherdeutung is
really a mirror image of the ferociously anti-Lutheran interpretation produced by
Denifle in his applecart-upsetting Luther und Luthertum (1904-6). Denifle argued that
Luther misunderstood Augustine and wrongly appropriated the Catholic father to his
own devious ends, vainly claiming heilige Augustinus as patron for the self-serving
theology of invincible concupiscence and forensic justification which he built around
the “simul” in order to excuse his uncontrollable need for sex. Hermann agreed about
Luther’s mistaken reading of Augustine, but championed the new evangelical theology
which the Reformer’s auspicious misunderstanding of Augustine gave rise to. Grane’s
1975 Modus loquendi, a very good book in many respects, effectively picks up where
Hermann left off in 1930. In chapters 3 and 4, I cross swords with these formidable
scholars and argue just the reverse: Luther read Augustine—that is, the “420s
Augustine”—well, and appropriated him with real insight and skill. In arguing against
them and in favor of the “Augustinian” character of Luther’s theology, I see that I am
also arguing for the catholicity of the Reformation. This was not an explicit intention
of mine at the outset, but in the process of writing I have come to the conclusion that
it is inevitably bound up with the subject matter. Against Hermann and Grane’s
inflated assertions of evangelical novelty, and against Denifle’s mean-spirited
28

Rudolf Hermann, Luthers These “Gerecht und Sünder zugleich.” 2nd ed. (Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960).
29
Leif Grane, Modus Loquendi Theologicus: Luthers Kampf um die Erneuerung der Theologie (15151518) (Leiden: Brill, 1975).
30
Heinrich Denifle, Luther und Luthertum in der ersten Entwickelung, 2nd ed. (Mainz: von
Kirchheim & Co., 1904-6), esp. I/2.438-519.
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aspersions of uncatholic heresy, I argue for a deeply Augustinian and in this sense
“catholic” Luther, newly evangelical in some major respects to be sure, but
substantially and permanently traditional as well. In this vein, and as a segue toward
my comrades-in-arms, it is fitting at this point to mention the dean of German Luther
research, Oswald Bayer. Promissio has stood the test of time; forty-plus years after its
publication, it remains a brilliant and richly rewarding work.31 But I shall have to argue
here that its argument is flawed in some key respects. Perhaps it can be said that in
general Bayer is right in what he affirms and wrong in what he denies. The
promissio—fides—fiducia nexus was hugely important for the genesis of Reformation
theology; but it did not signal as clean a break from the Catholic past, especially in its
Augustinian and “mystical” streams, as Bayer has contended for. To say the same thing
a little cryptically: the evangelical Luther was a reformed Augustinian, a Finnish
Worttheologe.
As for my friends: I have already noted the significance of Root and Yeago for
my argument. In particular, Yeago’s 2004 essay on renewal and the “simul” helped
awaken me from my dogmatic slumbers, and brought Joest to my attention.32
Similarly, Root’s 2008 lecture at Concordia Seminary on “The Deconstruction of
Twentieth-Century Lutheranism” led me to Hermann.33 I gladly acknowledge their
work, and I hope they will find to their satisfaction the way this book advances
insights gleaned from them. In terms of actually digging into the substance of Luther’s
31

Oswald Bayer, Promissio: Geschichte der reformatorischen Wende in Luthers Theologie (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971).
32
David Yeago, “Martin Luther on Renewal and Sanctification: Simul Iustus et Peccator Revisited,”
in Sapere teologico e unita’ della fede. Studi in onore Prof. Jared Wicks (Rome: Gregorianum, 2004):
655-74.
33
“The Work of Christ and the Deconstruction of Twentieth-Century Lutheranism,” read at
Concordia Theological Seminary, Fort Wayne (17 January 2008), esp. pp. 7-8.
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teaching about sin, grace, justification, and holiness, for my money Julius Köstlin has
yet to be surpassed.34 In the nature of the case, my own insight into Luther’s
exposition of these great matters has been shaped especially by the work of my
teachers: Dr. David Steinmetz, in his books but perhaps especially in lectures and
seminars at Duke; Reinhard Hütter, mainly through a book written while he was still a
Lutheran,35 but also in seminars engaging Augustine, Luther, and Thomas Aquinas;
and Prof. Mickey Mattox, who kindly agreed to supervise a reading course on the
Reformer in spring 2011, suggested the theme of holiness as a focus for my research,
and has taught me much about Luther in the process of directing my Marquette
dissertation.36 Amongst the proliferating articles and books in Luther scholarship on
dogmatic, spiritual, and philosophical themes pertinent to my argument, in addition
to the above-mentioned theologians I have found the work of Regin Prenter,37 Erwin
Iserloh,38 Jarod Wicks,39 Simo Peura,40 Theodor Dieter,41 Volker Leppin,42 and Risto
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The Theology of Luther in its Historical Development and Inner Harmony, esp. II/4.
Reinhard Hütter, Bound to Be Free: Evangelical Catholic Engagements in Ecclesiology, Ethics, and
Ecumenism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 111-67.
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Mickey L. Mattox, “Defender of the Most Holy Matriarchs”: Martin Luther’s Interpretation of the
Women of Genesis in the Enarrationes in Genesin, 1535—45 (Leiden: Brill, 2003); “Martin Luther’s
Reception of Paul,” in R. Ward Holder, ed., A Companion to Paul in the Reformation (Leiden: Brill,
2009), 93-128; “From Lutheran to Catholic—Justification and Holiness,” in idem and A. G. Roeber,
Changing Churches: An Orthodox, Catholic, and Lutheran Theological Conversation (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2012), cp. 1.
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Regin Prenter, “Luthers Lehre von der Heiligung,” in Vilmos Vajta, ed. Lutherforschung heute:
Referate und Berichte des 1. Internationalen Lutherforschungskongresses, Aarhus, 18.-23. August 1956
(Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1958), 64-74. Note well that Prenter’s argument in this paper marks a
fundamental shift away from positions held in his earlier work (as a student of Hermann), Spiritus
Creator.
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Erwin Iserloh, “Gratia und Donum, Rechtfertigung und Heiligung nach Luthers Schrift ‘Wider
den Löwener Theologen Latomus’ (1521),” in Luise Abramowski und J. F. Gerhard Goeters, eds.,
Studien zur Geschichte und Theologie der Reformation. Festschrift für Ernst Bizer (Neukirchener
Verlag, 1969), 141-156.
39
Jarod Wicks, S.J. Luther’s Reform: Studies on Conversion and the Church (Mainz: von Zabern,
1992), esp. cp. 4, “Living and Praying as simul iustus et peccator: A Chapter in Luther’s Spiritual
Teaching,” and cp. 9, “HOLY SPIRIT—CHURCH—SANCTIFICATION: Insights from Luther’s
Instructions on the Faith.”
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Saarinen43 especially useful. In regards to Luther’s engagement with Augustine,
though he is influenced somewhat by Hermann, Adolf Hamel is more a friend than a
foe.44 Despite a few significant differences in method and interpretation, my argument
for the depth of Luther’s “Augustinianism” in the doctrines of sin, grace, and
justification finds a real (and more recent) ally in Dr. Jairzinho Lopes Pereira, a
Portuguese Roman Catholic theologian who followed up his master’s thesis on
Augustine at Coimbra with a thorough dissertation on Augustine and Luther written
under Saarinen at Helsinki.45 As for the theology, and moral psychology, of the great
African himself, I am especially indebted to my teacher at Marquette, Prof. Michel
René Barnes. If the argument of this book against my eminently worthy opponents
proves to be compelling, it is in large part because of such wise and learned friends as
these.
40

Simo Peura, “Die Teilhabe an Christus bei Luther,” in Simo Peura and Antti Raunio, eds., Luther
und Theosis: Vergöttlichung als Thema der abendländischen Theologie (Helsinki and Erlangen,
1990), 121-61; Mehr als ein Mensch? Die Vergöttlichung als Thema der Theologie Martin Luthers von
1513 bis 1519 (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1994); Simo Peura, “Christus als Gunst und Gabe. Luthers
Verständnis der Rechtfertigung als Herausforderung an den ökumenischen Dialog mit der
Römisch-katholischen Kirche,” in Oswald Bayer, Robert W. Jenson and Simo Knuuttila, eds.,
Caritas Dei. Beiträge zum Verständnis Luthers und der gegenwärtigen Ökumene. Festschrift für
Tuomo Mannermaa zum 60. Geburtstag (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, 1997), 340-363.
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Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006).
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Christoph Bultmann, Volker Leppin, and Andreas Lindner, eds., Luther und das monastische Erbe
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 269-90; idem, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation
Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. 23-6, 119-27.
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And now: to business.

PART I
LUTHER’S MATURE DOGMATICS OF
HOLINESS (1535—44)
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1. FIRST THINGS: CREATION, FALL, AND PROMISSIO IN THE 1535
LECTURES ON GENESIS 1-3
Werner Elert begins his widely influential 1931 Morphologie des Luthertums with a
chapter on the wrath of God under which sinful humanity stands condemned; he then
proceeds to an exposition of the Gospel relentlessly focused on forensic justification.46
In the same vein, Oswald Bayer’s recent Vergegenwärtigung of Luther’s theology
builds on the definition of theology’s proprium subiectum given by the Reformer in his
1532 lecture on Psalm 51, to wit: “The proper subject of theology is man guilty of sin
and condemned, and God the Justifier and Savior of man the sinner.” Luther adds,
with typical aplomb: “Whatever is asked or discussed in theology outside this subject,
is error and poison.”47 I will return to Luther and Ps. 51 in a moment. But must we not
admit at the outset that with claims as stark as these, Elert and Bayer are right to
regard the restoration of the lost human creature to real holiness of life as either an
absent or anemic theme in Luther’s evangelical theology?

46

Werner Elert, The Structure of Lutheranism. Vol. 1. The Theology and Philosophy of Life of
Lutheranism Especially in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Trans. Walter A. Hansen (St
Louis: Concordia, 1962 [= Morphologie des Luthertums, 1st edition 1931-32]).
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WA 40/2.328.17-20, LW 12.311. Oswald Bayer, Martin Luther’s Theology: A Contemporary
Interpretation. Trans. Thomas H. Trapp (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), chapter 2: “The Topic of
Theology: The Sinning Human Being and the Justifying God.” In the new Oxford Handbook of
Martin Luther’s Theology, two of the chapters begin with this same line from the lecture on Ps. 51:
Steven Paulson’s on “Luther’s Doctrine of God” and L’ubomír Batka’s on “Luther’s Teaching on Sin
and Evil.” See Robert Kolb, Irene Dingel, and L’ubomír Batka, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Martin
Luther’s Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 187 (Paulson) and 233 (Batka).
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My argument in this book is, in effect, a sustained “No” in response to this
question, and it is no accident that I begin my argument with Luther’s 1535-45 Lectures
on Genesis. For unlike much of modern Lutheranism, the mature Luther, the reader
and teacher of the biblical story, knew that he could not begin with the wrath of God
against the sinner for the simple reason that the Bible begins with the creation of Man
in the image of God, with God’s glad blessing upon Adam and Eve, and with his
pronouncement of their real goodness in his sight.48 As a theology that takes its point
of departure from das Urerlebnis of God’s wrath can only really terminate in the
removal of that wrath through judicial pardon and acquittal, so a theology that begins
with God’s joy in his creation of creatures able to share his divine life cannot arrive at
any real completion without passing through the proximate end of acquittal to the
final goal of restoration to life in communion with God.49 Elert cannot have a theology
of holiness, because he does not have a theology of creation. Luther has such a
theology, because he is basically a biblical theologian whose vision is shaped
definitively by the canonical and trinitarian drama of God’s generous creation ex
nihilo, of Adam’s fall into death through sin, of redemption in Jesus Christ, and of
restoration to newness of life—by the Spirit’s power—in sanctification and in the final
48

The great nineteenth-century Luther scholar, Julius Köstlin, saw this point very clearly. See his
The Theology of Luther in its Historical Development and Inner Harmony, trans. Charles E. Hay
(Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society, 1897), II/4, 217: It might be thought that a systematic
presentation of Luther’s thought should begin with sin and grace, law and Gospel. “But Luther’s
discussions of Law and Gospel rest upon the doctrines of God, of the nature and destiny of man, of
the general and original relation between the Creator and the creature, especially man, as objective
premises.” Recently David Yeago has urged essentially the same point; see esp. “Gnosticism,
Antinomianism, and Reformation Theology: Reflections on the Costs of a Construal,” Pro Ecclesia
2/1 (1993), 37-49.
49
For a concise dogmatic exposition of this claim, see John Webster, “Rector et iudex super omnia
genera doctrinarum? The Place of the Doctrine of Justification,” in Michael Weinrich and John P.
Burgess, eds., What is Justification About? Reformed Contributions to an Ecumenical Theme (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 35-56.
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glory of the resurrection.50 This is why, in his 1535 lecture on Gen. 1:26, Luther declares
that through the Gospel of Christ the imago dei lost through Adam’s sin is restored
(reparetur).51 It is also why, in the first of his Disputations against the antinomian
theology of John Agricola in December 1537, Luther teaches that the Old Testament
saints looked expectantly to the promised Messiah who would “restore everything
(omnia restiturum) that had been lost in Adam.”52 For in the New Testament, the
promised Christ is given in order that he might “restore (restituat) the corrupt nature
to its integrity,” that the “disease” (morbus) infecting Adam’s nature may be “healed”
(medeatur).53
Does this mean that Luther, the theologian of creation’s restoration and
healing in Christ, indulges in subject matters outside the bounds of genuine theology,
indeed, in error and poison? One might at this point seek to ameliorate Luther’s
famous remarks on the subject of theology in the Ps. 51 lecture by appealing to his
penchant for exaggeration, but I prefer to leave its full force intact through a twofold
explanation. My interpretation has to do first with the Psalm lecture itself, but it also
touches more generally on the character of Luther’s theology.
In the first place, the sentence that immediately follows Luther’s rejection of
anything outside the theology of sin and justification as error and poison reads as
follows: “All Scripture points to this, that God commends His kindness to us and in his
Son restores (restituat) to righteousness and life the nature (naturam) that has fallen
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His insistence on this point is a real strength of Ulrich Asendorf’s book, Lectura in Biblia. Luthers
Genesisvorlesung (1535-1545) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), e.g., 11, 13, 19, 69-73.
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into sin and condemnation.”54 He then explains that the “life” in question in not the
mere biological existence of man as animal; rather, “the issue here is the future and
eternal life; the God who justifies, repairs (reparante), and makes alive; and man, who
fell from righteousness and life into sin and eternal death.”55 The great kindness of
God does not stop at pardoning man’s guilt through the atonement that is in Christ
crucified; God restores, repairs, and gives life to the nature that fell in Adam through
his incarnate and risen Son. Luther adds: “Whoever follows this aim in reading the
Holy Scriptures will read holy things fruitfully.”56 So it is only through violence to
Luther’s own lecture text that a theology of restoration would be excluded from what
he means by the God who justifies the sinner. And in fact, shortly later in his
comments on Ps. 51:2, Luther explains that the “grace” (gratia) that brings peace with
God through trust in his mercy in Christ, on the one hand, and the “conferring
(donatio) of the Holy Spirit with his gifts (donis)” on the other, are “the two parts of
justification (duae partes iustificationis).”57 Here we have Luther’s robust theology of
grace and gift, reconciliation with God in Christ and renewal by the Spirit’s
operation—to which I will return often in this study; but for now, as we prepare to
enter into his lectures on Genesis, I note simply that Luther sees this basically creedal
theology as vital to reading the “holy things” of Holy Scripture fruitfully.
In the second place, I would like to strengthen Bayer’s own hand by
incorporating his emphasis on the sinful man and the justifying God—or Elert’s, or
Robert Kolb’s, theology of law and Gospel—within this overarching theology of grace
54
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and gift, of creation redeemed and restored. We must keep in mind that Luther is
lecturing on Ps. 51, whose Sitz im Leben is David’s plea for mercy after his fall into
grievous sin (cf. 2 Sam. 11-12). This is a basically pastoral setting, and Luther the pastor
is concerned above all to bring comfort and consolation to the grieving penitent, the
bruised reed and faintly burning wick of Isa. 42:3.58 In this specific situation, where the
pastor (or the brother with the Word) discerns in wisdom that the sinner’s heart is
broken and contrite and then speaks the Gospel of free mercy, grace, and forgiveness
through Jesus Christ—that is, when the pastor rightly handles the Word of truth by
rightly dividing law and Gospel (2 Tim. 2:15)—then the only proper subject of true and
evangelical theology really is the depth-reality of sin and the infinitely greater reality
of gracious justification in Christ. But as I have shown from this very lecture, this is by
no means the only moment in which the pastor/theologian is called to speak, nor are
the twin truths of God’s judgment against sin and his free justification of the sinner
the only truths he is called to understand and to teach in the Church of Jesus Christ.
The Lectures on Genesis are uniquely suited to demonstrate this claim, because
the biblical text itself summons Luther to present the whole scope of the Holy
Trinity’s creative, redemptive, and restorative work in grace and in glory. The bulk of
the present study explores how the living God brings about the restoration of his lost
and vitiated human creatures through the Gospel, that is, the renewal of the sinner
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into real holiness of life. To grasp this evangelical restoration in the fullness with
which Luther presents it, we must first attend to what was lost, how it was lost, and
what ensued for mankind after this loss. Hence the four subsections of this chapter
examine, primarily on the basis of Luther’s 1535 lectures on Gen. 1-3, the Reformer’s
teaching regarding: 1. the original, unfallen state of human nature as God’s creature
fashioned in his image for his glory; 2. the nature of the trial established by God’s good
command at Gen. 2:16-7, and of the temptation suffered by Eve and Adam at the
Serpent’s malicious instigation in Gen. 3—to which, alas, they succumbed; 3. the
consequent undoing of human nature by sin and death; 4. and finally, the first
proclamation of the saving Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Serpent-Crusher, who restores
what was lost in Eden through his grace and gift.

1. What are people for?
We begin with the nature of the “image of God.” In what did it consist? Simo Peura,
David Yeago, and Antti Raunio have drawn attention to the presence of theosis-related
themes in Luther’s lectures on Gen. 1-2.59 Lecturing on Gen. 1:26, for example, Luther
proposes in thesis-like fashion: “My understanding of the image of God is this: that
Adam had it in his being and that he not only knew God and believed that he was
good, but that he also lived a life that was wholly divine (vitam vixerit plane
divinam).”60 Thus Luther imagines God addressing Adam: “This is my Image, by which
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you are living just as God lives (qua vivitis, sicut Deus vivit).”61 Still handling Gen. 1:26,
the Reformer states that Adam and Eve were “completely engulfed (absorpti essent
toti) by the goodness and righteousness of God.”62 This mystical-sounding claim finds
an echo in a more theoretical comment at Gen. 2:18, to the effect that “man is a
singular creature and pertains to participation in divinity and immortality
(participationem divinitatis et immortalitatis).”63 Though Luther does not draw the
causal connection explicitly, the inference is clear enough: because of his creaturely
participation in (or absorption by) God’s divinity, goodness, righteousness, and life,
Adam leads a divine life. This participatory sharing in the divine life is what it means
for Adam to exist in the image of God. In a moment, I will explain how the “divine life”
of the imago very much comprises goodness and righteousness. But in the few cases
where Luther speaks overtly in the terminology of deification, the concrete shape of
Adam and Eve’s divine life is more typically characterized by utter fearlessness and
astonishing joy: image-bearing Eve is not intimidated by the Serpent, and deified
Adam is “drunk with joy toward God” (ebrius esset leticia erga Deum).64
Yet Luther’s bold declarations regarding Adam’s deifying participation in the
divine life are as striking as they are sparse. More often, he explains the meaning of
the “image” in terms of Adam’s psychological (and physiological) faculties in their
original perfections. I will argue this point as a friendly corrective of an overemphasis
on theosis in Luther’s protological anthropology, but the claim also cuts against the
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grain of much inherited wisdom in (mainly German) Luther scholarship. Bernhard
Lohse, drawing on the work of Bengt Hägglund, Wilfried Joest, and Gerhard Ebeling,
asserts that Luther’s non-psychological, “personal” interpretation of the image
constitutes a real point of contrast between the Reformer and scholastic tradition.65 In
a similar way, Bayer’s presentation of Luther on the image—which leans heavily on
Ebeling’s work on the 1536 Disputatio de homine—denies that it refers to “a quality
that resides within the human being in and of himself,” and is rather a “relational
term.”66 In point of fact, the university lecturer on Genesis 1-2 is keenly interested in
Adam’s psychological faculties. Their perfections engage Luther’s admiration and
fascination, and stand at the center of his teaching regarding the character of the
divine image.67
This holds true with respect to the vital, “thesis-like” proposition I quoted
above: “Therefore my understanding of the image of God is this: that Adam had it in
his being (in sua substantia) and that he not only knew God and believed that he was
65
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good, but that he also lived a wholly divine life.”68 Pace Bayer and other nonontological interpretations, Luther expressly states that Adam had the image “in his
being.” But at the same time, the substantial reality of Adam’s “divine life” should not
be set against his knowing God and believing his goodness. Rather, this knowing and
believing God provides the spiritual means sine qua non of Adam’s deifying
communion—his intimate relationship—with God. He leads a divine life because he
knows and trusts the divine goodness that absorbs and intoxicates him. He is able to
know and trust God thus, because he possesses, as the unique and originally perfect
kind of creature God made him to be, the faculties requisite to this form of spiritual
action.
Consider the context of Luther’s “thesis.” The eye-catching theosis-proposition
is embedded within two virtually identical discussions of the perfections of Adam’s
natural faculties (potentiae). In the preceding paragraphs, Luther explains: “His
intellect (intellectus) was the clearest, his memory (memoria) was the best, and his will
(voluntas) the most straightforward—all in the most beautiful tranquility of mind,
without any fear of death and without any anxiety.” (Note that Adam’s “divine”
fearlessness is here attributed to the perfections of his psychological faculties.) In
addition, the image includes Adam’s physical perfections: his eyes sharper than an
eagle’s, his strength greater than a lion’s, his ability to eat enhanced beyond our
imagination, and his sex-life unembarrassed, ordered, and pure. Luther concludes,
marveling: “No one can picture how much better nature (natura) was then than it is
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now.”69 Luther’s ergo imaginem Dei sic intelligo and “theosis”-proposition follow on
the heels of this conclusion. In other words, the comprehensive perfection of Adam’s
nature as originally created is summarized in the claim that he led a wholly divine life.
The succeeding paragraphs confirm this interpretation and take it one step
further. There was in Adam, Luther states, “an enlightened reason, a true knowledge
of God, and a most sincere desire to love God and his neighbor.”70 In other words, he
both possessed rightly functioning mental and volitional faculties and actually
exercised these faculties as they were created to be used, knowing and loving both
God and his neighbor. Here lies the real solution to Luther’s qualified rejection of a
simple identification of the image with psychological faculties per se.71 Raunio takes
this to involve a shift away from scholasticism toward “theosis” in much the same way
Lohse, Bayer, and others envision a shift to existential personalism. In fact what
Luther is saying is that the image consists not merely in man’s (or an angel’s or
demon’s) possession of psychological faculties, but in the complete vivification of such
faculties as they engage in their proper actions toward their appointed end, namely,
knowing, trusting, and loving union with God. But to return to the text under
discussion: Luther continues to add “other lesser but exceedingly important gifts” that
pertain to Adam and Eve’s dominion over the other creatures which parallel the
physical perfections treated above. “If all these qualities are combined, do they not
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make up and produce the sort of man in whom you would think that the image of God
shines (relucere)?”72
In a later comment on Gen. 5:1 (“On the day which God created man, He made
him according to the similitude of God”), Luther again stresses that Adam’s likeness to
God consisted not in the mere possession of psychological faculties, but in their right
use ordered to intimate fellowship with God. He had “such” (talem) a will and
intellect, as by them to understand God and to will what God wills.73 Thus created “in
this perfect image and similitude of God,” had Adam not fallen “he would have lived
forever, happy and full of joy, and he would have had a will that was glad (hilarem)
and ready to obey God.”74 These are the very qualities that mark Adam’s “divine life.”
Adam is full of joy and leads a divine life because his psychological faculties are fully
engaged in the actions for which God created them: at Gen. 1:26, knowing God and
believing that he is good; here at Gen. 5:1, understanding God and willing what he
wills with a readiness prompted by gladness and joy.
The “image,” then, does consist in the divine life that was Adam’s by nature,
given him to enjoy through participation in God. But Luther’s predominant interest
vis-à-vis the image seems to lie elsewhere, namely, in the perfection of Adam’s
faculties that made him naturally capax of the gift of participation in God’s goodness,
divinity, righteousness and life. Knowing God, believing his goodness, loving him with
pure affection: these are descriptions of the fully vivified psychological faculties that
explain—from Adam’s side—the original, “natural” reality of his deifying and
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gladdening communion with God. By them Adam and Eve “acknowledged God’s
goodness, rejoiced in God, and felt safe in God’s goodness,”75 knowing, believing, and
receiving the gift of God’s own “rejoicing and exulting” over them.76 Nor should
Luther’s interest in Adam’s physical perfections be entirely ignored, for in them the
fullness of Adam’s divine life as bearer of God’s image “shines” forth through his body
into the rest of the material cosmos. Though on the whole, with the tradition at large,
Luther is most concerned with the spiritual character of the image. It is precisely and
only because Adam and Eve are endowed by their Maker with these specific natural
perfections that they are able to engage in those spiritual actions by which they relate
to God in deifying union with God. Thus my proposed interpretation of Luther on the
image harvests the strengths of the German and the Finnish positions while correcting
their weaknesses.
Luther’s discussions of Adam’s “original righteousness” parallel his
explanations of the image closely. From what I can gather, he never quite equates the
two concepts outright, but he defines them in the same way. Lecturing on Gen. 2:17,
for example, Luther states that Adam’s originalem iusticiam meant that he “was
righteous, truthful, and upright, not only in body but especially in soul, that he knew
God, that he obeyed God with utmost joy (summa voluptate), and that he understood
the works of God even without prompting.”77 He adds: “Adam loved God and his
works with an excellent and pure affection,” lived amongst the other creatures in
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fearless peace, and had an obedient body untroubled by evil affections or lust.78 In his
comments on Gen. 3:7 the same themes arise, though now with a polemically-charged
emphasis on original righteousness as Adam’s “nature.”79 Luther states that it was
“Adam’s nature to love God, to believe God, to know God, etc.”80 As it is the eye’s
nature to see, “so it was the nature of reason and will in Adam to know God, to trust
God, and to fear God.”81 These claims about the nature of original righteousness again
reflect the Reformer’s predominant interest in the perfection of Adam’s psychological
faculties, fully alive and naturally realized in those actions which united him to God.
Reason and will unreservedly engaged in the actions of knowing, trusting, and loving
God was “truly natural”82 for unfallen Adam, connaturalis,83 de essentia hominis,84 de
natura hominis.85 And this knowing, trusting, and loving God was at once Adam’s
original righteousness and the wellspring of his divine life of fearless, God-drunken
joy.
Thus if I have tried to reduce an emphasis on theosis to its proper proportions,
I fully agree with Yeago’s claim that when Luther defines man’s originally righteous
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natura, he does so “in terms of the acts that are its telos, its fulfillment.”86 As I have
repeatedly noted, Luther is not disinterested in the nature of the human person
formally considered. To the contrary, he extensively discusses the natural perfections
of Adam’s psychological and physiological faculties and includes them within his
definition of the divine image. But the Reformer is not ultimately concerned with
philosophical questions about the nature of the will or the intellect. Indeed, in his
lecture on Gen. 1:2 he admits candidly that “we lack knowledge about our very selves”
and despite endless investigations remain “incapable of giving a definition of the
soul.”87 The real object of Luther’s concern is man’s nature considered in terms of its
finality, viz., not the quid sint of his faculties but the purpose for which those faculties
were created by God. Putting aside consideration of Adam’s physical perfections and
their penultimate ends, it is clear that his mind and heart are by nature ordered to—
and engaged in—the unitive acts of knowing, trusting, and loving God. By these
actions, Adam received and maintained the originally-given gift of deifying
communion with God: the gift that constituted his being in the divine image.88
Knowing, loving, and trusting God, he is “completely absorbed” by his goodness,89
radiant with his divine life, perfect in righteousness, drunk with joy toward God,
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and—vitally—“content with God’s grace” (contentus gratia Dei).90 This is Adam’s
nature considered with respect to the end for which he was created, to wit:
experiencing by trust and love the gladdening and deifying gift of communion, as a
creature, with God.
As a creature—and therefore, as a worshipper. For Adam to know, trust, and
love his Maker is for Adam to offer him the “inner and spiritual worship” that is his
Maker’s due.91 To this point, we have seen Luther describe man’s end in terms of
psychological faculties fully alive and engaged in those actions that unite him in glad
communion with God. Luther also teaches that the chief end of man is to glorify God
and enjoy him forever. In his lecture on Gen. 2:3, he twice states this explicitly: the
institution of the Sabbath day proves “that man was especially created for the
knowledge and worship of God” and that his nature “was chiefly created for
acknowledging and glorifying God (ad agnitionem et glorificationem Dei).”92 In
Luther’s teleological anthropology these two definitions of man’s nature, the
psychological and the doxological, coincide. Adam was made to worship his Maker
will all his heart, soul, mind and strength, and in worshipping him to be glad. That is
what people are ultimately for, to be worshippers who live and flourish in adoration of
the true God whose gracious goodness absorbs and intoxicates them with thankful
delight.
The coincidence of the psychological and the doxological accounts of man’s
nature surfaces tellingly in Luther’s comments on Gen. 2:21-22. He states that Plato,
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Cicero, and other philosophers of “the better sort” are able to grasp something of the
formal and material causes of human nature. That is, they have some genuine insight
into human psychology, biology, etc. But they are in the dark as to the efficient and
final causes of mankind, “about who did the creating and for what purpose he
created.” And “without the knowledge of these two causes, our wisdom does not differ
much from that of the beasts.”93 Plato might know something useful about the
intellect as such, but he does not know what the intellect is ultimately for. Thus he
will use it the way beasts use their eyes and ears, namely, to achieve a modicum of
self-preservation in this world only to perish in the end, having failed to attain his true
end or even to understand what it is. It is perhaps not an accident that Luther singles
out Platonism as an example of an earth-bound philosophy; the irony merely sharpens
the point he is making as a Worttheologe. For the Word alone reveals that the true
God—the Holy Trinity—is both “the efficient and the final cause”94 of all things,
including his “beautiful creature,” Man.95 The Word reveals that God made Adam as
his creature ex nihilo, out of the sheer goodness and generosity of his heart. He then
appointed Adam to the end of manifesting his Maker’s glory, and to do so in that
intimate fellowship with himself which—from Adam’s side—took the form of adoring,
thankful, praising knowledge, trust, and love. This was Adam’s “purpose” (finem), the
chief end for which he was made. He “was created to worship God and to live eternally
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with God.”96 And according to Luther, as we should by now expect, Adam’s principalis
finis—to worship and live with God—is what it means that Adam was created
according to God’s likeness.97 His natural existence as righteous bearer of the divine
image (the psychological account of man’s end) consisted in his being a worshipper of
the true God (the doxological), who lived to glorify God and to enjoy him forever,
“drunk with joy toward God.”98
Thanksgiving stands at the center of the glorificatio Dei that is Adam’s chief
end: he existed to give God thanks. In his exposition of the first article of the Creed in
the 1529 Small Catechism, Luther first celebrates the munificence of God’s gifts in
creation, all lavished upon us “out of pure, fatherly, and divine goodness and mercy,”
then culminates by insisting on our responsibility to respond to such a generous God
with thanksgiving and praise.99 In his meditation on this text, Bayer declares
categorically: “This describes everything about the human being that needs to be
stated.”100 I believe my argument thus far has shown both the way in which Bayer
exaggerates and the deeper sense in which he is absolutely correct. Luther’s lectures
on Gen. 1-2 demonstrate that for the Reformer—much to the surprise, I suppose, of
Dom Gregory Dix—Adam is, originally as well as ultimately and finally, homo
eucharisticus. Having received everything from God as the sheer gift of his generosity,
goodness, and love, including his life in communion with such a God, Adam was to
rejoice and give God thanks from the bottom of his heart. Thus when Luther imagines

96

WA 42.98.12-3, LW 1.131.
WA 42.98.20-2, LW 1.131.
98
WA 42.71.31-2, LW 1.94.
99
Book of Concord, 354-5.
100
Bayer, Luther’s Theology, 173.
97

42

Eden’s “church” in his comments on Gen. 2:16-17, this great and glad thanksgiving
holds the central place in the liturgy. Adam would have “praised God and lauded him”
for the gift of dominion over the creatures, using something like Ps. 148 or 149 as “a
kind of liturgy for such thanksgiving (quandam formam talis gratiarum actionis).” And
in his preaching, Adam would have extolled “the greatest gift,” viz., that he was
created according to God’s likeness.101 The only thing God wanted from Adam, the
telos to which he appointed him, was that he praise, thank, rejoice in, and obey his
Maker.102 But this form of eucharistic existence is the very gift that God himself had
lavished upon Adam freely by virtue of his creation in the divine image. To be fully
human meant that Adam was an adoring, thankful worshipper and lover of the God
who made him by grace, who knew this generous God in the intimate communion of
faith and love, and gave him glory. This, in Luther’s reckoning, is what people are
defined in terms of what people are for.
2.1. Gen. 2:16-17—Adam and Eve’s Trial
To grasp what happened in the temptation and fall of Adam and Eve in Gen. 3, I need
first to explain the trial of their obedience established by God’s command at Gen. 2:1617 to refrain, on pain of death, from eating from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good
and Evil.
The trial is inextricably bound up with Luther’s contention that “Adam had a
twofold life: animal and immortal (duplicem vitam: animalem et immortalem).”103
What does this mean? At one level, it reflects what I exposited above regarding the
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perfections of Adam’s physiological and psychological faculties. Like the beasts in
“physical life and bodily activity,” comments Luther at Gen. 2:17, Adam also possessed
the “intellectual power (potentiam intellectivam)” which is in the angels, such that
“man is an animal compounded from the nature of beasts and of angels (sit homo
mixtum animal ex brutali et angelica natura).”104 This idea of the human as an
“amphibious” creature, situated between beasts and angels in the order of being and
partaking of each of their natures, has a long pedigree in the theological and
philosophical tradition and is certainly not new to Luther.105 But it is not the primary
meaning Luther normally intends when he speaks of Adam’s duplex vita.
The second, and more predominant, meaning Luther attaches to the higher
kind of “life” possessed by Adam refers not so much to his capacity for certain types of
actions but to his eschatological destiny. His life is twofold, because unlike the beasts
and like the angels he is destined for immortality. “We were created for a more
excellent life (ad excellentiorem vitam) in the future than this physical life would have
been, even if our nature had remained unimpaired,”106 not merely an animal but a
“spiritual life (spiritualem vitam)”107 and “an immortal one.”108 That the two meanings
converge is plain from what I have argued above regarding the nature of the divine
image, to wit: that Adam’s psychological constitution, his ability to think, to know, to
love, rendered him not only a rational but a “spiritual” animal, indeed an “angelical
104
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animal” (animal ex… angelica natura) naturally capable of, and engaged in, living a life
of radiant joy in communion with God.
Nevertheless, Luther envisions a very definite eschatological reserve in Eden.
Adam did have a twofold life, animal and immortal, but the latter “was not yet clearly
(plane) revealed, but only in hope (in spe).”109 In some sense, deified and God-drunken
Adam already enjoyed the spiritual, immortal, angelic, and eternal life that
complemented and surpassed his animal nature. But in another sense, he had yet to
arrive at this fullness of the life his nature was created to enjoy, save only in hope.110
God so constituted his nature that even in Paradise he had not yet arrived at his
eschatological goal. Here, Luther stands on firm traditional ground—and tells his
students so:
Therefore the Doctores have put it well: Even if Adam had not fallen through
his sin, still, after the appointed number of saints had been attained, God
would have translated them from this animal life to the spiritual life. Adam was
not to live without food, drink, and procreation. But at a predetermined time,
after the number of saints had become full, these activities would have come to
an end; and Adam, together with his descendants, would have been translated
to the eternal and spiritual life.111
“Doctores” indicates Luther’s awareness that in speaking of Adam’s hypothetical
translatio he is passing on a common Augustinian inheritance.112 He alludes to it
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repeatedly in his lectures on Genesis 1-3.113 Adam was not created for an exclusively
earthly destiny. Rather, by nature the bearer of the divine image—who in some real
sense partook of divinity and immortality—was ordained by God to share in a higher,
more glorious, more “spiritual” kind of life than the one he already enjoyed. If we press
further for clarification of what Luther has in mind here, the most helpful insight
comes in a comment on Gen. 2:7, which St. Paul quotes at 1 Cor. 15:45. Reading Paul’s
First and Last Adam theology back into Eden in a very traditional way, Luther
speculates that the translatio would have transformed Adam as first created—the
“living soul” (animam viventem), still partly animal in nature and needing to eat, drink,
beget, etc.—into a “quickening spirit” (spiritum vivificantem) who would have lived
without any animal qualities “from within,” in direct dependence on God alone. But,
Luther is careful to add, this hypothetically translated Adam “would still have flesh
and bones and would not be a mere spirit (non sit mere spiritus) like the angels” (cf.
Luke 24:39). In other words, he would have experienced “resurrection,” as the Last
Adam did, but without the preceding death.114
But the translation into resurrection-like spiritual life depended upon the
condition of Adam and Eve’s obedience to God’s command at Gen. 2:16-17: “The LORD
God commanded the man, saying, ‘You may surely eat of every tree of the garden, but
of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil you shall not eat, for in the day that
113
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you eat of it you shall surely die.” Why did God establish this command? In his
comment on Gen. 2:13-14, Luther explains that this “Law was given to Adam that he
might have an outward form of worship by which to show his obedience and gratitude
toward God.”115 There are, I think, two points to tease out here for the purpose of my
argument.
First, drawing insights from Cargill Thompson, Raunio, and Yeago and building
upon my own exposition of Adam’s nature, it is vital to grasp that the verbum
externum issued in Gen. 2:16-17 depends upon a deeper and more basic “law,” to which
the command not to eat from the Tree gives expression. This is the law of Adam’s
nature: the lex naturae originally identical with his creation in the perfection of the
divine image.116 This point becomes clearer when Luther’s stance on the relation
between revealed and natural law post lapsum is correlated with the protological
anthropology examined thus far in this chapter. In the second Disputation against the
Antinomians (12 Jan. 1538), for example, Luther explains that fallen, vitiated humans
need the help of the revealed law “so that we might be reminded of what we were
before Adam’s fall (quid ante lapsum Adae fuerimus).”117 In the Decalogue, the Lord of
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WA 42.77.19-20, LW 1.101.
On natural law in Luther, see Antti Raunio, “Natural Law and Faith: The Forgotten Foundations
of Ethics in Luther’s Theology,” in Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, eds., Union with Christ:
The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 96-124; idem, Summe des
Christlichen Lebens: Die ‘Goldene Regel’ als Gesetz der Liebe in der Theologie Martin Luthers von
1510-1527 (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2001), 294-319. I am not here so interested in Raunio’s insights
regarding the Golden Rule, as with his contention that in Luther’s thought natural law is grounded
ontologically in human nature as God’s creature. Despite his differences with Cargill Thompson,
this aligns Raunio with the former’s argument for the persistence of a broadly Thomistic natural
law tradition within sixteenth-century Reformation theology, flowering in Richard Hooker but
already there in Luther and other magisterial reformers. See W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, The
Political Thought of Martin Luther (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1984), 79.
117
WA 39/1.454.13-14, ATD, 105. Cf. WA 39/1.539.7-15, ATD, 172: God’s laws, summed in the
Decalogue, “are written on the hearts of all men, unless they are utterly unnatural, ever since the
birth or creation of man, together with Adam.” But because man is so deeply fallen, “God was
116
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redemption does not issue arbitrary commands unrelated to his work in creation.
Rather, he reminds sinful, wounded, forgetful, and thus less than entirely “natural”
humans of what being fully alive as his creaturely image-bearers actually entails. But
innocent Adam needed no such reminder, because he knew, trusted, loved, obeyed,
and worshipped God by nature. This is what he was made for, and this is what he did
from the first moment of his creation, because this is who he was as the protological
Man. God did not “demand” this knowing, trusting, obeying, etc. from Adam as if from
an unwilling subject. He gave it to Adam when he gave him his being as this sort of
creature, for whom to exist is to exist as one who knows and trusts the divine
goodness that absorbs and intoxicates him, freely obeys such a trustworthy God, and
responds to God’s bounty with glad shouts of thanksgiving from the deepness of his
heart.118
Thus, as Luther states in the first Disputation against the Antinomians (18 Dec.
1537), “When Adam was first created, the law was for him not only something possible,
but even something enjoyable. He rendered the obedience the law required with all
this will and with gladness of heart, and did so perfectly.”119 For Adam is and does—by
the “grace” of his creation in God’s image—what the law of his nature requires him to
forced again to give us a limit, lest we forgot totally his law, so that we would at least remember
who we were before (qui iam antea fuerimus).”
118
Here I lean heavily on Yeago’s comments on Gen. 2:16-7, e.g., “Martin Luther on Grace, Law and
Moral Life,” 176: “The commandment is not given to Adam so that he might become a lover of God
by keeping it; Adam already is a lover of God… The commandment was given, rather, in order to
allow Adam’s love for God to take form in an historically concrete way of life.” Yeago’s analysis is
profoundly insightful, but he does not connect the “positive” lex regarding the Tree to the lex
naturae (which he nonetheless describes in concrete terms).
119
WA 39/1.364.10-3, ATD, 36. Cf. Andreas H. Wöhle, Luthers Freude an Gottes Gesetz: Eine
historische Quellenstudie zur Oszillation des Gesetzesbegriffes Martin Luthers im Licht seiner
alttestamentlichen Predigten (Frankfurt am Main: Haag und Herchen, 1998), 29-30, 63, 183. Wöhle
argues for an organic connection between the joyfulness of Adam’s law-keeping and its restoration
in Christ by the Spirit—to which we will return in the next chapter.
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be and do. Adam worships, obeys, and thanks God from the bottom of his glad heart,
because God has given this to him as the gift of his being. This is the real keeping of
the law, the law of his nature. That is why, for Luther, the subsequent command not
to eat from the Tree revealed not (as we might think) the severity, but “the goodness
of God,” who had created Adam’s nature with all its perfections.120 It is also why
Adam’s own preaching on the “text” of the command would have “extolled the
greatest gift” of his creation in the divine image.121 In short: “For Adam, this Word was
Gospel and Law,”122 for the purpose of Gen. 2:16-17 was to give external expression to
the inner spiritual reality of total obedience, complete faith and love, and thankful joy
that Adam simply was—prior to Gen. 2:16-17—by virtue of the free gift of his creation
in God’s image. The command gave occasion to reveal the glory of God’s beautiful gift,
as the spiritual reality of the divine image took shape—as Yeago puts it—in the
historical concreteness of Adam’s life.123
This brings me to my second point. When God tests Adam by establishing the
command about the Tree, his real object runs much deeper than testing external
obedience to a positive law. What is ultimately at stake is whether or not Adam will
continue willingly in his uniquely human form of creatureliness, gladly conforming to
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WA 42.80.1-10, LW 1.105.
WA 42.80.27-8, LW 1.106.
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WA 42.110.18-9, LW 1.146.
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This account of lex naturae vis-à-vis Gen. 2:16-17 has some affinity with Paul Althaus’ distinction
between a post-fall “law” and an original “command” that is essentially God’s loving summons to
“participation in his life in the partnership of love.” See his short book, The Divine Command: A
New Perspective on Law and Gospel. Trans. Franklin Sherman (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), 8-11,
here 8. Cf. Ernst Sartorius, The Doctrine of Divine Love: Or, Outlines of the Moral Theology of the
Evangelical Church. Trans. Sophia Taylor (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1884), 68: Gen. 2:16-7 “keeps
man in an orderly fellowship of love with God and His fellow-men, it admonishes him to abide in
love. The hearts of the first human beings were filled with their first love, and need therefore no
impelling and prescribing law, though they did require a regulative and restrictive one.”
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the law of his nature.124 Will he be “content” with the grace of his creation in the image
of God?125 Will it be enough for him to be and remain a creature, however glorious?
That is, will he continue to worship God—to humbly receive his entire being as a gift,
and thus to give God glory by giving him thanks? To obey the command and to wait
patiently for the translatio that such obedience would “merit”—this would mean for
Adam to abide in the “grace” of the trust, love, and thankfulness that made him
originally righteous and/or fully human and united him, as this kind of creature, in
communion with the God who rejoiced over him. To break God’s command would, by
contrast, mean for Adam to refuse and renounce the gift of his being as a creature in
God’s image; to be dissatisfied with this grace and gift; to hold back thanksgiving; to
turn his trust, love, and obedience in upon himself; to break off communion with God;
to attempt to cease existing as a creature, and to become his own god. In sum: would
Adam remain in the submission and thankfulness proper to his existence as a
dependent creature, refraining from the Tree and thus manifesting his “obedience and
gratitude to God”?126 Or would he destroy himself by entering upon a path of
autonomy, rebellion, and ingratitude, that is, of idolatry?127
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At civ. dei 12.22 (CCSL 48.380, Bett. 502), Augustine directly ties the “amphibious” nature of
humanity to the test of obedience established at Gen. 2:16-17 and thus to Adam’s original
eschatological vocation: “God created man’s nature as a kind of mean between angels and beasts, so
that if he submitted to his Creator, as to his true sovereign Lord, and observed his instructions with
dutiful obedience, he should pass over into the fellowship of the angels, attaining an immortality of
endless felicity, without an intervening death; but if he used his free will in arrogance and
disobedience, and thus offended God, his Lord, he should live like beasts, under sentence of death,
should be the slave of his desires, and destined after death for eternal punishment.”
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WA 42.47.11, cf. LW 1.63.
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Cf. civ. dei 13.20 (CCSL 48.403, Bett. 534): God forbade them to eat from the Tree of Knowledge,
“not because it was evil in itself, but in order to emphasize the good of pure and simple obedience
which is the great virtue of a rational creature (magna uirtus est rationalis creaturae) set under the
authority of the Lord his creator.”
127
On this entire theme, cf. Augustine’s exegesis of Gen. 17:1-21 at civ. dei 16.26-7 (Bett., 686-9). He
first explains in cp. 26 that the covenant God entered into with Abraham is the new covenant of
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2.2. Temptation and Fall
When the Devil tempts Adam and Eve in Gen. 3, he sets to work obfuscating and
eventually snatching away the concrete commandment of Gen. 2:16-17.128 But his real

grace, albeit hidden within the old: hic apertiora promissa sunt de uocatione gentium in Isaac, id est
in filio promissionis, quo significatur gratia, non natura; thus omnia resonant nouitatem, et in
testamento uetere odumbratur nouum (CCSL 48.530-1). Augustine then argues in cp. 27 that the
reason an infant left uncircumcised past the eighth day will be “cut off from his people” for having
broken the “covenant” (Gen. 17:14) is that the child broke the original covenant that God
established with Adam at Gen. 2:17, when he was in Adam originally: … etiam paruuli, non secundum
suae uitae proprietatem sed secundum communem generis humani originem, omnes in illo uno
testamentum Dei dissipauerunt, in quo omnes peccauerunt (CCSL 48.531). Again: Testamentum
autem primum, quod factum est ad hominem primum, profecto illud est: Qua die ederitis, morte
moriemini (CCSL 48.532). Key texts for Augustine in cp. 27 are Rom. 5:12, Hos. 6:7, and Ecclus. 14:17.
From what I can gather, Luther does not pick up on this Augustinian insight into the scriptural
theology of the covenant in so many words; later on, Reformed theologians will develop it
thoroughly in their contrast between the covenant of works and the covenant of grace (a
representative and lucid example of which can be found in Thomas Watson’s A Body of Divinity §
3.1 and 4.1). That said, Luther’s teachings regarding the command at Gen. 2:16-17 as an expression of
the natural law of Adam’s being, the contingent nature of Adam’s translatio on the condition that
he keep this law, and the material identity of the lex naturae with the lex Moysi, all have a deep
dogmatic affinity with both Augustine’s insights and with the subsequent developments in the
Reformed tradition. The same holds true in regard to the new covenant of grace in Christ; indeed,
the very notion of God’s “promise” of grace in the gospel is perhaps indistinguishable from the
biblical concept of the covenant. And the mature Luther everywhere aims to divide rightly between
the conditional promises of the law and the free promise of grace in the gospel. See, e.g., the 1542
lecture on Gen. 32:3-5, WA 44.71.26-31, 72.5-12, LW 6.96-7: vera est distinctio, duplices esse
promissiones, conditionales et simplices sine conditione: ut legis promissio est conditionalis: Gratiae
promissio est simplex. Quando merces promittitur laboranti, conditio est, quae requirit operam et
officium pactum, quod si non sequitur, merces non solvitur. Sed tales promissiones missas faciamus,
quando est cum Deo agendum in conscientia. Mox enim confundemur: Si quidem ne uno quidem
momento in officio sumus… Promissio autem gratiae haec est, quando dicit Deus: Tu nihil fecisti,
nihil es meritus. Sed hoc tibi faciam, et donabo ex sola misericordia. Tales promissiones sunt
gratuitae, et his similes fuerunt Patriarcharum Abrahae, Isaac, Iacob promissiones. Sicut supra
recitatae sunt. ‘Adorabunt te filii matris tuae’, item ‘vino et oleo stabilivi te’, ibi nulla conditio accedit:
Si feceris hoc, eris benedictus. Sed habes hanc promissionem et benedictionem gratuito. Moses
quidem plenus est promissionum legalium: sed Patriarchae simplices et gratuitas habent. I confess, it
is hard for me to see how this differs in substance from the later Reformed distinction between the
foedus operum and the foedus gratiae. Cf. Robert Letham, “The Foedus Operum: Some Factors
Accounting for Its Development,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 14/4 (Winter 1983): 457-67.
Letham’s learned article pinpoints the roots of later Reformed covenant theology in Zwingli and
Bullinger; it is, I think, especially intriguing that he locates a crucial developmental step in
Zacharias Ursinus’ union of Bullinger’s covenant theology with Melanchthon’s teaching on natural
law (p. 463). As I have merely suggested here, I think these roots run much deeper in the
Augustinian tradition, passing from Augustine himself through the late medieval Ockhamist
pactum-theology to Luther and thence to various sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Swiss,
German, Scottish, English, and Dutch theologians.
128
The classic old study on the Devil in Luther’s thought is by Hans-Martin Barth, Der Teufel und
Jesus in der Theologie Martin Luthers (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967). But Barth’s
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aim is to attack and destroy Adam himself, whose inner life of trust, love, obedience,
and adoration found expression in this external form of obedience and worship. The
two are deeply interwoven, the former being the Devil’s tactical means of achieving
the latter end. To unpack this farther, Luther’s remarks near the start of his lecture on
Gen. 3:1 merit quoting at length:
This was the greatest (summam) and severest of all temptations; for the
serpent directs his attack at God’s good will and makes it its business to prove
from the prohibition of the tree that God’s will toward man is not good (Dei
voluntatem erga hominem non esse bonam). Therefore it launches its attack
against the very image of God and the most excellent powers in the
uncorrupted nature. The highest form of worship itself, which God has
ordained, it tries to destroy. It is therefore vain for us to discuss this or that sin.
Eve is simply urged on to all sins, since she is being urged on against the Word
and the good will of God (voluntatem Dei bonam).129
God’s sheer goodness established Adam and Eve in his image, and they rejoiced in
God and led a “divine life” of fearless joy because they knew and trusted the goodness
of his will toward them. If God is for us, who can be against? They walked about in
Eden “resplendent with innocence and original righteousness, and abounding in peace

intentional disavowal of interest in the continuity of Luther’s demonology with the tradition,
combined with his thesis that Luther’s thought on the Devil must always be conceived
christologically, hampers his researches. Heiko Oberman’s biography rightly emphasizes Luther’s
own self-understanding as a man armed with the bare Word of God and engaged in apocalyptic
struggle against all the powers of hell. Luther: Man between God and the Devil, trans. Eileen
Walliser-Schwarzbart (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). At the 2012 Luther Congress in
Helsinki, Scott Hendrix spoke of the Devil as Luther’s “symbol for evil.” That may sell at Princeton,
but an Oberman student should know better than to modernize Luther in this way. For Luther, the
Devil was very much a real personal being, the ancient foe who lied to, poisoned, and killed Adam
and Eve—as his lectures on Gen. 3 put beyond any shadow of doubt. Cf. Volker Leppin’s fine little
article, “Luther on the Devil,” Seminary Ridge Review 16/2 (Spring 2014): 13-27. Inter alia, Leppin
tells of how Luther wrangled with Andreas Osiander over the reality of poltergeists in 1540. Luther
had often heard the devil clattering with something; and he’d sometimes seen the devil coming at
him in the form of a black sow or dog—once, the dog even crept into his bed, and Luther had to
cast him out the window! “This seems not to be the Luther of our confirmation classes or our
seminary lessons—but it is a real Luther, one who sees the devil as more than an enlightened idea
of evil” (p. 16, citing WA Tr 5.87f, #5358b).
129
WA 42.110.8-15, LW 1.146.
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of mind because of their trust in God, who was so kind” to them.130 Now in this highest
temptation, the Devil seeks to destroy the divine image—and the “highest form of
worship” that it represented—by calling into question the legitimacy of Adam and
Eve’s trust in God’s goodness. But this is the very divine goodness that absorbed and
intoxicated them and, in so doing, made them the fully living, fearless, glad, Godadoring creatures they originally were. Thus the deceptive attack on the concrete
command of Gen. 2:16-17 is an all-out assault on Adam’s natura, because it is nothing
less than an invidious slandering of the character of God.
So the Devil asks: “How can such ill will (tanta invidia) come upon Him that
He does not want you to be wise?”131 “How can He, who favored you with all these
things, be so envious (invidere) as to withhold from you the fruits of this one single
tree, which are so delightful and lovely?”132 God is not good after all. His purpose for
his human creatures cannot be trusted. Rather than an occasion to worship God and
give him thanks for his goodness, the Devil’s rhetoric makes the command to refrain
from the Tree proof of the restrictedness of God’s kindness toward Adam and Eve.
God must be holding back from them, hoarding some good that a more generous
Maker would have lavished upon them. In this way, Satan “stirs up resentment
(invidiam)” against God, and Eve first doubts and then begins to hate this God “as
though He bore them too little good will.”133 In short: by the Devil’s false logic, the
command proves that God’s will toward man is not good, but invidious, resentful,
grasping, tight-fisted; Adam and Eve’s trust in God’s goodness is broken, as they take
130
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the Devil at his word but reject the Word of God; and thus their hearts, filled with the
devil’s “poison,”134 begin to reflect the image of the “new god” that is “invented by
Satan for men without their even being aware of it.”135 They become as truly invidious
as the Devil’s aspersions have falsely made their Maker out to be. The divine image,
constituted at its core by trust in the divine goodness, is thus shattered by unbelief.
Eve and Adam obey the Devil instead of God and fall from the true worship they were
made for into the lie of idolatry.136
It is worth exploring Luther’s claim, in his lecture on Gen. 1:26, that through
the fall “the image of the devil (imago Diaboli)” was stamped upon us.137 Later in the
lectures the Reformer twice refers back to Gen. 3:5 and the Devil’s promise of selfdeification contained within it.138 At Gen. 3:22, Luther states: when Adam “wanted to
become like God (similis Deo), he became like the devil (similis Diabolo).”139 Likewise
at Gen. 4:9: “In Paradise we wanted to become like God, and through our sin we
became like the Devil.”140 What does it mean that Adam and Eve—who already bore
the divine image—strove to become like God only to be stamped with the likeness of
the Devil? Luther’s position becomes clearer when we focus on invidia in the context
of the story of the Devil’s own fall. When discussing this scripturally-reticent point of
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doctrine, Luther often refers coyly to Bernard of Clairvaux’s theory as a good
possibility.141 His comment on Gen. 1:6 is a good example. Referring to Isa. 14:13—a key
text for Bernard142—and to Bernard himself, Luther explains that Lucifer was given a
glimpse of God’s plan to raise mankind higher than the angels through the
Incarnation of the Son, and that “this proud spirit envied (invidisse) mankind this
happiness and fell.”143 Thus the devil and his angels “despised the Word or Son of God
and wanted to place themselves above him (se ei voluerunt anteferre),” and fell as a
result of this pride (ex superbia).144 Lecturing on Gen. 2:17, Luther again refers to Isa. 14
and restates the elements of Bernard’s theory: “Some proud angels, displeased by the
humility (humilitate) of the Son of God, wanted to place themselves above Him
(voluerunt se ei praeferre).”145 Notably in this connection, Luther introduces the idea
that the Devil exalted himself over all “on account of certain gifts (ob certa dona).”146
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Franz Posset points to Bernard’s Sermo in adventu domini 1, Homelium super ‘Missus est’ in
laudibus virginis matris 3, and Sermo super Cantica canticorum 17 as possible sources for Luther. His
study examines Luther-texts appealing to Bernard that range from 1526 to 1542, including two
further places in the Genesis Lectures: WA 43.319, LW 4.256 (on Gen. 24:5-7); WA 43.580-1, LW
5.220-1 (on Gen. 28:12-14). See Posset’s Pater Bernhardus: Martin Luther and Bernard of Clairvaux
(Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1999), 285-89. On Bernard’s general influence upon
Luther’s thought, see also Theo Bell, Divus Bernhardus: Bernhard von Clairvaux in Martin Luthers
Schriften (Mainz: Philip von Zabern, 1993).
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The basically Augustinian picture that emerges is bleak and centers around the
overlapping concepts of envy, pride, vainglory, and idolatry.147 The Devil prided
himself on account of his superior dona, envied the future glory of the inferior human
nature, and vaunted himself against the humility of God’s Son in a vain and futile
attempt to take God’s place as the true and sole possessor of glory. When he enticed
Eve and Adam into rebellion with the promise that they would become “like God”
(Gen. 3:5), he was luring them to imitate the path he had already chosen. And they
took the bait, preferring to be “like God” in the Devil’s proud, invidious, and idolatrous
fashion rather than thankfully abide in the divine image they had received as creatures
deified by grace. “They put themselves in the place of God the Creator and forget that
they are creatures,” laments Luther in a later lecture on Gen. 17:10-11; “Oh the wretched
divinity (miseram divinitatem) with which Satan surrounded us through sin.”148 Thus
despite the low profile of superbia in Luther’s lectures on Gen. 3,149 his repeated
references to invidia and his claim that Adam and Eve forfeited the divine image in
order to gain the Devil’s likeness argue strongly that the Reformer’s faith/unbelief
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On the Devil’s fall, see civ. dei 11.13-15, where Augustine makes appeal to Isa. 14 and Ezek. 28:13f;
and 14.2-3, where in the course of arguing that embodiment does not cause vice and sin, Augustine
exegetes Gal. 5:19-21 and argues that the Devil’s envy and pride make him an especially fleshly being
on St. Paul’s account (CCSL 48.417, Bett. 551): Etsi enim diabolus fornicator uel ebriosus uel si quid
huius modi mali est, quod ad carnis pertinet uoluptates, non potest dici, cum sit etiam talium
peccatorum suasor et instigator occultus: est tamen maxime superbus atque inuidus. On Adam’s fall,
see esp. 14.13 (CCSL 48.434-5, Bett. 571-2): Adam became proud, “and what is pride except a longing
for a perverse kind of exaltation?” (Quid est autem superbia nisi peruersae celsitudinis appetitus?)
Thus when he performed the first and decisive turn to the self in human history, this turning “to
abandon God and to exist in himself (esse in semet ipso)” was nothing but “the lifting up of one’s
heart in worship to one’s self, which is the essence of pride (sursum cor habere… ad se ipsum, quod
est superbiae).”
148
WA 42.647.20-25, LW 3.139.
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centered-account—favored by Bayer, e.g.150—incorporates an underlying
Augustinian/Bernardine focus on pride and vainglory as the root causes of Adam and
Eve’s devilish, self-deifying treachery. I shall return to this theme in the next section.
First, I need to outline the aesthetics of temptation (tentatio/Anfechtung) that
Luther first lays down in his lecture on Gen. 3 and then returns to throughout the
duration of the Lectures.151 Though there is nothing beautiful about temptation,
Luther does believe that a deep and instructive correspondence obtains between the
paradigmatic temptation in Eden and all subsequent varieties of the experience. One
way or another, all temptation leads man away from faith in the Word and true
worship of God into unbelief, self-reliance, and idolatry. “The source of all sin truly is
unbelief and doubt and abandonment of the Word,” on account of which the world
remains in idolatry, denies God’s truth, and invents new gods instead.152 “The root and
source of sin is unbelief and turning away from God (aversio a Deo).”153 “The pattern
(formam) of all temptations of Satan is the same, namely, that he first puts faith to
trial and draws away from the Word.”154 Thus Eve’s and Adam’s temptation is the
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Bayer, Luther’s Theology, 177-80.
Cf. Horst Beintker, Die Überwindung der Anfechtung bei Luther. Eine Studie zu seiner Theologie
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caput omnium tentationum.155 For the purposes of my argument, this must be further
specified in two respects:
(1) In temptation, one grows dissatisfied with the Word: non contenti verbo.156
Whether in the form of law or Gospel, command or gift, in temptation the Word no
longer seems to be enough. In the primal temptation, as the Deceiver gyrates
rhetorically to gain every point he can against Adam and Eve, they actually experience
both types of discontentment. The “Word” of God’s grace and good will toward them,
which established them in his image, no longer felt trustworthy once demonic invidia
suggested itself to their imaginations. On the other hand, the Devil convinced Eve that
the threatened punishment of death was not really credible either.157
(2) There is in Luther’s theology such a thing as a “high” temptation more
arduous than those of lower degree.158 It is “stupid to think” that Eve was inflamed
with sensual desire for the fruit. Such a temptation might suit a lesser person, but not
this awe-inspiring, holy, unfallen Eve. No, she had to grapple with the tentatio
summa,159 “the greatest (summa) and the most bitter of all temptations.”160 It was “far
more serious and more dangerous” than mere enticement to fornication, adultery, and
other sins of the flesh; indeed, it was a temptation “proper to the Church and to the
Saints (propria Ecclesiae et Sanctorum).”161 As we saw earlier, this is the temptation to
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believe that God had turned against her, to believe that his will toward her was no
longer good or had never truly been so at all.162 This is the summa tentatio that, in
Luther’s theology, is uniquely propria to the “Saints” of God in his Church.
In Luther’s mature and “mystical” theology of sanctification through the holy
cross, these two factors converge: amidst the summa tentatio, when Satan (or in
Jacob’s case at the Jabbok: God himself appearing in “hostile form”) beats and
pummels the tempted saint with the terrifyingly compelling lie that God has turned
against him, the saint responds by defiantly refusing to let go of the truth of the
Promise, the Gospel. Even in the highest and most bitter temptation, he resolves to
remain contentus verbo and triumphs by in fact clinging to this Word alone. In light of
Luther’s lectures on Gen. 3, it is clear that to endure this temptation and to triumph by
faith in the Word is to reverse the tragedy of Eden. There is a definite fittingness to
this state of things: the very temptation by which Adam fell becomes the graced
means of his wounded nature’s restoration in the saints. For the saint is precisely the
one who has learned, through faith’s struggle in temptation, “to take hold of the Word
and let sink and fall what falls (lassen sincken und fallen, was da felt).”163 He does what
Adam out to have done: crush the serpent with his foot and say, “Shut up! The Lord’s
command was different.”164 In such an heroic and holy person, vitiated nature is in
process of being restored to the original righteousness that had characterized unfallen
humanity deified by grace, that is to say, to wholehearted trust in the merciful
goodness of God.
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3. Human nature vitiated by original sin
Adam and Eve’s rebellion at the Devil’s bidding brings about their own ruination: the
corruption of their nature and the just sentence of condemnation to death and hell. I
will return to the problem of God’s wrath in the final section of this chapter. Now our
concern is the corruptio naturae that comes about through original sin. In Luther’s
teaching, original sin does not entail the complete obliteration of nature. Rather, it
means an undoing of the perfections of mankind’s unfallen nature as described above:
“For the name ‘original sin’ is correctly given to whatever was lost of those conditions
which Adam enjoyed while his nature was still unimpaired.”165 It should therefore
come as no surprise that Luther describes original sin in terms of the vitiation of our
psychological faculties and their permanent teleological frustration.166 Because of this
fatal wounding of their nature, humans are now cut off from the possibility of
attaining their true end in knowing, trusting, loving, and adoring communion with
God. The “darkened” intellect no longer knows God and his beneficent will. Lacking
true knowledge of God, the human will is “extraordinarily depraved” such that we no
longer trust God’s mercy or fear his severity, but simply disregard his will and Word
entirely and give way to the desires and impulses of the flesh. Fearless joy has given
way to a troubled, unquiet conscience prone either to despair before God’s judgment
or else to concoct foolish defenses.167 Importantly, because of these “vices of the soul”
(animi vicia)—which Luther sums as unbelief, ignorance of God, despair, hate, and
blasphemy—sin-wounded humans “do not everywhere and always give thanks to
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God.”168 The “madness of lust” (furor libidinis), that is concupiscence regarded in a
primarily sexual sense, is indeed some part of original sin; but these “spiritual
disasters” (calamitates spirituales) are of greater importance by far.169 Because of them,
fallen Adam has lost his original righteousness, lost the divine image, and forfeited his
divine life of fearless joy in communion with God.170 Having made himself his own
end, his own god, he is now doomed to the futility of failing to achieve his true
purpose in eucharistic adoration and glorification of God. His fists closed tightly, he
no longer gives God thanks.
For the purposes of my argument, I will pass over a more comprehensive study
of original sin’s global effects and focus more narrowly on its manifestation as the
abuse of “gifts” (dona).171 At times Luther simply identifies the misuse of gifts as
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original sin, as in his lecture on Gen. 6:1: “This is the original sin, that we have neither
the knowledge nor the capability to use God’s great and excellent gifts properly.”172 At
Gen. 6:4, he states similarly that “we in the corrupt state of our nature cannot make
use of even the slightest gift without haughtiness.”173 This is the real core of the subtle
spiritual idolatry that arises precisely in the saints, and is thus the focal point of their
progressive sanctification by the cross.
What did the proper use of gifts look like before the fall? In his lecture on Gen.
3:1, Luther states that Adam’s good and righteous will pleased, obeyed, and trusted in
God, “making use” (utens) of the creatures “with an expression of thanks.”174 This
passing remark fits snuggly with Luther’s entire teleological/doxological anthropology.
Adam too is a creature, and he must “use” himself rightly by offering the gift of his
being back to God—rejoicing—in the sacrifice of thanksgiving and praise. He exists to
glorify God and enjoy him forever. This right eucharistic use, and its corollary in the
true enjoyment of God, has been lost with the fall. Or better, the fall happened when
Adam stopped offering this sacrifice, and turned away from God toward himself as his
own chief end: fieri igitur deum est peccatum originale.175 In imitation of the Devil,
Adam and Eve did so in the act of the first sin itself; and the most gifted of the filii
Adae are shaped to the core of their being by the same propensity to self-adoration
and the refusal of thanksgiving to God that this vain-glorying entails. Thus fallen
mankind, like the Devil, boasts in “gifts” (whether this-worldly or spiritual) as if they
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were self-generated possessions and forgets or mocks God, the Giver of every good
and perfect gift (Jas. 1:17).
Luther is quite explicit about this point. Lecturing, for example, on Gen. 4:2
and the story of Cain and Abel, he first reiterates Bernard’s theory of Satan’s fall
sketched above,176 then applies the same principle to the human race: “This is the
universal bane of our nature, that we are not satisfied with God’s gifts (non contenti
sumus donis Dei) but abuse them and thus mock their Donor and Creator.”177 This
mocking of God takes its most subtle form in the vainglory inherent within the
autonomous pursuit of virtue: when one arrogates to himself the glory of his
goodness, it is “rank idolatry” and a “despoiling of the Godhead (spolium
divinitatis).”178 But alas, this insidious vanity, idolatry, and robbery of God’s glory
creeps into the hearts of the graced. For all false boasting is false worship, a “glorying”
(gloriari) in the creature instead of the Creator—even and indeed especially the false
boasting in spiritual dona that by definition can only take place in the heart of a saint.
There are deep Augustinian roots here,179 which surface in Luther’s plaintive
ruminations on this theme in his 1515/16 scholion on Romans 5:4. The young professor
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refers directly to Peter Lombard’s Sententiae Book I dist. 1, which establishes
Augustine’s uti/frui distinction as the organizing principle of his entire theology.180
Luther takes it up into his theology of sin and his mysticism of sanctification through
tribulatio. Sin runs deep, and the uti/frui distinction serves Luther as a heuristic tool
to penetrate its depths. In this context appears the famous claim that the wound of
original sin has left our nature “so deeply curved in upon itself” (tam profunda est in
seipsam incurva).181 What does this mean? Fallen humans do not stop at turning God’s
finest gifts back upon themselves for their own enjoyment; we even use God himself
(ipso Deo vtatur) to achieve this end.182 If we do seek God, we do so for our own sakes,
using him to enjoy ourselves. Everything is upside down: God exists to serve my own
ego, and I “serve” him only insofar as he serves me, and gratifies my own desires. I am
a mercenary, serving God for pay; I am the kind of child who “loves” his parents only
in order to get out of them what he wants. God is in the creature’s place, and the sinful
creature has exalted himself to God’s throne. As Lohse aptly puts it, “sin is the desire
to set oneself in place of God, not allowing God to be one’s God.”183
The original sin, as an historical act of transgression, took just this form: Adam
usurped God’s place, thinking it better to reign in his own hell than to serve in God’s
heaven. Now even the saint, still bearing the remnants of original sin in his flesh,
usurps God’s place precisely as he grows and increases in his service. For God’s gifts
are so lovely and so “vigorously excite enjoyment” that his fallen nature rushes in upon
180
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the “enjoyable” sin of resting in the gifts themselves, instead of thankfully resting in
God the Giver alone. He does not “love and worship God purely for himself,” but for
the sake of his grace and gifts. He “luxuriates” in the enjoyment of received grace. This
fruitio acceptae gratiae is tantalizing and irresistible. He cannot help but enjoy his own
holiness. But this means he enjoys the creature instead of the Creator.184 He worships
himself instead of God. He does not yet attain his true end, he is not yet restored to
the original purity of his nature, for he does not yet glorify God and enjoy him. That
is—unless God gives him the even higher, yet deeply hidden, gift of sharing in Christ’s
cross, which “comes and takes away everything he has” to lead him through hope’s
dark path to the praise and the enjoyment of the Giver in the pure affection of
friendship and love.185

4. The Promise of the Serpent-Crusher and his grace and gift
“I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your seed and her Seed:
he shall crush your head, and you shall crush his heel” (Gen. 3:15). Ulrich Asendorf
asserts that Luther’s christological interpretation of the Protevangelium became the
“organizing principle” of his mature theology, which “finds its monumental expression
in the Genesis Lectures.” If it is something of an exaggeration to claim that this verse
comprises “the summa of Luther’s theology,” Asendorf’s championing of its
importance does accurately reflect its utter centrality in the Lectures and in the lives
of the Genesis saints.186 Lecturing on Gen. 3:14 but already anticipating its sequel,
Luther himself laments his inability to do the text the full justice it deserves, “for it
184
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contains whatever is excellent in all Scripture.”187 If this too sounds like a (for Luther
admittedly characteristic) overstatement, consider a complementary claim from his
1525 de servo arbitrio: “Take Christ from the Scriptures—and what more will you find
in them?”188 Jesus Christ is the res of the Bible, and Gen. 3:15 is his first appearance on
the stage of the history of salvation. Because he is present here in the first promise of
all, the “source of all mercy and fountainhead of all promises”189 that would follow,
Luther’s (and Asendorf’s) valuation of the excellency of this verse is in fact quite
straightforward. Asendorf, who depends heavily on Oswald Bayer’s seminal
monograph on Promissio in Luther’s Reformation theology,190 may be consulted for an
exhaustive treatment of this theme; here I attend only to matters of direct relevance to
my argument.
In the first place, Luther’s lectures on Gen. 3:9-15 are highly forensic. Earlier I
claimed that the two basic problems facing fallen mankind are the corruption of his
nature and the wrath and judgment of God against his sin. My study of Luther’s
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theology of sanctification will focus on the healing or restoration of human nature.
But I hope this suggests neither an aversion on my part toward the Reformer’s
teaching about sin, guilt, judgment, and wrath (doctrina legis), nor that modish
distaste for his—or anyone else’s—theology of atonement, forgiveness, justification,
and reconciliation through Christ’s death on the cross (doctrina evangelii) which
seems to be afflicting much of historical, exegetical, and dogmatic theology today. To
the contrary, the proper correlation of forgiveness and renewal constitutes a deep and
abiding concern for Luther and a key aspect of my research. For primarily exegetical
reasons, the balances tip here in the forensic direction: God enters into judgment with
Adam and Eve, and this is the story of their trial, conviction, and sentencing. Thus
Adam, who “sinned and is guilty of death,”191 “stands before God’s judgment seat and is
now called in for his punishment.”192 To be sure, the vitiation of Adam’s nature is on
full display: his flight from God, his excuses and prevarications, his aversion from the
One who had not long since been his greatest delight, his sense of wrath and
Anfechtung, all demonstrate that “Adam is no longer the same that he was, but that he
has undergone a change and has become a different person (mutatum et alium esse
factum).”193 Luther is especially keen to underscore the way Adam’s turn to self
functions in the state of despair brought upon a man by the sense that his sin has
made God his implacable foe: though his only hope of help consists in turning away
from himself to God, apart from God’s own merciful intervention his bentness toward
self only disposes him to run further away, whether by hiding from God altogether, or

191

WA 42.130.34, LW 1.175.
WA 42.130.7, LW 1.174.
193
WA 42.130.17-8, LW 1.174.
192

67

by justifying himself, or by laying the blame for his sin at God’s own feet. “Thus we see
Adam and Eve so fallen and sunk in sin that they cannot sink deeper.”194 Only the
promise of God’s mercy is powerful enough to evoke such a sunken heart’s faith, to
pull it back out of its despairing obsession with itself to vivifying fellowship with God:
“Unless hearts are raised up through trust in mercy (fiducia misericordiae), this nature
cannot be urged on beyond this point.”195 The word that promises divine mercy, the
pardon of transgression and the abolition of God’s wrath through Christ, is itself the
root of man’s renovation; there is here a possible echo of Staupitz’s inversion of gratia
gratum faciens as the grace that makes God pleasing to the sinner, an object no longer
of fear but of hope and trust because of the Gospel.196
Regardless, Luther sets out to exegete this text as the story of how God, in his
mercy, makes himself pleasing to pitiable and cowering Adam and Eve. He finds
evidence of this gracious turning already to hand in the fatherly way the Lord deals
with his rebellious subjects, who had been the object of Satan’s cruelty and deception,
as opposed to the stern and unqualified judgment with which he handles the Deceiver.
This in two respects: first, the fact that God calls Adam and Eve back from their sin.
Fascinatingly, Luther avers that this fatherly turning “shows that even then Christ, our
Deliverer, had placed himself between God and man as a Mediator”197 (cf. 1 Tim. 2:5).
He explains further: “although the promise concerning Christ”—viz., Gen. 3:15—“is not
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yet there, it is already noticeable in the thought and counsel of God.”198 This is either a
rather daring piece of speculative theology bordering on the later Reformed concept of
the intra-trinitarian pactum salutis (a real possibility given its medieval precedents199)
or at the least a more scripturally-grounded insistence that God’s mercies are always
grounded in and with a view toward the mediation of Jesus Christ and the
reconciliation between God and man achieved by his self-interposing in taking man’s
flesh and suffering on the cross. The second pre-promise evidence of God’s fatherly
affection for Adam and Eve consists in the cursing of the serpent in Gen. 3:14. The
Devil’s unmitigated punishment itself comforts them by assuring them that God has
entered into the lists as the enemy of their own foe: “Here in the midst of most serious
threats the Father reveals his heart,” and promises victory over the deceiver and
conqueror of human nature.200 These proofs of the Father’s mercy and affection for his
human creatures are of decisive importance for their destiny, for as guilty traitors
worthy of death their most pressing need is for a merciful pardon that would restore
them to the good graces of their Sovereign.
Now to the Protevangelium itself. For Luther, the promise of a “Seed” born
from the woman who will crush the Serpent’s head is a fully-orbed presentation of the
Gospel of the incarnation of God’s Son from Mary and his victory over sin, death, and
the powers of hell through his death and resurrection. Combined with the threats of
Gen. 3:14, this first promise draws up Adam and Eve into battle against the Devil and
198

WA 42.135.21-2, LW 1.181.
So Christine Helmer, “God from Eternity to Eternity: Luther’s Trinitarian Understanding,” HTR
96/2 (April 2003): 127-46, here 140-1, who—evincing her penchant for theological genre—points to
intimations of the eternal decree of redemption in medieval art, the mystical poetry of Mechthild of
Magdeburg, Bernard’s sermon on Ps. 85 [84], and the speculative philosophy of John Duns Scotus.
200
WA 42.141.38-41, LW 1.189.
199

69

alongside God himself, “with the hope of help from the Son of God, the Seed of the
woman.” Thus forgiveness of sins and reception back into God’s grace are extended to
Adam and Eve through this promise: “Their guilt has been forgiven; they have been
won back from death and have already been set free from hell.”201 In accord with the
forensic emphases of the trial at God’s judgment seat, the promise of the Woman’s
Seed has as its real focal point the liberation, through Christ’s atoning sacrifice, of
Adam and Eve from the guilt of their sin and its just punishment in death and hell. To
expound the meaning of the promise, Luther turns rather naturally to Rom. 4:25
(“Christ died for our sins and rose again for our justification”) and John 1:29 (“Behold
the Lamb of God, which bears the sin of the world”).202 The joining of these verses
embodies the inseparable nexus in Luther’s kerygmatic theology of objective
substitutionary atonement through Christ’s shed blood and its subjective implicate,
free justification by grace through faith in Christ (cf. Rom. 3:21-28). Held together as
Luther holds them here, they show how atonement by the cross and justification by
faith are two sides of the same coin. It is no accident that the very same verses, in the
same order, front Luther’s presentation of “the first and chief article” regarding “the
office and work of Jesus Christ, or to our redemption” in the 1537 Smalcald Articles203
(on which more below in chapter 2). There as here, the primary issue for Luther is “the
glory of our redemption and deliverance” from sin, death, and hell; and this glory
belongs by right and quite exclusively to the Son of God, the Promised Seed.204 In
short: “the Son of God had to become a sacrifice to achieve these things for us, to take
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away sin, to swallow up death, and to restore the lost obedience.”205 Thus the mercy
and affection of the Father, who turned to his lost and ruined creatures already with a
view to their redemption through the Mediator, first promises and then finally secures
the pardon, justification, and reconciliation of sinners to himself through the death of
his Son, Eve’s Seed. It is noteworthy that in a text so given to the Christus Victor
theme, which is by no means absent in the lecture, it is the Seed come as the sacrificial
Lamb who triumphs and crushes Satan’s head. The Son’s sacrifice on the cross is itself
the great victory over the Devil: through it, sin’s power to condemn is destroyed;
death, the just wages of sin, is therefore abolished; and in this way, the head of the
murdering, lying, and accusing adversary is crushed.206
In the next chapter, I will argue that in the 1530s and 40s Luther’s typical
shorthand for this gift of forgiveness and justification received at the hands of God’s
fatherly mercy and secured through Christ’s blood is gratia, “grace.” It is the heart and
soul of the first promise as Luther exposits it in the Lectures, and as such it constitutes
the central reality of the patriarchal saints who, like Adam and Eve, put their trust and
hope in the promise of God’s grace in Christ. However, as my introductory reading of
Luther on Ps. 51 has already shown, this does not exhaust the fullness of his theology
of the ransomed and restored human creature. The first promise, and the Gospel as
such, necessarily emphasizes the grace of reconciliation with God through Christ
205

WA 42.147.4-5, LW 1.197.
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because the basic disaster of ruined humanity is alienation from God through sin. But
in Luther’s theology, the promise of a grace and mercy strong in Christ to restore the
sinner to fellowship with God always and necessarily entails the promise of the
restoration of the sinner himself, the healing and restoration of his nature into the
fullness of life and joy in union with God. This, in Luther’s shorthand, is the Spiritworked donum or “gift,” a term sufficiently elastic to encompass all the element’s of
man’s renewal from regeneration, through progress in sanctification, to the full glory
of the resurrection.
In the lecture on Gen. 3:15, this theme is present but muted, not because of
Luther’s lack of interest in it but because of the mainly forensic themes called for by
the scriptural text itself. Still, it is there: those who believe the promise are enlisted in
battle, by faith in the Seed, against the Devil; and they are able to do so effectively
because in addition to abolishing sin as guilt, the promise of the Seed also brings with
it the renewal of Adam and Eve’s lost obedience. Thus Jesus Christ defeats the devil,
death, sin, and the Law’s power to condemn (“grace”), “and not only this, but at the
same time the obedience which was lost is restored (restituitur simul obedientia, quae
amissa est)” (“gift”).207 This restoration is real but imperfect in this life: “we make some
progress (aliquousque procedimus),” but the abiding presence of sin warring in our
members—Luther alludes here to Rom. 7:23—prevents the perfection of righteousness
in this life.208 Thus Adam and Eve, restored through faith in the promise of the Seed,
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are not yet fully restored to the life they had lost; they live in hope of the resurrection
of their flesh and the eternal life that is promised to them through the Son of God.209
Now, as Peura has pointed out,210 what is intriguing about this claim is Luther’s
contention that unfallen Adam and Eve had already lived in hope of a resurrection-like
translatio. What Luther seems to be saying is this: on the one hand, partially restored
but still sinful humans are not yet possessed of the full vigor of righteousness, life, and
joy enjoyed by Adam and Eve prior to the fall. Yet at the same time, their partial
restoration to that originally given holiness of life entails within it a full restoration to
the original state of eschatological hope. Adam has forfeited his chance at obtaining
the translatio through his own obedience, but in the end he will arrive at his originally
appointed destination nonetheless through the obedience unto death and the
victorious resurrection of the Second Adam, the Son of God. In the meantime, post as
ante lapsum, he lives in hope.
What of the restoration of the image itself? In the immediate vicinity of the
lectures on Gen. 1:26 that I explored above, Luther found the occasion to discuss the
loss of the image through original sin and its restoration through the grace and gift of
the Gospel: imago illa reparetur.211 The Gospel brings it about that ruined humanity is
re-formed (reformemur) “according to that familiar and indeed better image.” For
through it, we are “born again into eternal life, or rather into the hope of eternal life
by faith, that we may live in God and with God and be one with him, as Christ says”
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(John 17:21).212 Luther rushes ahead, as it were, to the final glory of the complete
restoration of human nature, even to the extent of its deifying union with God, then
pulls back to reassert the same eschatological reserve we saw above: we are reborn
into the hope of eternal life. There follows a compact summary of Luther’s theology of
grace and gift, with the restoration of the image both in this life and in the next falling
under the latter category. Faith takes hold of God’s mercy through Christ, acquires
Christ’s merits, and knows that by Christ’s death we have been set free. This is man’s
rebirth ad iustitiam, the righteousness of faith through which he is set free from guilt
and condemnation and reconciled to God. But from it (inde) “that other righteousness
of ours arises, namely that newness of life (novitas vitae) by which we are zealous to
obey God.” To be sure, this second kind of righteousness is never perfect in this life
and, therefore, can never stand as the basis for one’s standing before God’s righteous
judgment. But by the Holy Spirit given to us through the Gospel, a real beginning is
made in newness of life (cf. Rom. 6:4), fierce resistance is offered against the flesh that
remains (cf. Rom 7:14-25), and the “grace” of God’s mercy in Christ covers whatever is
lacking in the “gift” of the Christian’s renewal.213 “In this manner”—that is, by the gift
of inchoate renewal empowered by the Spirit—“this image of the new creature (imago
ista novae creaturae) begins to be restored by the Gospel in this life, but it will not be
finished in this life.”214 Then, when the image is perfected in the Father’s kingdom,
man’s natural psychological faculties will be restored: the will made truly free and
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good, the mind enlightened, the memory steadfast and sure.215 That is, the natural
perfections that rendered Adam originally capax of deifying union with God, ruined by
his rebellion, will be restored; which is why, as we saw just above, Luther explicitly
describes the eschatological completion of the redeemed in the Johannine terms of
eternal life in, with, and united to God. In short: “the godly have within themselves
that unfinished image (imaginem rudem) which God will on the Last Day bring to
perfection in those who have believed his Word.”216
Those who have believed his “Word”—that is, the Promise of the Gospel, first
freely spoken by God in his mercy to unworthy Adam and Eve at Gen. 3:15. It is crucial
to grasp that both the grace of forgiveness and reconciliation with God through Christ
and the gift of the restoration of human nature, the novitas vitae begun in this life and
perfected in the glory of the resurrection, are included in and given with the Promise
of the serpent-crushing Seed. There is a real priority to “grace,” for at least two
reasons: first, the origin of the redemption and restoration of ruined mankind lies
entirely in the merciful purpose of the Father, who turns to us in Christ the Mediator;
second, the incompletion (in this life) of the saint’s renewal after the image of God in
true holiness ever stands in need of being covered over by the mercy of God in
Christ.217 But grace is ordered to glory, and the final aim of God’s mercy in pardoning
and accepting sinners through Christ is the restoration of these ruined creatures to
their true end of glorifying and enjoying him. That, after all, is what the invidious
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Devil sought to destroy: the image of God which is the summum cultum.218 When the
generous God purposes in mercy to destroy the work of the Devil, and promises Adam
and Eve that he will do so by crushing the Serpent’s head through Eve’s Seed, it is the
whole evil work that he purposes to undo and overcome. Thus “grace” leads to glory
through the ongoing restorative work of the “gift.” Grace, we might say, restores the
union of God and man from God’s side of the relation, through his own free mercy and
through the Mediator and his sacrifice. But it is the gift of the Spirit’s renewal that
restores this union from man’s side, healing and renewing his inmost being and thus
empowering him to trust and love, hope and delight in the God who has accepted him
freely in Christ. Each of these two blessings, the grace of forgiveness and the gift of the
image’s renewal into the highest righteousness of eucharistic life, is given in the
promise of the Gospel and received by faith/hope: “These treasures we possess in
Christ, but in hope.”219
The following chapter pursues Luther’s mature theology of grace and gift in
greater depth.
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2. LUTHER’S MATURE DOGMATICS OF HOLINESS (1536-44):
GRACE, GIFT, AND THE “AUGUSTINIAN SIMUL”
We come now to the heart of my argument in this book: in the present chapter
expositing the mature Luther’s dogmatics of holiness, then in Part II exploring its
roots in the young Luther’s appropriation of the old Augustine’s theology of sin, grace,
and holiness. Since in chapter 1.4 I have already introduced the dogmatic subject
matter to be taken up at length here, I can afford to be relatively brief in this
introduction. My principal object is to set forth Luther’s creedal and evangelical
theology of forgiveness and justification in Jesus Christ (gratia/Gnade) and
regeneration and progressive renewal in holiness of life by the Holy Spirit
(donum/Gabe); and to do so attending carefully to the kind of “sin” which
characterizes the saints of God as they live, suffer, and fight in via under the covering
of Christ’s great grace and in the strength of the Spirit’s effectual gift. In process, I
have three subordinate goals in mind as well: first, to drawn attention to the scriptural
exegesis that informs and shapes Luther’s dogmatics; second, to highlight the robust
economic trinitarianism that is virtually co-extensive with this scriptural dogmatics;
third, to bring to light the reality and nature of the renewed spiritual agency which the
Holy Spirit brings about in the saints of God by his gift. A few comments on these
three ancillary aims will, I think, help to elucidate my approach in this chapter.
In the first two points, I stand close to Ulrich Asendorf both in his critique of
much modern historical and dogmatic theology and in his proposed alternative.
Discussing Gerhard Ebeling’s influential work on Luther’s hermeneutics, Asendorf
states that as a rule, “the more abstract one’s understanding of the Word, the greater
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the possibility that the interpreter is removed from Luther and his biblical fullness.”220
That strikes me as exactly right; and one concrete way to counteract this scholarly flaw
is to attend with great care to the proof-texts that Luther appeals to as he argues
theologically, rather than skipping on (as is the scholarly fashion) past his scriptural
premises to the conclusions he reaches thereby. The better we become at listening to
Luther as he listens to the Word of God, the deeper our grasp of his response to that
Word—i.e., his theology—will become; and beyond the real gains to be had in
historical comprehension, this increased proximity to the Word will better position us
to critically assess both the strengths and the weaknesses of Luther’s dogmatics in
lumine scripturae.221
As to the second point: Asendorf speaks of the older Luther’s growing concern
to integrate Scripture and Dogma, the result being a lively, dramatic, and “integral
theology” that echoes the Bible’s polyphony and revolves around the cantus firmus of
Gen. 3:15; and for Luther, a kind of patristic exegete born out of season, the
Protevangelium is empty and lifeless apart from the rich trinitarian christology that he
finds hidden in the enigmatic promise of an eternal redemption through the mortal
human Seed of Eve which only the true and living God himself could ever possibly
accomplish.222 In the course of his own meditations on Luther’s exegesis of Gen. 3:15,
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Asendorf draws on Albrecht Peters’ great Kommentar zu Luthers Katechismen to
establish this point; and even if one must decline Asendorf and Peters’ suggestion that
Luther’s resolute focus on the saving economy of God in Christ signals a return past
die augustinisch-scholastischen Trinitätsspekulationen back to die altkirchlichen
Trinitätstheologie exemplified by the Cappadocian fathers—since, on the one hand,
Augustine’s and Thomas’ speculations were deeply grounded in the biblical economy
of salvation, and on the other Basil, the two Gregories, and Luther were all keenly
interested in speculative trinitarian theology—still, I think they are quite right to say
that Luther’s relentless attention to the biblical Zentrum of the gospel led to an
enriched trinitarianism as a matter of course.223 In Luther’s mature theology of God’s
free bestowal of grace in Christ and renewal by his Spirit’s gift, we shall see this
reinvigoration of a scriptural, evangelical, and catholic trinitarianism on full display.224

theologian. Abraham “understood the promise beautifully” for “he reasoned (ratiocinatus est)” (WA
42.448.17-18, LW 2.261) in the following way: First, the promise clearly states that through Abraham
all the nations of the earth will experience “blessing”: specifically, blessing to overcome the curse
that entered upon the human race because of original sin. Thus Abraham correlates the new
promise of Gen. 12:3 with the original promise of Gen. 3:15, interpreted with the help of the
curse/blessing contrast elaborated by St. Paul in Gal. 3:10-14 (WA 44.448.3-5, LW 2.261). The curse
of sin, death, and damnation that afflicts the entire human race is to be removed, somehow, “in”
Abraham, and replaced with the blessing of forgiveness, life, and salvation. Abraham knows this
cannot possibly come to pass through his own person, for two reasons: first, he is mortal, and
second, he is himself a sinner saved by sheer mercy. Therefore, the promise must refer to one of his
heirs, the “Seed” (cf. Gen. 22:18) who will be such a Man as to be blessed in his own person (per se
benedictus) and thus without need of the blessing of another. But in order to bring blessing to the
entire world, this human offspring of Abraham must necessarily be true God at the same time. He
therefore concludes his vaguely Anselmian logic: “He must necessarily be God and not a human
being, although He will be a human being and will take on our flesh so that He is truly my seed”
(WA 42.447.20-29, LW 2.260). Thus Abraham reasoned, on the basis of Gen. 12:3’s promise of
“blessing” (and back of it, the first promise of Gen. 3:15), to the fully-orbed doctrine of the two
natures in Christ’s person that encompasses the mysterium incarnationis filii Dei (WA 42.448.17,
LW 2.261).
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The creedal and richly trinitarian dogmatics of holiness that I read in Luther’s
texts puts me at odds with some major currents in the scholarship. In the first place,
for Luther the gospel of grace in Jesus Christ is unintelligible apart from the revelation
of God’s just judgment and fierce wrath against sin through the law. Since
condemnation to death and hell at the hands of God’s justice is the great and
fundamental disaster facing fallen mankind, the satisfaction of God’s justice through
the merciful donation of his own Son pro nobis in the cradle and on the cross—and
above all, the shedding of his blood as our substitute—stands at the heart of the
gospel of grace (Rom. 1:18-3:26, 8:1-4). The verbum crucis is not in vogue today,225 but
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these dogmatic themes cannot be avoided without running the risk of a serious
historical misapprehension of Luther’s mature doctrine of “grace.” No presentation of
Luther’s theology of holiness that minimizes the cross of Christ and the free gift of
righteousness won by it (and given freely to faith) can do real justice to the Reformer’s
actual position. Rather than arguing for the reality of renewal in holiness at free
justification’s expense, I follow Luther’s texts in emphasizing both; and perhaps I will
find a few salty amici crucis (or even a Bluttheologe like Joachim Mörlin) amongst my
readers.226
The deep trinitarianism of Luther’s dogmatics of holiness cuts against another
and perhaps more surprising grain in the scholarship. There is a tendency in some
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his holy, precious blood and with his innocent suffering and death” (p. 233, SC, BSLK, 872.4-7, BC,
355). Well and good; but Bayer dances around the quite explicit and concrete teaching of the LC on
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Finnish theologians to read both gratia and donum in christological terms at the
expense of the proper work of the Spirit, often in concert with a somewhat forced
differentiation between Luther and Melanchthon in this regard.227 One of my major
aims in this chapter is to accentuate the pneumatological character of the “gift” in
Luther’s mature theology, and in so doing to establish the inseparability of forgiveness
in Christ (gratia) and real renewal by the Spirit (donum) on the sure trinitarian footing
that it in fact enjoys in the works of his maturity.
I have a hunch that this is not unrelated to the third of my ancillary aims in
this chapter. At the center of Mannermaa’s groundbreaking work is the thesis that
Jesus Christ himself is present in faith: in ipsa fide Christus adest. On my reading, this
is in fact a vital theme for Luther in not a few of his writings, including some of his
most important and well-known, e.g., the 1520 Freedom of a Christian, the 1521
Antilatomus, and in particular the great 1531/5 Lectures on Galatians upon which
Mannermaa rested most of his case.228 In some of his comments on Gal. 2:20 (“Now it
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is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me”),229 Luther’s emphasis on the real
presence of Christ in faith does seem to overwhelm any sense of a distinct personal
agency on the believer’s part; and because of their zeal to promote the ontological
reality of union with Christ, this is a point the Finns are inclined to underscore.230 If
this Finnish emphasis on Christ’s agency is then combined with vague assumptions
about Luther’s “monergism” (Alleinwirksamkeit) based upon impressions formed by
the 1525 de servo arbitrio—assumptions which, I suspect, grow in force in inverse
proportion to how closely that intricate text is actually read—the notion of Luther as a
theologian of renewed human agency would seem a most unlikely hypothesis.
Yet I will argue that this is just what we find in the texts at hand: a repeated
grappling with the mysterious interplay of divine and human action, carried out
within a broadly Augustinian framework but now with Augustine’s gratia cooperans
reworked into Luther’s donum Spiritus Sancti. To be sure, the fallen human being can
only suffer the advent of grace. But once a dead son or daughter of Adam is reborn in
Christ and made alive by the Spirit, the latter’s vivifying gift renews the nature vitiated
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in Adam and thus restores believers to the spiritual agency in which real human
holiness chiefly consists: believing God’s promise, hoping in his faithfulness, loving
him with all the tattered fragments of one’s broken heart, rejoicing in his goodness,
and giving him thanks. This very much includes that high pitch of spiritual agency
which only comes about amidst the extreme sufferings of the Anfechtungen. By the
Spirit’s hidden co-operations, an actio spiritualis comes into being precisely and only
in summa passione, in process refining the spiritual agent’s character in the virtues of
faith, hope, patience, detachment, and love. Attending to the Holy Spirit’s role in the
economy of salvation will help bring Luther’s reflections on human agency out from
under the dark shadow of determinism into the light of the true freedom which God
gives again to the redeemed of Jesus Christ in the depths of their being through the
operations of his Spirit. In the words of ancient prophecy and promise: “I will put my
Spirit within you, and you shall live” (Ezek. 37:14).
The scholarship on “grace,” “gift,” and the “simul” is immense; though there is
no need to rehearse here what I have written in the introduction to this book, I think
it is helpful to focus our attention on a few salient figures. Most misreadings of
Luther’s theology of holiness can be traced back to Rudolf Hermann’s 1930 monograph
on the “simul” via Wilfried Joest’s 1951 Gesetz und Freiheit. I will engage Hermann at
length in Part II below. In this chapter, Joest’s introduction of a distinction between
the Total- and Partialaspekt of the “simul” will occupy my attention. Joest’s
Totalaspekt is so deeply ensconced in the literature that it is pretty much assumed in
many quarters as a kind of primum principium for interpreting Luther’s theology of
renewal in holiness—that is to say, for taking as granted that he doesn’t really have

84

much of one. David Yeago first taught me to question the validity of this principle,231
and my confidence in rejecting it has grown steadily as I have studied the works of
Julius Köstlin,232 Reinhold Seeberg,233 Axel Gyllenkrok,234 Regin Prenter,235 Philip
Watson,236 Manfred Schloenbach,237 Erwin Iserloh,238 Juhani Forsberg,239 Jarod
Wicks,240 Gilbert Meilaender,241 Simo Peura,242 Sammeli Juntunen,243 Andreas
Wöhle,244 Otto Hermann Pesch,245 Theodor Dieter,246 Reinhard Hütter,247 Risto
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Saarinen,248 Olli-Pekka Vainio,249 Mickey Mattox,250 and Jairzinho Lopes Pereira.251 In
their diverse ways and to varying degrees, each of these theologians has argued against
Hermann and/or Joest (or other readers of Luther who take their lead from them) in
the course of arguing that real renewal in holiness constituted a core dogmatic
commitment for the historical Luther. My argument in this chapter stands on their
shoulders. This includes those occasions when I have found it necessary to correct an
emphasis here or there, usually in relation to how a given reader of Luther calibrates
the often complex interrelation of the dogmatic and spiritual realities summed up in
the three helpful verba that orient this chapter: gratia, donum, simul. If there are
particularly novel aspects to my work, I suspect they lie in two areas: one, my
contention that the “simul” as Luther held it was deeply Augustinian, and perhaps
above all in his consistent and adamant insistence that the saint’s refusal of consent to
his residual sin is the gift-empowered conditio sine qua non for his remaining in the
grace of Christ; two, my exclusive focus on writings from the last decade of Luther’s
life. This, as opposed (say) to the richly rewarding—and programmatic—Antilatomus
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(1521), the penetrating de servo arbitrio (1525), or the joyful Galaterbrief (1531/5), all of
which set forth substantially the same dogmatics of sin, grace, and holiness that I
exposit in this chapter on the basis of texts ranging from late 1536 to 1544.
We begin with the Smalcald Articles.

1. The Smalcald Articles (Dec. 1536/Jan.-Feb. 1537—1538)
In June 1536, Pope Paul III called for a general council to meet in Mantua the following
year. The Elector of Saxony, John Frederick, did not intend to participate in this
council—which did not, of course, materialize until 1545 as the Council of Trent—but
he did wish to present it with a clear statement of the confessional position of the
Saxon churches. To this end, he commissioned Luther (assisted by Melanchthon, John
Bugenhagen, Nicholas von Amsdorf, John Agricola, George Spalatin, Justus Jonas, and
Caspar Cruciger Sr.) to draft a confession. The Smalcald Articles were ready by
February 1537 to be presented to the meeting of the defensive league whence the
confession took its name; though the text did not take hold as a binding confession till
the intra-Lutheran disputes of the 1550s culminating in its inclusion in the Book of
Concord.252
I anchor this chapter with the SA for two reasons. First, as a confessional text it
offers dogmatic conciseness and clarity that helps bring focus to Luther’s mature
theology of grace, gift, and the “simul.” A real strength in this regard is its firm
theology of atonement through Christ’s cross and forensic justification by faith alone.
As Brecht says of the SA: “Like no other Reformation confession, they were based on

252

For more historical detail, see Brecht, Preservation, 178-85; for an overview of the SA, see William
R. Russell, Luther’s Theological Testament: The Smalcald Articles (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995).

87

the central doctrine of justification.”253 Second, the trenchant, feisty, and pugnacious
tone of the SA vis-à-vis Rome make them an ideal source for Luther’s robust theology
of holiness. For if we find such a theology in this “warlike manifesto”254 where Luther
explains “all that we teach and live against the pope, the devil, and the world”255 and
condemns “many noxious maggots and the excrement of various idolatries” in no
uncertain terms,256 we can rest assured that this theology of holiness is indeed the
Reformation theology of the evangelical Luther; or else, if here too the Reformer is
found to have retained “pre-reformational” relics from his theological past,257 I
suppose confessional Lutherans will need to embrace the catholicity of their tradition.

1.1. Gnade
Like the 1530 Augsburg Confession penned by Melanchthon, Luther’s Articles begin by
confessing the common Catholic faith in the Trinity, the two natures in Christ’s
253

Brecht, Preservation, 181.
So Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical Notes, ed. David S.
Schaff, 6th ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1931), 1/222.
255
SA II.1, BSLK, 728.11-12, cf. BC, 301.
256
SA II.2, BSLK, 732.13-14, BC, 303.
257
This is the rather implausible argument of Lowell Green regarding most of Luther’s writings up
to 1530, in his book How Melanchthon Helped Luther Discover the Gospel: The Doctrine of
Justification in the Reformation (Fallbrook, CA: Verdict Publications, 1980). But “vorreformatorisch”
is a common adjective used by scholars in pursuit of the Durchbruch to described either (1) Luther’s
theology prior to what they pinpoint as the decisive breakthrough to Reformation, or (2) bits and
pieces of Luther’s pre-breakthrough theology that linger on inconsistently after the breakthrough.
So, e.g., Oswald Bayer (Promissio, 12) argues against “the popular canonizing of the Heidelberg
Disputation” (held 26 April 1518), since one can be quite Catholic and embrace its theologia crucis;
whereas the same cannot be said of the theologia promissionis et fidei clearly articulated for the first
time in the disputation pro veritate inquirenda et timoratis conscientiis consolandis held in the early
summer months of the same year. Cf. ibid., 166-7, 173, 181, 191, 195, 235-6, 285, 299-301, 340. In my
judgment, Volker Leppin’s stepwise approach to Luther’s development has much to commend it.
There was no sudden breakthrough, but instead a series of gradually mounting shifts from the
monastic piety-theologian to the Reformer: Staupitz leading Luther to the solus Christus in 1513,
Augustine to sola gratia by 1516, St. Paul to sola fide by the Heidelberg Disputation, and
Melanchthon (and John Eck at the Leipzig Disputation) spurring full-blown sola scriptura
commitments in 1519, all culminating in the unmistakably “reformational theology” of the great
Reformation treatises written in the summer and early fall of 1520 (Martin Luther, 107-64,
summarized at 116-7).
254

88

person, and the history of his birth from Mary the Virgin, his death, descent,
resurrection, ascension, rule, and promised return in judgment. This amounts to a
summary of the ancient Creeds of the Church, and the Reformer refers to and upholds
the Apostles’ and Athanasian Creeds by name (SA I.1-4). The brevity of this portion of
the confession must not belie its decisiveness. Everything else that Luther states builds
upon this foundation, which does not need to be further explicated because it is
shared in common with his Roman Catholic opponents. In the foremost place, this
holds true of der erste und Heubtartickel which immediately follows, viz., regarding
the office and work of “Jesus Christ, our God and Lord” in the redemption of sinners
through his death on the cross (SA II.1).258
Though the word Gnade appears only once in passing, it is here that Luther
lays down the theology of “grace” that definitively shapes the rest of the confession. As
the catena of scriptural texts marshaled by Luther demonstrates, “grace” refers to the
forgiveness and justification that God in his mercy grants a Gospel-believing sinner on
the exclusive basis of the substitutionary death of Jesus Christ. Indeed, as I argued in
chapter 1, the objective, self-substituting, sin-bearing death of the God-Man on the
one hand, and the acquittal or justification of the sinner on the other, form two sides
of the same coin in Luther’s theology.259 This is why Rom. 3:23-8 proves to be so
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structurally significant in SA II.2.260 The Reformer merely reproduces St. Paul’s
insistence on the inseparability of redemption and propitiation through Christ’s shed
blood (vv. 24-5) on the one hand,261 and justification by grace (v. 24) and faith (vv. 26
& 28) on the other. Into this basically Pauline fabric, Luther weaves texts from St. John
and Isaiah: Jesus Christ is the Lamb of God who took away the sin of the world (John
1:29) when the Lord laid upon him the iniquity of us all (Isa 53:6). Because of this slain
Lamb, though all have sinned and fall short of God’s glory (Rom. 3:23),
… werden on verdienst gerecht aus seiner Gnade, durch die Erlösung Jhesu
Christi inn
seinem blut etc., Ro. 3.
… they become righteous without merit by his grace, through the redemption
that is in Jesus Christ in his blood etc., Rom. 3[:24-5].262
According to the Apostle and to the Reformer, since this undeserved justification
before God is “by his grace” (Gnade)—accomplished apart from our works and solely
through the work of Jesus Christ on the cross—it may be grasped only by faith.
“Because this must be believed and may not be obtained or grasped otherwise with
any work, law, or merit, it is clear and certain that this faith alone makes us righteous,
as St. Paul says,” citing Rom. 3:28: “Wir halten, das der Mensch gerecht werde on
Therefore when we teach that men are justified through Christ and that Christ is the Victor over
sin, death, and the eternal curse, we are testifying at the same time that He is God by nature” (WA
40/1.441.29-33, LW 26.283).
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werck des Gesetzes durch den glauben.”263 Such faith does not justify by its own
intrinsic virtue, but by virtue of the object it apprehends: Jesus Christ and his cross.
When an ungodly sinner hears this Gospel of “grace”—that is to say, of redemption,
forgiveness, and justification through Christ’s shed blood—and believes it, God
mercifully justifies him on the just basis of Christ’s substitution: “That he alone may be
righteous (Gerecht sey) and may make righteous (gerecht mache) the one who has
faith in Jesus” (Rom. 3:26).264
“Grace” (Gnade), then, refers at once to Jesus Christ and his atoning work and
to the forgiveness and justification that faith receives through him. Thus in SA III.3
(“On Repentance”), with John 1 especially in mind, Luther contrasts the convicting
“hammer” of God’s law (cf. Jer. 23:29) with “the consoling promise of grace
(verheissung der gnaden) through the Gospel.”265 The Reformer vividly portrays his
classic law/Gospel contrast through the figure of John the Baptist, who preached
repentance to convict open sinner and false saint alike and thus prepare them “for the
Lord to receive grace (die gnade zu empfahen), to await and accept from him the
forgiveness of sins.”266 St. John told everyone without exception: “You all need the
forgiveness of sins,” then pointed his finger to the Lamb of God and proclaimed: “God
is present there, in the One from whose fullness we all must receive grace upon grace
(gnade umb gnade) and without whom no human being can be righteous before
God.”267 Note how Luther combines John 1:16’s gnade umb gnade with the Pauline
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language of righteousness before God, all in the overarching context of the movement
in John 1 from the incarnation of the Word at v. 14 to the sin-bearing Lamb at v. 29.
Thus in the following paragraphs, when Luther defines evangelical contrition (reu),
confession (Beicht), and satisfaction (gnugthuung), the last consists “in the suffering
and blood of the innocent Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world.”268
Incarnation, atonement through satisfaction, forgiveness and becoming righteous
before God: Gnade. In these later passages from SA III.3, as in the foundational
confession of the chief article in SA II.1, by “grace” Luther means the forgiveness of
sins and justification before God that are to be had only through God’s incarnate Son
and blood-shedding Lamb, Jesus Christ.
What of the “gift”?
1.2. The deep, evil corruption of nature
To grasp Luther’s theology of the “gift,” I need first to sketch his teaching on the depth
of sin’s corrupting power and thus the totality of the repentance required by the Law’s
judgment upon the sinner. In SA III.1 (“On Sin”), Luther reiterates the Augustinianism
he embraced as a lecturer on Romans in 1515, including its application contra
pelagianos modernos in much the same manner Leif Grane has accounted for in the
earlier period (matters that will occupy our full attention in Part II below).269 In 1537
the aging Reformer still stakes his position on Rom. 5:12-19, and the entire article
prioritizes the “original sin” (Erbsunde) of Adam. Through his disobedience, “all
people have become sinners (sind Sünder worden) subject to death and the devil.”270
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This “chief sin” (Heubtsunde),271 inherited by all, has caused “a deep, evil corruption of
nature (verderbung der natur).”272 From it grow subsequent evil works, as the rotten
fruits of a wounded tree (cf. Matt. 7:17-20).273 In short, Adam’s filii sin because they are
born sinners; they do not become sinners by committing discrete sinful acts. Agere
sequitur esse. This is why a theology of repentance (SA III.3’s topic) that focuses
exclusively on actual sins—in Luther’s judgment, “the false penance of the Papists”
consisting in contrition, confession, and satisfaction—fails to grapple with the real
issue at hand, “always doing penance but never arriving at repentance.”274 True
repentance begins when people who are sinners hear and take to heart the Law’s
sobering—indeed, strictly speaking, mortifying—judgment:
You are all of no account, whether you are open sinners or saints; you must all
become different and act differently (Ir müst alle anders werden und anders
thun), no matter who you are and what you do now, be you as great, wise,
mighty and holy as you want, here no one is godly (cf. Rom. 3:10).275
Such a law-crushed, contrite heart makes the total confession: “We are all lost, neither
hide nor hair of us is good, and we must become altogether new and different people
(müssen schlechts neue und andere Menschen werden).”276
Once God’s “hammer” (the law) has effected this true contrition and elicited
this absolute confession, the sinner is prepared to receive the Gnade of satisfaction
through God’s Lamb. But the “grace” of forgiveness through Christ, inestimably
precious as it is in itself, does not exhaust the fullness of God’s redeeming work in the
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Gospel. For the law exposes the awful reality of sin not only as guilt but also as
corruption, and thus lays bare humanity’s need not only for forgiveness by “grace” but
also for renewal by the “gift” (Gabe) of the Spirit, to the end that justified sinners may
become neue und andere Menschen.

1.3. Gabe
In the SA, there are two principal loci to examine regarding this gift of renewal: the
conclusion of SA III.3 on repentance, and III.13 on justification and good works. For
reasons that will become clear presently, I first turn briefly to the latter. Appealing to
Acts 15:9, Luther states that “through faith (as St. Peter says) we receive a different,
new, pure heart (ein ander neu, rein hertz).”277 Though he does not use the word, this is
an account of the spiritual regeneration that either takes place through faith (as
Luther puts it here) or is identical with the Spirit-worked gift of faith itself, the donum
fidei in the heart (Eph. 2:8).278 The “different, new, pure heart” of faith marks the real
beginning of the “new and different man” called for by the Law and sought ought in
repentance. As the broken-hearted penitent takes hold of the grace of forgiveness in
Christ by faith, he does so by virtue of the very gift that initiates the inchoate renewal
of his vitiated nature. The two realities—forgiveness and newness of life—are distinct,
but inseparable. Thus Luther lines up “faith, renewal (verneuerung), and forgiveness of
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born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God’ (John 3:3).”
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sin” in grammatical parataxis, innocent of the later Lutheran scruple to reverse their
order; convinced of the inseparable unity of grace and gift in the divine work of
redeeming and renewing lost sinners, it is enough to insist upon their ontological and
temporal priority vis-à-vis the doing of good works.279 As in the fallen creature, so in
the creature restored by the grace of Jesus Christ and the gift of his Spirit: action
follows being, as the good fruits springing forth from an old and rotten tree made new
and fruitful.
Having considered the beginning of renewal in regeneration, we can now turn
to the concise but rich explanation of die Gabe des heiligen Geists in SA III.3 (which
follows on the heels of the Christ- and Gnade-focused material I considered above).280

279
BSLK, 776.20-21, BC, 325: “Good works follow such faith, renewal, and forgiveness of sin…” Hence
the next two theses that follow Luther’s discussion of regeneration in the 1535 disputation I cited in
the preceding footnote (WA 39/1.48.19-23, LW 34.113): “67. For that reason, it is impossible to be
justified by good works, since it is impossible for us to be born of our works, but rather, the works
are born of us, so to speak. 68. By the same Spirit we are called righteous, a new creature of God
(nova creatura Dei) and the firstfruits of God’s creatures, who according to his will brought us forth
by his Word (2 Cor. 5:17, Jas. 1:18).”
280
The phrase die Gabe des heiligen Geists is ambiguous: is the Spirit himself the gift, or does the
Spirit give a gift distinct from himself? On this question, Risto Saarinen’s interpretation of Luther’s
shifting stances vis-à-vis the scholastic distinction between gratia increata et creata is quite
illuminating: “Ipsa Dilectio Deus Est: Zur Wirkungsgeschichte von 1. Sent. dist. 17 des Petrus
Lombardus bei Martin Luther,” in Tuomo Mannermaa, Anja Ghiselli, and Simo Peura, eds.,
Thesaurus Lutheri: Auf der Such nach neuen Paradigmen der Luther-Forschung (Helsinki: LutherAgricola, 1987), 185-204. Saarinen shows (pp. 192-3) that in the 1509/10 Sentenzkommentar, Luther
recognizes that Peter’s Augustinian emphasis on uncreated grace stands in some tension with later
developments in scholastic theology; for assuming the ascendancy and primacy of an Aristotelian
theory of virtue as habitus somewhat stacks the deck against a robust account of the role of gratia
increata in the Christian life. Luther tentatively suggests an alternative (WA 9.42.39-43.8): quando
Augustinus dicit quod dilectio est deus, non intelligatur cum praecisione seu exclusive i.e. quasi
dilectio sit tantum deus, Sed concedendo quod dilectio sit deus, Sed non tantum. Sed est etiam dilectio
creata. Sicut ‘Christus est fides, justitia, gratia nostra et sanctificatio nostra.’ Et videtur Magister non
penitus absurdissime loqui: in eo quod habitum dicit esse spiritum sanctum. Quia commentum illud
de habitibus opinionem habet ex verbis Aristotelis rancidi philosophi. Alias bene possit dici, quod
spiritus sanctus est charitas concurrens seipso cum voluntate ad productionem actus amandi, nisi sit
forte determinatio ecclesiae in oppositum (i.e., at the Council of Vienna 1311/12; see DEC I.361.9-25,
esp. ll. 17-18: et culpa eisdem [parvulis] in baptismo remittitur et virtutes ac informans gratia
infunduntur quoad habitum). Saarinen next argues convincingly that the Augustinian Rom. 5:5/1
John 4:8-centered theology of caritas as gratia increata stands near the center of Luther’s polemics
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Recall that the overall context of the article is the contrast between false and true
repentance, the former focused on actual sin and the latter—without disregarding
actual sin—pressing deeper to the sinful or corrupt nature of the sinner. Now, as I will
argue in Part II of this book, Luther has been convinced since his reading of St. Paul
and the anti-Pelagian treatises of Augustine in 1515 that the dregs and remnants of this
vitiated nature remain a force to be reckoned with (and fought against) in the lives of
the renati, who are really but only partially renewed in this life. For this reason,
repentance can only be restricted to actual sins dealt with in the context of
sacramental penance at the risk of mortal spiritual danger to the penitent. Rather, as
Luther put it in the first of his Ablaßthesen (31 Oct. 1517), “When our Lord and Master
Jesus Christ said, ‘Repent’ (Matt. 4:17), he willed the entire life of believers to be one of
repentance (omnem vitam fidelium penitentiam esse).”281 Two decades later, the

against Ockham, Biel, et al. in the 1515-17 period (pp. 193-8). Later on, however, Luther assumes a
mediating position (pp. 199-201). On the one hand, in the 1537 Zirkulardisputation De veste nuptiali
he explicitly rejects Peter’s teaching in Sent. I d. 17 (WA 39/1.319.25-320.18): Charitatem fecerunt
[scholastici] creatam et increatam. Charitas increata, quae est ipse Deus, iustificat, sed creata non
iustificat, nisi in futura vita; ibi erit perfecta. Iam magister sententiarum est reprehensus, qui dixerit,
Spiritum sanctum esse ipsam charitatem in nobis, et non distinxit inter charitatem infusam seu
creatam et increatam. On the other hand, in the Promotionsdisputation von Palladius und Tilemann
of the same year, Luther argues that the real presence of the indwelling Spirit and the gifts of faith,
hope, love, etc. which he infuses are inextricable (WA 39/1.245.12-246.11 [A]): Neque tantum venit ad
nos sicut artifex aliquis, qui aedificat domum et postea abit et tradit eam alteri possidendam. Sed
semper adest nobis, fulcit et conservat nos. Denn er hat immerdar an uns zu halten, und wie an einem
alten bösen peltz zu flicken. Itaque cum infundit nobis fidem, spem, charitatem, modestiam,
libertatem, beneficientiam, longanimitatem, non discedit, sed manet in nobis. Es were denn, das wir in
selber mutwilliglich mit unsern sünden von uns jagten. Hoc tantum bonum summa cum veneratione
et gratiarum actione agnoscendum est et cavendum, ne amittamus. Et ut Spiritus sanctus nobis
adest, ita adest pater, filius, in suis involucris conclusi et tecti veluti puer in fasciis. Saarinen thus
observes that for Luther in 1537, the Holy Spirit, personally present in the saints as the divine Giver,
is really distinct from his gifts, yet inseparable therefrom (p. 201). This, I suggest, is the nuanced
dogmatic position that lies behind the ambiguity in Luther’s oft-repeated phrases die Gabe des
heiligen Geists and donum Spiritus sancti. I will explore this farther in the argument below,
especially with respect to texts like Rom. 8:13.
281
WA 1.233.10-11, LW 31.25. Cf. Volker Leppin, “‘Omnem vitam fidelium penitentiam esse voluit’—
Zur Aufnahme mystischer Traditionen in Luthers erster Ablaßthese,” ARG 93 (2002), 7-25. Leppin
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mature theologian holds the same doctrine of repentance: “This repentance endures
among Christians till death, since it struggles with the leftover sin in the flesh (der
ubrigen sunde im fleisch) through the whole life.”282
In the Augustinian tradition, the classic scriptural locus for this “leftover” or
“residual sin in the flesh”—in Nikolaus Selnecker’s 1584 translation, peccato residuo in
carne283—is St. Paul’s forthright confession at Rom. 7:14-25 of his grievous battle with
the lex peccati indwelling his members. Luther appeals directly to it here: “As St. Paul
bears witness in Rom. 7[:23], er kempff mit dem Gesetz seiner glieder etc.”284 This battle
against the stubborn remnants of original sin, this true and enduring repentance,
forms the spiritual Sitz im Leben for the ongoing work of the Holy Spirit by his “gift” in
the regenerated saint’s heart. St. Paul fights against his own flesh, not as a strong
Pelagian but as a weak Christian, that is,
… er kempff mit dem Gesetz seiner glieder etc., Und das nicht durch eigen
kreffte, sondern durch die Gabe des heiligen Geists.
… he battles with the law of his members etc., and that not though his own
powers, but through the gift of the Holy Spirit.285
(This “gift,” he adds, “follows upon the forgiveness of sins,” i.e., “grace,” thus reversing
the order found later at SA III.13.286) The Spirit’s gift empowers the believer for the
great battle against “sin”/flesh through lifelong daily repentance. And as the gift of
God the Holy Spirit, it is not weak and ineffectual but potent and transformative: “This

argues convincingly for the decisive influence of the mysticism of John Tauler, the Theologia
Deutsch, and John Staupitz for the formation of Luther’s Bußtheologie.
282
BSLK, 764.3-4, cf. BC, 318.
283
BSLK, 765.3-4: Haec poenitentia in Christianis durat usque ad mortem, quia luctatur cum peccato
residuo in carne per totam vitam.
284
BSLK, 764.4-5, cf. BC, 318.
285
BSLK, 764.5-6, cf. BC, 318.
286
BSLK, 764.5-7, cf. BC, 318.
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same gift (Gabe) daily purifies and sweeps out the remaining sins (die ubrige sunden;
in Selnecker’s Latin, reliquias peccati) and works to make people truly pure and holy
(recht rein und heilig zu machen).”287
Here, then, is a concise formulation of Luther’s trinitarian theology of grace
and gift circa the winter of 1536/37: Jesus Christ brings forgiveness and righteousness
to condemned sinners by his death on the cross, and the Holy Spirit works progressive
renewal in forgiven but still partly sinful or fleshly believers, making them truly pure
and holy.

1.4. Agricola’s Antinomian and Luther’s “Augustinian Simul”
Luther’s strongly-worded articles were presented to the princes of the Smalcaldic
League in February 1537, but for use in their negotiations with Rome they chose
Melanchthon’s more irenic Augsburg Confession and its Apology. When Luther
eventually prepared his articles for publication in 1538, he appended two highly
significant paragraphs to SA III.3. This addendum is directed primarily against the
theological antinomianism of John Agricola, the erstwhile friend and colleague with
whom Luther engaged in protracted controversy from 1537 to 1540.288 But it also
addresses the popular abuse and degeneration of Luther’s teaching on free grace and
justification into a convenient excuse for licentiousness. Esto peccator et pecca fortiter,
after all: reducing progress in sanctification to “the art of getting used to justification”
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BSLK, 764.7-9, cf. BC, 318.
The controversy that flared up in 1537 had roots in the dispute between Agricola and
Melanchthon in the 1520s. See Timothy J. Wengert, Law and Gospel: Philip Melanchthon’s Debate
with John Agricola of Eisleben over “Poenitentia” (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997).
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is a perennially popular theological option.289 As such, these paragraphs—which fit
seamlessly into the confession, and do not introduce any substantial change in its
doctrine—shed invaluable light on the Reformer’s theology of grace and gift,
especially as it pertains to the surprisingly specific sense in which he regards the
graced and gifted Christian as a “sinner.” Luther’s opponents
… maintain that all who once have received the Spirit or the forgiveness of sin
or have become believers, should they sin after that, would remain
nevertheless in the faith, and such sin would not harm them. They shout, “Do
what you will! If you believe, then nothing else matters. Faith blots out all sin,”
etc.290
In short, believers may indeed go on sinning that grace may abound: do what you like,
since faith in Christ blots out all sin. Thus Luther’s doctrine of free justification
elicited from some the same response as St. Paul’s (Rom. 6:1, cf. 3:5-8), and the
Reformer’s response to the antinomian abuse of his teaching was identical to the
Apostle’s: unmitigated opposition. “I have encountered many such foolish people, and
I am concerned that such a devil is still present in some.”291 This is an ominous
allusion to Agricola, no doubt. In it Luther stoutly rejects—as demonic—any version
of the “simul” that eliminates the Christian’s real renewal in holiness and winks at sin
in the name of an exclusively forensic doctrine of justification. Against antinomianism
refined or vulgar, Luther the theologian and pastor urges that sin does indeed do great
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Gerhard O. Forde, “The Lutheran View of Sanctification,” in The Preached God: Proclamation in
Word and Sacrament, eds. Mark C. Mattes and Steven D. Paulson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007),
226-44. Cf. David P. Scaer, “Sanctification in Lutheran Theology,” Concordia Theological Quarterly
49/2-3 (April-July 1985): 181-97; Matthew Harrison, “Sanctification and Charitable Works in
Lutheran Theology,” in Sanctification: New Life in Christ, ed. John A. Maxfield (St. Louis: Concordia
Historical Institute, 2002), cp. 5.
290
BSLK, 764.15-19, cf. BC, 318.
291
BSLK, 764.21-2, BC, 319.
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harm to the Christian, who may not do whatever he wills if he wills to remain in
Christ.
In what sense, then, is the real Christian—forgiven by Christ’s grace and
renewed by the Spirit’s gift—still a sinner? If it is not exactly decisive, it is nonetheless
important that in his explanation of his position Luther does not appeal to “the simul”
(though he describes it) nor does he call Christians “sinners” (though he does explain
the sense in which that is not an improper appellation). Better to call believers “the
holy people (die heiligen Leute),” with this qualification: “they still have and feel the
original sin (die Erbsunde noch haben und fülen) against which also they daily repent
and struggle.”292 As a partly but not yet perfectly renewed “holy people,” believers
must still fight the Pauline battle against the lex peccati lodged within them, which
they have and feel but to which they do not yield their consent. Rather, by virtue of
the Spirit’s Gabe, they overrule the sinful inclinations, desires, and impulses which
their imperfectly renewed nature still obliges them to suffer. As Vinzenz Pfnür has
recently observed vis-à-vis SA III.3,293 Luther insists that in God’s saints,
… the Holy Spirit does not allow die sunde to rule [Rom. 6:12a] and gain the
upper hand so that it is brought to completion (volnbracht werde) [cf. Rom.
7:18b], but controls and forbids, so that it [sc. die sunde] is not able to do what
it wants [Gal. 5:17c].294
292

BSLK, 764.23-5, cf. BC, 319.
Vinzenz Pfnür, “Simul iustus et peccator—Gerecht und Sünder zugleich. Hintergrund bei Luther
und in der katholischen Kontroverstheologie. Abklärung der Kontroverse im amicum colloquium
zwischen Eck und Melanchthon. Augsburg 1530 und Worms 1541,” in Theodor Schneider and
Gunther Wenz, eds., Gerecht und Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen (Freiburg: Herder and
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 227-51, esp. 232 and 249.
294
BSLK, 764.27-9: Denn der heilige Geist lesst die sunde nicht walten und uberhand gewinnen, das
sie volnbracht werde, Sondern steuret und wehret, das sie nicht mus [alt.: darf] thun, was sie wil.
Selnecker translates a little freely (BSLK 765.25-7): Spiritus enim sanctus non sinit peccatum
dominari, invalescere et victoriam obtinere ac consummari, sed reprimit et coërcet, ne facere possit,
quod vult. Kolb and Wengert accept the suggested alternate, reading “darf” for “mus” (BC, 319); this
makes better sense of the grammar, and fits with Selnecker’s translation.
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The Reformer thus acknowledges the presence of “sin” in God’s holy people only in the
limited sense of the persisting remnants of original sin that are throttled, reigned in,
checked, and overruled by the Spirit’s sanctifying Gabe.295
This is Luther’s real “simul” in its most basic form. The twin facts that he (1)
states it in terms drawn from Rom. 6-7 and Gal. 5:17, interpreted unselfconsciously
through the lens of the traditional facere/perficere (volnbracht) distinction, and then
(2) proceeds to summarize his position by pairing together 1 John 3:9 and 1:8 in just
the manner that Augustine had modeled at pecc. mer. 2.7.9-8.10 in the winter of
411/12,296 strongly suggests the depth of its roots in Augustine’s own theology.
As St. John says: “Whoever has been born of God does not sin and cannot sin
(sundigt nicht, und kan nicht sundigen)” [1 John 3:9]. Nevertheless, this is also
the truth (as the same St. John writes): “If we say that we have no sin (wir nicht
sunde haben), we lie, and God’s truth is not in us” [1 John 1:8].297
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Cf. Risto Saarinen, “The Pauline Luther and the Law: Lutheran Theology Reengages the Study of
Paul,” Pro Ecclesia 15/1 (2006): 64-86, here 81: despite the fact that the sinful subject of Rom. 7 is the
spiritual man, “for Luther this does not mean that the speaker in question would actually perform a
morally bad action”; Mickey Mattox, “Martin Luther’s Reception of Paul,” 120: “Paul as Luther
imagines him was not at all a man who struggled with besetting sins.”
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CSEL 60.79-82, WSA I/23.84-5. From Augustine’s summary at §8.10, the matrix for which is
provided by Rom. 8:23-5 (CSEL 60.81-2): Adoptio ergo plena filiorum in redemptione fiet etiam
corporis nostri. primitias itaque spiritus nunc habemus, unde iam filii dei re ipsa facti sumus; in
ceteris uero spe sicut salui, sicut innouati ita et filii dei, re autem ipsa quia nondum salui, ideo
nondum plene innouati, nondum etiam filii dei, sed filii saeculi. proficimus ergo in renouationem
iustamque vitam per quod filii dei sumus et per hoc peccare omnino non possumus [cf. 1 John 3:9b],
donec totum in hoc transmutetur, etiam illud, quo adhuc filii saeculi sumus; per hoc enim et peccare
adhuc possumus. ita fit ut et qui natus est ex deo non peccet [1 John 3:9a] et, si dixerimus, quia
peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos decipiamus et ueritas non sit in nobis [1 John 1:8]… nunc ergo et
similes ei esse iam coepimus primitias habentes spiritus et adhuc dissimiles sumus per reliquias
uetustatis. proinde inquantum similes, in tantum regeneratione spiritu filii dei, in quantum autem
dissimiles, in tantum filii carnis et saeculi. illinc ergo peccare non possumus [1 John 3:9b]; hinc uero,
si dixerimus, quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos decipimus [1 John 1:8] donec totum transeat in
adoptionem et non sit peccator et quaeras locum eius et non inuenias [cf. Ps. 37:10].
297
BSLK, 764.30-33, cf. BC, 319. In citing 1 John 1:8 here, Luther adds the word “Gottes” prior to
“warheit.”
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In Parts II and III of this book, I will attend in depth to the question of how Luther’s
theology of sin, grace, and holiness relates to Augustine’s. For the time being, I pause
to mark the baseline content of Luther’s “Augustinian simul” in its striking Johannine
formulation by supplying (in gut augustinisch fashion) interpretive glosses taken from
Rom. 7/Gal. 5:16-17. Luther’s position in the 1538 addendum to SA III.3 comes to this:
(1) The born of God confess that they have “sin,” that is, the remnants of
original sin, the sinful flesh, the law of sin, the law of one’s members, etc.
(2) Despite this, the regenerate do not sin and indeed cannot sin: that is,
because they are born of God, regenerated by water and the Spirit and
endowed with the Spirit’s gift, they refuse to gratify the sinful desires they still
have and feel within them, and instead restrain and fight against them by the
Spirit’s strong Gabe.
This is, I think it safe to say, a far cry from standard assumptions about Luther’s
“simul.” The reborn kan nicht sundigen! Still, it is important to specify what he takes
St. John to mean. Luther rejects outright the ancient perfectionist claim—revived by
some Anabaptists in the sixteenth century—“that if someone sins after receiving faith
and the Spirit, then that person never really had the Spirit and faith.”298 On Luther’s
reading, 1 John 3:9 does not mean that the regenerate have already obtained the high
gift of not being able to sin at all: in Augustine’s and Peter Lombard’s terms, the
complete eschatological freedom of non posse peccare.299 Rather, 1 John 3:9 means that
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BSLK, 764.19-20, BC, 318.
Sent. II d. 25 cp. 6 de quatuor statibus liberi arbitrii (Grott. I/464-5). Drawing heavily on
Augustine, Peter distinguishes the power of free decision (1) ante peccatum, when nothing impeded
Adam from obtaining the good, and nothing compelled him toward evil; (2) post peccatum but ante
reparationem gratiae, when the fallen human being potest peccare et non potest non peccare, etiam
damnabiliter; (3) post reparationem but ante confirmationem. This is the Christian life of grace in
via, when the regenerate premitur a concupiscentia, sed non vincitur; et habet quidem infirmitatem
in malo, sed gratiam in bono: ut possit peccare propter libertatem et infirmitatem, et possit non
peccare ad mortem propter libertatem et gratiam adiuvantem; nondum tamen habet posse omnino
non peccare vel non posse peccare, propter infirmitatem nondum perfecte absorptam, et propter
gratiam nondum perfecte consummatam; (4) post confirmationem, i.e., in glory, when weakness will
299

102

insofar as the regenerate are and remain so, they do not and cannot sin. But for
Luther, with the Catholic tradition he inherits and the Lutheran tradition he
inspires—but unlike later developments amongst the Reformed—regeneration is
amissible (and, by God’s grace, recoverable).300 When the regenerate do in fact
commit sin by succumbing to the “sin” that they “have” (1 John 1:8), they thereby
forfeit their regeneration.301 So it turns out that the regenerate kan sin after all: but if
and when they do so, they ipso facto cease to be the regenerate.

be completely consumed, the work of grace will be consummated, and the elect will no longer be
able to sin (non posse peccare). For the roots of the Augustinian theology of true freedom in
Augustine himself, see e.g. civ. dei 14.11 (CCSL 48.432, cf. Bett. 569): Arbitrium igitur uoluntatis tunc
est uere liberum, cum uitiis peccatisque non seruit. Tale datum est a Deo; quod amissum proprio
uitio, nisi a quo dari potuit, reddi non potest. Vnde Veritas dicit: ‘Si uos Filius liberauerit, tunc vere
liberi eritis.’ Id ipsum est autem, ac si diceret: Si uos Filius salvos fecerit, tunc uere salui eritis. Inde
quippe liberator, unde saluator. Note well the centrality here of John 8:36, which has a high profile
for the mature Augustine.
300
I claim no authority of my own regarding Lutheran Orthodoxy; but according to Heinrich
Schmid’s useful anthology, the later Lutheran scholastics followed Luther on the amissible nature
of regeneration. See The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, trans. Charles A.
Hay and Henry E. Jacobs (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1899), 458-9, citing David Hollaz (1646-1713): “It
depends, too, upon the fidelity of man, whether he will persevere in the new condition of
regeneration or not, and thus regeneration is amissible; but, at the same time, it is recoverable by
the grace of God, for the way of return to the state of regeneration, so long as life lasts, is open to
him who has fallen from grace.” For Luther, as an Augustinian of the rock-ribbed variety, the
recovery of lost grace is not in one’s own power to obtain. See, e.g., WA 43.537.7-11, LW 5.157-8 (on
Gen. 27:38): Fruamur itaque praesenti benedictione, et oblata gratia post renatam lucem Euangelii,
nec simus negligentes aut ingrati. Si enim semel ablata est benedictio: non est id in nostro arbitrio, ut
eam recuperemus, sed in donatione Dei gratuita, atque ita, ut nullius lachrymis, clamoribus,
laboribus moveatur; WA 44.822.9-14, LW 8.329-30 (on Gen. 50:19-23): Sed regia via incedendum, et
fugiendum est peccatum. Quanquam enim promisit Deus veniam, sicut ait Augustinus, tamen non
promisit hoc, quod certo sis rediturus post lapsum, sicut Saul et Iudas non redeunt. Non est in nostra
potestate apprehendere gratiam, neque scis, an possis remissionem oblatam accipere. Ideo timendus
est Deus, qui et praesumptionem et desperationem odit.
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Pace e.g. Berndt Hamm, “What was the Reformation Doctrine of Justification?” cp. 6 in idem,
The Reformation of Faith in the Context of Late Medieval Theology and Piety: Essays by Berndt
Hamm, ed. Robert J. Bast (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2004), 197-201. Hamm asserts that for Luther, as for
Reformation theology as a whole, “Salvation means the unconditional and thus final acceptance of
the godless, an acceptance that cannot be reversed” (p. 200). That is incorrect: in this section of his
paper, Hamm conflates Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin on the unconditional eschatological finality of
justification and, therefore, the assurance of persevering to the end in salvation. I shall return to
this point in the conclusion of this book.
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In the addendum to SA III.3, Luther makes this point clear by using the story of
David’s great fall from grace and gift alike as an example (2 Sam. 11). When David
commits adultery, murders to cover it up, and thus blasphemes God, he falls into
“open” or “public sin” (offentliche sunde). “At that point,” declares Luther without the
slightest equivocation, “faith and the Spirit have departed.”302 For “when sin does what
it wants”—that is, when the believer stops repenting and struggling by the Gabe
against the residual sin still present in his members, and instead gives free reign for it
to break out into open, actual, consentient sin—“then the Holy Spirit and faith are not
there.”303 David might have resisted the urges of his flesh by the Spirit’s gift, but he did
not; and when he yielded his consent, die sunde lurking in his flesh began to rule,
gained the upper hand, and brought to completion its evil desires. Having laid down
his spiritual arms, quit the holy battle of repentance, and given way to the residual sin
in his flesh, David forfeited his good standing in “the holy people” who enjoy the
exalted status gratiae et doni.
In terms of Luther’s polemic against antinomian counterfeits of his theology of
justification, this means that when David progresses (that is, regresses) from “having
and feeling sin” in his flesh to the point of actually committing sin through consent,
the “simul” simply breaks down. Suppose a hypothetical fighting David, who saw
Bathsheba, manfully resisted the lusts of his flesh by the Spirit’s Gabe, and turned the
other way. He could not but confess that he is a sinner, for he laments and longs to be
freed from the sinful desires that afflict him; yet he would remain very much a
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BSLK, 764.25-7: … das als denn der glaube und Geist weg ist gewest. Cf. BC, 319.
BSLK, 764.29-30: Thut sie [sc. die sunde] aber, was sie will, So ist der heilige Geist und glaube nicht
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righteous and holy man at the same time, the grievousness of his lust to his own soul
being the chief proof of the reality of his holiness. And to this we can add that, having
engaged in such a painful conflict and emerged the victor by the Spirit’s power, a sinkilling, repenting, and believing David would have made real progress in holiness. For
in that case, the Spirit’s Gabe would have purified and swept away der ubrigen sunde a
little bit more, and worked to make him recht rein und heilig. But alas, David chose not
to fight this battle; faith and the Spirit departed from him; and this meant, in Luther’s
judgment, that fallen David—prior to the subsequent renewal of his repentance and
faith in the Gospel (2 Sam. 12:13, Ps. 51)—became an unqualified peccator, no longer
iustus in any sense at all.304

1.5. Grace, gift, and the “simul”
To this point I have referred to Luther’s “simul” exclusively in terms of the real but
partial renewal in holiness effected by the Spirit’s gift. This is, as I argued above, its
baseline content, and David’s example leaves no room for doubt on this score. Only
spiritually regenerate, Gabe-empowered, sin-fighting, daily-repenting believers attain
the lofty status of the “simul.” But this does not yet fully describe the complexity and
richness of Luther’s teaching; and to do this, we must take into account the ongoing
role of “grace” in the life of the Spirit-gifted believer. In stressing (as I have, following
Luther) the distinction between “having and feeling sin” on the one hand, and
committing sin through consent on the other; and in insisting on the spiritually-
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decisive role of refusing consent to residual sin through gift-empowered repentance; it
is possible to lose sight of the fact that the “sin” which a regenerate believer has, feels,
and fights against is in fact—sin. This, as Luther sees it, is the basic error of his
opponents. Having denuded the lex peccati of its sinful quality in the baptized, “they
only do penance for actual sins, such as evil thoughts to which they consent (böse
bewilligete gedancken),” because in itself—apart from consent—the “evil impulse, lust,
and inclination was not sin (böse bewegung, lust, reitzung, war nicht sunde).”305
Now, in saying this Luther is not dismissing the spiritually vital significance of
refusing consent to indwelling sin’s böse bewegung, lust, or reitzung. David’s example
proves that in this respect, the Reformer agrees with his opponents: whether the
believer retains faith and the Spirit through repentance or forfeits both through
consent to the evil impulse in his flesh determines whether or not he remains in statu
gratiae et doni. Rather, Luther is insisting—against the majority position in the
tradition—that already prior to consent, the evil impulse, lust, and inclination that
constitutes the remnant of original sin in the regenerate is itself intrinsically sinful. In
Part II below, I will come to the question of how this relates to Augustine’s shifting
evaluations of concupiscentia in the 410s and 20s and Luther’s engagement with
Augustine’s texts in 1515. For now, I content myself with an analysis of how the real
sinfulness of original sin’s remnants in the saints factors into Luther’s theology of
grace, gift, and the “simul.”
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To this end, we return once more to SA III.13: “How a person becomes
righteous before God (fur Gott gerecht wird), and concerning good works.”306 I drew
attention above to Luther’s teaching on regeneration/renewal in this article; now we
must see how the gift of new life, fruitful in good works, relates to the grace of
forgiveness in Christ. Luther sums up his entire theology of grace and gift in their
interrelation vis-à-vis the saints’ residual sin in a tw0-sentence proposition:
… wir durch den glauben (wie S. Petrus sagt) ein ander neu, rein hertz kriegen
und Gott umb Christi willen, unsers Mittlers, uns fur gantz gerecht und heilig
halten wil und hellt; ob wol die sunde im fleisch noch nicht gar weg oder tod
ist, so wil er sie doch nicht rechen noch wissen.
… through faith (as St. Peter says) we receive a different, new, pure heart, and
for the sake of Christ our Mediator, God wants to and does regard us as
completely righteous and holy; although the sin in the flesh is still not
completely gone or dead, God will nevertheless not count it or consider it.307
The first sentence comprises Luther’s teaching on how a sinner becomes righteous
(gerecht wird) in the gracious divine act of justification: his heart is renewed through
faith, and God regards him as completely righteous and holy for the sake of Jesus
Christ the Mediator. In short, Gabe and gnade, real renewal and forensic/imputational
justification propter Christum, together form the complex reality of justification
conceived as a whole; they are, as we saw in Luther’s 1532 comment on Ps. 51:2, the
“two parts of justification.” But why, if the sinner has really received a new and pure
heart through faith, does he still need God to regard him as righteous and holy for
Christ’s sake?
The renewed believer, pure of heart by faith, still needs Christ’s mediation and
God’s justification because of “the sin in the flesh,” which despite the reality of renewal
306
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“is still not completely gone or dead.” It is, I think, unfortunate that Kolb and Wengert
omit the word die before sunde im fleisch in their translation. Their anarthrous “sin in
the flesh” leaves the door open to the very sort of antinomian interpretation of his
theology that Luther is keen to stamp out, for it obscures the specificity of die sunde
that keeps the pure-hearted Christian in constant need of die Gnade of forgiveness in
Christ. In fact, Luther operates here with the same high degree of precision regarding
the nature of “the sin” that remains in believers which we saw above. “The sin in the
flesh” that is not yet completely gone or dead despite the different, new, pure heart
that comes through faith is the original sin of Adam in the depleted, fragmentary,
residual, and overruled form it assumes in the regenerate person. By the power of the
Gabe, the renewed repent of and fight against this sin in their flesh; that is, they refuse
to yield to its böse bewegung, lust, or reitzung. But because the sin in the flesh really is
and remains sin even in its overruled condition, it still needs to be forgiven if the
“sinful” believer is to enjoy reconciled fellowship with the true God, who is perfect in
holiness. This lack, the Gnade of forgiveness and (forensic) justification through Christ
the Mediator supplies. For his sake, God “wants to and does regard us as completely
righteous and holy,” even though we are in fact only partly so, inchoately renewed
through faith but still bearing the remnants of Adam’s sin in our flesh. The latter God
in his mercy does not “count” or “impute” (rechen) to our account. In short, through
Jesus Christ the Mediator the remaining “sin” in believers is not imputed to their
account, and instead God regards them as perfectly righteous and holy.
This is the “grace” that, so far from conflicting with the role of the “gift” in the
lives of the renewed, complements and completes it. The Spirit renews the redeemed
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of Jesus in true righteousness and holiness; and whatever remains of the old Adam in
their flesh as they are progressively renewed, God mercifully covers, overlooks, and
disregards for the sake of Christ, seeing in believers only the perfect righteousness and
holiness of the Mediator whom they grasp hold of by faith. Translated into the terms
of the “simul,” this means Luther teaches that believers are “sinners” for one reason,
but righteous and holy for two. They remain sinners because of die sunde im fleisch,
the remnants of Adam’s sin that persist in them despite the reality of their renewal.
Yet they are righteous and holy—partly but really—through the Spirit’s Gabe, the gift
of faith that renews and purifies their hearts and empowers them to rule over the sin
that remains. And this sin cannot harm them, because they are also righteous by the
Gnade of Jesus Christ, who presents them holy and blameless before the Father by the
power of the blood he shed in their place as the Mediator. That is to say, this sin
cannot harm them so long as they continue to battle against it in repentance and to
grasp hold of Christ by faith. If, as in the case of David, the sinful flesh is permitted to
break out into open sin, it is spiritually lethal: faith and the Spirit depart; Christ’s
righteousness, graspable only by faith, is grasped no longer; and the one who had once
been righteous in two senses and “sinful” only in the very specific way I have just
described is righteous no longer, a sinner pure and simple.
This is Luther’s mature theology of residual sin, grace, and holiness as he
confesses it in the Smalcald Articles.

2. The First (18 Dec. 1537), Second (12 Jan. 1538), and Third (6 Sept. 1538) Disputations
against the Antinomians

109

We have already seen Luther expositing his theology of grace, gift, and the “simul”
with respect to John Agricola’s aberrant antinomianism. I turn now to the set of three
disputations which Luther held in 1537 and 1538 to publicly clarify his position on the
proper use of the law in articulo iustificationis. For the purposes of my argument,
however, both the tangled skein of the number of uses Luther envisions for the law308
and the time-honored Lutheran pastime of distinguishing law and Gospel309 are
mainly tangential. My object is again to set out his theology of grace and gift, and in so
doing to elucidate the sense in which the Christian remains sinful while advancing in
real holiness of life. For the most part, I follow Martin Brecht’s recent analysis of these
texts: though his spare remarks on the sanctifying work of the Spirit are
underdeveloped, his compelling case for the continuity of Luther’s Bußtheologie from
1517 on, with its focus on the peccatum remanens, points in the right direction.310 I
have chosen to treat the three disputations as a single text. Though this is somewhat
artificial, their thematic unity, their temporal proximity to one another, and the
consistency of Luther’s theology within this short span of time (as within his last
308
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decade taken as a whole) argue in favor of this approach. For ease of reference, I will
abbreviate as follows: “D 1.4” refers to the first disputation in its fourth argument.

2.1. Luther’s theology of grace and gift in the Disputations
Because the presenting issue in the disputations is the role of the law, the lion’s share
of passages wherein Luther’s theology of grace and gift surfaces speak directly and
concretely of Jesus Christ’s work in fulfilling the law once for all on the cross (“grace”)
and the Holy Spirit’s work in the saints empowering them to keep the law in their own
right (“gift”). The quasi-technical use of the terms gratia and donum to designate this
trinitarian soteriology is present in the disputations, but relatively rare.

2.1.1. Gratia and donum: verba et res
To begin with “grace”: at D 1.3, for example, Luther states that “grace properly (gratia
proprie) is the fulfillment of the law, the forgiveness of sins, righteousness, and life in
Christ.”311 Note that to the familiar “grace” of forgiveness, righteousness, and life in
Christ is now added the fulfillment of the law. This does not mark a substantial
innovation so much as an epexegetical fleshing-out of the fullness of Christ’s grace.
The believer has Christ’s perfect obedience, even to death on the cross, as his own; and
to say this is to say that he possesses forgiveness, righteousness, and life propter
Christum. This is gratia proprie. Thus at D 1.14, Luther explains that the law-broken
penitent ought to hear the “word of grace” (verbum gratiae) from his choice Pauline
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proof-text, Rom. 3:22-24: “the free forgiveness of sin by God’s grace (per gratiam Dei) is
to be taught, through the redemption (per redemptionem) which is in Christ Jesus.”312
The same nexus of grace and redemption through Christ’s cross emerges at D 1.21.
Referring to John 1:29, Isa. 53:4-6, and Gal. 2:21, Luther explains that the Gospel
teaches that satisfaction for sins comes about only through God’s slain Lamb, and
declares that all who believe this cannot doubt the grace of God (gratia Dei) unless
they want to imply that Christ died for nothing.313 Similarly at D 2.13, those whom the
law has taught to “learn to aspire for grace (gratiam)” seek and thirst for Christ, the
Lamb of God.314 By faith in the Gospel of grace through the Lamb, the embattled
Christian can tell the law that accuses him of his sins:
Behold, Christ is already present here, without me (hic iam adest sine me). For I
certainly have this Christ (eum habeo Christum), who makes me alive, saves,
justifies, and gives eternal life, and this freely (gratis) and though I am
unworthy, therefore without me (sine me). And now, be quiet! For Christ is
already here, that is, peace and the forgiveness of sin because of his blood.315
The odd-sounding adest sine me in the first sentence becomes clearer by the end of
the second: “without me,” that is, without regard to the sinner’s own unworthiness,
Jesus Christ is freely present with and for him, bringing the grace of forgiveness and
peace with God won for the believer by his shed blood. Finally, two passages from D 3
which illuminate the connection between “grace,” imputation, and the blood of the
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Mediator. In his preface, Luther explains that sin is taken away completely by
imputation (reputative seu imputative), which means that “the mercy and grace
(gratia) of God has removed sin.”316 This gracious imputation takes place through and
for the sake of Jesus Christ, “the Propitiator and Mediator,” whom the condemned
sinner grasps by faith.317 Likewise at D 3.2.2[29], believers are already “utterly saints
and righteous by way of imputation,” because it is certain that “we have been baptized
in Christ’s blood and received by the Father into grace for Christ’s sake (in gratiam
propter Christum), in whom we believe.”318
In sum: in these disputations, gratia properly defined is virtually identical to
Gnade in the SA, and Luther develops his theology of grace on the basis of the same
catena of scriptural texts taken from Isaiah, John, and Paul. “Grace” means free
forgiveness, righteousness, and peace with God for the unworthy, through faith in the
Lamb who made satisfaction for sins and brought redemption to his own by his blood.
If there is a new nuance here, it lies in the tendency to define grace in terms of God’s
merciful imputation for the sake of Christ’s perfect fulfillment of the law. And in fact,
as I suggested above and as we shall see in further depth below, for the most part it is
this forensic nuance that takes center-stage in the disputations regardless of whether
or not the Reformer speaks explicitly about gratia. But as the texts I have cited
demonstrate, each mention of God’s gracious or merciful imputation and/or Jesus
Christ’s propitiatory and redeeming fulfillment of the law marks an instance of
Luther’s theology of grace.
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On my reckoning, there are only three explicit references to the donum of the
Holy Spirit in the disputations. In each case, the context is an interesting
pneumatological parallel to Luther’s familiar christological distinction between God
hidden in his majesty and revealed in the incarnation and cross of the Son.319 When, in
accordance with John 16:8, the Spirit acts to convict the sinner, he speaks in his divine
majesty and terrifies hearts. “Yet when he is enveloped in tongues and spiritual gifts
(donis spiritualibus), then he is called the gift (donum), sanctifies, and vivifies.”320 In D
1.17, Luther explains further: “For usually we call the Holy Spirit the One whom Christ
sent us from the Father as gift (donum) in order that he might be our Vivifier,
Sanctifier (noster vivificator, sanctificator), etc.”321 Thus when the Spirit is “God in his
nature,” he is the Law’s author and he convicts of sin; but when he is “the gift through
Christ (donum per Christum), he is our Vivifier and Sanctifier.”322 Arguing along the
same lines at D 2.29, Luther concludes that “the Holy Spirit as God terrifies by the law,
but as gift (donum), in the form of a dove, in the fiery tongue, he consoles, sanctifies,
and vivifies.”323 Thus in the disputations, the “gift” of the Holy Spirit refers principally
to the Spirit himself in his evangelical (as opposed to legal) operations, that is, the
Spirit clothed in his dona spiritualia and at work in the saints of God thereby,
sanctifying them and giving them life. As we shall see presently, in the context of the
disputations Luther primarily correlates the Spirit’s sanctifying work with the renewal
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of law-keeping in the justified. In each case, this is an instance of his theology of the
gift.

2.1.2. Grace and gift: res, non verba
I turn now to some select examples of how Luther develops his theology of grace and
gift in the disputations without mentioning either gratia or donum, and instead
describing the work of Jesus Christ and the Spirit in terms taken directly from the
Bible. Sometimes, he does so without immediate reference to the law. For example, at
D 1.14 Luther sums his theology of grace and gift by coupling John 1:29 and 3:8: “Christ
is the Lamb of God on whose shoulders the sins of the entire world are placed, and the
Holy Spirit is efficacious (efficax) and blows and works where he wills.”324 Likewise at
D 1.20, Luther sets out the same teaching by joining Rom. 8:1 and 8:13: “There is no
condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus; and if they still have remnants of sin,
nevertheless by the Spirit those remaining deeds of the flesh are put to death.”325 Or,
in a compact statement of this theology found in the preface to the third disputation,
Luther alludes to Rom. 4:6-8/Ps. 32:1-2 and 8:23 to this effect: Christians are “pure and
holy, but first through imputation, because sin is not imputed to us; secondly, we also
are formally righteous, as soon as I, through these firstfruits (primitias) and the Holy
Spirit given to me from heaven, through faith begin to wrestle and fight with sin and
blasphemy.”326 Finally, in a fascinating witness to the enduring role of Brautmystik in
his theology—drawn from the Song of Songs, Eph. 5:23-32, etc., and mediated above
all by Bernard of Clairvaux—at D 3.1 Luther teaches that when it is a matter of
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justification and the peace of consciences, “here we are in the Lord, who is our
Bridegroom (noster sponsus) and does not suffer anyone else to sleep with us in this
narrow bed.” For in the bridal chamber of the believer’s conscience, only Jesus Christ
may reign as king. But this regal Lover is impatient with his consort’s flesh, and leads
the fight against it, remaining in his chamber to console his bride and giving the Holy
Spirit to arm her for the battle.327 In each of these passages and in scripturally-varied
ways, Luther exposits his theology of grace, forgiveness, and justification in Jesus
Christ and of ongoing growth in real holiness through the gift of the Holy Spirit.

2.1.3. Grace, gift, and impletio legis: res, non verba
More often than not, Luther sets his theology of Christ’s grace and the Spirit’s gift in
direct relation to the fulfillment of the law (impletio legis). In such cases, Matt. 5:17 (“I
have not come to destroy the law, but to fulfill it”), Matt. 22:37-40, Gal. 3:13, Rom. 3:31,
8:1-4, 8:23, and 10:4 are especially prominent. Luther’s own remarks at D 1.1 provide a
useful summary statement of his position: “By freely submitting himself to his own
law, and enduring all its curses, Christ merited the Spirit for those who believe in him;
and with the Spirit impelling them, they begin to fulfill the law even in this life; and in
the future life, a most joyful and perfect obedience to the law will be in them, so that
in body and soul they will do then what the angels do now.”328 The Reformer revisits
this twofold trinitarian impletio legis so frequently in the disputations that it would be
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tedious to review each occurrence.329 But I will supply representative examples that
draw out particular nuances within his overall design.
(1) In the preface to the first disputation, Luther cites Matt. 5:17 and then
exegetes it, from the perspective of Jesus, in terms of Christ’s and the Spirit’s work in
bringing about the law’s fulfillment in the redeemed:
I did not come to abolish the law, but to fulfill it, which demonstrates that my
office is not to take away the law, but to fulfill it: and to fulfill it in such a way,
that those who believe that they are redeemed from the curse of the law (Gal.
3:13) through this, my fulfillment of the law (hanc meam legis impletionem),
may know that the law is to be fulfilled by them here (legem a se hic
implendam), especially since they have already received the firstfruits of the
Holy Spirit (Rom. 8:23).330
Luther goes on to explain this further in terms of Rom. 3:31 and 8:3-4. Justification by
faith apart from works of the law (Rom. 3:28) does not destroy the law, but establishes
it: first by setting sinners free from its curse through Christ’s impletio legis; then by
empowering the redeemed to do in the Spirit’s strength what had previously been
impossible for them to do on their own, ut iustificatio legis impleretur in nobis.331 Both
in Christ extra nos and by the Spirit in nobis, the law is upheld and confirmed
precisely because it is kept. On the basis of Christ’s fulfillment of the law in the
sinner’s place, God justifies the ungodly with full respect to the perfection of his own
justice as it is expressed in the law; and this forensic, atonement-focused justification
in Christ is intrinsically ordered to the Gerechtmachung, the iustificatio legis in nobis,
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that begins to take shape in the redeemed by the power of the Spirit’s primitiae (Rom.
8:23).
(2) In D 1.12, the polemicist gegen die Antinomer explains the precise sense in
which he too affirms that Jesus Christ has abolished or abrogated the law. As the
above-quoted excerpt from Luther’s preface already demonstrates, Gal. 3:13’s
maledictum legis provides the crucial distinction.332 It is with respect to the law’s
“curse,” that is, to the law in its exacting, accusing, condemning, terrifying, and
punishing function, that Christ has abrogated the law. As for St. Paul in Gal. 3-4, so for
Luther here, the emphasis therefore lies on Christ’s self-substituting submission to the
law in penal suffering (cf. Gal. 4:4-5). Because the law condemned him though he was
innocent (cf. Rom. 8:3), Christ took from it its whole power to condemn anyone who
trusts in him (cf. Rom. 8:1).333 When Christ is present, the exacting law that punishes
sinners comes to an end (Rom. 10:4), since he has already fulfilled all its demands.334
This takes place “through the forgiveness of sins and divine imputation,” that is to say,
“God wills to consider the law fulfilled (Deus vult habere legem pro impleta lege) when
we believe in the Fulfiller of the law (impletorem legis).”335 Though the law’s sentence
is not fulfilled in the believing sinner, who deserves nothing short of death and hell,
God forgives him and regards him as a righteous law-keeper on account of Christ the
impletor. So far the theology of “grace” in D 1.12, to which Luther promptly annexes the
complementary “gift”: “On top of this, God gives the Holy Spirit, in order that we may
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begin to fulfill the law here,” with a view to the future life when we will be similes
impletori Christo (cf. 1 John 3:2) and thus keep the law perfectly.336
(3) In D 1.13, weaving together Acts 15:9-11 and Matt. 11:28-30 with allusions to
Rom. 5:1, 5:12-21, and Phil. 2:8, Luther states that the condemning “yoke” of the law is
replaced by Christ’s light and easy yoke, “so that they may live in peace under him
who rendered the obedience owed and required by the law, and gives it to those who
believe in him.”337 As in the preceding argument, the overarching terms are set by Gal.
3:13 and liberation through Christ’s impletio legis from the law’s curse. But whereas at
D 1.12 the emphasis rested on Christ’s substitutionary penal sufferings, here his own
“active” (to speak anachronistically, but clearly) obedientia rises to the fore: to those
who lack the obedience owed to the law, Christ gives his obedience as their very
own.338 Thus the believer is not only set free from the law’s curse by Christ’s becoming
a curse in his place. He is also given Christ’s entire obedience as his own, possessed of
which he stands before God as innocent and blameless as Christ himself. By faith, he
has fulfilled the law, because by faith he has Christ’s obedientia—or, as Luther
explicitly says at D 2.4, Christ’s aliena iustitia339—as his own. Et tamen, the law is still
to be fulfilled by the godly (piis) as well: and to this end, they mortify the deeds of the
flesh by the Spirit (Rom. 8:13) and purge out the old leaven (1 Cor. 5:7).340 Thus the
“gift” of law-keeping by the Spirit, so far from being rendered superfluous by Christ’s
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“grace,” is in fact rendered possible by the transformation (through that grace) of a
grievous and intolerable burden into the light and easy iugum Christi. Once again,
grace in Christ is ordered to the gift of the Spirit.
(4) In D 1.14, Luther develops the same theology with special reference to Rom.
8:3-4, which he interprets in light of his distinction between an imputational and a
real or formal fulfillment of the law. Weakened by the flesh, the law cannot justify and
save. But God in his mercy has done what the law, thus weakened, could not do: “he
sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and damned sin in the flesh through sin, in
order that the justification of the law (iustificatio legis) might be fulfilled in us.”341
Luther takes full advantage of this rich scripture to elaborate his bedrock theology of
incarnation and atonement. Bearing our flesh, Christ “killed” our sin by his sacrifice on
the cross, “so that in this way, the righteousness of the law (iustitia legis) might be
fulfilled in us.”342 This righteousness, obtained by the cross of God’s Son, is fulfilled in
nobis in two ways: “first, by way of imputation (imputative), then also formally
(formaliter).”343 This second kind of righteousness refers to the formal renovation of
human nature, such that the ungodly is not only declared to be righteous from
without for Christ’s sake but is in fact also made righteous deep within by the
operation of the Spirit. The God who sent his Son in our flesh to shed his blood ex
gratia
… gives the Spirit to those who believe this (haec [viz., gratia]), in order that
they may begin to hate sin ex animo, to acknowledge this immense,
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incomprehensible, and ineffable gift (donum) and to thank God for it, to love,
worship, and call upon God, to expect everything from him.344
Since Luther quotes Rom. 8:32 in the next sentence, it is clear that the “gift” in
question here is the gift of God’s Son in the incarnation and on the cross—a good
reminder that gratia and donum do not always function as technical terms.
Nevertheless, in D 1.14 we again find Luther developing his creedal theology of grace
and gift, of righteousness won through the cross of God’s incarnate Son, imputed to
believers, and effectually worked within them by the Spirit through the formal
renovation of their nature. For by the Spirit’s renewing work, the vitiated filii Adae
begin again to engage in those spiritual actions which unite them with God, viz., to
know, acknowledge, thank, worship, and love God.
None of this, Luther insists, comes ex nobis. Rather, all is ex gratia Dei mittentis
filium in carnem.345 This reflexive anti-Pelagian qualification of formal righteousness
probably has two points of reference in this context. On the one hand, Luther upholds
the commonplace Augustinian conviction that all righteousness has its origin in the
free generosity of God: non ex nobis, sed ex gratia Dei (cf. Eph. 2:8). In this regard,
Luther stands in an august line of high and late medieval Augustinians contra
pelagianos modernos. But on the other hand, he seems to be making a point more
immediately related to the dynamics of his own theology of grace and gift, namely,
that the formal renewal of the justified into real righteousness of life is itself the fruit
and outworking of God’s “grace” in the incarnation and atonement of his Son. In other
words, he is again linking the Spirit’s “gift” to Christ’s “grace” in the closest possible
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way, by causally rooting the gift of formal renewal by the Spirit in the grace of
atonement and (forensic) justification through the Son.
(5) I turn last to the Reformer’s rich exposition of these themes at D 2.3, where
three times he unfolds his theology of grace and gift vis-à-vis the law’s fulfillment both
imputatively and formally or purgatively. He builds the first on a christological
interpretation of Isa. 9:4. Jesus Christ breaks “the yoke of burden and the rod of the
exactor,” that is, the exactio legis which accuses the sinner, because he “devours
(devorantem) our sin in his own body” (cf. 1 Pet. 2:24).346 Thus Luther explains that by
way of imputation (imputative), sin is dead and ceases to affect the Christian “when I
receive forgiveness of sins because of faith in Christ, and I am utterly set free from sin,
as if it were nothing, as if we were already in heaven.”347 But at the same time, because
“certain remnants (reliquiae) of every kind of sin” adhere in us, sin is also removed and
ceases in Christians formaliter et expurgative.348 Notably, in this first case Luther does
not actually speak of the Spirit’s sanctifying work at all—though it is assumed—and
locates the agency of progressive growth in holiness firmly in the renewed Christian
himself: “Day by day, more and more, I purge and mortify (expurgo et mortifico) the
sin still adhering in my flesh, till finally everything that belongs to the old man is
taken away and consumed, and a pure and glorified man, without any spot or blemish,
comes forth.”349
Luther’s donum-rendition of the traditional gratia cooperans becomes clearer
in the second instance of his theology of grace and gift in D 2.3. The believer is free
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from sin and the accusing law first imputative, “since sins against the law are not
imputed to me and are pardoned on account of the most precious blood of the
immaculate Lamb, Jesus Christ my Lord.”350 Then, Luther immediately adds, he is also
set free from sin expurgative, “when the Holy Spirit is given to me.”351 But this
purgation by the gift of the Spirit is not a monergistic affair, for the Spirit’s operation
quickens and sustains a spiritual agency on the part of the redeemed person himself:
“having received the Spirit, I begin to hate ex animo everything that offends his name,
and I become a pursuer of good works. And if there is something of the remnant of sin
in me, I purge it until I become totally pure—and this in the same Spirit (in eodem
spiritu) who is given for Christ’s sake.”352
The third place builds on the first two, implicitly explaining the relation
between the Spirit’s work and the redeemed person’s renewed spiritual agency in
terms of the latter’s new-found love for the righteousness required by the law. In a
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striking use of Col. 2:14, Luther first states that “Christ took our place and supplied
what we lack, and erased by his blood the handwriting of the decree which was against
us, until the law was finally satisfied by one in the place of us all.”353 Thus sin’s guilt
and the accusing law are clear taken away by Christ’s death in our place. But sin is also
taken away formaliter when it is “purged and eliminated,” and the law itself—that is,
the accusing law—also ceases formaliter
… when what the law demands is done in us (fit in nobis), and we render it
freely and willingly (ultro et volentes), not just because the law demands it, but
out of love of righteousness (ex amor iustitiae) and the right and of God
himself.354
Prior to the renovating operation of the Spirit, fleshly humans only ever keep the law
out of fear of punishment or hope of reward.355 But in those redeemed from the law’s
debt-sheet by Christ’s blood, the Spirit so transforms the heart that the Christian is no
longer motivated to keep the law by compulsion or self-complacence, but by real love
for the righteousness expressed in and required by it. I shall attend to this point
further in section 2.2 below.
In sum, Luther’s position in the disputations comes to this: although it is no
longer possible, after the fall of Adam, for vitiated humans to keep the law, God sent
his Son in our flesh to keep it for us, in our place. He fulfilled it positively through his
active obedience (as later Protestant theology would put it), keeping all its
commandments; and he fulfilled it negatively through passive obedience, suffering all
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its sanctions by taking its curse upon himself on the cross in our place. In the
preaching of the Gospel, Jesus Christ gives his superabundant twofold impletio legis to
the believer as his own, and thus sets him free from the law’s curse. At the same time,
Christ gives his Spirit, so that the just requirements of the law—summed up in the
twofold love commandment—might begin to be fulfilled ex corde in those who have
been set free from its curse; and what is begun really but imperfectly in this mortal life
will be brought to completion in the resurrection to come. In the terms of this study,
Christ’s “grace” sets believers free from the law’s curse so that by the Spirit’s “gift” they
may begin to keep the law. This is Luther’s creedal theology of grace and gift,
transposed into the framework of the law in order to reply to the antinomian
challenge but identical in substance to his confession in the Smalcald Articles.

2.1.4. The renovation of Adam and impletio legis
In chapter 1, I argued that Adam’s being and life in the divine image needed to be
understood in part in terms of natural law. In his lectures on Gen. 1-3, Luther depicts
the unfallen Adam as one who keeps the law of his nature—which can be properly
reduced to wholehearted love of God and neighbor—spontaneously and with great
joy. Now I shall argue just the reverse, that is, that the theology of renewed lawkeeping by the Spirit’s gift set forth in Luther’s disputations is at once a theology of
the restoration of fallen and vitiated human nature to its original wholeness and
holiness. Theses 29-32 from D 1 show that Luther, no less than Irenaeus or Augustine,
is able to compress his entire soteriology into St. Paul’s Adam-Christ typology: dead in
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sin through the first Adam, we are justified and made alive in the Last,356 who is the
Promised Seed of Gen. 3:15.357 And in D 1.15, to which I drew attention above, Luther
states that Christ is given in order that the “disease” (morbus) infecting Adam’s nature
may be “healed” (medeatur); for he came in the likeness of Adam’s sinful flesh that “he
might seek the lost and restore (restituat) the corrupt nature to its integrity” (note
Luther’s composite allusion to Luke 19:10 and Acts 3:21).358 In the fourth set of theses—
which were never disputed—Luther says virtually the same thing, but now in terms
not of nature but of law: in thesis 40 repeating his allusions to Luke 19:10 and Acts 3:21,
then concluding in thesis 41 that “the law is not taken way through Christ, but
restored (restituitur), so that Adam might become such as he was and even better.”359
Thus for Luther, the law is restored in Christ because “Adam”—viz., humana natura—
is restored and perfected in him. But we shall have to look into this a bit further, in
relation to the Spirit and the law.
Remember that for Luther vitiated humans need the help of the revealed law,
summed in the Decalogue, the Golden Rule, and the twofold love commandment, “so
that we might be reminded of what we were before Adam’s fall (quid ante lapsum Adae
fuerimus).”360 The law’s perfection and beauty gives some sense of what unfallen
Adam’s original being was like in its natural perfections. Because he was given the gift
of being and acting as a law-keeper by virtue of his creation in the divine image,
356
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obeying the law was not only a possible but an enjoyable or pleasant (iucunda)
exercise for Adam; he obeyed it perfectly, “with the highest will and gladness of soul
(summa voluntate et laetitia animi),” because it was identical to the law of his being as
the protological Man.361 That, I argued in chapter 1, is the fuller picture that emerges
from comparing Luther’s wistful portraits of Adam in the lectures on Gen. 1-3 with the
theology of the law developed in the disputations.
In D 1.1, after asserting the glad and voluntary nature of unfallen Adam’s
obedience to the law, Luther continues to explain that what was possible and pleasant
for Adam has become impossible and terrifying to us, not because the law has
changed but because we have by Adam’s fall.362 It is no accident that at this point
Luther pairs our impossibility and terror before the law, for they correspond to the
twofold predicament of Adam’s fallen children: natural corruption and subjection to
the law’s curse of death and damnation. This sets the stage for the concise statement
of the Reformer’s theology of grace and gift already noted above: “By freely submitting
himself to his own law, and enduring all its curses, Christ merited the Spirit for those
who believe in him; and with the Spirit impelling them, they begin to fulfill the law
even in this life; and in the future life, a most joyful and perfect obedience to the law
(iucundissima et perfectissima obedientia legis) will be in them, so that in body and
soul they will do then what the angels do now.”363 It is at first glance a little odd that
Luther begins with Adam only to end with the angels, but keep in mind that in
Luther’s protology even unfallen Adam looked in hope for the future translatio to the
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fullness of spiritual life with and in God. What Luther is saying therefore comes to
this: Jesus Christ takes away the curse of the law, and with it its terror, making it
“pleasant” once again to those redeemed by his blood. Then by the gift of his Spirit, he
renders the law possible even in this life by beginning to restore vitiated human
nature to its original perfection. This beginning will attain its end in the angelic,
iucundissima et perfectissima obedientia legis that will be in us—body and soul—in the
coming resurrection. Thus in D 1.1, and in terms of the impletio legis, Luther develops
a full-fledged theology of Adam’s redemption and restoration in Christ by the Spirit.364

2.2. Luther’s partim/partim or “Augustinian simul”
In these 1537-38 disputations, as in the 1538 addendum to SA III.3 examined above,
Luther’s “simul” is predominantly and basically an account of the renewed Christian
undergoing the Holy Spirit’s progressive sanctifying work while battling—in the power
of the Spirit’s gift—against the “sin” or “flesh” that still remains in a depleted,
fragmentary, and overruled form.365 The heart of this spiritual battle—fought only by
the saints—is the struggle to refuse consent to the sinful desires that constitute one’s
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“flesh.” These desires at once entice and grieve the renewed person, who, as “spirit”
(spiritus), suffers their presence unwillingly (invitus) and longs for the eschatological
freedom of perfection in righteousness. Thus we find ourselves once again in the
familiar territory of an anthropology and penitential spirituality driven by a deeply
Augustinian interpretation of Rom. 6-8, Gal. 5:16-17, and the Psalter. In this section I
continue to build my case for this, Luther’s real “simul” by first studying the Spirit’s
work in creating the renewed spiritus by producing holy desires in the donumrenovated heart. I then sample a few choice battle scenes that especially highlight the
logic of non-consent to “sin” that comprises the spiritual linchpin of Luther’s “simul.”
In the following section 2.3, I will interpret the rather sparse texts that Wilfried Joest
employed in 1951 to make his case for the so-called Totalaspekt of the “simul.”

2.2.1. The Spirit’s re-creation of the soul through holy desires
In studying D 2.3 above, I took note of the Spirit’s work in producing amor iustitiae in
the renewed heart, so that the believer begins to keep the law willingly and gladly.
This, states Luther at D 2.14, is what the law—grasped in its true spiritual depths—
really requires of us: not just external conformity to precepts, but a pure, spiritual,
joyful heart (or “spirit”) brought into being through the renovating work of the Holy
Spirit.366 Such a heart is the effect and production of the Spirit’s gift in the redeemed:
raised up by the promise of forgiveness through Christ (“grace”), “we receive through
faith the Holy Spirit, who brings forth new emotions (novos motus parit) and
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permeates the will (voluntatem imbuit), so that it truly begins to love God and to
detest the sin left in the flesh.”367
By the sixteenth century, “motus” had already enjoyed a long and distinguished
career in the tradition of moral psychology, with deep roots in ancient Stoicism.368 For
the Stoics, motus animi are emotions, commotions, passions, affections, perturbations,
agitations, disturbances, or impulses that take place in the soul through what Pierre
Hadot calls “the double aspect of the cognitive process—passive and active,
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constrained and free.”369 In essence, it consists in the complex psychological interplay
of
(1) An external stimulus that pressures, allures, or otherwise “moves” the soul
from without, thus giving rise to a pre-emotional impression
(φαντασία/imago/visum). This happens willy-nilly to sage and fool alike.
(2) A rational process of judgment, in which the soul assesses the propriety of
its pre-emotional impression in light of what it holds to be true about reality.
This issues either in the decision to decline the initial impression’s suggested
motus or to consent to it; and it is within the soul’s power to withhold or grant
its consent (adsensus mentis/consensus voluntatis).
Since the initial impression affects the soul but falls short of causing a complete
motus, it is sometimes theorized as either a pro-passio or a primus motus. When the
fool, by an act of false judgment, grants consent to the appropriateness of the initial
pre-emotional response, he inwardly experiences or “suffers” (patitur) a full-blown
motus animi. The language of “movements,” “affections,” or “passions” connotes the
passivity and responsiveness that is basic to emotional phenomena: because a person
experiences some object as auspicious or threatening, it moves or affects him; and if in
response he gives way and consents to suffering the full force of the suggested
impulse, he is moved or affected in the depths of his soul. Thus passion is, by
definition, mental suffering; it is intrinsically injurious to the soul’s well-being, a kind
of psychological wound. For it is what happens to the fool when he permits an
external reality to act upon and affect his soul. πάθος, motus, and affectus are
therefore preferred and basically convertible terms in Stoic accounts of psychological
affections: though Augustine, followed by Brachtendorf, notes that Cicero uses
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perturbatio to translate the Greek πάθος (Tusc. Disp. 3.10.23), while most other authors
employ passio.370
This will, I think, become clearer if I present the Stoic theory concretely vis-àvis the classic “tetrachord” of the passions, of which the four genera are desire,
pleasure, fear, and grief.371 At its heart, the project of ancient philosophy involved
programs of therapy that aimed to heal the soul of its deep sadness and lead it instead
to happiness, eudaemonia.372 In the train of the Socrates presented in Plato’s early
dialogues, the Stoics held that happiness consisted exclusively in the possession of
virtue. The moral excellence of the wise soul is itself the summum bonum. The notion
that an external good might contribute to one’s happiness, or that an external evil
might take away from it, is an error of philosophical judgment. Indeed, a quite literally
pathological error: for the passions arise from believing this bad philosophy. Objects
represented to the soul as pleasant and propitious (e.g., sexual pleasure or wealth),
which the fool mistakenly thinks will bring him happiness if attained, move him first
to desire, then to pleasure if he attains the desideratum. By a like error in judgment,
objects perceived to be prejudicial to one’s self (e.g., torture or poverty) cause fear in
anticipation, then pain or grief in the event. But this is all to reason irrationally, that is
to say, to experience realities circumstantial to one’s soul in the manner proper to
soulless beats; for humans are by nature rational beings whose happiness consists
solely in the enjoyment of the inner good of wisdom. And as no external good can
370

Augustine, civ. dei 14.8 (CCSL 48.423, Bett. 558-9); Brachtendorf, “Cicero and Augustine on the
Passions,” 290 n. 3. Brachtendorf suggests that the use of “passio” in such contexts was a neologism
coined by Apuleius (p. 296), which is perhaps implied by Augustine’s comments at civ. dei 9.4.
371
See, e.g., Tusc. Disp. 3.11.24-5, civ. dei 14.3.
372
Cf. Augustine’s s. 150.4 (WSA III/5.31): “In common, all philosophers strove by dedication,
investigation, discussion, by their way of life, to lay hold of the blessed life. This was their one
reason for philosophizing.”
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contribute to the happiness of wisdom, so no external evil can take it away. Since the
Stoic sage possesses this wisdom, if an initial pro-passio buffets him from outside the
inner citadel of reason and virtue, he defeats its assault on his tranquility and
blessedness by rendering a true judgment about both the irrationality of the proposed
passion and the sufficiency of the virtue which he already enjoys for his happiness.
The outcome is the goal of Stoic moral therapy. Though a fierce storm at sea makes
even the philosopher’s face turn pale, he refuses to consent to the impulse of fear
suggested by his pre-rational (and thus pre-emotional) response to the external
provocation presented by the wind and the waves and the threat of impending death,
and remains unmoved in the freedom and felicity of apatheia.373 So far the Stoics on
matters moral-psychological.
In 1969, Wilhelm Maurer argued that the precocious Melanchthon acquired his
early Affektenlehre by reading Cicero, Marsilio Ficino, and Lorenzo Valla at Tübingen
under the watchful eye of uncle Reuchlin: the Stoic theory of the affections shaping his
doctrine of sin, and Renaissance Platonism’s theory of love his doctrine of grace.374
Luther, by contrast, was just not interested in a theory of psychological affections; and
when he did come to speak of the affections, he did so on the basis of his own spiritual
experience in prayer, interpreted in the language of the Bible and especially the
Psalter.375 Maurer’s (and derivatively, Karl-Heinz zur Mühlen’s376) arguments
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Some time before Hadot (The Inner Citadel, 102), Augustine used this example, drawn from
Aulus Gellius’ Attic Nights 19.1, to explain the Stoic theory at civ. dei 9.4.
374
Wilhelm Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation. Bd. 2: Der
Theologe (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969), 257-9.
375
Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon, 249-51.
376
Karl Heinz zur-Mühlen, “Melanchthons Auffasung vom Affekt in den ‘Loci communes’ von 1521,”
in idem, Reformatorische Prägungen: Studien zur Theologie Martin Luthers und zur Reformationzeit,
Athina Lexutt and Volkmar Ortmann, eds. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 84-95.
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regarding the sources of Melanchthon’s moral-psychology are, I think, compelling. But
unless one is predisposed to drive a wedge between the biblical Luther and the
philosophical Melanchthon,377 Maurer’s assertions about Luther’s disinterest in a
theory of the affections appear to be groundless. For Luther too had read his
classics;378 and, as Risto Saarinen has recently argued, Cicero and Seneca in particular
were important philosophical influences on the formation of his thought.379
Now, as Lodi Nauta has argued, for an Augustinian humanist like Lorenzo
Valla, Cicero had more to offer than elegant prose: he provided an alternative
philosophical discourse to the scholastic Aristotelianism that Valla had grown tired
of.380 One part of this bigger humanist program of Antischolastik via Ressourcement—

377
From his Duke dissertation, Timothy J. Wengert has labored indefatigably to disabuse the guild
of Reformation studies from this predisposition. See e.g. Philip Melanchthon’s Annotationes in
Johannem in Relation to its Predecessors and Contemporaries (Geneva: Librairie Droz S.A., 1987),
57-8, where Wengert locates Maurer’s Humanismus—Reformation dichotomy in the tradition of
Wilhelm Neuser, Adolf Sperl, and Ekkehard Mühlenberg. By the mid 1530s, Luther was already
aware of the emerging differences between his theology and that of his junior comrade-in-arms;
but into the 1540s, Luther continued to hold Master Philipp in the highest regard. See, e.g., WA Tr
5.204.16-28, cf. LW 54.441-2 (#5511, winter 1542/43): “If one wishes to become a theologian, he has in
the first place a great advantage: he has the Bible. This is now so clear that he can read it without
any trouble. Afterward he should read Philipp’s Loci Communes. This he should read diligently and
well, so that he has it all in his head. If he has these two, he is a theologian whom neither the Devil
nor any heretic can shake. The whole of theology stands open to him, and afterward he can read
whatever he wants for edification. If he wishes, he can read Philipp’s Romans, my Galatians,
Deuteronomy; that’ll give him eloquence and an abundance of words. You will find no book under
the sun in which the whole of theology is so excellently gathered together as in the Loci Communes.
Read all the fathers, the sententiaries, etc., it’s nothing. There is not a better book after holy
scripture. Philipp is more efficiently machined than I am: he fights, and he teaches. I’m garrulous,
and more rhetorical.”
378
Helmar Junghans, Der junge Luther und die Humanisten (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1985); Brecht, Martin Luther: His Road to Reformation 1483—1521, trans. James L. Schaaf
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1985), 38-44.
379
Risto Saarinen, “Luther und humanistische Philosophie,” Lutherjahrbuch 80 (2013), 77-109.
380
Lodi Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense: Lorenzo Valla’s Humanist Critique of Scholastic
Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), esp. 155-74 on Valla’s insistence that
virtue is an affect, not a habit, and his debt to Cicero’s eclectic Stoicism—despite, ironically, Valla’s
bitter polemics against Stoicism: in which points he parallels both Augustine and, I am arguing,
Luther. Cf. Charles Trinkhaus, In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian
Humanist Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); William Bouwsma, “The Two Faces
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in which figures as diverse as Petrarch, Valla, Luther, Melanchthon, and Calvin all
participated in their different ways—involved the displacement of virtue theory from
the habitus tradition inspired by Aristotle (and ascendant in the schools) into the
sphere of “Emotionstheorie als Affekte,” the special province of the Stoics.381 So the
supposition that Luther acquired the elements of his affective theory directly from
Cicero or Seneca is not outside the realm of possibility. Indeed, Volker Leppin has
argued that Luther participated quite self-consciously in “die humanistische Front
gegen Aristoteles.”382
That being said, I think it is highly probable that Luther’s (and Melanchthon’s,
for that matter) appropriation of the Stoic motus-theory—like Valla’s a century
before—is mediated through Augustine’s own reworking of the psychology of human
motivation in the context of his theology of grace.383 Ockham’s useful razor suggests as

of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought,” in Heiko Augustinus
Oberman and Thomas A. Brady Jr., eds., Itinerarium italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance
in the Mirror of its European Transformations (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 3-60.
381
Risto Saarinen, “Luther und humanistische Philosophie,” 78-9. Cf. Jill Kraye, “Moral philosophy,”
in C. B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, and Jill Kraye, eds., The Cambridge History of
Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 303-86, esp. 364-7 on the
Stoic theory of emotions as it was alternately appropriated, modified, or rejected by various
Renaissance philosophers and theologians; also Katharine Park and Eckhard Kessler, “The concept
of psychology,” ibid., 455-63, esp. 460.
382
Leppin, Martin Luther, 93-4.
383
With respect to Melanchthon, in the same breadth Maurer (p. 258f) asserts both (1) that “Diese
einzigartige Synthese von Cicero und Plato ist Melanchthons eigenstes Werk,” and (2) that “Von
Augustin an bis zu Erasmus hin kannte die abendländische Rhetorik und Psychologie eine Synthese
von Cicero und Plato.” Which one is it? I think certainly the latter. In civ. dei 9.4, Augustine is
already discussing (with approbation) Cicero’s argument for the real identity of Platonic,
Aristotelian, and Stoic virtue theory in his de finibus bonorum et malorum. Colish (The Stoic
Tradition, I/141-2, 153-55) confirms that Cicero attempted a synthesis of Platonism and Stoicism: in
e.g. his Tusculan Disputations, he upholds the ancient Stoic theories about passion, virtue, and
apatheia even as he revises its psychological monism by incorporating faculty psychology in the
tradition of Plato and Aristotle. This, as civ. dei 9.4 attests and as Colish (II/165-79, 207-25), James
Wetzel, and Sarah Byers have cogently argued, approximates at least one side of Augustine’s
complex position (i.e., the moral-psychological; the other being the theology of grace): see Wetzel,
Augustine and the Limits of Virtue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Byers, “Augustine
on the ‘Divided Self’: Platonist or Stoic?” AugS 38/1 (2007), 105-18. It will be remember that from the
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much: if Luther read Cicero and Seneca, he “devoured” Augustine; and Augustine’s
critical revision of the Stoic theory is there in the texts, ripe for the harvest by one who
has the ears to hear to it.384 (On the nature of this revision in a moment.) Indeed, we
know that by 1509 Luther had read and annotated—briefly, but in a way that evinces
understanding—civ. dei 14, arguably the most important essay in moral psychology in
Augustine’s works;385 and in any case, by 1515 at the latest he was voraciously engaging
the anti-Pelagian writings bound up in vol. 8 of the new Amerbach edition of
Augustine’s works,386 writings replete with Augustine’s philosophical psychology for
the very reason that their main object is the defense of a scriptural theology of human
renewal by grace.

initium of his search for true wisdom in 373, Cicero exercised a profound influence on Augustine,
not just as a rhetorician but as a philosopher. Cf. Maurice Testard, Saint Augustin et Cicéron:
Cicéron dans la formation et dans l’oeuvre de Saint Augustin, 2 vols. (Paris: Études augustiniennes,
1958); Johannes Brachtendorf, “Cicero and Augustine on the Passions”; John C. Cavadini, “Feeling
Right: Augustine on the Passions and Sexual Desire,” AugS 36/1 (2005), 195-217; idem, “The Darkest
Enigma: Reconsidering the Self in Augustine’s Thought,” AugS 38/1 (2007), 119-32; Timo Nisula,
Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), esp. pp. 194-200 on
Augustine as a Ciceronian Platonist with key influences from Stoic moral philosophy, and p. 234 on
the nexus of moral psychology and the theology of grace in Augustine’s thought.
384
WA Tr 1.140.5, #347 (1532): Principio Augustinum vorabam, non legebam. Cf. LW 54.49.
385
WA 9.25.19-23. At 14.6 (CCSL 48.421, Bett. 555-6), Augustine argues that diverse affections/motus
are nothing but diverse forms of one’s voluntas transformed by one’s response to diverse objects:
Voluntas est quippe in omnibus [motibus]; immo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt... Et
omnino pro varietate rerum, quae appetuntur atque fugiuntur, sicut allicitur vel offenditur voluntas
hominis, ita in hos vel illos affectus mutatur et vertitur. Luther accurately notes: Perturbationes sunt
voluntates. On 14.8, Luther’s terse Stoicorum philosophia seu potius stultitia { Apathie/pathe is an
accurate if unsympathetic summary of the specific Stoic doctrine against which Augustine writes in
bk. 14, even as he draws other key elements from the Stoics for use in fashioning his own moral
psychology.
386
So Hamel, I/9-10, II/1-2; Bernhard Lohse, “Die Bedeutung Augustins für den jungen Luther,” in
Leif Grane, Bernd Moeller, and Otto Hermann Pesch, eds., Evangelium in der Geschichte. I. Studien
zu Luther und der Reformation (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 11-30, here 13-14 (this
essay began as Lohse’s 1964 Hamburg Antrittsvorlesung); Grane, Modus loquendi, 26-7; Markus
Wriedt, “Produktives Mißverständnis? Zur Rezeption der Theologie des lateinischen Kirchenvaters
Augustinus im Werk Martin Luthers (1483-1546),” in Norbert Fischer, ed., Augustinus: Spuren und
Spiegelungen seines Denkens. Band 1. Von den Anfängen bis zur Reformation (Hamburg: Felix
Meiner, 2009), 211-223, here 215; Leppin, Martin Luther, 89-95.
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This, I think, suggests a more (though not less) than quellenkritisch reason for
the hypothesis that Luther acquired his moral psychology from Augustine. For it is no
accident that the old Augustine (in Julian of Eclanum) and the young Luther (in
Gabriel Biel, and in Bartholomäus Arnoldi von Usingen and Jodocus Trutfetter, his
Erfurt teachers) faced diverse species of a cognate philosophical, spiritual, and
theological position, to wit: Aristotelian virtue theory recast within the Sitz im Leben
of Christian asceticism and a theology of merited grace. Faced with similar
“Aristotelian” opponents,387 Augustine in the 420s and Luther in 1515—the latter,
certainly, intending dependence upon the former; and both alike, from the vantage of
catholic dogmatics but also defensibly from an historical perspective, engaged in the
same struggle that St. Paul had (Phil. 1:30)388—responded with robust pneumatologies

387

Henri Strohl, Luther jusq’en 1520 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), 181: “The
adversary is the same.” Cited in Pereira, 29 n. 11, who argues in his own right (p. 26) that Luther
turned to Augustine because they shared a common interest, to wit, “the struggle against
Pelagianism in the Church.” Indeed, this is the thesis of Pereira’s book (p. 17): “The radical
anthropological and soteriological insights with which Augustine opposes the theologians
associated with fifth century Pelagianism are the key for understanding the early stages of Luther’s
call for Reformation of the doctrine of the Catholic Church regarding Original Sin and
justification.”
388
Cf. John Owen, writing in 1674, on the course of the Church’s grasp of the nature of the Spirit’s
regenerative and sanctifying operations: “This, I acknowledge, was variously contended about of
old; and the truth concerning it hath scarce escaped an open opposition in any age of the church.
And at present this is the great ball of contention between the Jesuits and Jansenists; the latter
keeping close to the doctrine of the principal ancient writers of the church; the former, under new
notions, expressions, and distinctions, endeavoring the re-enforcement of Pelagianism, whereunto
some of the elder schoolmen led the way, of whom our Bradwardine so long ago complained. But
never was it with so much impudence and ignorance traduced and reviled as it is by some among
ourselves [i.e., by English Socinians and Arminians]… The ancient writers of the church, who
looked into these things with most diligence, and labored in them with most success, as Austin,
Hilary, Prosper, and Fulgentius, do represent the whole work of the Spirit of God towards the souls
of men under certain heads or distinctions of grace; and herein were they followed by many of the
more sober schoolmen, and others of late without number… And although there may be some
alteration in method and ways of expression—which may be varied as they are found to be of
advantage unto them that are to be instructed—yet, for the substance of the doctrine, they taught
the same which hath been preached amongst us since the Reformation, which some have
ignorantly traduced as novel. And the whole of it is nobly and elegantly exemplified by Austin in
his Confessions; wherein he gives us the experience of the truth he had taught in his own soul.”

137

of grace. The main object of these pneumatologies of effectual or operative grace was
the affective renovation of vitiated human beings enslaved to their “selves” by the
perversity of their vicious loves; and that is to say, from the perspective of ancient
philosophy, that the main object of Augustine’s (and by derivation, Luther’s) theology
of renovating grace was the resolution of an aporia in the moral-psychological
tradition.
Aristotle didn’t really know how a vicious person could become virtuous (nor
the Stoics, for that matter389): the self-transformation of one’s character from the
quality of injustice to justice via the repeated performance of just acts is a moral
theory hard to square with a metaphysics that insists that a being in a state of potency
cannot reduce itself to a state of action. Something existing at a greater level of being
must act upon it: for the vicious soul to become virtuous, it must undergo or suffer the

ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΑΛΟΥΙΑ, or, A Discourse Concerning the Holy Spirit, in WJO, 3.300-1. Owen is a
luminous example of an Augustinian Aristotelian in the Reformed tradition, and it is no accident
that he held Thomas Aquinas in high esteem amongst the number of “the more sober schoolmen.”
Cf. the conclusion to Pereira’s book (p. 476): “The fact remains that every now and then, a
theologian sympathetic to Augustine’s radicalism of grace shakes things up by revisiting and
insisting on the soteriological insight of the old bishop of Hippo … The truth is that whenever
someone insists on the need of accepting the real theological and doctrinal implications of the
Pauline-Augustinian soteriology, it means trouble.” Pereira, a Roman Catholic theologian, offers
Gregory of Rimini, Luther, Calvin, and Jansen as examples of such “trouble.”
389
Primarily due to the co-inherence of two defining moral-psychological theories, viz., (1)
psychological monism, and (2) the doctrine that anything less than complete virtue is vice. See e.g.
Colish, The Stoic Tradition, I/44: “The sage possesses all virtues; the fool possesses all vices. To
possess one vice or one virtue is to possess all, for vice and virtue are not a congeries of individual
acts but expressions of unified, consciously determined states of being. Thus both vice and virtue
are all-or-nothing propositions. For the ancient Stoa there is scarcely any possibility of a gradual
change from folly to wisdom or vice versa.” Colish (I/45-50) argues that Middle Stoics like
Panaetius and Posidonius modified these doctrines in Platonic directions, while the later Romans
drew upon both currents in the tradition: Epictetus tending more to ancients like Zeno and
Chrysippus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius to the moderating doctrines of the middle Stoa. Cicero
has much in common with the Middle Stoic effort to combine the strengths of Stoic virtue theory
with the faculty psychology of Plato and Aristotle; as a conduit of Stoic doctrine to the Middle
Ages, he stands second only to Seneca (I/127).
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agency of another more virtuous than itself.390 (A bald-faced theory of self-realization
would have to wait for the likes of Fichte and Nietzsche;391 but seeing as it is the
philosophia perennis ingrained in the hearts Adam’s children, it ought not surprise the
Christian theologian that the 17th-century turn to the self has culminated in the
commonsense nonsense of the autonomous creation of one’s “self” ex nihilo that holds
the field today in our acutely Adamic culture.)
Plato could speak indefinitely of a kind of mystical “grace,” a door closed to the
other philosophical schools.392
Augustine—as a kind of Platonist to be sure, but also as a kind of Stoic and,
above all, as a student of the Bible and a preacher of the Gospel—surmounted this
390

Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles, 153-75. Dieter (pp. 156-8) notes that Aristotle recognizes
the aporia in his own thought at Nichomachean Ethics 2.3, for acting virtuously presupposes the
presence of virtue. He also discusses (pp. 168ff) a sermon from 1 Jan. 1517, where Luther interacts
with the problem directly (WA 1.119.23-39): At dicitur ‘si ergo Abraham iustus ante Circumcisionem
et Abel ante oblationem, similiter et omnes S. Patres, Quid ergo necesse fuit illos operari? Et nos cur
operamur? Simus otiosi et dormitantes, quia in gratia sumus’. Sic sapiunt qui ex circumcisione et
operibus iustificari quaerunt, quia sine illis ideo non putant esse iustitiam, quia eis non sit opus si iam
iustitia habetur. Quare enim audita iustitia statim dicunt ‘non ergo operemur bonum’, nisi quia ea
velut causam iustitiae posuerunt, tanquam habito effectu, iustitia scilicet, iam non sit necessaria
causa. Haec ergo est perversitas tota, cum etiam secundum Aristotelem, licet ipse iustitiam ex
operibus fieri dicat, actibus scilicet frequentatis, tamen docetur, quod, cum iusti fuerimus, tum
maxime possumus iusta operari. Quis enim discit cantare, ut cum scierit nunquam cantet, ac non
potius ut saepe cantet? Ita iustitia fidei sine quidem operibus datur, sed tamen ad opera et propter
opera datur, Cum sit res quaedam viva nec possit esse otiosa. Sic Circumcisio Abrahae fuit opus fidei
seu iustitiae et non causa iustitiae: accepit enim eam pro signaculo iustitiae fidei, Rom. 4. Ac sic
omnes Sancti antiqui aliquod signum foris necessario in opere habuerunt, quo fidei iustitiam intus
testarentur foris. Sic Abel suae fidei signaculum habuit sacrificium, et consequenter postea omnes S.
Patres.
391
Reinhard Hütter, “(Re-)Forming Freedom,” in Bound to be Free, 111-44, esp. 116-24, citing and
translating e.g. J. G. Fichte’s System der Sittenlehre nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre (GA
I/5.208, F 4.229): “Independence—which is our ultimate goal—consists in the fact that everything
depends on me and I depend on nothing; that what I will occurs in the complete world of senses,
that it occurs absolutely and merely through the fact that I will it—in the same way that it occurs in
my body, the starting point of my absolute causality. The world has to become for me what my
body is to me. Although this goal cannot be reached, I have to continually approximate it, i.e., to
treat everything in the world of sense such that it becomes a means for reaching this final goal. This
approximation is my final goal.”
392
William Christian, “Waiting for Grace: Philosophy and Politics in Plato’s Republic,” Canadian
Journal of Political Science 21/1 (March 1988), 57-82; J. Patout Burns, “Grace,” ATTA, 391-98, esp. 39192.
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philosophical impasse with his theology of effectual grace. The Spirit’s operations in
the depths of the self-enclosed heart are alone able to reorient it to God by changing
from within what such a heart in fact desires, fears, enjoys, and grieves, i.e., what
moves the heart and thus produces motus animi. The unregenerate person neither
fears nor desires God. This includes the virtuous pagan and above all the Stoic sage:
for possessed as he is of his own self-cultivated virtue, he is quite happy all on his own
and is in principle committed to the proud and vain notion that he does not need to
live in dependent communion with God.393 Thus the filii Adae do not find God
“moving,” as we say today. And even if they do, it is not because the real God moves
them in truth, i.e., in accord with the ordo rerum and, therefore, the ordo amoris.394

393

civ. dei 14.5 (CCSL 48.420, cf. Bett. 554): “Anyone who exalts the nature of the soul as the
summum bonum and censures the nature of the flesh as evil in fact both desires the soul in a fleshly
way (animam carnaliter adpetit) and flees the flesh in a fleshly way, since his opinion stems from
human vanity, not divine truth.” See too s. 150.8-9 (WSA III/5.35-6): “The Epicurean, who places
man’s supreme good in the body, is placing his hopes in himself. But after all, the Stoic who places
man’s supreme good in the mind has indeed placed it in man’s better part; but even he has placed it
in himself. Now the Stoic is a man just as much as the Epicurean. ‘Cursed therefore is everyone who
places his hope in man’ (Jer. 17:5) … A virtuous mind is something very praiseworthy; sagacity,
telling the difference between bad things and good, justice, distributing to all what is theirs by
right, moderation, curbing lusts, courage, imperturbably enduring trials. A great thing, an
admirable thing; admire it, Stoic, as much as you ever can. But tell me: where do you get it from? It
is not precisely your virtuous mind that makes you happy, but the One who has given you virtue,
who has inspired you to desire it, and granted you the capacity for it… You are among those who
trust in their own virtue; among those who place their hopes in man. Virtue delights you; it’s a
good thing that delights you. I know, you are thirsty for it; but you can’t pour yourself a drink of
virtue. You’re dry; if I show you ‘the fountain of life’ (Ps. 36:9), you will probably mock. You’re
saying to yourself, you see, ‘Am I going to drink from this crag?’ The rod was brought, and water
poured out (cf. Num. 20:11, 1 Cor. 10:4). ‘For Jews seek a sign’; but you’re not a Jew, Stoic, I know;
you’re a Greek: ‘and Greeks seek wisdom. But we preach Christ crucified’—the Jew is shocked, the
Greek sneers—‘to the Jews indeed a stumbling block, and to the nations folly; but to those who are
called, Jews and Greeks’—that is, to Paul himself, once Saul, and to Di0nysius the Areopagite, and
such as these and such as those—‘Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God’ (1 Cor. 1:22-4).
Now you are not mocking the crag; recognize the cross in the rod, Christ as the gushing torrent;
and if you are thirsty, drink your fill of virtue. Take your fill from the Fount, and perhaps you belch
out your gratitude. What you get from him you won’t now be giving yourself, and you will exclaim
with your belching, ‘I will love you, Lord, my virtus’ (Ps. 18:1).”
394
civ. dei 15.22, on Gen. 6:2 and the disordered love of the filii dei for the bodily pulchritudo of the
filiae hominis (CCSL 48.487-8, Bett. 592-3): Sic enim corporis pulchritudo, a Deo quidem factum, sed
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Rather, the idea of God either moves the fallen soul to a selfish desire for the reward
he wishes to obtain from God’s hands, a reward he would just as happily enjoy on his
own apart from filial love and intimacy with his Father (cf. Luke 15:12-3); or else it
moves him to sheer terror when faced with the prospect of God’s judgment. For the
vetus homo is ruled by, indeed in the depths of his Adamic psychology he is
constituted by, perverse desire for his own self. Adam’s children find their selves
deeply “moving,” and regard their own selves and their needs and desires as objects of
sacred worth and worship.
Now it is good to lift up your heart: but not to your own self, which belongs to
pride, but to the Lord, which belongs to obedience; and obedience can only
belong to the humble.395
But the transition from the self-deifying worship of pride (amor sui, which is “vice”) to
the humble creaturely praise of God (amor dei, “virtue”) is not in one’s power to attain,
as neither Aristotle nor Zeno could see but as Aristotle’s metaphysics might have
taught him; it is a miracle of free grace, as St. Paul, John, Peter etc. heard and believed.
The God of all grace (1 Pet. 5:10), whose infinite fullness of being, goodness, and life is
pure lively activity without the slightest hint of potency, mercifully acts upon the

temporale carnale infimum bonum, male amatur postposito Deo, aeterno interno sempiterno bono,
quem ad modum iustitia deserta et aurum amatur ab auaris, nullo peccato auri, sed hominis. Ita se
habet omnis creatura. Cum enim bona sit, et bene amari potest et male: bene scilicet ordine custodito,
male ordine pertubato… Creator autem si ueraciter ametur, hoc est si ipse, non aliud pro illo quod non
est ipse, ametur, male amari non potest. Nam et amor ipse ordinate amandus est, quo bene amatur
quod amandum est, ut sit in nobis uirtus qua uiuitur bene. Vnde mihi uidetur, quod definitio breuis et
uera uirtutis ordo est amoris; propter quod in sancto cantico canticorum cantat sponsa Christi,
ciuitas Dei: ‘Ordinate in me caritatem.’ Cf. Song 2:4 LXX.
395
civ. dei 14.13 (CCSL 48.434-5, cf. Bett. 572): ut natura sit, ex eo habet quod a Deo facta est; ut
autem ab eo quod est deficiat, ex hoc quod de nihilo facta est. Nec sic defecit homo, ut omnino nihil
esset, sed ut inclinatus ad se ipsum minus esset, quam erat, cum ei qui summe est inhaerebat. Relicto
itaque Deo esse in semet ipso, hoc est sibi placere, non iam nihil esse est, sed nihilo propinquare. Vnde
superbi secundum scripturas sanctas alio nomine appellantur sibi placentes. Bonum est enim sursum
habere cor; non tamen ad se ipsum, quod est superbiae, sed ad Dominum, quod est oboedientiae, quae
nisi humilium non potest esse.
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hapless self-obsessed soul. He transforms it from within by his Spirit, quickening its
aptitudo passiva from the death and sorrow of its inherited self-enclosure into the
spiritual life of joyful communion with God.396 For the Holy Spirit renovates the vain
heart by permeating it with new motions, impulses, desires, and affections, which lead
it out of its passion for its self into holy and delighted love for God.397 Thus affectus
affectu vincitur, as a prodigious Augustinian philosopher and theologian put it in
1521.398
Perhaps Luther’s most striking elaboration of these Augustinian themes in the
disputations comes at D 1.6. The argument’s terms are set by the high praise of God’s
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Dieter rightly concludes (Der junge Luther und Aristoteles, 173) that the young Luther affirms
Aristotle’s metaphysical Grundsatz but then uses Aristotle’s metaphysics to develop an antiAristotelian/Scholastik moral theory, citing WA 56.364.17-20 (Rom. 8:7 scholion, early 1516): Non ex
operibus et actibus virtus, Vt Aristoteles, Sed ex virtutibus fiunt actus, vt Christus docet. Quia actus
secundus presupponit primum et operatio prerequirit substantiam et virtutem et effectus causam.
Dieter’s great work is impressive, but I think he leaves Luther’s Augustinianism underdeveloped
and this is telling a case in point: in pitting Aristotle against Aristotle, Luther is also siding with
Augustine. On the “passive aptitude” of the fallen human being, a kind of potency, see above cp. 1.3
and WA 18.636.16-22: At si vim liberi arbitrii eam diceremus, qua homo aptus est rapi spiritu et imbui
gratia Dei, ut qui sit creatus ad vitam vel mortem aeternam, recte diceretur; hanc enim vim, hoc est,
aptitudinem, seu ut Sophistae loquuntur dispositivam qualitatem et passivam aptitudinem et nos
confitemur, quam non arboribus neque bestiis inditam esse, quis est qui nesciat? neque enim pro
anseribus (ut dicitur) coelum creavit.
397
Pekka Kärkkäinen, Luthers trinitarische Theologie des Heiligen Geistes, 107-12 on “Die Sendung
des Geistes als Eingießung der göttlichen Liebe,” e.g. p. 107 (aptly citing WA 56.338.6-12): “… der
anwesende Heilige Geist mit der eingegossenen Liebe den Menschen einen neuen Willen gibt, der
bereit zur Erfüllung dessen macht, was das Gesetz fordert.
398
From Melanchthon’s original Loci communes theologici, on free choice §2 (MW 2.1.27, cf.
Wilhelm Pauck, ed., Melanchthon and Bucer [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969], 27): interni affectus
non sunt in potestate nostra. Experimentia enim usuque comperimus non posse voluntatem sua
sponte ponere amorem, odium aut similes affectus, sed affectus affectu vincitur, ut, quia laesus es ab
eo, quam amabas, amare desinis. Nam te ardentius quam quemvis alium amas. In this first edition,
Melanchthon set forth both an Augustinian-“Stoic” affective moral psychology and what is, for
Augustine himself, its theological corollary, i.e., St. John’s and Paul’s doctrine of predestination and
grace. For this reason, it is no accident that Luther lavished high praise on the 1521 Loci in the
introduction to his 1525 de servo arbitrio. WA 18.601.1-6 (cf. Packer, 62-3): besides the fact that
Luther has already refuted Erasmus’ (and the Sophists’) arguments for libero arbitrio in many
works, “Philipp Melanchthon, in his unconquered little book de locis Theologicis, has trampled
them in the dust.” So much so, that “in my judgment, that little book of his is worthy not just of
immortality, but even of the ecclesiastical canon.”
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law in Ps. 19 and 119; but just beneath the surface lie texts like the following from one
of Augustine’s initial forays against Pelagius, the de spiritu et littera of 412:
If the commandment is observed out of fear of punishment, not out of love of
righteousness (amore iustitiae), it is observed slavishly, not freely, and for that
reason it is not observed. For there is lacking the good fruit that springs up
from the root of love. But if faith that works through love (Gal. 5:6) is present,
one begins to delight (incipit condelectari) in the law of God in the interior
human being (Rom. 7:22). This delight is a gift, not of the letter but of the
Spirit (delectatio non litterae, sed spiritus donum est), even if another law in
one’s members resists the law of the mind (Rom. 7:23), until the whole oldness
(tota uetustas) is changed and passes over into the newness (nouitatem) which
grows from day to day in the interior human being (2 Cor. 4:16), as we are set
free from the body of this death by the grace (gratia) of God through Jesus
Christ our Lord (Rom. 7:24).399
For our purposes, notice three things from this excerpt, the whole tenor of which is set
by citations from St. Paul and especially Rom. 7:22-24: first, Augustine’s insistence on
the need for amor iustitiae in order to keep the law; second, his teaching that this love
comes into being when the Holy Spirit bestows delight (delectatio) in the law as a gift
(donum) within one’s inmost being; third, the fact that this incipient delight in the
law, confessed by St. Paul at Rom. 7:22, is limited by the counterbalancing weight of
the alia lex in membris which still repugnat legi mentis, as Paul also confesses in the
next verse. This, in basic outline, is Augustine’s teaching on how the Spirit renovates
the heart through the grace of holy delight, which in this instance he actually calls the
Spirit’s donum.
In its real content, if not necessarily in its use of the word “donum,” this is the
traditional soil in which Luther’s theology of the gift took root and grew. His
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sp. litt. 15.26, CSEL 60.180.22-181.4, cf. WSA I/23.161. On sp. litt., see Hombert, Gloria Gratiae, 18197, and on the same theme in works against Julian, 277-8; cf. Isabelle Bochet, Saint Augustin et le
Désire de Dieu (Paris: Insitut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1982), esp. cp. 10: “‘Delectatio Victrix’: Grace
et liberte.”
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presentation of the Spirit’s work at D 1.6 is especially germane to this point, because it
centers expressly on the Spirit’s recreation of the fallen soul through delight. Luther
first sets out a characteristic and pithy statement of Christ’s work in redeeming
sinners from the law’s curse (“grace”), then goes on to explain that the Redeemer
… brings (affert) the Holy Spirit to those who believe in him, in order that they
may have pleasure (voluptatem) in the law of the Lord, according to the first
Psalm [1:2; cf. Rom. 7:22]. And thus through it (per eam [viz., voluptatem]) their
souls are recreated (recreantur), and he gives the will (voluntatem) in order
that they may do it (eam [viz., legem]), this spirit (hic spiritus). But in the
future life, they will have the will to do the law (voluntatem faciendi legem) not
only in the spirit (in spiritu), but also in the flesh—which, so long as it lives
here, strives against this delight (adversatur huic delectationi).400
The two ambiguous pronouns, and the awkward hic spiritus, make this a difficult text
to translate. I have suggested my interpretation in the brackets and will defend it here.
Luther is giving an account of how the Holy Spirit transforms a vitiated or fleshly soul
into a voluntary law-keeper, that is, one moved from within by holy desire for the
beauty, pleasantness, and goodness of the law’s commandments. To this end, the
Spirit produces a pleasure in the law within the soul, of the sort that David (Ps. 1:2)
and Paul (Rom. 7:22) attested; Luther calls this first voluptas and later delectatio.
Through the gift of this pleasure, the soul itself is recreated: both grammatically and
in accord with the sense of the passage, Luther’s ambiguous per eam must refer back
to the believer’s voluptas in the law. So, Christ gives the Spirit in order that believers
may take pleasure in the law; and through this pleasure, their souls are recreated
(recreantur) such that they become the kind of people who want (voluntas) to perform
the law, and do in fact perform it, because they delight in it. As Augustine once said,
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WA 39/1.373.1-6 [A], my translation; cf. ATD, 42.

144

everything is easy for love.401 Right action springs forth from the goodness of the
renewed will, and the will’s renovation follows from its permeation by the Spirit with
new, holy, and spiritual affections, pleasures, delights.
This is Luther’s account of the inner-workings of the Spirit’s gift within the
soul, and its Augustinian character is further confirmed by two details relating to his
appropriation of the Pauline and Augustinian spiritus/caro distinction. Consider first
the awkwardly placed hic spiritus. It is possible to read this as a reference to the Holy
Spirit, in which case Luther is clarifying that the One who gives the will (datque
voluntatem) to keep the law is the Spirit of God. But I suggest that it is better to
interpret it as a reference to the spiritus created by the Holy Spirit within the soul. By
his gift, the Spirit makes the fleshly soul spiritual, a new creation constituted by
voluptas, delectatio, and voluntas ordered to God’s holy law; and this law-delighted,
Spiritually-renovated human being, who must still struggle with the remnants of his
flesh, is spiritus, “spirit.” On this reading, Luther is specifying both the object of the
Spirit’s recreating work and the subject of the holy pleasure and action thus brought
into being. The recreated soul, which has a will to keep the law and does in fact keep
it: this is the “spirit” produced by the Holy Spirit’s bestowal of holy delight. Luther’s
next sentence, with its allusion to Gal. 5:17, argues in favor of this interpretation in two
respects. First, Luther states that believers already possess the will to do the law in
spiritu, but that in the resurrection to come this joy in the law will consume the entire
401

Nat. grat. 69.83, CSEL 297.22-3: omnia quippe fiunt facilia caritati. Cf. WSA I/23.258. See too En.
Ps. 31/2.5 (CCSL 38.228, WSA III/15.366-7): “Now, if faith is without love, it will be without a work.
But lest you think too much about the work of faith, add to it hope and love, and you won’t want to
think about what you will work. This love is not able to be idle.” Ibid., 31/2.6 (CCSL 38.229, WSA
III/15.368): “The work of faith is love, and this love cannot remain idle: it must refrain from doing
evil and do all the good it can.”
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being of the redeemed person body and soul, such that not only the “spirit” but the
flesh itself will be made new. (In passing, I note that in this text Luther identifies
“flesh” with the human body itself. Often enough, it has been asserted that
Augustine’s “Platonic” reading of caro as the natural human corpus fairs poorly
alongside Luther’s genuinely Pauline interpretation of flesh as egoism.402 In point of
fact, Augustine well knows that sin originated in the vanity and pride of an
incorporeal angel,403 and believes firmly in the eschatological resurrection of the
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Here are three important examples: (1) Rudolf Hermann, Luthers These “Gerecht und Sünder
zugleich,” 149-50: Augustine’s tantummodo concupiscere means sensuality. Though he sometimes
aims for a better definition of sin in terms of Adam’s disobedience to his Maker, it is always mixed
up with the more fundamental “mönchisch-asketische” opposition between sensuality and spirit.
(2) Anders Nygren, “Simul iustus et peccator bei Augustin und Luther,” Zeitschrift für
Systematische Theologie 16 (1 Jan. 1939): 364-79, e.g. p. 369: for Augustine, sin is being bound to
earthly reality (Erdegebundenheit), whereas for Luther it is being bound to one’s ego
(Ichgebundenheit); (3) Leif Grane, Modus Loquendi, 56: for Augustine, “das Fleischliche consists in
the resistance of the bodily against reason and the grace-strengthened will. Thus ‘flesh’ quite
unambiguously means bodily drives (körperliche Triebe); and along these lines, a fleshliness that
could be seduced by the devil sub specie spiritualis boni to please itself even in pious works appears
to lie outside the horizon.” For correctives, see Hamel, Der junge Luther und Augustin, I/105-9, II/14
(but cf. II/34-5, where the Hermann-style contrast surfaces again); Christoph Markschies, “Taufe
und Concupiscentia bei Augustinus,” in Theodor Schneider and Gunther Wenz, eds., Gerecht und
Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen (Freiburg: Herder and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 2001), 92-108, who takes Nygren to task at pp. 105-8; Pereira, 61-71.
403
civ. dei 14 alone establishes this point. When Augustine discusses Gal. 5:16-21 at 14.2 (CCSL
48.415-6, Bett. 548-50), he takes great interest in the fact that St. Paul’s catalogue of the opera carnis
includes in its number animi uitia like idolatry, enmity, envy, etc. On this scriptural basis, he
explicitly affirms what Grane claims he could not say, viz., that a man may refrain from the
pleasures of the body (a voluptatibus corporis) for the sake of subtle and refined evils like idolatry
and heresy—“and nevertheless even this man, though he appears to restrain and suppress the
carnis libidines, lives secundum carnem and is convicted by this apostolic authority; and by the very
fact that he abstains a voluptatibus carnis, it is proven that he does damnabilia opera carnis.” In 14.3
(CCSL 48.417, Bett. 551-2), Augustine states that “those who think that all the evils of the soul derive
from the body are in error,” arguing against Virgil and the Platonica sententia he upholds at Aeneid
6.730ff. “Our faith holds a very different position. For the corruption of the body, which weighs
down the soul [Wis. 9:15], is not the cause of the first sin, but its penalty; neither did corruptible
flesh make the soul sinful, but a sinful soul made the flesh corruptible.” The Devil is therefore an
eminently fleshly being. For though he is no fornicator or drunkard, he is maxime superbus atque
invidus; and Paul attributes demonic vitia like pride and envy to the flesh. “For it was not by having
flesh—which the devil does not have—that man became like the devil; it was by living secundum se
ipsum, that is secundum hominem. For the devil wanted to live according to his own self, when he
did not stand in the truth.” This, I think, is just the kind of sin-qua-Ichgebundenheit that Augustine
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dead;404 and, as the present text shows, on occasion Luther himself employs the usage
wrongly attributed solely to Augustine.) Second, as the Reformer concludes his
allusion to Gal. 5:17, where Paul has the flesh striving against the “spirit,” Luther has
simply replaced—and thus equated—Paul’s spiritus with Augustine’s delectatio. The
dregs of fleshly desire fight against the holy delight in God’s law produced by the gift
of God’s Spirit; and the new spiritual being recreated by and consisting in this holy
delight is the spiritus that fights back—in the power of the Spirit’s gift—against the
stubborn remnants of its caro.

2.2.2. Battle scenes: Spirit-gifted non-consent in real time
This restless Gal. 5:17-styled spiritual battle between “spirit” and “flesh,” the new
creature and the old, the believer as renewed by Christ’s Spirit and the believer as yet
bearing the remnants of Adam’s sin, forms the core content of Luther’s real “simul.” Or
to turn that around: the “simul” as Luther holds it is a snapshot of the Christian saint
as he battles against sin for the sole reason that he is undergoing the sanctifying
operations of the Holy Spirit. Thus in D 3.13, Luther has the law-fulfilling Christ
(“grace”) say to the Christian: “Be forgiven; but lest you complain that you are utterly
forsaken, I will give you my Holy Spirit, who will make you a soldier (militem).”405 The
third disputation is especially replete with battle scenes depicting the Christian

is said not to teach and that Luther is said to teach novelly. Cf. the striking discussion at En. Ps.
31/2.4, as well as my treatment of civ. dei 11.13-14 in chapter 1.2.2 above.
404
See esp. civ. dei books 13 and 22, e.g., 13.19 (CCSL 48.402, Bett. 532): “… at the resurrection, the
saints will inhabit the actual bodies in which they suffered the hardships of this life on earth”; 22.21
(CCSL 48.841, Bett. 1064): “The spiritual flesh will thus be subject to the spirit, but it will be flesh,
not spirit, just as the fleshly spirit was subject to the flesh, and yet was spirit, not flesh.”
405
WA 39/1.526.4-5 [A], cf. ATD, 164.
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believer as a brave and (by the Spirit’s power) victorious soldier fighting against and
triumphing over his own flesh.
I will present a sampling of them in this section, but first I again take pains to
specify the exact nature and limited scope of this spiritual combat. For here we have to
do with “the constant struggle of believing saints (perpetua pugna sanctorum
credentium) which is treated often in the Psalms, who complain and cry out about
their evils (suis malis), even when they do not add any actual sin (actuale aliquod
peccatum).”406 In Luther’s theology of holiness, the renewed saint does not fight
against actual or consentient sin, because he sundigt nicht und kan nicht sundigen (1
John 3:9). Rather, he fights against the sinful desires (suis malis) stubbornly persisting
in, and comprising, his “flesh” (cf. 1 John 1:8, Rom. 7:14-25, Gal. 5:16-17, and great
stretches of the Psalter—not least as interpreted in the monastic tradition of theology
and prayer). Actual sin is the visible tree that grows from the hidden root of evil
desire, and the Christian’s aim in the daily struggle of repentance is to tear up sin at its
roots in the depths of his soul. He does so, in the power of the Spirit’s renovating and
delight-producing gift, by refusing to consent to the sinful desires that still indwell
him. So, for instance, at D 2.4 Luther states that “after receiving the Holy Spirit we
begin to detest sin, and hate it, and we purge it with the Holy Spirit himself helping
us, not consenting to sin (non consentientes peccato) but fighting back.”407 This is the
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D 2.5, WA 39/1.438.13-15 [A], cf. ATD, 95. Cf. the undisputed third set of theses, #13-16 (WA
39/1.350.32-39): 13. Ita non multo minus est, per poenitentiam perpetuam reliquum peccati persequi,
quam a principio incoepisse detestari. 14. Unde fit, ut sancti et iusti (sic exercente eos per legem Deo)
saepius tristentur et lugeant pro peccatis. 15. Cum tamen remissis peccatis in gratia sint et in Domino
debeant gaudere. 16. Imo nullum actuale peccatum allegant, et tamen miserabiliter clamant et petunt
gratiam Dei, ut est in Psalmis videre.
407
WA 39/1.436.9-11 [A], cf. ATD, 94.
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logic of non-consent that holds Luther’s real “simul” together, as we shall see vividly
portrayed in the following battle scenes.
(1) In D 3.2, Luther first argues that the law belongs in the Church in order to
stir up the saints, who still have “residual sin in the flesh” (peccatum reliquum in
carne), to enter into “battle and military service (pugnam et militiam) against the
remnants of sins (reliquias peccatorum) and temptations.”408 Even “holy and righteous
Paul” needed the law in this way, “not insofar as he is righteous and holy, but insofar
as he is flesh (inquantum est caro).”409 This is Luther’s basic spirit/flesh “simul,”
exemplified by Paul and drawn directly from his letters. The very practical pastor and
professor goes on to give a concrete example of the battle entailed by it that probably
hit close to home for not a few of the university students listening to the public
disputation:
For example: if I, a Christian, still a robust adolescent, were to fall for some
beautiful girl or woman, in this case, unless I’m a total tree trunk, I’m not able
to not be affected toward her (non possum non affici erga illam)—even if I were
baptized and justified—so that I would desire to touch her (cuperem eam
attingere) if it were permitted, and if it weren’t for the disgrace and penalty
which I fear. Yet nevertheless, if I am a Christian, immediately the heart and
the Holy Spirit cry out against this within, in the heart (statim reclamat cor et
Spiritus sanctus intus in corde): “Get behind me, Satan [Matt. 16:23]! Say
nothing! No, no Lady Flesh (domina caro), hush, be quiet! You shouldn’t impel
or solicit me in this way to seduction, adultery, libido, or to do any other
shameful acts against my God. But I will wait until God gives me someone
whom I will love, and with her I will make an end; as for this one, I will leave
her to her own spouse and her family.” These and other such voices of this kind
are not of man, but of Christ and the Holy Spirit, who says in the heart: “Leave
the girl in peace; I will give you another in due time, whom you will love
without troubles.” This Christian, even if he is affected by sex (afficiatur sexu),
nevertheless obeys the Spirit, averting the evil he feels (sentit) by praying that
he will not enter into temptation [Matt. 6:13].410
408

WA 39/1.500.10-14 [A], cf. ATD, 148.
WA 39/1.500.14-16 [A], cf. ATD, 148.
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WA 39/1.500.16-501.5 [A], cf. ATD, 148.
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This, adds Luther, is what it really means “to take sin captive” (peccatum captivare),
“even if it doesn’t happen without annoyance and many difficulties.”411 The “sin” in
question is “the residual sin in the flesh,” which makes its presence known through its
disordered, powerful, alluring and (at the same time) vexatious affections. In Luther’s
Augustinian moral psychology, the sanctified Christian is not able to prevent his being
affected by the stirrings, movements, and impulses of “Lady Flesh.”412 For he is no
truncus, a cipher in Luther’s writings for either the apathetic Stoic sages of antiquity
or the hermitic monastics he regarded as Stoics redivivi.413 The adolescent Christian is
fired by sexual desire. He feels the evil impulse of his flesh. He wants to touch the girl
whose beauty arouses him. But he fights back. His own heart, and the Holy Spirit
shouting within it, resist, hush, stifle, repress, reign in, and overrule the illicit desires
of his flesh. Prayerfully calling upon God for help (with the Lord’s Prayer, Matt 6:13),
411

WA 39/1.501.5-6 [A], cf. ATD, 148.
In the terms of ancient philosophical psychology sketched above, these are pro-passiones which
only ignite into full-blown passions with the granting of consent. More on this in chapter 3 below,
but cf. Sarah C. Byers, “Augustine and the Cognitive Cause of Stoic ‘Preliminary Passions’
(Propatheiai)” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 41/4 (Oct. 2003), 433-48.
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See, e.g., Luther’s comments in praise of Joseph’s weeping at Gen. 42:24, against the Devil’s
saints, who are “Stoics seven times over” (WA 44.493.3-26): Hoc autem in primis notandum est,
quod Ioseph describitur plenus charitate et affectibus naturalibus ac fraterna benevolentia.
Quanquam enim duriter compellat et tractat fratres, tamen ardet cor eius στοργῇ φυσιχῇ et amore
spirituali. Quia fides et Spiritus sanctus non corrumpit, aut destruit naturam, sed corruptam et
destructam sanat et reparat. Manent itaque naturalissimi adfectibus in parentibus, fratribus,
uxoribus, qui non tolluntur per gratiam, sed excitantur. Monachi olim ex hominibus truncos et saxa
insensibilia fecerunt, ac singulare praeconium de sanctis suis voluit celebrari Sathan, quod non
commoverentur ullo genere adfectuum, homines stolidi, ac septies Stoici. Gratia vero et spiritus
sanctus non sic exuit humanam naturam suis motibus, ut pater Iacob non defleat filii interitum, hoc
enim pugnaret cum natura sic condita a Deo cum adfectibus. Vidimus autem ante aliquot annos
fanaticos spiritus conari eiusmodi ἀπάθειαν invehere in Ecclesiam. Sicut Monetarius [viz., Thomas
Münzer] eam vita et moribus studebat exprimere, tanquam singularem sanctimoniam. Cum enim
nunciata ei esset nativitas filii, stetit ante altaram quasi mutus et surdus, non laetatus est nec gratias
egit, neque quicquam respondit, ut ostenderet et truncum et stipitem esse et postea iactaverat
naturam suam prorsus esse mutatam et mortificatam. Id revera fanaticum fuit longe deterius
Stoicorum delirio. Deus enim vult servatam naturam, non extinctam, sed iubet eam corrigi, ut fiat
purior et affectus magis sint compositi in piis, quam in gentilibus, qui non regunt eos timore et fiducia
Dei, sed temere et sine certa lege verbi Dei iis rapiuntur. Cf. LW 7.261.
412
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and heeding the Word spoken by Christ and the Spirit within his heart, the Christian
averts and overcomes the evil he feels in his flesh, obeys the Spirit, and looks the other
way, leaving the girl in peace and waiting on God to provide a suitable wife. Without
using the word consentire, Luther has thus provided a dramatic sketch of the cooperative workings of the Holy Spirit and the renewed Christian (who together
employ scriptural teachings about chastity and God’s fatherly providence, which
function analogously to the Stoic lekta) amidst the ultimately successful battle to
refuse consent to the Christian’s residual flesh.
Later in the same argument, Luther explains that the same affective
psychological phenomena occur in each instance of temptation, whether it be
disobedience in the child, lust in the adolescent, ambition in the grown man,
vainglory in the theologian, or—in “the true saints”—the “highest temptations”
(summis tentationibus) of unbelief, despair, and blasphemy.414 Here is the same
hierarchy of temptations we took note of in chapter 1, culminating in the summa
tentatio. Regardless of how the particular Christian is tempted by the sinful desires of
his flesh, which vary by age and by degrees of growth in holiness,415 “it belongs to all of
us to take up the spear and sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God [Eph. 6:17],
and to fight, not snore, amidst such great evils.”416
(2) Luther carries the same themes into D 3.3. The Christian is a “true Thomas
Thomist” (!) or “twin” (cf. John 11:16), who at the same time exists in triumphant and
militant states: righteous, free, and glad by faith in Christ, but embattled and battling
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On degrees of growth in holiness, see D 1.8.
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because “he still has sin inhering in himself.”417 Luther equates this peccatum haerens
with Rom. 7:23’s aliam legem in membris meis.418 After lamenting its wretchedness, he
again vividly portrays the Christian’s battle against his own flesh:
But there (ibi), right away when these things happen [viz., evil desires], and
this law (lex) or that carnal nature (carnalis illa natura), infected by Satan’s
poison in Paradise, shows itself and incites the wretched Christian [miserum
christianum, Rom. 7:24] to sexual desire or avarice or desperation or hatred of
God, there (ibi) I say the Christian rouses himself and says, as if in wonder:
“Behold, and are you still here? Welcome, Lord Sin (domine peccatum)! Where
were you? Where were you off amusing yourself all this time? Are you still
alive? From where do you come to us? Away with you to the cross (Apage te in
crucem)! Not this way, it will not be this way! I will protect my virgin [cf. 1 Cor.
7:37] and I will do what is just, even against your will (te invito). And the more
you torture me, or invite and incite me to seduction, sexual desire, or
desperation, the more I will laugh at you, and with a great and strong soul—
supported by the help of my Christ—I will despise you and crush your head
[Gen. 3:15]. What business do I have with you? I have another Lord (alium
habeo dominum), in whose camp I am now a soldier; here I will stand, here I
will die.”419
Such a great-souled Christian, who valiantly fights his own flesh to the death, “makes
a great massacre in the devil’s army, and triumphs gloriously,” the Reformer
denominates a true St. George—ille gloriosus miles et fortis Georgius—to match the
dragon-slaying legend of old. He says with St. Paul: “In all these things we more than
conquer through Jesus Christ” (cf. Rom. 8:37).420 As this battle scene graphically
attests, such holy knights cannot but help “feeling (sentire) many sins and desires,”
says Luther; “but with the Lord helping we do not permit them to rule (dominari).”421
Thus Luther confesses that he sees in his flesh a taste for the same things as the Turk,
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the Pope, and the rest of the world: sed non acquiesce!422 In the same way, the
paradigmatic spiritual warrior, St. Paul, “has sin [cf. 1 John 1:8], but conquered and
faint (victum ac languidum),” whereas the impious have peccatum vivum, dominans,
triumphans.423 In short, and in terms of a rich Augustinian constellation of texts from
St. John and Paul (especially Rom. 6:12-14), the Christian knight successfully
overcomes the residual desires of his flesh by not consenting to them, however fierce
the struggle.
Now, apart from the fundamental similarities that unite this passage with the
preceding argument, four things stand out. First, the sense of surprise that Luther’s
knight experiences when the flesh’s impulses make themselves known indicates their
spontaneous and pre-volitional quality. Haec fiunt, these motions “happen” because of
the indwelling sin’s operations in the renewed Christian; and they happen apart from
and prior to any consent to their movements on his part. Indeed, the Christian
experiences the onslaught of Lord Sin’s enticements as a kind of spiritual torture.
Second, the Christian’s heroic refusal of consent to the evil desires of his flesh is as
instantaneous as their arousal in his embattled soul (ibi … ibi.). This strong George
does not toy with his flesh; he slays it, promptly. Third, the Christian knight fights and
takes his stand with confidence and bold defiance, mocking and despising Lord Sin,
whom we might otherwise consider a rather formidable opponent. This, I suggest, is
due to the fourth striking aspect of this passage, namely, that the Christian fights
against Lord Sin with and in the Lord Jesus Christ. He sends evil desires away to the
cross and triumphs over them with Christ’s help; and when he does so, he becomes a
422
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Gen. 3:15-style serpent-crusher in his own right, beating down Lord Sin’s head beneath
his feet. For he is a solider in the camp of the true Serpent-Crusher, Jesus Christ.424
Thus the battling Christian participates in Christ by faith and enters into conformitas
Christi: in particular, the flesh-conquering knight assumes the form of a Christus
victor in miniature.425
(3) The last battle scene I will present here, from D 3.5, is unique in that it is
mainly an expansive exegesis of Rom. 7:14-25. For this reason it is especially
illuminating as to the nature of the “simul” that characterizes Luther’s flesh-fighting
saints, who long for a perfection in holiness which they cannot yet attain.
Thus also the divine Paul, when he was turning the matter up and down and in
various parts, finally cried out: “Ach, who will set me free from the body of this
death?” [Rom. 7:24] He therefore says that this life [viz., the Christian life of
struggle depicted in Rom. 7:14-23] is to be defended, so that we can at last be
set free from sins. For before we are buried, we are not able not to sin (non
possumus non peccare), even the saints. To be sure, we all desire (Cuperemus)
to live according to God’s law and to obey it in the most holy way possible
(quam sanctissime), but alas, how often does our flesh interrupt us here? How
often is our soul drawn in different directions and seized by that which it does
not want (rapitur eo, quo nolit)? In this way Paul complains about himself,
Rom. 7[:19]: “I do not do what I want, but what I do not want (Non, quod volo,
facio, sed quod nolo),” and many other things in the same sentence—which is a
place where one can see that huge battle or wrestling match of God’s Spirit and
the flesh in the saints (ingentem illam pugnam seu luctam spiritus Dei et carnis
in sanctis). Without a doubt, there are many adolescents and youths who with
perpetual and assiduous prayers petition and beg for the same thing from God,
in order that they might be able to live as holy and piously as they want to (ut
ita sancte et pie possent, quam vellent, vivere). For what pious person would not
wish (optaret) to be free from those vexations and difficulties, which he is
forced (cogitur) to take in here, and never to be seized and solicited by things
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which offend God the Father? But this cannot happen in this life; we are
flesh.426
We have to be very precise in handling Luther’s non possumus non peccare. In the
context of exegeting Rom. 7, it refers to the illicit and unwanted movements of the
saint’s residual flesh, not to the unavoidable necessity of falling into actual sins. 427 The
saints eagerly desire to obey God’s law perfectly, without the least resistance of the
residual sin in their flesh. They beg God in prayer to be given the ability (posse) to
really live in a way that equals their earnest will (velle) for holiness. But Paul himself,
read through Luther’s Augustinian spectacles, confesses: “I do not do what I want, that
is, I do not yet live in the freedom of holiness for which I long; rather, I do what I do
not want, that is, I am still forced to suffer being rapt, seized, solicited, drawn, and
vexed by the evil desires of my flesh, which are offensive to my Father and repugnant
to my own holy soul.” In Luther’s theology of holiness, the partly renewed but still
partly fleshly believer longs for the perfection of the Spirit’s inchoate work with all his
heart. For, as we saw above, he delights in the law and loves righteousness and is
therefore repulsed by his own residual fleshly impulses, against which he fights
incessantly and from which he longs to be set free. This is the huge battle and
426
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wrestling match between the Spirit’s gift, operative in and through the renewed
agency of the believer, and the flesh that remains in sanctis. In contrast to valiant
knight George in D 3.3, here the plaintive longing of battle-weary Pauline Christians
comes to the fore. The saint’s fight with his flesh is hard, trying, and lifelong, and the
longer he perseveres in its course the more Rom. 7:24’s quis me liberabit becomes the
cry of his own painfully divided heart. Farther on in the same disputation, Luther
again quotes Rom. 7:24 (and 7:19), then exhorts his hearers: “Learn to pray in this way
for sanctification, and do not be secure.”428

2.2.3. Summary
In the disputations, Luther’s theology of regeneration and renewal by the Spirit’s gift
co-inheres with a Rom. 7-centered theology of residual indwelling sin, such that
Christians are “partly righteous, partly unrighteous,”429 “partly saint, partly sinner.”430
In Paul’s terms, they are both spirit and flesh, with the new creature in the ascendancy
and the remnants of the old held in subjection to the new; and Luther intends his own
terms as explications of the apostle’s. The really but partially renewed Christian
delights in the law of God in his inner being or spirit, and therefore battles against the
unholy desires that remain lodged within (or simply constitute) his flesh. The heart of
this spiritual battle consists in his refusal—in the power of the Spirit’s sanctifying
gift—to yield voluntary consent to the sinful desires which afflict and grieve the saint
precisely because (a) they are his desires, not some separate subject’s, and (b) they cut
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painfully against the grain of his own renewed will.431 The Lutheran saint no longer
wants to experience the sinful passions he is nonetheless forced to endure: passions to
which, through the delight-producing renovation of his heart by the Spirit, he is no
longer bound to consent. This account of the Christian soul as a complex of
disordered affections inherited from ruined Adam (“flesh”) and holy affections
produced by the new-creating Spirit (“spirit”), locked in perpetual combat that only
persists so long as the flesh remains subordinate to the spirit through the victory of
Christ’s spiritual knight in non-consent: this is Luther’s real “simul.” Far from being
inimical to real growth in holiness, it is in Luther’s theology an account of evangelical
sanctification underway and advancing amidst the vicissitudes and dangers of spiritual
life lived out and fought for in a deadly combat zone, with due attention paid not only
to the ongoing reality of the sinful flesh (and the devil, and the world) but also to the
greater and stronger reality of the Holy Spirit’s—and the holy spiritus’!—progressive
victory over all his foes. Rightly grasped in the context of his theology of the gift, the
Reformer’s “simul” is nothing less than a profile of the Christian advancing in holiness.
Thus at D 3.25, Luther explains that by “dying to sin” (cf. Rom. 6:2, 11) Paul means
“fighting against them and not allowing it to rule in us” (cf. Rom. 6:12-14), and adds
that “this happens, not only in one member, but in all, so that now the heart, eyes,
hands, tongue, and feet operate differently than before, and serve Christ the Lord—
not sins—and thus become from day to day constantly holier and better (sic fieri
subinde de die in diem sanctior et melior).”432
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2.3. Totaliter peccatores? Grace, gift, and the “simul”
In his term-setting 1951 study, Joest referred to this (to him, more pedestrian) element
in Luther’s theology as the Partialaspekt of the “simul,” or alternately as the
partim/partim variation of the same, which he contrasted unfavorably with its
Totalaspekt. Although Joest’s study moves freely from various texts spanning the
length of Luther’s theological career, two passages from the third disputation figure
especially prominently in his argument for a “total simul” interpreted as an overtly
anti-logical, existential, “paradoxical collision of two total realities,” in which total
righteousness and total sinfulness are predicated of the same subject at the same
time.433 I will examine them both, and argue (following David Yeago’s suggestive 2004
essay)434 against Joest that Luther’s occasional totus/totus remarks fit quite snuggly
with his rather more frequent emphases on partial residual sinfulness juxtaposed to
real though partial renewal in holiness.
(1) The first comes in the last paragraph of the unusually lengthy D 3.3, an
earlier portion of which I studied above—viz., the great battle scene where Luther
names the flesh-slaying saint, who refuses to consent to the evil desires that torture
his righteous soul, a true St. George. More on this in a moment. Joest’s attention falls
on an arresting phrase near the end of the argument: duo contraria in uno subiecto et
in eodem puncto temporis.435 He then conflates this text with a similar passage at D
3.2.3[30], which I will consider separately below, and asserts that this proves that for
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Luther Christians are Reputative totaliter iusti—revera totaliter peccatores. For this
seemingly impressive Latin summation of Luther’s “total” theology of justification,
Joest cites WA 39/1.564.3ff; but as Yeago has pointed out, it isn’t actually there.436 I will
interpret what Luther does say at this critical text shortly, but for now it suffices to
note that Joest reads the duo contraria remark at D 3.3 to mean that Christian
believers are totally righteous by way of imputation, but in reality totally sinners. Is
this what Luther is fact teaching at this point in the disputation? He does claim, a few
lines later, that the Christian is a saint “insofar as he is a Christian, viz., to the extent
that I am righteous, godly, and Christ’s, but insofar as I look at me and my sin, I am
wretched and the greatest sinner” (cf. Rom. 7:24, 1 Tim. 1:15).437 I grant that, taken out
of the context of D 3.3, Joest’s reading of Luther’s duo contraria in light of this
sentence is at least possible; but there are two factors that militate strongly against it.
First, consider the phrase itself. Luther speaks of two contraria in a single
subject at the same time, to wit, righteousness and sin. Joest finds in this cause to
celebrate an instance of the Reformer’s “flagrant” disregard for the principle of noncontradiction and, with it, “the foundations of all logic.”438 He then explains the
simultaneous coexistence of these mutually-excluding predicates in existential terms:
they belong to “two wholly distinct planes of being (völlig verschiedenen Seinsebenen),”
on the one hand one’s extrinsic relation to Christ with his perfect righteousness, on
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the other one’s own qualitative being as a sinner.439 As I allowed earlier, Luther’s
subsequent eatenus/quatenus lends a certain plausibility to this reading; but Joest is, I
think, being a little too clever for his own good. For he overlooks the most obvious fact
about Luther’s remark, namely, that the two contraria exist in a single subject. On
Joest’s interpretation, one of the predicates is relational and extrinsic to the Christian’s
being (i.e., righteousness) while the other is intrinsic, qualitative, and real (i.e., sin).
To be sure, Luther can say that the Christian is to be considered in praedicamento
relationis et qualitatis, as he does in the 1540 Promotionsdisputation for Joachim
Mörlin, which Joest supplies as a parallel text to D 3.3 and leverages for his
interpretation.440 But Luther does not do so here: the two contraria are both “in” a
single subject. This does not refer to two kinds of predications, relational versus
qualitative, applied to a single subject. Rather, it refers to two contrary qualities
predicated of a single subject, precisely because they inhere together within the same
subject in their contrariety. In other words, taken in its simplest sense, this is another
instance of Luther’s partim/partim “simul,” wherein the partially renewed Christian
continues to bear within himself the remnants of Adam’s sin. This is why, in the very
next line, Luther explains that the saint cries out to God quia sentio peccatum
adhaerens mihi,441 and in the last two lines of the paragraph speaks of the vetus Adam
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and natura corrupta which manet in the saints till death.442 As Yeago and Theodor
Dieter have argued against Joest, the predication of contrary qualities to a single
subject only rises to the level of a logical contradiction if they are predicated not only
at the same time, but also in the same respect.443 This point of logic is just what Luther
himself upholds at D 1.8: contraria non sunt in eodem subiecto in eodem gradu.444 He
explains this, vis-à-vis his theology of progressive growth in holiness, in sanative terms
taken from the venerable christological interpretation of Luke 10:25-37:
When health is perfect, disease is excluded. But in faith we are not yet perfectly
healthy, but we are being healed. The Samaritan began to heal the man who
had fallen into the hands of robbers. And therefore the disease is not yet
entirely healed, but repeatedly bothers us. In this way, both are in us, sin and
righteousness, certainly not in the same degree, but in different ones (Sic
utrumque est in nobis, peccatum et iustitia, non tamen in eodem gradu, sed
diverso).445
Faith (the root of all inherent righteousness) battles against the disease of sin, and
rules over it. Sin fights back against faith, but though it proves bothersome it does not
triumph, for it only exists in the Christian subject in inferiore gradu.446 The Samaritan’s
healing ministrations have effected much, and though his patient in the inn is not yet
perfectly sound, he is more healthy than sick. “In this way,” reasons Luther, “in diverse
degrees contraries are well able to exist in the same subject.”447 I submit that D 1.8’s
explanation of how contraria bene possunt esse in eodem [subiecto]—viz., diversity in
respect of degree—is the far more suitable text to pair with D 3.3’s duo contraria in
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uno subiecto. To round off this first argument, I need only add that Joest does indeed
engage D 1.8 at some length, and that he does so in his treatment of the Partialaspekt
of Luther’s “simul.”448
Second, consider the context of Luther’s remark in the course of the overall
argument of D 3.3. As I noted above, its first half consists in the Knight George versus
Lord Sin “battle scene” examined earlier. From here, Luther presses the point of real
holiness maintained and furthered through the saint’s fierce struggle to refuse consent
to the desires of his flesh by presenting a second vivid hagiographical story, which
Luther (speaking off the cuff in the disputation) mistakenly attributes to Cyprian. A
certain martyr was bound and shut up alone by his captors, who then brought
beautiful prostitutes into his chamber to entice him to engage in illicit sex, with the
promise that if he did so he would be set free. He steadfastly refused their advances,
throttled the sexual lusts aroused in his own flesh, and, as a true “soldier of Christ”
(militem Christi), preferred to die in faith in Christ rather than to live by offending his
Lord.449
Luther proceeds to explain the theology (and moral psychology) exemplified in
the story of the martyr’s heroic and victorious battle to refuse consent to his fleshly
desires for sex and for freedom from torture and death. “The Christian feels that he is
moved and inflamed (sentit, se moveri et accendi) by wrath, hatred, that he is burned
(uri) by sexual lust, that he is inflamed (ardere se) by love of glory, money, power,
etc.”450 Does the mere fact that he feels and is moved violently by these passions mean
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he is not a Christian? Luther’s answer to his own question contains an exact statement
of his theology of grace, gift, and the “simul.” “In that part” (in hac parte) of him which
is comprised by these unruly motions and sinful passions, that is in his residual flesh,
the Christian—as flesh—is not a Christian.451 The law exposes this, not least the
encompassing non concupisces452 of the 10th Commandment and Rom. 7:7-8. But the
gospel speaks a stronger reality and supplies two reasons for a better judgment of such
a person: “He who fights, and neither suffers himself to be conquered by sin nor
permits sin to rule [Rom. 6:12], is and is called a Christian on account of faith in Christ,
because of which whatever evil is still present in him is not imputed to him.”453 Once
again, Luther adjudges the Christian a “sinner” (or in this case, a non-Christian) in the
very precise sense that in that “part” of him which is his flesh—quod adhuc adest
mali—he continues to feel, suffer, or experience illicit and disordered impulses,
desires, or affections. This is the one reason why the Christian is sinful; but for his
righteousness there are two. First, he fights against his sinful flesh, refuses its powerful
suggestions, and does not permit it to rule over him. Second, because of his faith in
Christ, these evil desires—overcome through the refusal of consent, yet intrinsically
sinful nonetheless—are not reckoned to his account. Thus gift and grace together,
victory over one’s flesh by the Spirit and forgiveness or non-imputation propter fidem
Christi of the “sin” that remains in its conquered and depleted form, constitute the
Christian’s righteousness. And to be clear, the Christian’s refusal of consent to the
desires of his flesh in the power of the Spirit’s gift is the sine qua non of his abiding in
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the grace and forgiveness of Christ. Qui pugnet—the sin-fighter, and the sin-fighter
alone, is the one to whom the residual sin against which he fights is not imputed for
Christ’s sake. Now, this proves that Joest’s “total simul” is, for Luther, theologically
(and spiritually) impossibile. The person who consents to his sinful flesh forfeits gift
and grace alike, and does indeed become a “total sinner.” But now he is not righteous
at all, either in himself or in Christ. For he has lost that faith which alone unites (or
relates) him to Christ and grasps hold of his righteousness. Only the Spirit-gifted, sinfighting, non-consenting knight has that faith in Christ which receives all the riches of
his grace. That is to say, only the Christian who is really (though partially) renewed in
righteousness by the Spirit obtains the grace in Christ that pardons the vexatious
dregs of Adam’s sin which remain for the fight.
The next paragraph’s Augustinian interpretation of Ps. 32 and 1 John 3:9 and
1:8, which immediately precedes the duo contraria remark highlighted by Joest,
confirms that this is in fact Luther’s real dogmatics of sin, grace, and holiness. He
begins with Ps. 32:1: “Blessed are they whose iniquities (iniquitates) are forgiven, and
whose sins are covered.”454 Interestingly, he does not continue to v. 2, which provides
the vital non imputavit that he has already alluded to in the preceding paragraph’s
summary of his theology of grace and gift. St. Paul cites these verses in Rom. 4:6-8 to
establish his doctrine of justification by faith, and they are of great moment for Luther
even if his sense of their meaning has sometimes been mistaken. In D 3.3, his
interpretation stands out clearly because he passes on strait to v. 6: “for this, viz.,
iniquity (iniquitate), every saint (omnis sanctus) will pray to You,” then cites 1 John 3:9
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and 1:8 as parallel and explanatory texts.455 The latter two verses, as we have seen,
factored decisively in the 1538 addendum to SA III.3, and they are taken in the same
sense in this text from the same year. St. John’s qui natus est ex Deo, non peccat (1 John
3:9) matches the sanctus in Ps. 32:6, while his si dixerimus, quod peccatum non
habemus, nos ipsos fallimus (1:8) explains why David’s saint prays to God on account of
his iniquity and is blessed in the first place because God mercifully forgives and covers
his sins. The renewed saint “has sin”—the sinful flesh and its illicit passions—but he
does not commit actual sin through voluntarily consenting to the desires he has. He
does not boast of his inherent righteousness as though he were already perfect, but
humbly prays to God in the fashion of Ps. 32:6. All the while, despite the reality of his
“sin” and the imperfection of his renewal in real holiness, he is nonetheless perfectly
beatus and sanctus through God’s merciful non-imputation. Thus when Luther asks,
What is this? How do these things fit together? How does it agree, to be holy
and to pray for sin (sanctum esse et orare pro peccato)? It is truly a marvelous
thing. It is truly a fine thing. Reim da, wer reimen kan.456
—his question is basically rhetorical, for he has already “rhymed” a solution to the
apparent contradiction of duo contraria in uno subiecto in the body of the argument. I
do not mean to imply that Luther, any less than St. Paul or Augustine, is indifferent to
the mysteriousness of indwelling sin or, what is far greater, to the marvelousness of
the gospel that defeats it. Far from it. But Luther is not in the least at a loss to render a
theological explanation of the nature of residual “sin” in the saints, on the one hand,
and on the other of the manner in which it is overcome through the grace of Jesus
Christ and the gift of the Spirit. That is what he has labored at, over against the
455
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antinomian misconstrual of his theology, in D 3.3 and throughout these disputations,
as I hope my own exposition of the same is bearing out. In light of the regnant
confusion in much of twentieth-century Lutheran theology on this point, the
exhortation which the Reformer interposes amidst his explanations in D 3.3 of the
interrelation of grace, gift, and indwelling sin takes on a certain prophetic quality: “I
implore you to learn this well. Believe me this: when we are dead, not many will teach
this and make this distinction.”457
(2) The second text from the disputations that Joest claims in defense of his
“total simul” comes at D 3.2.3[30]. Although Joest misquotes it, the passage as it
actually stands in WA 39/1 does include the statement that revera sumus et totaliter
peccatores,458 and concludes dicimur iusti et peccatores simul et semel.459 As Yeago has
already handled this text ably, I can afford to be more brief in my treatment of it
here.460 But as a complement to Yeago’s interpretation, which leans heavily on the 1521
Antilatomus, I will base my reading exclusively on texts from the third disputation.
In the first place, it is vital to grasp that the thesis to which Luther responds in
the body of his argument is itself an explicit argument against the partim/partim
“simul.” To wit: since the beneficium Christi, namely justification, vivification, and
liberation from the law, pertains to the whole person, believers cannot be described as
partim iusti, partim iniusti; instead, they are either totaliter iusti vel totaliter
peccatores.461 This thesis did not drop out of thin air: in the preceding D 3.2.2[29],
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Luther had argued that “it is absolutely certain that we are partly righteous, partly
sinners (partim iustos, partim peccatores), since we carry around with us the flesh of
our father Adam infected by original sin.”462 So, the initial thesis in D 3.2.3[30], in the
mode proper to scholastic disputation, is pressing the logical validity of what Luther
had just established by directly countering it. In his reply, we should expect Luther to
defend his partim/partim by way of further clarification of its meaning. And that—
pace Joest’s interpretation but consistent with the theology of grace, gift, and residual
sin that Luther upholds throughout the disputations—is precisely what we find.
Luther begins by granting that the “total” thesis is a good one Reputative
scilicet, by way of imputation.463 He goes on: “For this is true, that by divine
imputation we are really and totally righteous (reputatione divina sumus revera et
totaliter iusti), even if sin is still present.”464 Now, the question that must be asked
here is, What is the nature of the “sin” that is still present (adhuc adsit peccatum) in
the saints and requires God’s mercy in order to establish the believer as totally
righteous in his sight? In light of the preceding argument’s claim that we are partim
peccatores on account of the remnants of Adam’s sin, as well as the whole tenor of
Luther’s theology as I have exposited it to this point, the answer is ready to hand; and
a few lines farther on, Luther specifies that Christians are sinners “insofar as we regard
ourselves and the first birth (prima generatione).”465 Indeed, says Luther, in this
respect revera sumus et totaliter peccatores.466 This is more or less the line that drew
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Joest’s attention, but Luther’s meaning is far more restricted than Joest recognized. In
D 3.3, Luther stated that in hac parte of the Christian that is his residual “flesh,” the
Christian is not a Christian. Here, he states that when the Christian attends to what he
is in himself, that is to say, to what he is by virtue of his first generation as a son of
ruined Adam, apart from his regeneration in Christ by the Spirit, he is truly and totally
a sinner. In both cases, different terms express the same theological judgment: in his
residual Adamic “flesh,” apart from Christ’s grace and the Spirit’s gift, the Christian
non est christianus and the saint is totaliter peccator. This kind of language sounds
paradoxical, and Joest and his heirs would have it be so, but it actually is not. Rather,
Luther is urging what a later English Puritan called “the sinfulness of sin,”467 precisely
in the flesh of the regenerate Christian. By the Spirit’s gift such a one really is reborn
and made new. But the remnants of Adam’s sin, manifest in the disordered passions
which afflict the saint’s heart against his will, are so utterly repugnant and abhorrent
to the holiness of God that their mere presence in the saint—apart from any voluntary
consent to their illicit promptings—requires the merciful non-imputation of God, and
the covering of Christ’s precious blood, for the flesh-bearing saint to stand righteous
and pure in God’s sight.468 When regarded apart from this gift and grace—which, in
addition to being a logical possibility and as such a useful penitential discipline, is also
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an immensely fruitful (if intensely painful) spiritual experience, viz., the suspensio
gratiae469—the greatest saint in via is indeed maximus peccator, revera et totaliter, and
confesses himself to be so (1 Tim. 1:15).470 But in theological truth and spiritual reality,
amidst all the afflictive passions of his sinful flesh—including the despairing
paroxysms of the soul’s dark night—the Christian never actually exists apart from the
regenerating and renovating gift of the Spirit and the abundant riches of God’s grace
in Jesus Christ.
There are two further points to be made in conclusion, the first in confirmation
of the fact that the “sin” that requires God’s forgiving grace in Christ and renders
Christians “total sinners” apart from that grace is to be understood only as the residual
sinful flesh, the second regarding the nature of that grace itself. The first concerns
Luther’s appeal, in D 3.2.3[30], to his favorite rhetorical trope: “synecdoche,” that is,
taking a part for the whole or vice versa. He sandwiches two examples between his
first reference to residual sin (adhuc adsit peccatum) and his last (prima generatione).
When a wounded person is healed, we say that “the whole man” (totus homo) was
healed, even though only a part of him had been wounded and only that part restored.
469
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Likewise we say that a man is wounded, when in fact “scarcely one of his members” is
actually harmed. Sic etiam, explains Luther, when we have regard to ourselves and our
first birth, we are really and totally sinners: viz., by way of synecdoche, in this case the
second example being the more directly pertinent of the two.471 Its force requires that
the rhetorically impressive totaliter peccatores is on par with saying that a whole man
is wounded even though only one part of him really is. That is, the whole Christian is
said to be a sinner, because part of him still is: his flesh. In other words, Joest’s
apparently strongest candidate for a “total simul” is in fact an intentional rhetorical
variation of the partim.
On the whole, Yeago’s interpretation of this point is quite good. But he goes on
to assert (a little vaguely) that as the totus peccator is really based on the Christian’s
partial residual sinfulness, so the totus iustus is based on the reality of his partial
renewal.472 This, I grant, is a legitimate inference from the first example of a
synecdoche that Luther provides: the whole person is said to be healed (or
“righteous”), whereas really only part of him is. The trouble with this is that in the
text, Luther leaves the first example behind and explains the Christian’s “total”
righteousness another way. Careful attention here will yield deeper insight into the
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ongoing role of “grace” (properly defined) in Luther’s theology of holiness. If, in the
present argument, Luther had maintained the kind of symmetry that Yeago suggests is
there, he would have followed up his rhetorical reduction of the totaliter peccator to
the partim with a statement of his theology of the Spirit’s gift of real but partial
renewal in holiness. But this he does not do. Instead, Luther turns to his theology of
grace in Jesus Christ: “Because Christ was given for us, we are totally holy and
righteous (sancti et iusti totaliter).”473 In other words, a decisive asymmetry obtains
between the theological rationale for calling a Christian a “total sinner” on the one
hand and “completely holy and righteous” on the other. He is called totus peccator
rhetorically by way of synecdoche, though he is actually only partly sinful and is in fact
partly renewed in real holiness by the Spirit. But he is called—and really is—totus
iustus by way of gracious imputation, God in mercy overlooking his fleshly
imperfections and reckoning Christ’s self-donation into death on the cross to his
account. This, after all, is how Luther had begun his reply: reputatione divina sumus
revera et totaliter iusti, etiamsi adhuc adsit peccatum. So we have come full circle, with
the important clarification that the divine imputation by which believers are found to
be entirely righteousness in God’s sight (despite the residual sin in their flesh) is
granted on account of the gospel of grace, quod Christus pro nobis datus est.474
This, then, is Luther’s theology of grace, gift, and the “simul” as he exposits it in
the three disputations gegen die Antinomer held from December 1537 to the fall of
1538.
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3. On the Councils and the Church (early 1539)
On the Councils and the Church falls in between the third (Sept. 1538) and the fourth
(Sept. 1540) of Luther’s disputations gegen die Antinomer. So it is not at all surprising
that in this his major work on church history, patristic authority, conciliar theory, and
ecclesiology, Luther twice engages his ongoing polemics with Agricola.475 In each case,
the result is a rich exposition of his trinitarian theology of grace and gift that
emphasizes the real renewal of the Christian in the most robust terms. I shall first
examine both loci on grace and gift, and then turn finally to Luther’s teaching on the
sanctifying holy cross.

3.1. A Pfingst prediger: the dialectics of grace and gift
The first locus on grace and gift comes mid-way through the second part of the work,
as Luther interacts in a strikingly sympathetic manner with the christologies of
Nestorius and Eutyches vis-à-vis his own deeply held Chalcedonian orthodoxy.476 In
each case, says Luther, well-meaning theologians erred by denying conclusions that
logically followed from their own correct premises (e.g., Nestorius denied that God
was born of Mary, but he affirmed that Christ was God and Man). This, says Luther, “is
what my Antinomians, too, are doing today,” who are
… preaching beautifully and (as I cannot but think) with real sincerity about
Christ’s grace (der gnade Christi), about the forgiveness of sin and whatever
else can be said about the article of redemption. But they flee as if it were the
very devil the consequence that they should tell people about the third article,
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of sanctification (Heiligung), that is, of the new life in Christ (neuen leben in
Christo).477
The paragraphs that follow are framed entirely by Luther’s theology of grace and gift,
and from them three observations especially stand out for the sake of my argument.
First, in contrast to Agricola et al. and their exclusive emphasis on “grace,” Luther
offers an explicit and full presentation of his own creedal theology of grace and gift.
Indeed, the Reformer’s insertion of the Latin gratia/donum at this juncture in this
German writing lends them the aura of quasi-technical terminology. Since he basically
affirms Agricola’s preaching of grace or redemption through Jesus Christ,478 the weight
of his discussion falls on the gift of sanctification and renewal by the Holy Spirit. Jesus
Christ “did not earn for us only gratiam, die gnade, but also donum, die gabe of the
Holy Spirit,’ so that we might have not only forgiveness of sins, but also ceasing from
sins (auffhoeren von den sunden).”479 Together with this negative definition of the
Spirit’s donum/gabe at work in the sin-ceasing saints, Luther repeatedly couples a
positive. With an allusion to 1 Pet. 2:24 in the foreground and Rom. 5—8 in the
background, Luther states that Spirit-gifted believers are not only “dead to sin (der
sunden tod),” they “live to righteousness (der gerechtigkeit leben), beginning and
increasing (anfahen und zunehmen) here on earth and perfecting it beyond.”480 For the
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Spirit gives life and righteousness to those who are dead in sin, making “new men
(neuen menschen) out of the old Adam”481 who “lead a new life (neu leben fueren)”
precisely because they “have the Holy Spirit.”482 Thus true Pfingst-preaching about the
Spirit means speaking de sanctificatione et vivificatione Spiritus Sancti,483 that is, of the
Heiligung and vivification produced by the Spirit and consisting in “the new life in
Christ (neuen leben in Christo).”484 In short, the Holy Spirit makes new men and
women out of the old Adam, who desist from sin and progressively increase in
righteousness as they advance by the Spirit’s gift in the new life in Christ. This ongoing
work of sanctification and vivification by the Spirit, set in the context of St. Paul’s
contrast between sin and death in the first Adam and righteousness and life in Jesus
Christ, Luther here (as elsewhere in the works of his maturity) encapsulates in the
single term, donum.
Second, I note not merely Luther’s spirited defense of the real holiness of life
imparted by the Spirit’s donum, but the integral and inseparable nexus of this
sanctifying gift with the grace of redemption through Jesus Christ. With polemical
verve, Luther insists that it is impossible to have Christ’s grace without the Spirit’s gift,
since the mutual relation of the two is not only intimate and organic, but causal and
purposeful. For Christ “has purchased redemption from sin and death”—i.e., grace—
“so that the Holy Spirit might make us into new men (das uns der Heilige Geist sol zu
neuen menschen machen)”485—i.e., gift (cf. Gal. 3:14, 4:4-6, Acts 2:22-33). In the slight
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variation quoted above, Luther can also simply say that Christ merited both grace and
gift, and not the one without the other.486 Either way, his point is clear: Christ’s work
in meriting the grace of forgiveness cannot be separated from the Spirit’s gift of
renewal without imperiling the work of Christ itself. Or, to say the same thing
positively, the redemption of sinners by forgiveness in Christ is not an end in itself,
but is intrinsically ordered to their renewal in righteousness and life through the
Spirit.487
This is the insight that originally prompted Luther to digress from his
discussion of fifth-century christologies to enter the fray against (as he put it) meine
Antinomer. Like Nestorius and Eutyches—mutatis mutandis—Agricola et al. preach
grace and forgiveness through Christ “beautifully” and even sincerely. But they refuse
to preach holiness through the Spirit’s gift, because they fail to grasp that the Spirit’s
gift of new life in Christ is the theo-logically necessary consequence (consequens) of
Christ’s redeeming work. “They may be fine Easter preachers, but they are very poor
Pentecost preachers,” quips Luther.488 But his real contention is that in the end the
Antinomians prove to be bad rhetoricians because they were bad logicians first:
granting the premise of redemption through Christ but denying the conclusion of
sanctification by the Spirit.489 “They therefore preach Christ beautifully with
Nestorisch und Eutychische Dialectica, that he is and yet is not Christ.”490 By contrast,
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in the orthodox “Chalcedonian” dialectics driving Luther’s theology of grace and gift,
“there is no such Christ that died for the kind of sinners who do not, after the
forgiveness of sins, leave their sin and lead a new life (von den sunden lassen und ein
neues leben fueren).”491 Mark well the vehemence of Luther’s polemic at this point, for
it demonstrates just how seriously he regarded the matter of Christian holiness and
the threat posed to it by the errant theology and preaching of Agricola. In Luther’s
judgment, Agricola’s sincere but flawed theology of grace-sans-gift ends in a heresy no
less devastating than the sincere but flawed christologies of the ancient heresiarchs;
and heresy, in the Reformer’s still very catholic mind, cuts off its adherents from the
salvation that is only to be had through faith in the true Gospel.492 Because the true
Jesus Christ brings the pentecostal gift of holiness through the Spirit as the necessary
consequence of his paschal forgiveness and grace, the Christian “should either have
the Holy Spirit and lead a new life, or know that he has no Christ.”493 A sinful, Spiritless life falsely justified in the name of Christ’s grace is rooted at bottom in
christological heresy: “He who does not abstain from sin, but persists in his former evil
nature, must have a different Christ, that of the Antinomians; the real Christ is not
there, even if all the angels would cry, ‘Christ! Christ!’ He must be damned with this,
his new Christ.”494
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Third and last, a few comments on the “simul” as it pertains to this theology of
grace and gift. In Luther’s positive exposition of his position, the res described by the
term is nearly as absent as the term itself, which does not appear. The nearest he
comes to it is a single, brief qualification of the saints’ renewal in the life of
righteousness: it begins and increases in this life, but only reaches perfection in the
next.495 This is an unexceptionable statement of traditional Augustinian eschatological
reserve, in no way prejudicial to the theology of donum-worked holiness that Luther
sets forth and defends in this passage with marked zeal. On the whole, it is the reality
and vividness of the new life in Christ that impresses the reader as the real object of
Luther’s concern here; even the very specific sense in which his Smalcald Articles and
Disputations recognize the ongoing reality of sin in the Christian life is absent from
this text. That said, the Antinomian “simul” that animated Luther’s stern
disapprobation and summoned his discussion of David’s fall in the 1538 appendix to
SA III.3 finds a nearly identical counterpart in this text from the following year. Luther
charges that Agricola and his circle
… think one should not frighten or trouble the people, but rather always preach
comfortingly about grace and the forgiveness of sins in Christ, and under no
circumstances use these or similar words: “Listen! You want to be a Christian
and nonetheless (gleichwol) remain an adulterer, a whoremonger, a drunken
swine, arrogant, covetous, a usurer, envious, vindictive, malicious, etc.!”
Instead they say, “Listen! Though you are an adulterer, a whoremonger, a
miser, or other kind of sinner, if you but believe, you are saved, and you need
not fear the law. Christ has fulfilled it all!”496
Regardless of whether Luther is fair to Agricola’s actual preaching and theology, his
polemics powerfully illuminate his own position; for he charges his erstwhile friend
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with the very “simul”-theology he is often thought to have embraced himself. For
Luther, it is impossible to be a Christian and remain an adulterer, a whoremonger, a
drunken swine, arrogant, covetous, a usurer, envious, vindictive, malicious, “or other
kind of sinner” at the same time. To teach and preach otherwise is to reject the Spirit’s
gift and deny the gospel of Jesus Christ.

3.2. The Holiness of the Church
The second major locus on grace and gift appears in the compact treatise on
evangelical ecclesiology that forms the third part of On the Councils and the Church. If
in the previous material Luther digressed somewhat from his treatment of conciliar
history and theory, here the theology of grace and gift is absolutely central to his
exposition, for it is itself constitutive of the Reformer’s ecclesiology. More concretely
put, for Luther redemption through Jesus Christ and sanctification by the Spirit are
the evangelical realities that together make a gathered people the Church of God.
Luther takes his point of departure from “the Children’s Creed,” that is, the
Apostles’ in the form it took in late medieval Germany already prior to the
Reformation: “I believe in one holy Christian Church, the Communion of saints (eine
heilige Christliche Kirche, Gemeinschafft der heiligen).”497 This he glosses with both
ecclesia sancta catholica Christiana and, more decisively, ein Christlich heilig Volck.498
The Church is a Christian, holy people: Christian, because it believes in Christ; holy,
because it
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… has the Holy Spirit, who sanctifies it daily (teglich heiligt), not only through
the forgiveness of sins that Christ has merited for them (as the Antinomians
foolishly believe), but also through the abolition, sweeping out, and
mortification of sins, on the basis of which they are called a holy people.499
The Church’s holiness cannot be reduced to its reception of forgiveness in Christ by
faith, as Agricola contends and as Luther himself had at least suggested in the recent
past.500 Rather, the Church ransomed by God’s blood (Acts 20:28) is ein heilig Volck
because it has den Heiligen Geist, who works real holiness in God’s forgiven people by
ridding them of sin, which he abolishes, sweeps out, and kills. Amidst the ongoing
controversy of the late 1530s, Luther maintains his firm insistence on the “grace” of
forgiveness through faith in Christ but now adds a vigorous complementary emphasis
on the Spirit’s sanctifying “gift” (described concretely by the Spirit’s works, though not
here by the word Gabe).
The Reformer’s culminating summary statement nicely captures his theology of
grace and gift in its ecclesiological key:
There is always a holy Christian people on earth, in whom Christ lives, works,
and rules per redemptionem, through grace (gnade) and the forgiveness of sin,
and the Holy Spirit, per vivificationem et sanctificationem, through daily
purging of sin and renewal of life (erneuerung des lebens), so that we do not
remain in sin but can and should lead a new life in all kinds of good works, and
not in old evil works, as the Ten Commandments or the Two Tables of Moses
demand.501
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In short, for Luther redemption through Christ and renewal by the Spirit, forgiveness
and holiness, grace and gift—never one apart from the other—together transform
guilty and vitiated sinners into Gottes volck,502 the holy Christian people who are the
Church of God. To put this pointedly, Luther is here claiming that the “grace” of
forgiveness and justification in Christ cannot bear the whole weight of the Church’s
being and life on its own. Only foolish Antinomians believe that forensic justification
isolated from the Spirit’s renewal is the article by which the Church stands or falls. In
Luther’s considered judgment, it is the trinitarian theology of grace and gift, taken as a
creedal whole, that attests the fullness of the Gospel’s saving power and thus
comprises the articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae.503 “He who does not believe
rightly in Christ is not Christian or a Christian; he who does not have the Holy Spirit
against sin is not holy; therefore, they cannot be ‘a Christian holy people,’ that is,
sancta et catholica ecclesia.”504
Luther proceeds to an extensive and rich exposition of the nature of the
Christliche heiligkeit505 worked by the Spirit in the Church. Drawing on Acts 15:9 as he
had at SA III.13, Luther first establishes a basic proposition: Christian holiness is found
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“when the Holy Spirit gives (gibt) people faith in Christ and through it sanctifies them,
Acts 15[:9], that is, he makes a new heart, soul, body, work, and nature (er macht neu
hertz, seel, leib, werck und wesen), and writes the commandment of God not on stone
tables but in hearts of flesh, II Cor. 3[:3].”506 Although Luther refers expressly to 2 Cor.
3:3, he draws the imagery of the new heart inscribed by the Spirit with God’s law from
Ezek. 36:26-7 and Jer. 31:33. This collation of texts affords Luther the occasion to
unfold the Spirit’s regenerating and sanctifying operations in the concrete terms of the
Decalogue’s Two Tables: the First pertaining to the life of the soul in relation to God,
the Second to the renewed person’s bodily existence in human society.
To write the First Table’s commands in the human heart, the Spirit-vivificator
“gives (gibt), effects, and works” faith, hope, and love in the inmost parts of a
spiritually dead son of Adam.507 Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Luther calls these
gifts the “tres virtutes theologicas, the three heubt tugent of Christians,” and explains
that the “new holy life in the soul (neue heilig leben in der seele)” created by the Spirit
consists in them.508 Is this the traditional language of infused supernatural virtue? As
Eero Huovinen has rightly argued—against Joest’s personalist interpretation—Luther’s
staunch anti-Pelagian contention that the Spirit’s gift comes to the undeserving gratis
sine nobis ab extra does not at all require that it does not really enter in nobis to renew
and transform vitiated human nature.509 The Finnish scholar rested his case mainly on
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the basis of Luther’s relatively early 1520 disputation de fide infusa et acquisita, in
which Luther defines and approves the former while energetically rejecting the
latter.510 In our text from 1539, the mature Luther is still plainly describing the real
inner renewal of man’s vitiated nature by the Holy Spirit, who makes a new heart by
fashioning a “new holy life in the soul” through the gifts of faith, hope, and love.
Though he does not use the term gratia infusa, the ease with which he speaks the
traditional language of the theological virtues and his clear assertion that the neue
heilig leben consisting therein really exists in der seele argues for the enduring and
profound affinity of Luthers’ theology of the Gabe/donum with the transformational
concerns of the broad Augustinian tradition.
That said, the Spirit-worked “gift” of new holy life in the soul is intrinsically
ordered to the believer’s restored relationship with God. This is clear from the way
Luther describes the Spirit’s renewing operations by aligning each of the virtues with a
faculty and/or activity of the soul. Thus the Spirit gives (gibt) true knowledge of God
by illumining (erleucht) the soul with true faith.511 He gives (gibt) strength and comfort
to the conscience through hope.512 He gives (gibt) true fear and love toward God, so
that we “love, praise, thank, and honor him for all that occurs, good or evil.”513 In
short, the soul’s new and holy life of faith, hope, and love is life together with the God
whom the renewed soul trusts, hopes in, and loves. All of which, as we know from
gegenwärtigen Ökumene. Festschrift für Tuomo Mannermaa zum 60. Geburtstag (Helsinki: LutherAgricola-Gesellschaft, 1997), 192-204. Cf. Risto Saarinen, “Ipsa Dilectio Deus Est: Zur
Wirkungsgeschichte von 1. Sent. dist. 17 des Petrus Lombardus bei Martin Luther.”
510
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chapter 1, is redolent of Luther’s protological anthropology: Adam had the divine
image “in his substance,” that is, in the natural perfections of his psychological
faculties; but the true glory of the image shined forth in the fact that by means of
these faculties he was naturally capable of receiving (and in fact did originally enjoy)
the gift of communion with God. To be sure, in On the Councils and the Church the
verba have shifted somewhat from Luther’s lectures on Gen. 1-3; but I submit that the
res is in essence the same.
As for the Second Table, Luther adds that the Holy Spirit “also sanctifies the
Christians in the body.”514 This too pertains to the material content of the sanctifying
gift. The Spirit who restores communion with God through the soul’s new holy life
effects renewal in Christian character as it takes shape in one’s relationships with
other people “in the body.” Thus the Spirit gives (gibt) to God’s holy Christian people
… that they are willingly obedient to parents and rulers; that they behave in a
friendly, humble way, and are not wrathful, vindictive, or malicious but
patient, friendly, obliging, brotherly, loving; not unchaste, adulterous, lewd but
chaste and modest, with wife, child, and servants or without wife and child.
And on and on: they do not steal, are not usurious, avaricious, do not cheat,
etc., but work honorably, support themselves honestly, lend willingly, and give
and help whenever they can. Thus they do not lie, deceive, and backbite, but
are kind, truthful, faithful, and trustworthy, and do whatever else God’s
commandments demand.515
Such is the concrete shape of the “new life” which the Holy Spirit works in the body, in
accord with the commands of the Second Table. Together with the new holy life in the
soul, this is die Christliche heiligkeit, “the Christian holiness,” to be found in the
Church of God.516 Rarely understated, Luther adds bluntly: “People who are not like
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this should not count themselves Christians, nor should one comfort them (as if they
were Christians) with much babbling about the forgiveness of sins and Christ’s
grace—as die Antinomer do.”517 In dogmatic terms, Christ’s Gnade only avails amongst
the people made holy by the Spirit’s Gabe.
That might sound a little jarring, or at least perplexing. But Luther’s adamant
stance against lawlessness and his robust account of Christian holiness is not just the
product of his polemical context in the late 1530s. Rather, it is the result of his
carefully measured and deeply held theology of grace and gift brought to bear upon
the pressing pastoral/theological demands of that context. Farther on in the third part
of On the Councils and the Church, Luther returns to his theology of grace and gift,
reinforcing the reality of holiness in the Christian life and at the same time putting it
in proper relation to the Christian’s ongoing need for the grace of forgiveness. The
Holy Spirit
… effects in us a daily sanctification and vivification in Christ, and that
according to the First Table of Moses, which we thereby fulfill (Die erfuellen wir
hie durch), although not as abundantly (reichlich) as Christ has done. But we
always follow after him (Wir Folgen aber jmer nach), under his redemption or
the forgiveness of sins, until we too shall one day become completely holy
(gantz heilig) and no longer need forgiveness. Everything is directed toward
that goal.518
The Spirit’s sanctifying and vivifying gift empowers believers to fulfill the Law, not as
richly as Christ himself kept it but in earnest imitation of him in discipleship (Folgen
nach) and with hearts set on the eschatological goal of perfection in holiness. On that
great day, forgiveness will no longer be needed. But in the meantime, those who
follow Christ by the Spirit’s “gift” stand under his forgiveness—“grace”—so that what
517
518

WA 50.627.14-17, cf. LW 41.147.
WA 50.642.33-643.2, cf. LW 41.166.

184

is lacking in their real but imperfect fulfillment of the Law is covered by his redeeming
blood. There is, however, no “grace” for the impenitent rebel against the Law, the false
disciple who despises the Spirit’s gift and sins boldly in the name Christ’s grace.
Forgiveness covers the true disciple of Jesus Christ, who remains a sinner not because
he breaks the law willfully but because he does not yet keep it perfectly. The hidden
premise, and the key to Luther’s real “simul”—as in the Smalcald Articles and the
Disputations—is the lex peccati that the Christian has and feels, but which he fights
against by the Spirit’s might and which God pardons for the sake of Christ. The
unwanted companion of his “flesh” keeps the disciple back from the abundant lawkeeping which the law requires and which Christ alone performed. But despite this, it
does not keep the disciple from peace with God. Christ’s abundant grace in
redemption sees to that, so long as by the Spirit’s gift he continues and makes progress
in the Nachfolge Christi that is Christian sanctification. “Thus we constantly grow in
sanctification (jmer fort wachsen in der Heiligung) and always become the more a new
creature (stets je mehr ein neue Creatur werden) in Christ (2 Cor. 5:17). This means
‘grow’ and ‘do so more and more’ (2 Pet. 3:18).”519

3.3. The Relic of the Holy Cross
The heart of On the Councils and the Church’s third part consists in a highly creative
(and in ways bitterly ironic) explanation of how the Gospel of forgiveness in Christ
and holiness by the Spirit becomes visible in history as God creates, sustains in being,
519
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and sanctifies his Church through the seven “relics” or “sacraments”520 bestowed upon
it: the Word of God, Baptism, Eucharist, the Keys, the Pastoral Office, Prayer/Praise,
and the Holy Cross.521 These “marks” of the true or evangelical Church are—tellingly—
at once the “principal parts of Christian sanctification” (heubtstueck Christlicher
heiligung).522 For, as Reinhard Hütter has argued, Luther holds that it is by means of
these seven sanctifying parts, relics, or sacraments in the Church that “the Holy Spirit
effects in us a daily sanctification and vivification in Christ.”523 In section 3.2, I
attended directly to the Spirit’s sanctifying operations and bypassed Luther’s
treatment of the means employed by the Spirit in this work. Because of its special
relation to his mystical theology of holiness, not least as it is displayed in the lives of
the saints in the Lectures on Genesis, I now turn briefly to Luther’s remarks on the
seventh and last of the relics, dem Heilthum des heiligen Creutzes.524
The holy cross stands out somewhat from the other relics: unlike the Word,
Baptism, Eucharist, etc., where the emphasis lies on the externality and objectivity of
the Spirit’s sanctifying means, the holy cross refers primarily to subjective experiences
of suffering in the way of Christ (Matt. 16:24-27, John 12:24-26), indeed, to sharing in
Christ’s sufferings (cf. Rom. 8:17-18, 2 Cor. 1:5, Phil. 3:10, Col. 1:24, 1 Pet. 4:13). For this
520
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very reason, it is in discussing the last relic that Luther engages what I refer to in this
study as his “mystical theology” (or spirituality) of holiness. In such contexts, Luther
steps beyond bare dogmatic description of the Spirit’s operations to speak from within
these operations themselves, attesting the spiritual or experiential reality of
conformity to Jesus Christ in his death and resurrection. In so doing, however,
Luther’s spiritual teaching fills out his dogmatics of the “gift” by specifying its course
in the lives of the saints with greater precision and depth. It is one thing to affirm
broadly that the Holy Spirit sanctifies a soul by mortifying and vivifying it, and quite
another to narrate the hard and narrow ways and means of the donum’s progress
through “every misfortune and persecution, all kinds of trials (allerley anfechtung) and
evil (as the our Father prays) from the devil, world, and flesh, inward sadness,
timidity, fear, outward poverty, contempt, illness, weakness, suffering.”525 Such is a
sample of the pieces of the holy cross which Christians must endure, “in order to
become like their head, Christ.”526
Hence the dogmatic and creedal skeletal structure of the Reformer’s theology
of sanctification through the Spirit is filled with the mystical marrow of the holy cross.
“When you are condemned, cursed, reviled, slandered, and plagued because of Christ,
that makes you holy (das macht dich heilig), because it kills the old Adam and teaches
him patience, humility, meekness, praise and thanks, and joy in suffering.”527 Sharing
experientially in the holy cross is the means used by the Spirit to mortify the remnants
of Adam’s sinful flesh in the saints; in the midst of this suffering with and for Christ,
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the new creature—who is patient, humble, meek, glad, etc.—comes to life. As I noted
in chapter 1, Rom. 5:3-5 figures prominently in this connection, and Luther cites it
compactly here: wie Ro. 5, ‘Tribulatio spem &.c.,’ it is in and through suffering that the
Christian “learns to believe, trust, hope in, and love God.”528 That is to say, it is by
means of the holy cross that the “new holy life in the soul”—born anew of the Spirit
and consisting in faith, hope, and love—comes more and more into its own. The dregs
of the old life inherited from Adam progressively die by partaking in Christ’s death on
the cross, and the new life in the risen Christ revives, increases, and grows precisely
through the mystical experience of this death.529 “That,” says Luther, “is what it means
to be sanctified (geheiliget) through the Holy Spirit and renewed to the new life in
Christ (erneuet zum neuen leben in Christo).”530 Thus the mystical theology of the holy
cross comprises the inner spiritual content of Luther’s dogmatics of the gift.

4. Grace, Gift, and the “simul” in select lectures on Genesis (1540—44)
In chapter 1, I introduced Luther’s theology of grace and gift by examining texts from
his 1535 lectures on Gen. 1 and 3. This theology of forgiveness in Christ and restoration
to holiness by the Spirit, which we have now seen displayed in three prominent texts
from the late 1530s, pervades Luther’s sprawling lectures on Genesis. Rather than
attempting an exhaustive study of Luther’s theology of grace and holiness as it stands
in the lectures, which might end up exhausting me instead,531 I will examine here two
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select loci dating from the 1540s where the interrelation of grace, gift, and the “simul”
is especially vivid and clear.

4.1. On Gen. 24:1-4 (May 1540)
In Gen. 24:1-4, Abraham commissions his senior servant to secure a wife for his son,
Isaac, from among his kindred in Mesopotamia. For Luther, this occasions a long
discussion of a burning issue in Wittenberg at the time: parental authority over the
marriages of their children, and the legitimacy of secret betrothals entered into
without parental consent. This, in turn, leads to a more general consideration of the
nature of marriage, procreation, and sexual desire or concupiscentia that unfolds along
traditional Augustinian lines.532 The fact that Abraham, being like a Luther a good
Augustinian on the matter at hand, “did not deny that concupiscence is a sin” which
requires “the medicine of marriage” (medicinam coniugii) thus forms the immediate
2.127; WA 42.406.32-4, LW 2.204-5; WA 42.440.9-11, LW 2.250; WA 42.448.3-10, LW 2.261; WA
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context for two concise and typical expositions of the Reformer’s theology of grace,
gift, and residual sin in the Christian.533
(1) In the first, Luther begins by deploring the indecency of the male and
female sexual organs and the vileness of their act, which together evince the harsh
reality that “human nature has been terribly corrupted” by the fall.534 The ignominia
and summa impuritas of fallen sexuality is an evil “implanted” (insitum) in human
nature “by the vice of the origin” (vicio originis), and cannot be entirely emended or
avoided in this life even in the married state.535 This is cause for grief and lamentation
in the saints.536 Like St. Paul at Rom. 7:18, they therefore confess that they find no
good in their flesh; but like the same apostle at 1 Cor. 9:27, they resolve to pummel
their body and reduce it to servitude.537 The inexorability of fallen sexuality’s malum
insitum does not, for Luther, justify passive acquiescence on the Christian’s part in the
lasciviousness of his residual flesh. To the contrary, it summons the saint to battle for
sexual purity: “with all zeal” he is to “throttle libidines, repress and detest
concupiscentia, and strive for purity and chastity (pudicitia et castitas).”538
Although Luther does not mention the Holy Spirit in this passage, his
exhortation to sexual holiness embodies the familiar Pauline struggle of the saint’s
spiritus with his flesh that stands at the center of the Reformer’s theology of the “gift.”
On the heels of his citation of Rom. 7:18, Luther proceeds immediately to the
complementary theology of “grace” in Jesus Christ, the promised “Seed” of Gen. 3:15.
533
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“But afterwards”—that is, after one has zealously throttled, repressed, detested, and
lamented his sexual desire, and striven no less zealously for purity and chastity—
… one must apprehend and invoke the Seed on whose account God has blessed
us, in order that the remnants of sin are not imputed (ut reliquiae peccati non
imputentur). For there is no condemnation (nihil damnationis) for those who
are in Christ Jesus [Rom. 8:1].539
The libido- and concupiscence-battling believer has the reliquiae peccati, for they are
the antagonists against which he fights in his spiritual struggle for chastity. But
because the sin-fighting saint grasps hold of the evangelical Seed promised to Eve and
Abraham (Gen. 22:18), God’s blessing undoes Adam’s curse; and the dregs of Adam’s
original sin left over in the saint—in this case, repressed, hated, and subdued sexual
desires—are not reckoned to his account propter Christum. After quoting Rom. 8:1,
Luther further explains that Paul “does not say nihil peccati, but nihil damnationis.”540
The “sin” is there, in its residual form as the saint’s flesh; and the fragmentary and
overruled remnants of Adam’s sin which constitute the saint’s flesh are intrinsically
evil, sinful, and damnable. But so long as (a) the saint fights against the Rom. 6-7
styled peccatum that afflicts and grieves him, and (b) apprehends Jesus Christ the sinbearer by faith—and indeed is found by faith to be in Christ Jesus—the sin that
remains in his flesh is pardoned, and the condemnation it deserves by right is clear
taken away by God’s grace in Christ. Here, then, is another case of Luther’s real “simul”
as an account of the faithful Christian in a state of grace and gift. “Sin” is there as an
unruly (and intrinsically guilty) affective force to be reckoned with. But through the
Spirit’s battle-empowering “gift,” the sin that thus remains in the saint is overruled as
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he or she advances in purity and holiness; and, so long as he stays in the fight against
it, the sinful libidines and concupiscentia that remain in this repressed state are
forgiven by God’s “grace” in and for the sake of Jesus Christ. That the saint’s “gift”empowered battle against his flesh is the real spiritual condition sine qua non for his
remaining in a state of “grace” becomes quite clear in the immediately succeeding
lines of the lecture:
Otherwise we will pursue (sectabimur) the work of the flesh, fornication, and
adultery, and relax the reins (laxabimus frenum) for libido, and thus apprehend
(apprehendemus) the matter while excluding the blessing (exclusa
benedictione).541
In this grim presentation of the alternative to holiness, Luther employs the same
terms as before but carefully reverses them to set forth the logic of the forfeited
“blessing” of grace in Christ through consent to sinful desire. Instead of reining in
(frenandae) his libidines, striving for (sectanda) purity and chastity, and apprehending
(apprehendendum) Christ the blessed Seed,542 the “gift”-forfeiting, sin-consenting
erstwhile Christian relaxes the reins, strives after the realization of his evil desire, and
apprehends his object. In so doing, and because he so does, he loses the blessing or
“grace” of condemnation’s removal in Christ. In the apt example of 2 Sam. 11 taken up
in the 1538 addendum to SA III.3, when David lies with Bathsheba, faith and the Spirit
depart, and the “simul” breaks down.
(2) On the very next page, Luther leaves behind these considerations specific to
sexual sin and broadens his scope to engage the conflict with the Antinomi, still
dragging on at this point in mid 1540. He explains Agricola’s position as a
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misinterpretation of Rom. 8:1, the very verse that factored so critically just above in
the course of Luther’s exposition of his own theology of “grace”: non dicit [Paulus] nihil
peccati, sed nihil damnationis.543 By contrast, the Antinomians wrongly assert “that sin
has been forgiven, that nihil est damnationis, and that therefore peccatum est nihil, or
has been completely done away with (sublatum), Rom. 8[:1].”544 Luther continues:
“They do not understand that righteousness and the forgiveness of sins is in the midst
of sins (in mediis peccatis), but think that sins are completely done away with
(sublata).”545 Now, extracted from its context, this is just the sort of Lutherrede that
proponents of a “radical” or “paradoxical” theology of justification might make much
of: in the midst of his sins, the total sinner is nonetheless righteous. But this,
ironically, amounts to asserting a brand of antinomian theology the likes of which
Luther everywhere opposes in the 1530s and 40s—including this very text—by failing
to account for the highly specific nature of the peccata that encompass the Christian
graciously possessed of the iustitia fidei. Once more, for Luther these “sins” are the
remnants of sin adhering in (or simply comprising) the saint’s flesh, that is, the
disordered desires to which he does not yield consent so long as he remains—by the
Spirit’s gift—in Christ.
Luther’s ensuing counter-exposition of St. Paul’s meaning at Rom. 8:1, in which
he cites Rom. 7:19, 24, and 25, leaves no room for doubt on this score. When the
Apostle admits that he serves “the law of sin” (v. 25) and that he cannot do the good
he wants to do (v. 19), this does not mean that he commits actual sin, or that he is
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powerless to do the good in any sense at all, but is nonetheless forgiven and righteous
simul. Rather, on Luther’s reading, Paul’s real meaning comes to this:
“I serve the law of sin.” Likewise: “I do not do the good I want,” that is, many
vicious affections and motions adhere to me (haerent in me multi viciosi
adfectus et motus), [for example,] security, doubt, impatience in adversities.546
The “good” that Paul “wants” is to be set perfectly free from the vicious affections,
emotions, impulses, etc., which comprise the lex peccati, which he “serves” by the very
fact that he still experiences and suffers these sinful passions against his own
spiritually regenerate and holy will (7:22). In aggregate, these vicious and vexatious
affections are the “sin” that St. Paul has in his flesh, yet which cannot bring him into
condemnation so long as he remains in Christ by not consenting to them. Luther
concludes the substance of his reply with another striking “simul”-type claim which,
on further examination of his own explanation of the same, bears out the Augustinian
interpretation of Rom. 7 that the Reformer has been upholding all along:
Therefore those who have been justified and have the forgiveness of sins are
sinners (sunt peccatores), because they complain that they cannot do what
they want [Rom. 7:19]. They fight, they resist concupiscence and the inhering
disease (inhaerenti morbo), they crucify the flesh [Gal. 5:24], and nevertheless
they are not able to be completely set free (non possunt penitus liberari), as
Paul exclaims: “Wretched man, who will set me free from the body of this
death?” (Rom. 7:24)547
The justified are proved to be sinners, not because they commit sin, but because
amidst their struggle to crucify the flesh they complain (conqueruntur) about the fact
that they are not yet fully liberated from the sinful desires against which they fight. In
other words, the justified are shown to be sinners precisely because they are really
(though inchoately) holy, fighting against “sin,” lamenting its ongoing presence, and
546
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greatly desiring the day when they will at last obtain what they already want (Rom.
7:19), to wit, to be completely set free from sin, and to enjoy the eschatological peace
of uncontested and incontestable holiness.
Tying his polemics against Agricola back to the question of marriage and
sexual desire raised by the text of Gen. 24:1-4, Luther summarizes the matter thus:
“marriage is holy, and Paul says 1 Tim. 2[:15]: ‘child-bearing women are holy, but if
they remain in faith,’ that is, if they believe in Christ and fight with the Serpent, that
is, if they are chaste and fight against the vicious motions of the flesh (viciosis motibus
carnis).”548 In short, married Christians are “holy” if (a) they believe in Christ for the
“grace” of forgiveness and justification that is found in him, and (b) battle against the
vicious (and vexatious) operations of their residual flesh, and for chastity and purity,
in the strength of the Spirit’s “gift.”

4.2. On Gen. 42:7 (mid 1544)
“Just as there is nothing more beautiful in Holy Scripture than Genesis as a whole,”
effused Luther in 1543 as he began to exposit the hagiography of St. Joseph, “so also
this example is outstanding and memorable among the rest of the stories of the
patriarchs.”549 Luther’s high esteem for the Joseph saga in Gen. 37—50 is due in large
part to his profound admiration for the real holiness of life evinced in the patriarch
amidst the great vicissitudes he first endured and then enjoyed. When the reader finds
him in Gen. 42, Joseph has just been raised up from the Sheol-Schul (“hell-school”) of
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his sanctifying sufferings550 and exalted to the vice-regency of Egypt.551 His
impoverished brothers bow unwittingly (and in fulfillment of young Joseph’s dreams)
before the man they murdered in intention and banished to exile in fact. Joseph holds
their fate in his hands, and resolves to show them mercy. But first, he must labor to
ensure that they have been suitably humbled, and brought to a true knowledge of the
depth of their sin. So he toys with them, hiding his identity and stringing them along
till Gen. 45:1, when the fratricidal brothers—crushed by guilt and remorse, and at their
wits’ end—at last hear the evangelical words: “I am Joseph!”
In the wise, powerful, and merciful exercise of this “game,” playful to Joseph
but sheer death and hell to his brothers,552 Luther finds not only an example of true
holiness, but a pattern of God’s “marvelous” dealings with his saints (cf. Ps. 4:4 and
67:37 Vg; farther on this theme in cp. 4.1 below). Indeed, as Luther introduced his
lengthy and for our purposes rather rich comments on Gen. 42:7 sometime in mid
1544, he stated at the outset that it is “the Holy Spirit’s principal design in this history”
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to display through Joseph’s manner of handling his brothers “the wonderful spectacle
and certain and faithful example of God’s way of governing in the saints
(administrationis Dei in sanctis).”553 Thus in the old Luther’s still keen and active
exegetical imagination, the brothers kneel before Joseph as fallen but impenitent men
kneel before the holy God, who, in his mercy, intends to cause in them a contrition
and exact from them a confession suitable to the gravity of their hidden wickedness,
not to destroy but to save them in Christ. To do this, Joseph must “pretend that he is
alien toward them (alienum se simulabat erga ipsos), and speak roughly with them,” as
Gen. 42:7 reads in WA 44.554 Rather like a Tauler, a Gerson, or a Staupitz, Luther the
mystical Seelsorger would have his students know that “in trials (in tentationibus) God
conducts himself toward his saints just as Joseph conducts himself toward his
brothers,” namely, with an apparent harshness that masks his true intention “to search
out their repentance and thus drive them to an acknowledgment of their sin and to
the mercy of God.”555 Here is the well-known movement in Luther’s theology from
God’s legal and wrathful opus alienum—itself already a token of grace hidden sub
contrario—to the gracious and evangelical opus proprium, long based on Isa. 28:21 Vg.
but now embedded within the text of Gen. 42:7 and exemplified in the divine
comportment of Joseph with his brothers.
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This, then, is the exegetical and spiritual context that shapes Luther’s
elaboration of his theology of grace and gift in the lecture on Gen. 42:7. Two further
prefatory remarks are required, however, to clear up an ambiguity in the text. In light
of my argument thus far, the impenitent fratricides556 would presumably stand before
Joseph/God as “total” sinners, like fallen David before the renewal of his repentance
and faith. Yet it is the ongoing presence of residual sin in the baptized, faithful, and
“graced” Christian, and the need for God’s fatherly chastisements to progressively
remove it through the Spirit’s “gift,” that dominates Luther’s lecture. That is, the
theology Luther draws out of his exegesis assumes that the brothers are already in a
state of grace and gift. What are we to make of this?
First, I draw attention to the way Luther’s theology of predestination lies just
beneath the surface of some critical remarks in the lecture. The theme of God’s
fatherly affection for his afflicted but chosen children fills the lecture on Gen. 42:7,
primarily on the basis of Heb. 12:3-11 (also Jas. 1:12)557 and the Staupitzian pastoral
theology that Luther builds upon it:
Thus the Epistle to the Hebrews (12:5-7) teaches: “My son, do not regard lightly
the discipline of the Lord, nor lose courage when you are punished by him. For
the Lord disciplines him whom he loves, and chastises every son whom he
receives [Prov. 3:11-12]. If you endure punishment as sons, God offers himself to
you (vobis offert se Deus)… When you are exercised by various difficulties and
hardships of every kind, consider that God is playing with you, and that this
game is wonderful for you and delightful to God. For if he did not embrace you
with his fatherly heart (paterno animo vos complecteretur), he would not play
with you this way. Therefore this is proof of ineffable mercy (ineffabilis
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misericordiae) toward you, that you are in the number of those in whom God
delights (delectatur), with whom they are his delights (deliciae).558
This is the scriptural and traditional language of the Augustinian doctrine of election
by free grace: God’s affection and delight for the numerus electorum results in the
grant of mercy to the same; embraced by God’s fatherly heart, his adopted children
endure the disciplines he knows will best fit them to “share his holiness” (Heb. 12:10);
and in the process, the very chastisements that seem to manifest his anger and wrath
testify rather of his ineffable mercy and strong love for the adopted child in whom he
delights.559 This election by the Father’s love is the eternal spring from which both
Christ’s grace and the Spirit’s gift flow to God’s chosen ones.560 So, God knows what
the impenitent but predestined fratricides do not, namely, that he has chosen them as
his own sons and therefore purposed to forgive and cleanse them from their sins. And
whereas Luther, in keeping with the Augustinian tradition, typically disavows the
possibility of knowing one’s election with certainty561—with Staupitz, this is to be
sought in Christ’s wounds by faith, and confirmed experientially by one’s own heartwounds endured in Anfechtungen562—as hagiographic interpreter of Genesis, he has
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certain knowledge of the patriarchs’ election to grace and gift, adoption and glory. In
every respect—in their election by grace; in the grievousness of their sin; in the
consequent renewal of their repentance and faith through the gratuitous bestowal of
God’s free grace and gift; in the interpreter’s scripturally revealed knowledge of their
true situation sub specie aeternae praedestinationis—the brothers’ case closely follows
St. David’s, which Luther cites as a spiritual parallel.563 I submit that this functions as
something of a (for the most part) hidden premise in the lecture on Gen. 42:7, freeing
Luther to blur the distinction between God’s operation in bringing a “total” sinner to
repentance and faith, and his similar but distinct operation in purging away the sin
that remains in the saints.
Second, in Luther’s eyes the fact that the brothers have smugly ignored or even
forgotten their past actual sins strongly evokes the surreptitious nature of the
remnants of original sin in the saints, which lurk in secret until God brings them out
into the open through his fatherly chastisements. The loving Father takes no pleasure
in his rod, “but the sin that adheres in nature (peccatum haerens in natura) is hidden
from our eyes, and he brings it to light” through the gift of affliction.564 In the saints,
all sins, actual and residual, have been forgiven and covered by grace; but the residual
sin has not yet been completely cleansed away. This is a sobering reality that the fleshbearing saints are exceedingly prone—like Joseph’s brothers—to forget. “Although we
don’t care about these [dregs] and do not groan (gemimus) because of such a
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disgraceful fall, yet God sees. Therefore he tries to purge our impure nature.”565 It is
this parallel between the brothers’ smug forgetfulness of their actual sin on the one
hand, and the furtive and self-deceiving quality of original sin’s “dregs” (fex) on the
other, that makes the circumstances of Gen. 42:7 such fertile ground for Luther to set
out his theology of grace and gift, in the spiritual context of the saints’ ongoing
purgation through the endurance of Joseph-like opera aliena.
I turn now to the two foremost presentations of Luther’s dogmatics of grace
and gift in the lecture on Gen. 42:7. Rather tellingly, they bookend a concise summary
of the Reformer’s objections to the Roman Catholic doctrine of penance, which comes
complete with a reminiscence of the 1517 Ablaßthesen and a quotation of the first:
“When at the beginning of the theses which I published I taught that the whole life of
believers is repentance (totam vitam fidelium esse poenitentiam), the papists were
driven almost to madness.”566 In 1544, Luther’s objections are in essence unchanged.
But in the intervening twenty-seven years, his formal presentation of Rome’s twofold
error in doctrina poenitentiae has arguably gained clarity by its correlation to his
theology of grace and gift. In the first place, Rome errs by teaching that original sin is
not only forgiven (remissum), but also taken away (ablatum) in baptism. Nothing
intrinsically sinful is left over in the baptized, only the morally neutral “tinder”
(fomitem) or “a certain natural weakness” (naturalem quandam infirmitatem).567 Rome
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therefore focuses exclusively on the removal of actual sins through sacramental
penance, and says nothing “about purging out sin” (de expurgando peccato) in lifelong,
daily, Thesis 1-styled repentance.568 This will be met with his theology (and mystical
spirituality) of the “gift.” In the second place, Rome teaches that actual postbaptismal
sins confessed to and absolved by a priest must be expiated “by good works and
satisfactions, vigils, prayers, monastic vows, etc.”569 In fact, “a far greater expiation and
satisfaction is required, viz., the Son of God.”570 This is the evangelical theology of
“grace.” In short, as he saw the matter, Luther’s opponents (a) derogated the glory of
redemption and justification in Christ to their own penitential works, thus obscuring
“grace,” and (b) “were too little concerned about purging out sin,”571 thus reducing the
heart-transforming, nature-renewing power of the Spirit’s “gift” to the mere
externalism of virtue and piety.
(1) The first of the two bookends is the more colloquial, as Luther imagines our
Lord God’s own explanation of the matter:
Then the Lord says: “I pardon you freely, without any merits on your part,
neither on account of contrition, nor on account of satisfaction. For there is no
sin that can be expiated or, if I may so say, satisfied for by us, but only through
the Son of God. But this I will do: when I forgive you your sin, I will make you
an heir and son of the kingdom of God, that I may declare my love toward you.
But in this way: I will first wash away your filth. I must first wipe and wash you
(Jch muß dich vor wischen und waschen)!” Thus a mother does not place her
baby into a cradle without first washing and cleaning it. Nor does the baby’s
wailing and weeping prevent her from washing it.572
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The riches of God’s “grace” of forgiveness are free, lavished upon the undeserving for
the sake of the expiation and satisfaction that are through the cross of God’s Son. But
the Father’s saving purpose does not terminate in even this great grace. For he intends
not only to forgive but to wash away our filth, cleansing his adopted children from the
pollution of their sins—in spite of their foolish cries, amidst the unrecognized gift of
purifying suffering, that he stop doing this—with all the loving care of a diligent
mother, and in this way preparing and fitting his children to inherit the kingdom he
has promised them.573 This is the work of God’s “gift,” ordered to the glory of his
coming kingdom. In short, concludes Luther, we have been called to God’s kingdom,
we have the forgiveness of sins, we are sons and heirs of God—now, in the present, by
God’s “grace” in Christ; but there still adheres (haeret adhuc) in us the indolence and
sloth of body and soul alike, “a plague which God determines to remove in our whole
life.”574
(2) The second of the two bookends expressly employs the quasi-technical
terms gratia and donum and integrates Luther’s mystical theology of affliction into the
overarching theology of grace, gift, and residual sin:
We have been received into grace (gratiam) through baptism, not only for the
forgiveness of sins but also for purging them out. Forgiveness is free, which
takes place on account of God’s Son alone, without any worthiness, merit, or
contrition on our part. Vexation, distress, tribulation, mortification follow this
forgiveness; they all pertain to this end, that sin may be abolished (aboleatur
peccatum), so that it has not only been forgiven and pardoned by divine grace
(gratia) and mercy, but may also be purged out by the gift of the Holy Spirit
573
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(dono spiritus sancti expurgetur)—in order that you may learn to understand
how great is the malice and perversion of human nature. For that darkness and
blindness is innate in us, and permits us to recognize neither our misery nor
the immense mercy of God; but it is a certain stupor, which completely
oppresses our body and soul. To take this away, the fiercest upheavals are
needed, which shake out this sloth and indolence. For this a sharp bur reed is
needed, to arouse in us, with the Holy Spirit co-operating (cooperante spiritu
sancto), acknowledgment and admiration of God’s infinite kindness and of the
immense love with which he has embraced us.575
Free forgiveness, flowing from God’s mercy and secured through and for the sake of
God’s Son—this is “grace,” as Luther twice calls it here. But the sinner’s reception into
God’s grace by baptism is ordered to the abolition of sin by the Spirit’s “gift.” The
trouble is, the remnants of original sin, innate in fallen human nature and not yet
entirely removed by baptism, blind the saints from realizing either the sinfulness of
sin or the immensity of God’s merciful love in Christ. The Father has embraced them
in love through the death of his Son, but residual sin’s operations are so stealthy and
soporific that the completely forgiven but only partly renewed saints need to be
shaken out of their stupor by the “fierce upheavals” which their wise and good Father
sends to further their sanctification. As in the third part of the On the Councils and the
Church, so here, suffering in its various forms is the experiential means employed by
the Holy Spirit to co-operatively advance the progress of the “gift” in the lives of the
saints.
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WA 44.473.35-474.7: Sumus enim recepti in gratiam per Baptismum non solum ad remissionem
peccatorum, sed etiam ad expurgationem. Remissio est gratuita, quae contingit propter solum filium
Dei, sine ulla dignitate, merito et contritione nostra. Hanc remissionem sequitur vexatio, angustia,
tribulatio, mortificatio, quae omnia eo pertinent, ut aboleatur peccatum, ita ut non solum sit
remissum et condonatum divina gratia et misericordia, sed etiam dono spiritus sancti expurgetur et
ut discas intelligere, quanta sit malicia et depravatio humanae naturae. Caligo enim et caecitas illa
nobis innata nec miseriam nostram nec misericordiam Dei immensam nos sinit agnoscere, sed est
stupor quidam, qui penitus oppressit corpus et animam nostram. Ad hunc tollendum opus est
vexationibus vehementioribus, quae excutiant veternum et ignaviam hanc, Es gehort ein scharpffer
ygels kolb dazu ut excitent in nobis cooperante spiritu sancto agnitionem et admirationem infinitae
Dei benignitatis et immensi quo nos complexus est amoris. Cf. LW 7.235.

204

I conclude my reading of the lecture on Gen. 42:7 with three observations.
First, the only “simul” that fits what Luther says here about grace, gift, and afflictive
but fatherly chastisements is that of the partial or Augustinian variety, which centers
on the progressive abolition of residual sin. Peccatum haerens in natura absconditum
est ab oculis nostris.576 This is why Luther cites Ps. 90:8 prominently (cf. Ps. 19:12-13).577
God sees the secret or hidden sins of the flesh that the graced and gifted saints cannot
see, precisely because they are advancing in real holiness through habitually refusing
consent to the fleshly desires that they are aware of. Take an example: with the Spirit’s
help, an adolescent saint kills sexual lust. But without realizing it, he becomes proud
of his victory, and forgets both the abiding sinfulness manifested in this very boasting
and the immensity of God’s grace and love toward him, who embraces the proud little
saint as his dear child nonetheless, and knows full well how he will cure the boy of his
pride. Hence it is people who are really growing in holiness who need the gift of
purgative afflictions. “To us,” teaches Luther as he explains Ps. 90:8, “the deformity
and foulness of vicious nature is unknown. Therefore, in order to manifest it and
purge it, God uses violent and bitter remedies. If he is to sweep out the evil, he must
take a broom and sharp sand and scrub until the blood flows.”578
Second, for all the forcefulness of the Father’s agency in purging his adopted
children through the Spirit’s gift, we must not lose sight of Luther’s cooperante spiritu

576

WA 44.468.26-7, LW 7.228.
WA 44.468.28-31, LW 7.228.
578
WA 44.468.31-34: Nobis vero deformitas et foeditas naturae viciosae ignota est. Itaque ad
manifestandam et purgandam eam utitur Deus remediis violentis et acerbis. Soll er das malum
außfegen, so muß er nemen ein Strowisch, und ein scharpffen sand, und schewren, das blut hernach
gehet. Cf. LW 7.228.
577
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sancto.579 By the operation of the gift, the Spirit does not secure progress in holiness
through abolishing or overriding the saint’s own agency. Rather, the Spirit quickens
and sustains in being the renewed spiritual agency by which the believer undergoing
purgatorial afflictions mortifies his flesh and clings by faith and hope to the God
who—contrary to the saint’s present sense of abandonment—has given himself to the
believer in the Promise. In the depths of hellish spiritual suffering, it is God’s vivifying
Spirit who sees to it that the “faintly burning wick” (Isa. 42:3) of faith does not go out,
to be sure; but the Spirit-gifted believer himself exercises this faith, in co-operation
with the Spirit. This spiritual cooperatio is the occasion for the graced deepening of
that most Lutheran of virtues, to wit, defiant hope in the promise of the gospel
heroically exercised amidst extreme Anfechtungen.
Third, this restoration to spiritual agency, which entails both a deepening
grasp of the sheer wickedness of sin and a growing astonishment at the goodness of
God, brings us back from Gen. 42 to Gen. 1-3. The “sin” exposed in the saints through
affliction is Adam’s, which became their own by natural inheritance but which, after
their regeneration by the Spirit in the Last Adam, remains operative in their residual
flesh (the “old Adam”) contrary to their own renewed and holy will. In affliction, the
Spirit brings the saint face to face with the dreadful consequences of Adam’s
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Even amidst the heated polemics of de servo arbitrio, when Luther stresses the Spirit’s sovereign
work emphatically, he does not abolish Spirit-empowered human cooperation. WA 18.754.8-15
(Packer, 268): Homo antequam renovetur in novam creaturam regni spiritus, nihil facit, nihil
conatur, quo paretur ad eam renovationem et regnum; Deinde recreatus, nihil facit nihil conatur, quo
perseveret in eo regno, Sed utrunque facit solus spiritus in nobis, nos sine nobis recreans et
conservans recreatos, ut et Iacobus dicit: Voluntarie genuit nos verbo virtutis suae, ut essemus
initium creaturae eius; loquitur de renovata creatura. Sed non operatur sine nobis, ut quos in hoc
ipsum recreavit et conservat, ut operaretur in nobis et nos ei cooperaremur. Cf. WA 18.634.37-9
(Packer, 102): si Deus in nobis operatur, mutata et blande assibilata per spiritum Dei voluntas iterum
mera lubentia et pronitate ac sponte sua vult et facit, non coacte.
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ruination, and of his own share in them all. But in and through this painful and
mortifying humiliation, the Spirit quickens the saint into deepened trust in the gospel
of grace in Christ; and in so doing, he leads him from the fall in Gen. 3:1ff through the
first promise at Gen. 3:15 back to the gladdening and intoxicating experience of God’s
kindness and goodness that unfallen Adam enjoyed in Gen. 1-2. He had
“acknowledged God’s goodness, rejoiced in God, and felt safe in God’s goodness,”580
taught Luther back in 1535; here in 1544, the Spirit’s restorative operations sub
contrario lead the affliction-awoken saint to “an acknowledgment and admiration of
God’s infinite kindness and of the immense love with which he has embraced us.”581 In
light of his protological anthropology, Luther’s lecture on Gen. 42:7 thus sets forth a
theology of the saints’ progressive restoration (by the Spirit’s gift) to the unfallen glory
of faithful and holy human persons, men and women who are alive because they live
in intimate fellowship with the God whose infinite love embraces them in Jesus Christ.
This, I submit, is Luther’s mature dogmatics of holiness. In the next part of this
book, we shall have to see whether my assertions of its deeply Augustinian character
hold water.
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On Gen. 3:1. WA 42.107.16-7: agnoscebat Dei bonitatem, laetabatur in Deo, securus erat in
bonitate Dei. LW 1.142-3.
581
WA 44.474.5-7: ut excitent in nobis cooperante spiritu sancto agnitionem et admirationem
infinitae Dei benignitatis et immensi quo nos complexus est amoris. Cf. LW 7.235.
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PART II
ON THE PLACE OF THE “420S AUGUSTINE” IN
LUTHER’S EMBRYONIC DOGMATICS OF
HOLINESS
(WINTER 1515/16)
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INTRODUCTION TO PART II
AUGUSTINE AND LUTHER, LUTHER AND AUGUSTINE
The nature of Luther’s debt to—and grasp of—Augustine’s theology of sin and grace
has been in dispute since the first days of the Reformation. I have no illusions about
settling the matter here. That said, as it has already cropped up plentifully in chapter
2, and as the res ipsa demands, some account must be given of how the Reformer’s
mature theology relates to that of the Church’s illustrious doctor gratiae. That is the
burden of the second and third Parts of this book. To put it in hugely understated
terms, assessing the extent, depth, precision, and appropriateness of Luther’s
appropriations of Augustinian theology is a rather difficult and disputatious problem.
Augustin bei Luther, Luther und Augustinus, Luther’s Augustinianism: however one
frames the issue, this is a hard nut to crack; for in it, historical complexity and
confessional conviction are perhaps inextricably intertwined.
This has been so from the initium evangelii, as Luther, probably in imitation of
St. Paul (cf. Phil. 4:15),582 sometimes styled the period of the Ablaßstreit.583 By 1521,
both the Reformer and insightful opponents such as John Eck of Ingolstadt584 and
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Cf. Timothy J. Wengert, “Martin Luther’s Movement toward Apostolic Self-Awareness as
Reflected in his early Letters,” Lutherjahrbuch 61 (1994): 71-92.
583
E.g., the 1545 lecture on Gen. 48:20 (WA 44.711.15-20, cf. LW 8.181): “Toward the beginning of the
rebirth of the Gospel (initium renascentis Euangelii), I heard a certain monk—after he’d cast off the
papal superstition and heard and clearly understood the purer doctrine—say this: ‘Good God! I
never heard anything about the promises in my whole life.’ And he congratulated himself from the
heart because he was permitted to hear and understand this word, ‘promise.’”
584
See Eck’s position in the 1519 Leipzig Disputation, in Otto Seitz, ed., Der authentische Text der
Leipziger Disputation (Berlin, 1903), e.g. p. 242: Accipio posteriorem sententiam Augustini, qui
aliquando fuit in sententia Paulini, et tunc dico concupiscentiam illam legem membrorum, quamvis
fuerit peccatum ante baptismum, tamen post baptismum non est peccatum… In summa dico
concupiscentiam infirmitatem illam et malam valetudinem, legem membrorum, legem carnis, non
esse peccatum nec mortale nec veniale, et post baptismum non originale.
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Jacobus Latomus of Louvain585 had come to see that at the heart of the dogmatic
controversy provoked by Luther’s theology lay competing evaluations of the nature of
evil desire (concupiscentia) in the baptized.586 Does evil desire in the faithful retain an
intrinsically sinful and guilt-bearing quality, as Luther asserted on scriptural but also
on Augustinian grounds? Or, as his opponents countered—perplexingly, also on
Augustinian grounds—has the power of infused grace denuded concupiscentia of its
sinfulness and guilt and rendered it a bothersome and potentially dangerous weakness
instead?
Springing up from this central issue were competing theological explanations
of why the presence of evil desire in a regenerate person does not separate him or her
from the grace of God in Christ. The traditionalists held an uncomplicated position:
since postbaptismal concupiscence is no longer “sin” in the proper sense of the word,
it does not pose an intrinsic threat to the regenerate person’s fellowship with the holy
God. The baptized person only falls away from God’s grace in the event that his free
and responsible consent to evil desire ignites the “tinder” of concupiscence into the
fire of actual sin and consequently, guilt. Luther’s doctrine, while less straightforward,
claimed an equally Augustinian pedigree; and it will be noted that Luther arrived at
585

J.E. Vercruysse, “Die Stellung Augustins in Jacobus Latomus’ Auseinandersetzung mit Luther,” in
M. Lamberigts, ed., L’Augustinisme à l’Ancienne Faculté de Théologie de Louvain (Leuven: University
Press, 1994), 7-18, esp. 12-13. Luther’s June 1521 Rationis Latomianae Confutatio or Antilatomus
replies to Latomus’ Articulorum doctrinae fratris M. Lutheri per theologos Lovaniensis damnatorum
ratio ex sacris literis et verteribus tractoribus of the previous month. In 1533 at table, Luther spoke
highly of this worthy opponent: “Latomus has been the one excellent writer against me. Mark this
well: Latomus is the one man wrote against Luther; all the rest, even Erasmus, are croaking frogs.”
WA Tr 1.202.5-7, #463, cf. LW 54.77. Of course, no one needed to twist Luther’s arm to move him to
criticize Erasmus after 1524.
586
I say “dogmatic,” as opposed to the church-political controversy over papal primacy, that great
distraction from the heart of the matter peremptorily introduced by John Tetzel and Sylvester
Prierias in early 1518. See David V. N. Bagchi, Luther’s Earliest Opponents: Catholic
Controversialists, 1518-1525 (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 19-22, 27-30.
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his position, complete with proof-texts from Augustine, several years prior to the
outbreak of the Ablaßstreit, as a 1514 sermon587 and especially the 1515/16 Lectures on
Romans amply demonstrate. Luther argued that evil desire in the regenerate is itself
sinful and guilty per se, but that it is not imputed or reckoned to the baptized person’s
account—on one condition: the mercy of non-imputation only obtains so long as the
believer refuses to consent to the sinful desire which puts him in need of this mercy in
the first place. Now, as Risto Saarinen has observed, this means that as to the necessity
of refusing consent to residual evil desire, the two parties came much nearer to one
another than has sometimes been appreciated.588 On this point at least, both sides of
the Reformation controversy upheld received Christian teaching in the definite shape
which Augustine had impressed upon it and bequeathed to the medieval Church.
The real quarrel centered rather in the dispute over the nature of this residual
evil desire itself: and, therefore, in the necessity, nature, and role of the nonimputation of this unique kind of “sin” (so Rom. 6:12-14, Rom. 7:7ff, Heb. 12:1, 1 John
1:8) as it is set forth in the teaching of St. David (“the Prophet,” in Luther’s
judgment589) and St. Paul (Ps. 32:1-2, Rom. 4:6-8). Being catholic theologians on all
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“On the Feast of the Conception of Blessed Mary the Virgin, and about Congenital Sin,” WA
4.691.30-692.2: Cum dicitur in baptismo originale peccatum dimitti, quomodo ergo tu dicis, quod
remaneat et cum eo pugnandum esse? Respondet Divus Augustinus: ‘Dimittitur quidem peccatum
gentilitium in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut non imputetur’. Sicut Samaritanus ille apud Lucam c.
decimo, quando infudit oleum et vinum in vulnera semivivi, non statim eum sanavit, sed in stabulum
eum posuit. Ita per baptismum omnia peccata tolluntur, sic tamen, quod Deus non imputat: sed non
ideo non sunt, immo sananda sunt et coepta sanari. Verum in morte sanantur absolute omnia. See
chapter 5.2 below.
588
Risto Saarinen, “Klostertheologie auf dem Weg der Ökumene,” 269-90, on this point esp. 281-8;
idem, “Desire, Consent, and Sin: The Earliest Free Will Debates of the Reformation,” in Kent
Emery, Jr., Russell L. Friedman, and Andreas Speer, eds., Philosophy and Theology in the Long
Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 471-83, esp. 482.
589
Spring 1532 lecture on Ps. 2:12, WA 40/2.297.33-4 [Dr], LW 12.82: Sic Apostolum intelligimus:
Paulum, Prophetam: Davidem, Philosophum: Aristotelem.
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sides, neither Luther nor his sparring partners rested their case on Scripture alone.
Each side appealed to various patristic and medieval authorities in defense of their
cause, the peerless Augustine being at once the most desirable of all possible patrons
and, as it happens, perhaps the most vexingly difficult to claim unreservedly as totus
noster.590
For what modern Augustine scholars (and not a few Luther scholars) have
recognized is that a certain fluidity characterizes Augustine’s position on the nature of
evil desire in the baptized and, eo ipso, its doctrinal correlate, the non-imputation of
evil desire as sin.591 Augustine’s thought on this crucial point developed over the
course of his nearly two-decade long battle with “Pelagianism,” prior to 418 facing
Pelagius and Coelestius and then till his death in 430 the more resourceful Julian of
Eclanum. In general it can be said that in anti-Pelagian writings prior to 418,
Augustine’s position seems to favor Eck and Latomus as the better interpreters of the
great church father: concupiscence comes from sin and leads to sin in turn, but it is
not sin stricto sensu apart from the grant of consent (see, e.g., pecc. mer. 1.39.70, 2.4.4,
2.22.36, nupt. conc. 1.23.25). But in the writings against Julian in the 420s, Augustine’s
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On medieval and Reformation-era attempts to claim that Augustinus totus noster est, see
Markus Wriedt, “Via Augustini. Ausprägungen des spätmittelalterlichen Augustinismus in der
observanten Kongregation der Augustinereremiten,” in Christoph Bultmann, Volker Leppin, and
Andreas Lindner, eds., Luther und das monastische Erbe (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 9-39, esp.
12-14; idem, “Produktives Mißverständnis?” esp. 213-4.
591
Adolf Hamel, Der junge Luther und Augustin, I/17-23, II/14-19; Malcolm E. Alflatt, “The
Development of the Idea of Involuntary Sin in St. Augustine,” Revue d’études augustiniennes 20
(1974), 113-34; Christoph Markschies, “Taufe und Concupiscentia bei Augustinus,” 92-108, esp. 102-4;
Frederick Van Fleteren, “Augustine’s Evolving Exegesis of Romans 7:22-23 in its Pauline Context,”
AugS 32/1 (2001), 89-114; Risto Saarinen, “Klostertheologie,” 269-90; idem, Weakness of Will in
Renaissance and Reformation Thought, 23-6, 119-27; idem, “Desire, Consent, and Sin,” 471-83; Timo
Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence, 122-7, 251, 262, 331, 345-50; Pereira, Augustine
of Hippo and Martin Luther on Original Sin and Justification of the Sinner, 151-7, 179-86, 369-80,
though on p. 25 Pereira disclaims any material shifts in Augustine’s theology of original sin and
justification after 418.
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increasingly negative evaluations of evil desire as “sin,” and the increasingly high
profile of non-imputation (or simply forgiveness) as an ongoing necessity for the
saints of God during this fragile life of exile, pilgrimage, and hope, seem rather to favor
Luther.592 Take this example from c. Iul. op. imp. 3.210, noting that in the context of
the preceding §209 it is clear that Augustine has evil desire in the regenerate in mind:
Why is it, I ask, that you say that “concupiscence is not sin”? Do you not see
that you thus argue against the apostle? For he demonstrated quite clearly that
sin is evil desire (peccatum esse concupiscentiam), where says, “I would not
have known sin except through the law; for I would not have known evil desire
if the law had not said, ‘Do not desire evilly’ [Exod. 20:17]” (Rom. 7:7). What
could be said more clearly than this testimony? what more vainly than your
opinion?593
Now, it is not altogether certain whether Luther read c. Iul. op. imp.,594 which
Augustine wrote through sleepless nights c. 427—30. But it is beyond question that
the earlier writings against Julian c. 418/19—421 (nupt. conc. bk. 1 in 418 or 419; nupt.
592

So Markschies, “Taufe und Concupiscentia bei Augustinus,” 103: “He can, in some places and
above all in his writings against Julian of Eclanum, hold that concupiscence is even true and real
sin.” With Markschies, I wish to be clear that the general shift in the “420s Augustine” toward
identifying evil desire and “sin” is not uniform. The older usage of the “410s Augustine” persists as
well, and the underlying reason why Augustine can shift between the two positions is that amor sui
as the universal root of all sin is conceptually quite close to concupiscentia as evil desire (103-4).
With a nod to Hamel (II/18-9), Markschies concludes (108) that Luther’s doctrine of evil desire as
“sin” is “an attempt to transfer the terminological vacillation of Augustine before the background of
a radical conception of ‘sin’ into a consistent theory.” Cf. Risto Saarinen’s rewarding article on
Luther’s “Klostertheologie.” Saarinen draws on Markschies’ article, Simo Knuuttila’s Emotions in
Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, and his own expertise in medieval theories of volition and argues
that the ambiguity in Augustine’s texts gave rise to two variant traditions: (1) the “Stoic,” which
upholds the moral neutrality of the initial pro-passio, and found expression in Johannes Buridan,
Bartholomäus Arnoldi von Usingen, and the Council of Trent; (2) the “Gregorian,” which held that
the pro-passio already constituted a venial sin prior to volitional consent, and passed through
Gregory the Great, Peter Lombard, and no little Klostertheologie to the young Luther. My typology
matches up nicely with Saarinen’s: Eck and Latomus fall in the first category predominant in the
“410s Augustine,” while Luther falls in the second characteristic of the “420s Augustine.”
593
CSEL 85/1.503.11-17 (cf. WSA I/25.381): Quid est, rogo, quod dicis “nec concupiscentiam peccatum
esse”? Itane contra apostolum te disputare non vides? Ille namque peccatum esse concupiscentiam
satis omnino monstravit, ubi ait, Peccatum non cognovi nisi per legem; nam concupiscentiam
nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: Non concupisces. Quid hoc testimonio clarius, quid tua sententia vanius
dici potest? On the significance of Exod. 20:17 for Paul’s argument in Rom. 7:7-25, see sp. litt. 4.6.
594
Cf. Hans-Ulrich Delius, Augustin als Quelle Luthers: Eine Materialsammlung (Berlin:
Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1984), 189, who notes three possible references.
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conc. bk. 2 in 420 or 421; c. ep. Pel. and c. Iul. in 421) exercised immense influence on
the formation of Luther’s theology. In the event, a few lines from Augustine’s initial
sortie against Julian played a large part in setting in motion the series of attacks and
counter-attacks that comprise the dogmatic tennis match of the 420s:
… dimitti concupiscentiam carnis in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in
peccatum non inputetur. Quamuis autem reatu suo iam soluto, manet tamen,
donec sanetur omnis infirmitas nostra.
… the evil desire of the flesh is forgiven in baptism, not so that it no longer
exists, but so that it is no longer imputed as sin. Although its guilt has already
been unshackled, it nevertheless remains until our whole weakness will be
healed.595
Eleven centuries later, these controversial lines from nupt. conc. 1.25.28—together
with Augustine’s subsequent defenses and explanations thereof in c. Iul.—played a
massive role in the Reformation-era struggle for Augustine.596 Present and possessed
of decisive dogmatic force already in the 1514 sermon I mentioned above, we shall
meet with Luther’s idiosyncratic citation of this passage throughout Parts II and III of
this book.
595

BA 23.116-8; cf. WSA I/24.46. Peter Lombard cites this text when discussing quomodo originale
peccatum dimittatur in baptismo, cum et post sit illa concupiscentia quae dicitur originale peccatum
at Sent. II d. 32 cp. 1.6 (Grott. I/513), but he already hinted at it earlier in the same chapter, §2: Nec
post baptismum remanet ad reatum, quia non imputatur in peccatum, sed tantum poena peccati est;
ante baptismum vero poena est et culpa (Grott. I/511).
596
Grane (Modus loquendi, 35) recognized the disproportional weight of nupt. conc. 1.25.28 in
Luther’s theology: though Luther only cites it directly in the Romans lectures twice, “aber dafür ist
das eine Zitat davon vielleicht das wichtigste überhaupt, das Luther bei Augustin gefunden hat.”
Delius (Augustin als Quelle, 182 n. 1568) notes its appearance at WA 2.414.11f; 4.691.32f; 7.110.5f and
345.10-12; 8.93.7f; 17/2.285.16-18; 39/1.95.23f, 121.26f, 125.1-3; 44.508.18f; 56.273.10-274.1; WA Tr
1.140.8f/25f; 5.406.8/14-16. This list is not exhaustive. NB that at WA Tr 1.140.17-27 (#347, Rörer,
Summer/Fall 1532), Luther first praises Augustine for having taught truly “about the grace of God,”
then explains how his ardor for Augustine cooled after having learned from St. Paul “what the
righteousness of faith was.” But then, he states that there are “two principle and best sayings in
Augustine” of abiding significance. The first is Luther’s standard rendition of the contentious lines
from nupt. conc. 1.25.28: “Die Sünde wird vergeben, nicht, daß sie nicht mehr da sey, sondern, daß
sie nicht zugerechnet wird.” In Veit Dietrich’s hand (ll. 8-10): Peccatum dimittitur, non ut non sit,
sed ut non damnet et dominetur. (The second is from Retr. 1.19: “Das Gesetz wird als denn erfüllet,
wenn das verziehen wird, das nicht geschicht noch gethan wird.”)
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From what I can gather, nineteenth-century Luther scholars grasped the
fundamental dogmatic issues at stake here, if not always the precise contours of
Augustine’s shifting positions in the 410s and 20s. For this reason, the older
presentations of Luther’s theology of sin and salvation by Julius Köstlin and Reinhold
Seeberg are not far from the position I have argued for in Part I.597 Much changed with
the fortuitous discovery of Luther’s previously unpublished 1515/16 Romans lectures in
the Vatican library in 1899. Heinrich Denifle, O.P., the learned medievalist and
Vatican archivist, drew core elements of his polemic against Luther der Halbwisser
from these lectures, and published his interpretation of the Reformer’s ignorant and
heretical theology in his multivolume Luther und Luthertum beginning in 1904.598 In
essence, Denifle picked up the “410s Augustine” championed by Eck and Latomus—
and by then, of course, the Council of Trent as well599—and argued forcefully that
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Julius Köstlin, The Theology of Luther, II/4.435-45, 455-58, 465-6; Reinhold Seeberg, The TextBook of the History of Doctrines, II/3.260-5. Manfred Schloenbach (Heiligung, 5) concurs, naming
Seeberg and Holl but not Köstlin.
598
Heinrich Denifle, Luther und Luthertum in der ersten Entwickelung, 2nd ed. (Mainz: von
Kirchheim & Co., 1906), esp. I/2.438-519. On Denifle and the Romans lectures, see Mickey L.
Mattox, “Martin Luther’s Reception of Paul,” 102-3.
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Session 5 (17 June 1546), the Decree on Original Sin §5: “If anyone says that the guilt (reatum) of
original sin is not remitted through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ which is conferred in
baptism, or even asserts that the whole of that which pertains to the true and proper definition of
sin is not taken away (non tolli totum id, quod veram et propriam peccati rationem habet), but says
that it is only shaved off or not imputed (tantum radi aut non imputari): let him be anathema. For
God hates nothing in the reborn, because there is nothing of condemnation [Rom. 8:1a Vg.] for
those who are truly buried together with Christ through baptism into death [Rom. 6:4], who do not
walk according to the flesh [Rom. 8:1b Vg.] but, putting off the old man and putting on the new
who is created according to God [cf. Eph. 4:24], are made innocent, immaculate, pure, blameless
and beloved children of God, heirs indeed of God and coheirs of Christ [Rom. 8:17], so that nothing
at all might delay their entrance into heaven. The holy synod confesses and senses that in the
baptized, concupiscence or the tinder (fomitem) remains; which, since it is left for the struggle, is
not able to harm those who do not consent (consentientibus) and manfully fight back against it
through the grace of Christ Jesus. In fact, he who competes legitimately will be crowned [2 Tim.
2:5]. This concupiscence (concupiscentiam), which the Apostle sometimes calls sin (peccatum), the
holy synod declares the church catholic has never understood to be called sin because it is truly
and properly sin in the reborn (vere et proprie in renatis peccatum sit), but because it is from sin
and it inclines to sin (ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat). If anyone however holds the contrary:
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Luther’s theology from 1515 on perniciously celebrates the invincibility of
concupiscence in the baptized: “Die Concupiszenz ist völlig unbesiegbar.”600 This being
so, Denifle asserts that Luther’s theology upholds the necessity of consent on the part
of the regenerate person to his residual sinful desire. For invincible concupiscence
does not merely attract, but defines and determines the will of the justified human
being:
Die Concupiszenz kann dann nicht mehr bloß als ein Gewicht oder als eine
Lüsternheit erscheinen, durch die der Wille zur Sünde angelockt, nicht aber
bestimmt wird, im Gegenteil, sie muß sich als das Grundübel im Menschen
aufdrängen, da der Wille unwiderruflich in den Versuchungen zur Sünde in
dieselbe einwilligt.601
Concupiscence, then, can no longer appear merely as a weight or a
lasciviousness, through which the will is attracted to sin but not determined by
it. On the contrary, concupiscence must impose itself as the fundamental evil
in the human being, since in temptations to sin the will irrevocably consents to
the same.
This sets the stage for an interpretation of Luther’s theology of justification which—in
comparison to such benchmarks as the theologies of Chemnitz, Gerhard, or Sartorius,
a. s.” DEC II/667, my translation. The background to radi is in Julian’s polemics, who charged
Augustine with teaching that in baptism the roots of original sin were left intact, as when hair is
shaved off one’s head. See c. ep. Pel. 1.13.26 (CSEL 60.445.8-15, cf. WSA I/24.129): “‘They even say,’
says [Julian], ‘that baptism does not give the full forgiveness of sins or take away crimes, but shaves
them off (rarare), so that the roots (radices) of all sins are retained in the evil flesh.’ Who but an
unbeliever would maintain this against the Pelagians? We therefore say that baptism gives the
forgiveness of all sins and takes away crimes; it does not shave them off, neither are the roots of all
sins retained in the evil flesh, quasi shavings of hair from the head, whence they grow back again,
sins that need to be trimmed.”
600
Denifle, I/2.441-2 (original emphasis). Notably, Denifle does not cite a text from Luther’s works
to justify this stark claim. The real proof, both for Luther in the construction of his own theology
and for Denifle in his interpretation thereof, lies in the fact that Luther himself was overcome by
concupiscence in his own experience (442); he was a proud, self-righteous man who culpably failed
to seek grace (450-64); und so weiter. Denifle often leaves little for the imagination in his
explanations of how Luther’s wickedness and his forensic theology of justification intertwined, e.g.,
I/2.519: “Luther began with the sentence, ‘it is impossible to fulfill the command, You shall not
desire’; he ended in the arms of a runaway consecrated virgin with the confession: ‘continence is an
impossible thing’; he ended by throwing overboard everything that imposes self-denial or selfovercoming upon us.”
601
Denifle, I/2.442 (original emphasis). Cf. pp. 470, 475-6.
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or the Lutherdeutungen of Köstlin and Seeberg—was unprecedented at the time
Denifle wrote his big book. (That is, unprecedented amongst modern scholars aspiring
to engage in substantive Lutherforschung,602 for early polemicists like John Fisher,
Henry VIII, and John Cochlaeus anticipated Denifle’s Luther interpretation in many
respects.603) The “simul”-statements that Denifle found peppering Luther’s scholia on
Rom. 4:7 stand at the center of this radical theology of justification.604 Since invincible
concupiscence and irreversible consent to sin necessarily rule out the possibility of
real renewal in holiness, justification by faith becomes a purely forensic or “external”
affair. “In reality sinners, but righteous by the imputation of the merciful God,” as
Luther put it in 1515.605 Or, as Denifle summarized in 1904:
… die Rechtfertigung sich in ein bloßes äußeres Zudecken des Elendes auflösen
mußte. Von einem innerlich gerecht werden, von einer Durchdringung der
Seele durch die Gnade, kurz, wie früher bereits bemerkt wurde, von einer
Rechtfertigung konnte keine Rede mehr sein. Luthers Innere ließ keine
eingegossene, heiligmachende Gnade als eine Wirkung Gottes zu, die uns
reinigt, heilt, erhebt, kurz, die ein neues Lebens- und Tätigkeitsprinzip in der
Seele wird.606
… justification had to disintegrate into a mere external covering up of misery.
Of an inner becoming righteous, of a penetration of the soul by grace, in short
602

Denifle, who wrote extensive books on John Tauler, medieval universities, and the welfare of the
Church in France during the Hundred Years War (1337-1453), clearly intends to be doing the same
kind of critical historical work in Luther und Luthertum. At e.g. I/2.447, he states that the recently
discovered Romans lectures are of great importance “für die Lutherforschung.” At I/2.515, Denifle
takes (1) Seeberg to task for his “untenable” account of Luther’s critique of gratia infusa (viz., that
Luther rejected it because it attributed not too much but too little to God’s transforming power),
and likewise (2) Dieckhoff for his baseless claim that in the Ablaßstreit Luther protested against the
overly lax—not overly rigorous—demand for contrition then regnant in the Church’s penitential
teaching and practice. In hindsight, it is clear that Denifle’s criticisms were wrong on both counts.
But the very fact that he engaged in criticism of major late nineteenth-century Luther scholars
shows that he regarded his own work as part of the ongoing scholarly conversation.
603
Bagchi, Luther’s Earliest Opponents, 127-8, 159-63, 168-73.
604
Denifle, I/2.443-5.
605
WA 56.269.29, cf. LW 25.258.
606
Denifle, I/2.514-5 (original emphasis). Cf. p. 443: “Von einem innerlichen Gerechtwerden kann
da keine Rede mehr sein; weder die Eingießung der heiligmachenden Gnade, noch die Austreibung
der Sünde im Akte der Rechtfertigung haben hier mehr einen Sinn.”
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(as has been noted earlier already) of a justification, there could no longer be
any talk. Luther’s inner life did not allow for infused, sanctifying grace as an
effect of God that purifies, heals, and elevates us, in short, for a new principle
of life and action in the soul.
My reader will perhaps recall Luther’s warm treatment in 1539 of “der neue heilig
leben in der seele,” which is comprised of the three theological virtues, faith, hope,
and love (cp. 2.3.2); but I digress. For now what matters is this: according to Denifle’s
interpretation, invincible concupiscence and inexorable consent vitiate any pretended
claims that Luther might make to a doctrine of the soul’s real renewal by grace into
spiritual life and action; the justified person is a sinner—Punkt—whose “justification”
is exclusively external to his being, life, and action, which remain sinful through and
through. To illustrate this radical Lutheran “simul,” Denifle refers to the sixteenthcentury mura spagnole surrounding Milan:
“Christ’s righteousness covered those who are to be justified” (“Die
Gerechtigkeit Christi bedeckt die zu Rechtfertigenden”).607 When God sees the
sinner and wants to enter into judgment with him, he does not see him as
such. Rather, God sees the wall upon which—as necessity may require—
another picture or coloring appears: quickly Christ appears, as he sheds his
blood for all and bears the sins of the world; quickly he appears who alone
fulfills the law, etc. Behind the wall, the scoundrel may have sinned just as
much as it was possible for him to do, he may pursue what he wishes: if only he
has confidence that he is well protected and concealed by the wall, and God’s
glance is deflected from his inner life and his pursuits by the pictorial
representations on the wall, then none of this harms him at all; God forgives
him, but the rogue remains! That is the Lutheran justification!608

607

Citing Luther in n. 2, Christi iustitia eos tegit, et eis imputatur. The closest match to this that I
can find in the Romans lectures is from the scholia on Rom. 7, WA 56.347.9-14: simul Sancti, dum
sunt Iusti, sunt peccatores; Iusti, quia credunt in Christum, cuius Iustitia eos tegit et eis imputatur,
peccatores autem, quia non implent legem, non sunt sine concupiscentia, Sed sicut ȩgrotantes sub
cura medici, qui sunt re vera ȩgroti, Sed inchoatiue et in spe sani seu potius sanificati i. e. sani fientes,
quibus nocentissima est sanitatis presumptio, quia peius recidiuant. Cf. LW 25.336 and see below, cp.
3.1.6.
608
Denifle, I/2.516.
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Das ist die Luthersche Rechtfertigung! In the end, “the whole thing boils down to the
proposition: God declares righteous the person who remains unrighteous; God sees
the person who remains immoral as moral.”609 In short, on Denifle’s reading, there is
no “Wiederherstellung (reparatio, restauratio)” in Luther’s theology: no healing grace,
no sanctifying gift, no inner renovatio, no real renewal in holiness.610
One last matter in regards to Denifle. Having derided Luther for not having
read the theological texts of the high middles ages, Denifle was not one to miss the
fact that this “modern” (i.e., Ockhamist) Augustinian attempted to anchor his
theology in Augustine’s own writings. Indeed, it is one of Denifle’s foremost concerns
to show that Luther had no right to claim Augustine as an ally for Reformation
theology. In particular, Denifle observes that nupt. conc. 1.25.28 and c. Iul. 2.4.8, 2.5.12,
and 6.17.51 were extraordinarily important passages for Luther’s theology; and he
devotes some thirty-four pages to proving that Luther was wrong (and mischievous) to
claim them in every case.611 If Denifle does not always go about his work with the care
and nuance of a modern Augustine scholar, he does so with great confidence (and
such “confidence,” as Owen knew, “is the only relief which enraged impotency adheres
unto and expects supplies from”612). For example, after dispatching Luther’s
interpretation of nupt. conc. 1.25.28 in the scholia on Rom. 4:7, Denifle declares: “St.
Augustine therefore says just the opposite of what Luther puts in his mouth.”613
Indeed, upon close examination Luther’s erroneous gloss of Augustine’s original
609

Denifle, I/2.520-1.
Denifle, I/2.520.
611
Denifle, I/2.480-514.
612
John Owen, A Brief Declaration and Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity: as also of the
Person and Satisfaction of Christ (1669), WJO 2.373.
613
Denifle, I/2.483.
610
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“concupiscentiam carnis” as “peccatum” appears for what it really is: “eine Fälschung,”
and an “intentional” falsification at that.614 Later on, vis-à-vis c. Iul. 2.5.12 as it factors
in the Rom. 7:17 scholia, Denifle states that Luther has either “misunderstood”
Augustine’s meaning or else “willed to misunderstand” it; and the result is that “an
author has probably never been so falsely construed by his pupil as St. Augustine is
here.”615 Further instances could be multiplied. But for the purpose of my argument,
what counts is the insight that protecting heilige Augustinus from being tarred with
Luther’s brush was not at all tangential to Denifle’s project. Rather, Saint Augustine—
to be precise, the “410s Augustine” of Eck, Latomus, and Tridentine orthodoxy—stands
at the heart of Luther und Luthertum as the star witness for the prosecution in its
historical and dogmatic case against Luther and Lutheranism.616
Denifle wrote before the era of polite ecumenically-sensitive theology had
begun, and his unprovoked salvo had the effect of marshaling the deeply offended
Lutherans to defend their sainted hero.617 With an eye to its long-term impact, the
most significant of the replies contra Denifle was probably Rudolph Hermann’s 1930
monograph Luthers These “Gerecht und Sünder zugleich.”618 Engaging his Dominican
provocateur often text by text, Hermann’s book necessarily invests great attention in
614

Denifle, I/2.483. In n. 1, Denifle cites Domingo de Soto’s like judgment in his 1547 de natura et
gratia 1.11.48: Hunc locum praevericatus est Lutherus.
615
Denifle, I/2.487.
616
For this very reason, I find reading Denifle an oddly refreshing exercise: dismissive, tendentious,
and mean as he often is, the formidable Dominican grasped that dogmatic truth and the catholicity
of Church doctrine are invariably at stake in historical evaluations of Luther’s appeals to Augustine.
He therefore polemicized against Luther’s would-be Augustinianism with all the commitment and
zeal that one could hope to find in a catholic and ecclesial theologian, if not with all the sobriety,
generosity, historical nuance, scriptural attentiveness, and evangelical joy one hopes for too.
617
Cf. Robert Kolb, Martin Luther as Prophet, Teacher, and Hero.
618
Rudolf Hermann, Luthers These “Gerecht und Sünder zugleich.” I am grateful to Michael Root for
pointing me in Hermann’s direction. See his unpublished paper, “The Work of Christ and the
Deconstruction of Twentieth-Century Lutheranism,” esp. pp. 7-8.
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Luther’s appropriation of the anti-Pelagian Augustine. But whereas his Reformationera Lutheran forbearers—including Luther himself—had fought to claim Augustine
for their side,619 Hermann granted no little ground to Denifle’s reading of Augustine’s
theology in general in light of the “410s Augustine” in particular. In addition, he
labored—like Denifle—to distance Luther from Augustine on the decisive question of
the role of consent in the Christian life.620 (And it will be remembered that in regards
to the non consentire concupiscentiis, Augustine’s position did not shift at all during
the last decade of his life; accordingly, as Saarinen has seen, the later heirs of either
“Augustine” do not disagree on this point.)
The momentous turning-point in Hermann’s argument comes in the course of
an interpretation of Luther’s scholia on Rom. 7:17-18. The brooding Augustinian’s
explanation of St. Paul revolves around the concept of consent, and he quotes
Augustine repeatedly and at length, appealing to his authority to defend an exegesis of
Paul that Luther knew cut against the grain of the recentiores doctores.621 After citing
an especially important discussion of the relation between residual sin, non-consent,
and non-imputation,622 which will occupy our attention below, Hermann comments:

619

Not that the effort to claim Augustine was limited to the Lutherans. Arnoud Visser, Reading
Augustine in the Reformation: The Flexibility of Intellectual Authority in Europe, 1500-1620, narrates
how Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed theologians, and even Erasmian humanists, all
managed to lay claim to Augustine’s authority. The struggle for Augustine continued well into the
seventeenth century, Robert Bellarmine being the foremost defender of Trent (and of Augustine’s
Tridentine orthodoxy) and numerous evangelical theologians arguing for the Augustinian
credentials of the Reformation confessions, e.g., Martin Chemnitz, John Gerhard, John Davenant,
and John Owen. I will return to Davenant’s 1631 Disputatio de justitia habituali et actuali in the
conclusion of this book.
620
This is the burden of chapters 6-8 in Hermann’s book.
621
Following a lengthy excerpt from c. Iul. 3.26.62, which effectively concludes his exegesis of Rom.
7, Luther allows that he takes great comfort in the agreement of his exegesis with Augustine’s,
despite what the “more recent doctors” say. WA 56.354.14-26, LW 25.343.
622
WA 56.351.11-17: Concupiscentia sit ipsa infirmitas nostra ad bonum, que in se quidem rea est, Sed
tamen reos nos non facit nisi consentientes et operantes. Ex quo tamen mirabile sequitur, Quod rei
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“Grave words, which sound just like Augustine!”623 “Really,” he continues, “should Heil
und Unheil now again be shifted to the absence or occurrence of our consensus
voluntatis?”624 That is just not a possible option for the liberating theology of the
Reformation. If Luther means what he seems to mean, it would only lead to the
confessional and its casuistry,625 i.e., to Roman Catholicism. Therefore, Luther cannot
mean what he seems to mean. Some other explanation of the grave, Augustinischsounding texts (and their moral-psychological theory of consent) must be posited; and
in the heady days of the Luther Renaissance, nearly thirty years before the publication
of Bizer’s Fides ex auditu and forty-one before Bayer’s Promissio, dismissing Luther’s
Römerbrief as vorreformatorisch is not yet on the table.
So Hermann proposes a solution to the problem that he has discovered in the
scholia on Rom. 7. The sinfulness of the reliquiae peccati, and the identity of the
justified with this sin (infirmitas illa nos ipsi sumus), must mean that there is a kind of
incessant consent to sin even in the justified:
Das bedeutet, wenn man so will, einem immer noch—auch im Gerechten—
vorhandenen consensus mit der Sünde.626

sumus et non rei. Quia Infirmitas illa nos ipsi sumus, Ergo ipsa rea et nos rei sumus, donec cesset et
sanetur. Sed non sumus rei, dum non operamur secundum eam, Dei misericordia non imputante
reatum infirmitatis, Sed reatum consentientis infirmitati voluntatis. Cf. LW 25.340.
623
Hermann, 192.
624
Hermann, 192-3.
625
Hermann, 193-4.
626
Hermann, 192, continued through 195; the emphasis is Hermann’s. Hamel (II/23), having
approached the threshold of a sound interpretation of Luther on this point, pulls back at just the
last moment: “Luther in Gegensatz zu Augustin keine Konkupiszenz kennt, die nicht irgendwie,
und sei es so verborgen, Willensakt und darum Schuld wäre.” What does Hamel mean by “an act of
will”? If, following Hermann, he means consensus voluntatis, I believe he is wrong. But if Hamel
means that the regenerate will is itself divided between flesh and spirit, and that in this true but
restricted sense the renewed person who is the flesh he bears really does “will” his sinful desires
against his holy will—then his Willensakt claim is sound enough. But in that case, Hamel is wrong
to differentiate between Luther and Augustine, for they hold the same theory of the affectively
divided will. On the face of it, Hamel seems to favor Hermann; but his very good analysis of
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“Luther does not of course say that,” Hermann promptly admits.627 But this is the only
sense he is able to make of how Luther’s eerily Augustinian claims about consent
square with his radical doctrines of sin, justification, and the “simul.” And, as
Hermann had declared when discussing the consent-concept earlier in the book,
“Should we find no inner transformation of the Augustinian doctrine in Luther”—
which is just the problem facing Hermann in the scholia on Rom. 7:17-18—“then we
will have to try to refute Luther by Luther.”628 In taking the crucial step of positing a
kind of consent within the residual sin that comprises the saint’s flesh, I grant that
Hermann has opposed Luther, but he has fallen short of refuting him; and whether he
has come by his opposition to Luther durch Luther is another question entirely.629

Luther’s appropriation of the Augustinian facere/perficere distinction (II/69-71) seems to argue the
other way.
627
Hermann, 192.
628
Hermann, 140. At another point (p. 159), when discussing Luther’s appropriation of the
facere/perficere distinction, Hermann asks whether this isn’t just the same old Augustinian and
ascetic theory, and then declares: “We know ja, that that can’t be the case!”
629
To my surprise, Saarinen (“Klostertheologie,” 282 n. 41) writes that “Trotz vieler neuer Arbeiten
bleibt Hermanns Analyse m.E. bei vielen Luther-Stellen die meist nuancierte Interpretation.” His
note attends the following, more or less accurate comments on Luther’s interpretation of Rom. 7:
“Paulus will mit dem ganzen Willen das Gute, aber wegen des fleischlichen Widerstands kann er
nicht mit derselben Leichtigkeit und Spontaneität das Gute verwirklichen, wie er es in seinem
inneren Willen wünscht. So kann der Apostel zwar Gutes tun, aber nicht auf vollendete Weise.
Diesen Gedankengang Luthers hat Rudolf Hermann exemplarisch herausgearbeitet. Hermann
betont [p. 189]: ‘Es fehlt also offenbar nicht an Werken. Sie kommen auch aus einem gereinigten
Herzen. Es fehlt inhnen nur das eine, dass der gute Wille nicht zur Vollendung gediehen ist.’” I
grant that Hermann reads some aspects of Luther’s theology with real insight, the passage Saarinen
cites on the reality of good works flowing from a pure heart (despite the resistance of the flesh)
being a case in point. That said, on the real issues at stake for the interpretation of the “simul,” I
dissent from Saarinen’s general approbation; indeed, his high praise for Hermann puzzles me, since
Saarinen’s reading of Luther clashes with Hermann’s at just the same neuralgic points that I will
engage in my own argument. At e.g. p. 285, Saarinen observes the complexity of the consentconcept in Luther, credits Hermann for bringing it into the scholarly conversation, then states
“dass auch nach der Radikalisierung der augustinischen Harmartiologie die menschliche
Zustimmung zur Sünde ein wichtiger Gedanke bei Luther bleibt.” This gives the impression that
Hermann and Saarinen hold the same position. But the way in which Hermann reads the
“radicalization” of the doctrines of sin and consent in Luther stands at odds with Saarinen’s
interpretation, for the German’s assertion of a kind of constant consensus peccato within the saint’s
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Prima facie, it would seem more like that he came to his opposition to Luther durch
Denifle.
The result of Hermann’s decisive move is therefore rather ironic. For despite
his taking up cudgels against Denifle, his interpretation of Luther’s theology of sin and
justification is fundamentally akin to Denifle’s own (if not simply derivative
therefrom). Denifle insisted that Luther misunderstood—and misrepresented—
Augustine; Hermann argued that Luther, despite superficial similarities, had
profoundly transformed Augustine’s theology. Denifle argued that Luther viewed
concupiscence as invincible, even in the saints, and that the justified irrevocably
consent to sin; Hermann, that residual sin presupposes the presence of a kind of
consent to sin, auch im Gerechten. Denifle argued that the justification of the
concupiscence-conquered sinner must, for Luther, come about by the sheer
imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness to his account; Hermann agreed, the
difference, of course, being that the modern Lutheran championed what the
Tridentine Dominican abhorred.
In a thorough 2001 article, Wolf-Dieter Hauschild argues that Hermann’s book
proved to be a watershed in Luther research, and documents how—with few
exceptions—its thesis of a radical “simul” comprised of inevitable and incessant
consensual sin (semper peccator) and forensic justification sans real inner renewal (et
iustus) eventually became a communis opinio in modern Lutheran theology, an agreed

flesh is deeply corrosive to the robust non consentire peccato which the Finn rightly urges in his
article. Perhaps part of the problem lies in the fact that Saarinen seems to assume that the
Radikalisierung in question is a post-Augustinian development in the tradition that is not already
present in Augustine’s own works: for if this is indeed the case, then Hermann’s efforts to distance
Luther from Augustine on this point might not appear to be as problematic as in fact they are.
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Charakteristikum of genuinely reformational theologies of justification.630 As Hermann
himself put it in the first sentence of his paradigm-setting book:
The formula “righteous and sinner at the same time” embodies the whole of
Lutheran theology.631
Indeed:
The concepts themselves with which the formula is concerned, even its very
terms, stand so close to the Mittelpunkt of all Lutheran thinking that without
reference to them no theological statement of Luther’s can be understood.632
—including “Luthers Gottesanschauung.”
Now, if I may borrow a magnificent turn of phrase from Lewis’ The Weight of
Glory: as history, Hermann’s exaggerations are self-evidently false, or at least ought to
be; but they are true as prophecy. Take, for example, Luther’s view of God: must the
“simul” have a say in our interpretation of the theological statement “unus sit Deus in
essentia et trinitas in personis” if we are to understand its meaning?633 But if
Hermann’s hyperbolic claims are false as history, Hauschild skillfully narrates how
they have had their fulfillment in the subsequent course of twentieth-century
historical and dogmatic theology. Hauschild does not quite grasp, however, that what
this really amounts to is the startling insight that Heinrich Denifle’s truculent
Lutherdeutung has set the terms for much of what modern Lutherforschung and
Lutheran dogmatics have taken for granted about the Reformer’s theology of
justification vis-à-vis both the sinfulness of the saints and their renewal—or rather,
630

Wolf-Dieter Hauschild, “Die Formel ‘Gerecht und Sünder zugleich’ als Element der
reformatorischen Rechtfertigungslehre – eine Entdeckung des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Theodor
Schneider and Gunther Wenz, eds., Gerecht und Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen
(Freiburg: Herder and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 303-349.
631
Hermann, 7.
632
Hermann, 7.
633
From the 10th argument of The Disputation Concerning the Passage, “The Word was made Flesh”
(John 1:14), held in Wittenberg on 11 Jan. 1539. WA 39/2.18.10 [A], LW 38.252.
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their lack thereof. For at bottom of Hermann’s Luther is Denifle’s; and at bottom of
Denifle’s Luther, and so twentieth-century Lutheranism’s Luther, is a Luther who
departed drastically (whether to his eternal shame or his great credit) from the
theology of Augustine.634
In the course of expositing the Reformer’s dogmatics of holiness in its maturity,
I have asserted (and on a few occasions, proved by textual comparison) that it
continues to assume a fundamentally Augustinian form. The old Luther sometimes
maintains this himself. For example, in his 1544 lecture on Gen. 42:29-34, he sets out a
basic statement of his theology of grace, gift, and “the simul”—viz., sin is forgiven
perfectly in baptism but not yet completely taken away—then adds simply, ut inquit
Augustinus,635 most likely intending a reference to nupt. conc. 1.25.28. He then
proceeds to sketch a christological, soteriological, and in its patristic roots eminently
Augustinian interpretation of the Parable of the Good Samaritan636 that is virtually

634

Hauschild—who assumes the validity of the modern Lutheran Simullehre—tells the story ably.
There is a clear line running from Hermann’s book to (say) Anders Nygren, “Simul iustus et
peccator bei Augustin und Luther,” Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie vol. 16 (1 January 1939),
364-79, through Ebeling’s 1964 Luther and Grane’s (in other respects useful) 1975 Modus Loquendi
Theologicus, to Daphne Hampson’s grossly flawed Christian Contradictions: The Structures of
Lutheran and Catholic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
635
WA 44.508.17-9: “Nature is vitiated. But the papists interpose that it has been healed (sanatam)
through baptism and that sins have been forgiven. True enough, but they have not yet been taken
away (ablata), as Augustine says.” Cf. LW 7.281.
636
WA 44.508.21-30, cf. LW 7.281-2: “To be sure, the wounds of the half-dead man have been bound
up, as the parable in Luke 10[:25-37] has it. Wine and oil have been poured in (infusum), the gift
(donum) of the Holy Spirit has begun. Nevertheless, the wounds are still deadly. He has been taken
up into care (in curam), that he may be healed (sanetur). But he has not yet been completely
restored (restitutus). If you want to say that there is no wound, that there is no danger, find out
whether a half-dead man is able to walk, labor, and do the duty of a healthy man. He is carried by
the beast on which he has been placed. He does not labor. He does not walk. Thus through
baptism, we have been taken upon God’s beast, that is, the most precious sacrifice for us or the
humanity of Christ, by which we are carried and accepted once indeed (semel quidem recepti), but
we are being cured and healed from day to day (de die vero in diem curamur et sanamur).” For its
roots in Augustine, see En. Ps. 30/2.1.8 and 125.15, Io. Tr. 43.2, Sermo 171.2, Trin. 15.27, Nat. grat.
52.60, c. Iul. 1.3.10 and 1.7.32 (referring in both cases to Ambrose, In. Luc. 7.73). Cf. Hamel, I/115-9,
II/75-85.
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identical to the ones the young theologian had set forth in the very same doctrinal
context both in the 1514 sermon637 and while exegeting Rom. 4:7 and 7:17 in the winter
semester of 1515/16.638
However, for complex reasons that need not detain us here, in general it can be
said of the older Luther that he is less invested in citing Augustine chapter and verse
than he had been as a young man.639 Often enough, the positions he arrived at as a
young theologian (through the intricate interplay of scriptural exegesis, patristic
study, readings in German mysticism, his own spiritual experiences as an afflicted soul
and as a pastor to the same, and dogmatic controversy) carry over into the works of
his maturity with little more than a broken trail of bread crumbs indicating the path
that led him there. Put differently, the Weimar Ausgabe and Luther’s Works are often
missing footnotes to (say) Tauler but especially to Augustine, thus giving the
impression of a novelty that masks a deeper dependence and therefore obscures the
true originality that arose through Luther’s fresh engagement with tradition in light of
Holy Scripture, philosophical shifts, experientia spiritualis, etc.640 A good example of
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“On the Feast of the Conception of Blessed Mary the Virgin, and about Congenital Sin,” WA
4.691.30-692.2. See note 6 above, and chapter 5.2 below.
638
WA 56.272.3-273.2, LW 25.260 (on Rom. 4:7), WA 56.351.11-22, LW 25.340 (on Rom. 7:17).
639
For example, 1. in the wake of the 1519 Leipzig Disputation, sola scriptura as an operating
principle grows in importance and, to the extent that it does so, the auctoritas patrum diminishes
(though for Luther, as for the other catholic or magisterial Reformers, it never disappears); 2.
Luther recognizes and accepts the differences de imputatione that distinguish his mature theology
of justification from Augustine; 3. as with most all theologians, once Luther has digested a doctrinal
truth from the tradition he often simply reiterates it without further comment; 4. this is not merely
a matter of practice, but of conviction: for truth, and theological truth above all, is “public” and no
one person’s private possession (see trin. 3.2 and Paul J. Griffiths, Intellectual Appetite: A
Theological Grammar [Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009]); 5.
particularly in sermons, I think Luther realizes that brandishing patristic erudition sometimes
distracts his hearers from the real matter at hand.
640
Thus Volker Leppin (Martin Luther, 133) argues that it is Luther’s ability to connect otherwise
previously disparate strains of thought—Augustine, German mysticism, and humanism—that
makes for “die besondere Originalität Luthers.”
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this phenomenon is Luther’s final sermon at Wittenberg on 17 Jan. 1546, where his
mature theology of grace, gift, and residual sin is presented via the medium of
Christus Samaritanus just as it had been in the 1510s and 1544, but now without any
mention on the preacher’s part (or in the critical apparatus) to its roots in
Augustine.641
One great exception to this overall pattern is the role Augustine’s sp. litt. plays
in the famous preface Luther wrote for the 1545 edition of his Latin works. In narrating
his reformational “Durchbruch” to God’s gift of righteousness as the real meaning of
Rom. 1:17, Luther recalls the joy he experienced in finding praeter spem that his
apparently novel—and if novel, heretical—exegesis agreed with Augustine’s own
affirmation of the free gift of iustitia passiva, “with which God clothes us when he
justifies us.”642 Since Denifle’s initial provocations, whole library shelves have been
filled with volumes devoted to explaining the relation between the old Luther’s
memory of his progress to the actual events of the 1510s.643 I am not so foolhardy as to
enter into this fray here, except for two brief observations. First, Luther’s mention of

641

WA 51.125.1-14 [A], LW 51.373.
WA 54.186.16-8, cf. LW 34.337, referring to sp. litt. 9.15 (CSEL 60.167.7-8, WSA I/23.152): iustitia
dei, non qua deus iustus est, sed qua induit hominem, cum iustificat impium. In the context,
Augustine is exegeting Rom. 3:20-24, and here he uses Rom. 4:5 to that end. At sp. litt. 11.18 (CSEL
60.171.5-6, WSA I/23.154), Augustine cites Rom. 1:17 and explains: iustitia dei dicitur, quod
impertiendo eam iustos facit. Cf. Markus Wriedt, “Produktives Mißverständnis?,” 217.
643
To begin, see Otto Hermann Pesch, “Zur Frage nach Luthers reformatorische Wende: Ergebnisse
und Probleme der Diskussion um Ernst Bizer, Fides ex auditu,” Catholica 20 (1966), 216-43, 264-80;
idem, “Neuere Beiträge zur Frage nach Luthers ‘Reformatorische Wende,’” Catholica 37 (1983), 25987 and 38 (1984), 66-133; Martin Brecht, Martin Luther: His Road to Reformation (1483-1521), trans.
James L. Schaaf (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1985), 221-37; Volker Leppin, Martin Luther, esp. 107-117;
Berndt Hamm, The Early Luther: Stages in a Reformation Reorientation, trans. Martin J. Lohrmann
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014). I favor Leppin’s argument for a gradual, piecemeal development
rather than the sudden break-through sought for by “early-daters” like Holl and Vogelsang and
“late-daters” like Bizer and Bayer. For my present purposes, it is Leppin’s argument for Luther’s full
acceptance of Augustinian gratia by 1516/17 that counts most, a point that Bayer (Promissio, 140)
fully agrees with despite his contention for a Reformation breakthrough in 1518.
642
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sp. litt. has, I think, had the effect of over-focusing scholarly attention on the role of
this single text in the Reformer’s development.644 As I argued in chapter 2, I believe
Luther does indeed carry insights gleaned from this comparatively early (412 or 413)
anti-Pelagian writing into his mature theology of the Spirit’s gift of inner renewal
through the bestowal of spiritual delight. Thus while I in no way mean to
underestimate its importance, I do want to suggest that its prominence in the 1545
preface has sometimes distracted scholars from the greater debt Luther owes to
Augustine’s works against Julian. Which leads to my second point. In the 1545 preface,
Luther follows his happy recollection of finding his theology of justification by grace
confirmed in sp. litt. with this major qualification: “Although this was still said
imperfectly, and he did not explain everything about imputation clearly, it was
nevertheless pleasing that the righteousness of God by which we are justified was
taught.”645 To say the least, to teach less than clearly de imputatione was not a small
matter for Martin Luther. Is he not taking away with one hand the credit he had just
given to Augustine with the other?
Luther is quite right to think that his theology of imputed righteousness is not
to found in sp. litt.,646 the whole focus of which is Augustine’s classically
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Bernhard Lohse, e.g., argued in 1965 that sp. litt. is the real “hub” for the question of the
Augustine/Luther relationship, “since no other writing of the bishop of Hippo stands so close to
Luther’s reformation theology as this.” See his “Die Bedeutung Augustins für den jungen Luther,”
15. Leif Grane (Modus Loquendi, 35) likewise asserts that sp. litt. is the most important Augustinian
text in terms of its influence on Luther’s theology, and that other anti-Pelagian writings, while by
no means inessential, are “subordinate” to it. This, despite the fact that on the same page, Grane
notes that Luther cites c. Iul. more than any other work, esp. in the Rom. 7 scholia, and rightly
observes the disproportionate significance of nupt. conc. 1.25.28.
645
WA 54.186.18-20: Et quamquam imperfecte hoc adhuc sit dictum, ac de imputatione non clare
omnia explicet, placuit tamen iustitiam Dei doceri, qua nos iustificemur. Cf. LW 34.337.
646
As Lohse puts it, Luther “over-interprets” Augustine on iustitia dei in his own Lutheran or
“declarative” way. “Zum Wittenberger Augustinismus. Augustins Schrift De Spiritu et Littera in der
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“Augustinian,” 2 Cor. 3:6- and Rom. 5:5-centered account of the Christian’s ongoing
inner renovation through the grace of the Holy Spirit over against the Pelagian theory
of self-cultivated virtue. For this reason, to the extent that the modern student of
Luther first identifies the Reformer’s theology of justification with imputed
righteousness, and then secondly equates Augustine’s theology of justification with
real inner renewal, he or she will conclude—on the basis of Luther’s own authority in
the 1545 preface—that despite his eager protestations to the contrary, Luther’s
theology really is of a basically different kind than Augustine’s. Now, if due attention
is paid to what I have argued is the Reformer’s mature theology of the “gift,” the
speciousness of this conclusion appears readily enough: for Luther’s dogmatics of
holiness does comprise an Augustinian theology of real spiritual renewal. On the other
hand, if the nature of Augustine’s mature position against Julian in the 420s and its
role in Luther’s theology from 1514/5 on is fully appreciated, the gap between the
Church’s late ancient doctor gratiae and late medieval doctor iustificationis closes
further.
To begin to prove this decisively would require, first, a comprehensive study of
Augustine’s theology of sin and grace in the 420s, which of course I cannot attempt
here; and secondly, an equally comprehensive examination of the texts from
Augustine’s oeuvre that shaped the young Luther and left a permanent stamp on his

Auslegung bei Staupitz, Luther und Karlstadt,” in Kenneth Hagen, ed., Augustine, the Harvest, and
Theology (1300-1650) (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 89-109, here 99-100.
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theology.647 In lieu of such a great project, I propose here something of a more modest
shortcut.
A handful of Augustinian excerpts figure prominently in Luther’s early scholia
on Rom. 4:7 and 7:17-18. On this point, Denifle, Hermann, Adolf Hamel, and Leif
Grane648 are all agreed. In essence, these scholars have—from their different
perspectives and to differing degrees, Hamel being the most insightful and
sympathetic—argued that Luther’s interpretation of these Augustinian texts was
flawed at certain decisive points, and that his appropriation thereof to buttress his in
reality highly innovative theology with the much-desired auctoritas patris Augustini
was therefore mistaken. My aim in the next two chapters is to closely examine how
these excerpts factor in the early scholia,649 and to argue just the reverse: Luther’s
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For all their real strengths, both Hamel’s (Der junge Luther und Augustin, 1934/5) and Pereira’s
(Augustine of Hippo and Martin Luther on Original Sin and Justification of the Sinner, 2013) studies
of Augustine and Luther fall short in this regard. (1) Hamel depends heavily on Reinhold Seeberg’s
account of Augustine’s theology in his Lehrbuch (II/53-67), and Seeberg’s one-sided interpretation
of Augustine’s theology of justification as inner Gerechtmachung sets up Hamel for over-stated
contrasts between the church father and the Reformer (II/85-102). Hamel is also clearly influenced
by Hermann’s monograph on the “simul,” which was published in 1930 just a few years before
Hamel’s own work, such that at times Hamel’s position approaches the interpretation I will argue
for in this book only to hesitate due to the authority of Hermann’s thesis (II/84-5, 132). (2) In his
Helsinki dissertation, Pereira states that he intends to focus on the “mature/old Augustine,” i.e., the
anti-Julian Augustine (p. 24), and his argument is informed by Timo Nisula’s insightful work on
Augustine and concupiscentia. This is a step in the right direction. Still, I think Pereira is hampered
by his operating assumption that there is no real development in Augustine’s position after 418 (p.
25); relatedly, Pereira takes for granted the validity of the scholarly prioritization of sp. litt. which I
am challenging in this book (see, e.g., pp. 35, 225-43, 294-8). This, I am afraid, means that to some
extent Pereira has tied his own hands as an interpreter of Luther, for it is just those refinements
which the old Augustine achieves while writing contra Iulianum that animate the young Luther and
inspire his theology of sin, grace, and holiness. Further progress is therefore needed in terms of
locating the roots of Luther’s dogmatics in the “420s Augustine.” These criticisms aside, I have
learned much from both Hamel and Pereira and am in deep sympathy with many of their
judgments.
648
Leif Grane, Modus Loquendi, 32-6.
649
With Hamel, Lohse, Grane, Steinmetz, Wriedt, Leppin, Saarinen, and Pereira—pace one of
Heiko Oberman’s biggest theories—it is not necessary to posit the existence and influence of a late
medieval Augustinian school in order to explain Luther’s Augustinianism, above all because we
know that by 1514 or 1515 Luther had read Augustine himself in the 1506 Amerbach edition of his
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interpretation of texts from the “420s Augustine” contra Iulianum in 1515/16 is
intelligent and sound, and his appropriation thereof therefore carries real weight and
force for theologians who practice their art within the Augustinian tradition.650 In
effect, I am arguing that the young medieval Augustinian picked up in 1515/16 where
the old and battle-weary church father left off when he died in 430, and that he
intended to do this.651 It will then remain to compare the young Augustinian’s
theology of sin and grace with the old and battle-weary Reformer’s dogmatics of

works and cites extensively therefrom. The same cannot be said, e.g., of Luther vis-à-vis Gregory of
Rimini, who does not seem to have been much noticed by the Reformer until the 1519 Leipzig
Disputation. See Hamel, I/9-10, II/1-2; Lohse, “Die Bedeutung Augustins für den jungen Luther,” 15;
Grane, Modus Loquendi, 24-31; David C. Steinmetz, Luther and Staupitz: An Essay in the Intellectual
Origins of the Protestant Reformation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1980), 17, 23-30; Wriedt,
“Via Augustini,” esp. 35-9; idem, “Produktives Mißverständnis?” esp. 214-5; Leppin, Martin Luther,
65, 93-5; Saarinen’s foreword to Pereira’s book, p. 11; Pereira, Augustine of Hippo and Martin Luther.
But note Oberman’s partial adjustment at Masters of the Reformation: The Emergence of a New
Intellectual Climate in Europe, trans. Dennis Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
71: “Now that the Amerbach edition was being sold at the book fairs in Leipzig and Frankfurt, the
coming generation had no desire to travel the detour through Gregory’s writings in order to make
Augustine’s acquaintance.”
650
Ad mentem Augustini, it is a matter of course that any derivative or ministerial authority which
Augustine may enjoy as a doctor of the Church stands underneath the magisterial authority of the
Word of God. Even so, dogmatic arguments drawn from “proper” and “probable” authorities within
the catholic tradition of the Church are nothing to sneeze at. See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa
theologiae I q. 1 a. 8 ad. 2: … etiam auctoritatibus philosophorum sacra doctrina utitur, ubi per
rationem naturalem veritatem cognoscere potuerunt; sicut Paulus, actuum XVII, inducit verbum
Arati, dicens, sicut et quidam poetarum vestrorum dixerunt, genus Dei sumus. Sed tamen sacra
doctrina huiusmodi auctoritatibus utitur quasi extraneis argumentis, et probabilibus. Auctoritatibus
autem canonicae Scripturae utitur proprie, ex necessitate argumentando. Auctoritatibus autem
aliorum doctorum Ecclesiae, quasi arguendo ex propriis, sed probabiliter. Innititur enim fides nostra
revelationi apostolis et prophetis factae, qui canonicos libros scripserunt, non autem revelationi, si
qua fuit aliis doctoribus facta. Unde dicit Augustinus, in epistola ad Hieronymum, solis eis
Scripturarum libris qui canonici appellantur, didici hunc honorem deferre, ut nullum auctorem eorum
in scribendo errasse aliquid firmissime credam. Alios autem ita lego, ut, quantalibet sanctitate
doctrinaque praepolleant, non ideo verum putem, quod ipsi ita senserunt vel scripserunt. Note
Thomas’ appeal to Augustine’s ep. 82.1.3 (PL 33.277), an apt illustration of the Augustinian
principles articulated in this reply. Though I doubt Augustine would have credited the philosophers
per se with any authority at all, as Thomas at least seems to do here: for authority belongs to the
Truth, not to the one who perceives and attests him only because he is illumined by him (cf. John
1:9, 14:6).
651
Thus seconding Pereira’s judgment (p. 38): “When it comes to soteriological and anthropological
insights, Luther understood Augustine very well and was much more faithful to him than modern
scholars tend to assume he was.”
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holiness, as I have set forth the latter in Part I, to see whether my contention for the
persistence of these Augustinian appropriations in shaping his theology of grace, gift,
and the “simul” right up to his death in 1546 is in fact justifiable. That endeavor I
reserve for the third part of this book.
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3. AUGUSTINE CONTRA IULIANUM IN THE EARLY 1516 SCHOLIA ON
ROMANS 7: THE AUGUSTINIAN “SIMUL”
I begin with the scholion on Rom. 7, because Luther’s exegesis of Rom. 4:7
presupposes (and at key moments exhibits) convictions rooted in Augustine’s final
interpretation of Rom. 7:14-25 as St. Paul’s autobiographical confession. For Luther’s
exegesis of Paul, and indeed for his entire dogmatic and spiritual theology of holiness,
it is of paramount importance that the Apostle speaks here “in his own person and in
the person of all the saints.”652 In the marginal gloss on Rom. 7:10, Luther names
Nicholas of Lyra et alii as representatives of the alternate interpretation, viz., “that the
Apostle is speaking in the person of some befuddled man (hominis obfuscati) and not
in his own person,” in effect citing Lyra’s loquitur apostolus in persona generis humani
sic obfuscati.653 In his note in WA 56, Johannes Ficker suggests that at this stage in the
young exegete’s development et alii often refers to the great French humanist Faber
Stapulensis. This may well be the case; but behind them both lies the influence of
Jerome’s interpretation of Paul.654 Berndt Hamm has shown that Jerome was much
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WA 56.68.12-13, cf. LW 25.61.
WA 56.68.9-10. I draw the citation of Lyra’s Postillae perpetuae in universam S. Scripturam from
Johannes Ficker’s critical note on the text. Cf. LW 25.61.
654
Cf. Letter #27 to Spalatin, 19 Okt. 1516, WA Br 1.70.33-40: almost all the comments on the Bible
written after Augustine—including those by Lyra, Stapulensis, and Erasmus—accept the “literal,
i.e., the dead intelligentia.” Given Luther’s polemics against allegory, this sounds quite strange at
first. But Luther’s remarks earlier in the letter contrasting Jerome and Augustine on the meaning of
iustitia legis and justification show that in this case, a “spiritual and living interpretation” is simply
one that agrees with the theology of law, grace, and iustitia that Augustine formulated in sp. litt. In
doing so, he read 2 Cor. 3:6 as a summary statement of St. Paul’s contrast between law and grace,
over against the interpretation of the same verse as a kind proof-text for allegorical hermeneutics
preferred by Origen et al. In other words, Luther’s remark amounts to saying that after Augustine,
hardly anyone interpreted the Bible in the correct Augustinian way. Cf. WA Br 1.70.8-19, LW 48.24:
“Had Erasmus read the books Augustine wrote against the Pelagians, especially de spiritu at litera,
likewise de peccatorum meritis et remissione, likewise contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, likewise
contra Iulianum, which are all to be found in just the eighth part of the works; and had he seen how
nothing is of Augustine’s own sense, but that he grasps everything in the sense of the most
653
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preferred to Augustine by modish humanists prior to at least 1521. Furthermore,
beyond the elite circles of humanism it was not Augustine, but Jerome, who best
suited “the performance mentality and merit-orientation of late medieval piety and
Frömmigkeitstheologie.”655 In 1524/5, the looming conflict between Erasmus’ “Jerome”
and Luther’s “Augustine” finally broke out into the open. But already in October 1516,
shortly after completing his lectures on Romans, Luther had confided his growing
concerns with Jerome and Erasmus alike to Georg Spalatin.656 This being said, it is just
as likely that Gabriel Biel (and the medieval theologians whose insights he “harvested”
in his Collectorium) as well as the Erfurt philosophers Jodocus Trutfetter and
Bartholomäus Arnoldi von Usingen are the real inimici gratiae whom Luther, as of 1515
a voracious reader of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings, has in his sights as he sets his
hand to explain Rom. 7.

1. The excursus at Rom. 7:7

excellent fathers Cyprian, Nazianzus, Rheticus, Irenaeus, Hilary, Olympius, Innocent, and
Ambrose; then perhaps he would not only correctly understand the Apostle, but he would also hold
Augustine in higher esteem than he has so far done. Plainly in this I do not hesitate to dissent from
Erasmus, because in interpreting the scriptures I esteem Jerome after Augustine, just as much as
Erasmus esteems Augustine after Jerome in everything.”
655
Berndt Hamm, “Hieronymus-Begeisterung und Augustinismus vor der Reformation.
Beobachtungen zur Beziehung zwischen Humanismus und Frömmigkeitstheologie (am Beispiel
Nürnbergs),” in Kenneth Hagen, ed., Augustine, the Harvest, and Theology (1300-1650) (Leiden:
Brill, 1990), 127-235, here 156. On p. 157, Hamm adds: “Jerome, the doctor of ascetic virtue,
faithfulness to the law, and judgment according to works, displaced in substance (not as a cited
authority) Augustine, the doctor of grace and mercy,” and explains that when Augustine is cited as
an authority, he is inserted into and interpreted within the popular hieronymianischen virtue,
perfection, merit, and reward-oriented framework. Cf. Hamel, II/133-5; Oberman, Masters of the
Reformation, 72-4.
656
Letter #27, 19 Okt. 1516, WA Br 1.70-1, LW 48.23-6. Cf. Letter #57b to Spalatin, 18 Jan. 1518, WA Br
1.133-34, LW 48.52-55, where Luther reiterates the same concerns and directs Spalatin to three of
the four works he had listed in the letter from 1516: sp. litt., c. Iul., and c. ep. Pel. See too Luther’s
exegesis of Gal. 5:16-17 in early 1517, WA 2.583.27-588.20, where he ominously notes Jerome’s
dependence on Origen and cites Augustine contra Iulianum repeatedly.
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The long scholion on Rom. 7:7 actually ranges over the entire chapter, as Luther
marshals no less than twelve arguments to prove that Paul speaks here in his own
person and in the present as “Saint” Paul, a homo spiritualis.657 In v. 7 Vg., Paul writes
that he would not have known peccatum apart from the law, then argues for this
general principle from the particular instance of the 10th Commandment: nam
concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: non concupisces. The identification of sin
with concupiscence disappears after v. 8 (cf. Eph. 5:5, Col. 3:5), but in the broad
Augustinian tradition “evil desire” becomes the key concept for interpreting the
peccatum, malum, lex peccati, and caro that dominate the rest of the chapter (as well
as Rom. 6:12-14 and 8:1-14). Luther signals his firm standing in this tradition and his
basic concern in the scholion by heading off this section with the three words from St.
Paul, Nam Concupiscentiam nesciebam.658 In what follows I will forgo detailed study of
each of the many references and allusions to Augustine in the scholion on v. 7 in favor
of a few observations that get to the heart of the matter.
(1) First, Luther begins his exegesis not with a thesis of his own, but with a
lengthy paragraph comprised of excerpts from Retr. 1.23 and c. Iul. 2.5.13-14 that aims
to establish the genuinely Augustinian provenance of his interpretation of Paul. The
paragraph itself begins thus: “That the apostle from this text [v. 7] to the end speaks in
his own person and as a spiritual man, and not at all in the person of a merely carnal
man, blessed Augustine first asserted richly and firmly in the book against the
657

WA 56.339.4-6, LW 25.327; the twelve arguments continue to WA 56.347, LW 25.336. Grane
(Modus Loquendi, 53-6) correctly notes that whereas Augustine locates the beginning of Paul’s
present-tense confession at v. 14, Luther reads v. 7 already in this sense and, what’s more,
mistakenly thinks that in this respect he follows Augustine. But Grane uses this point as a wedge to
drive apart Luther from Augustine with respect to the chapter as a whole, a non sequitur both
logically and exegetically.
658
WA 56.339.4, LW 25.327.
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Pelagians.”659 Luther probably has in mind Augustine’s single work in four books c. ep.
Pel. (c. 420/1). Though he had toyed with the idea earlier, modern scholarship
recognizes that this is in fact roughly the time that Augustine began to assert it with
real confidence.660 That Luther saw this suggests a certain subtlety on his part as a
humanistic and historical interpreter of Augustine, which other scholars have pointed
to in his ability to discriminate between genuine and spurious Augustinian works
bound up together in the Amerbach edition661 and which Adolar Zumkeller argues had
been a distinguishing mark of the O.E.S.A. since Rimini’s day.662 Regardless, what
really stands out here is the fact that Luther demurs from staking out a position of his
own and presents his exegesis of Rom. 7 as, in literally the first place, an interpretation
that stands in intentional continuity with Augustine’s. This is clear from the first
sentence right on through the Augustinian excerpts that form the first paragraph,
which concludes with Luther pointing to the second half of c. Iul. 6 as “the clearest
interpretation of all.”663 Only at this point does Luther continue, “But let us elicit these
same things from the very words of the apostle.”664 Even then, as we shall see
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WA 56.339.5-8, cf. LW 25.327.
See, e.g., Frederick Van Fleteren, “Augustine’s Evolving Exegesis of Romans 7:22-23 in its Pauline
Context,” esp. 109-13, who rightly points to the 417 s. 151-7 as a major advance which is then
completed in nupt. conc. and c. ep. Pel. Van Fleteren’s article depends on M.-F. Berrouard,
“l’exégèse augustinienne de Rom. 7:7-25 entre 396-418 avec remarques sur les deux premières
périodes de la crise pélagienne,” Recherches Augustiniennes 16 (1981): 101-96. Van Fleteren’s
excursus on Luther and Augustine vis-à-vis Rom. 7 leaves much to be desired (113-14), and perhaps
suggests why he seems so keen to emphasize the more “optimistic” stance that Augustine held in
the early to mid 390s (113).
661
Oberman, Masters of the Reformation, 74 n. 56, pointing to Luther’s rejection of the De vera et
falsa poenitentia in Oct. 1516, WA Br 1.65.24-6: Est enim… nihil ab Augustini eruditione et sensu
remotius; cf. Brecht, Road to Reformation, 96.
662
Adolar Zumkeller, O.S.A., “The Augustinian School of the Middle Ages,” in idem., Theology and
History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages, ed. John E. Rotelle (Augustinian Heritage
Institute: Augustinian Press, 1996), 11-79, here 13-14.
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WA 56.340.3-4, LW 25.328.
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WA 56.340.5, cf. LW 25.328.
660

237

presently, the ensuing exegesis is shot-through with express citations of Augustine’s
works and implicit allusions to his mature theology. As Hermann, Hamel, and Grane
have recognized, Luther’s evident and eager intention in the Rom. 7 scholion is to
follow in the exegetical, theological, and spiritual footsteps of b. Augustinus.665 What
remains to be seen is whether this intention was well-meant but mistaken, as
Hermann and Grane argued, or in fact successfully executed.
(2) We can begin with Luther’s fourth argument, which starts out with v. 16b
Vg666 but then swings back to include vv. 15-18. Paul’s text reads thus:
[15] Quod enim operor, non intelligo: non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago: sed
quod odi malum, illud facio. [16] Si autem quod nolo, illud facio: Consentio legi
Dei, quoniam Bona est. [17] Nunc autem iam non ego operor illud, sed quod
habitat in me peccatum. [18] Scio enim quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne
mea, bonum. Nam velle, adiacet mihi: perficere autem bonum, non invenio.
[15] I do not understand what I work: for I do not do the good I want, but I do
the evil that I hate. [16] But if I do what I do not want, I consent to the law of
God, since it is good. [17] But now I myself do not do that, but the sin that
dwells in me. [18] For I know that the good does not dwell in me, that is in my
flesh. For to will the good is present to me, but to complete the good I do not
find.
Luther’s first concern is to avoid taking Paul to mean that he does the evil he hates
and does not do the good he wants—i.e., just what v. 15 says—moraliter et
methaphysice, “as if he did nothing good but all evil; for taken in a human sense, his
words sound that way.”667 But Paul’s apostolic “way of speaking” (modus loquendi)
must be carefully attended to. He is not, as Grane rightly emphasizes, speaking as an
Aristotelian moral philosopher. But neither is Paul—nor Luther—speaking as a kind of
modern existential Lutheran theologian born before his time. Rather, to explain Paul,
665

Hermann, 23, 139-40, 155-8, 192-5; Hamel, II/16-23; Grane, Modus Loquendi, 56, 59-60, 80, 99.
WA 56.341.20, LW 25.330.
667
WA 56.341.27-30, cf. LW 25.330.
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Luther turns to the very augustinischer Redeweise that Grane warns us not to be fooled
by,668 at the heart of which stands the facere/perficere distinction that Luther explains
b. Augustinus li. 3 in fine contra Iulianum copiose docet.669 The reference is to c. Iul.
3.26.62, which Luther cites in full as the conclusion to his scholion on Rom. 7, and to
which we shall return below. “One must note,” explains Luther, “that the Apostle
distinguishes between ‘to do’ (facere) and ‘to complete’ (perficere), as blessed
Augustine teaches.”670 In other words, Paul’s meaning is rightly grasped only when the
apparent human sense of his words is overcome by the proper “Augustinian” sense
that Paul actually had in mind, that Augustine explained copiously at the end of c. Iul.
3, and that Luther purposes to carry forward in his own interpretation. And in point of
fact, when Luther explains Rom. 7:15-18 he displays a full command of Paul’s modus
loquendi augustinianus. Paul means
… that he does not do the good as often and as much and with as much ease as
he wants. For he wants to act in the purest, freest, and most joyful way,
without the vexations of the flesh fighting back. This he cannot do. It is as with
a man who proposes to be chaste: he would want not to be assailed by any
titillations, and to have chastity with the greatest ease. But this is not
permitted by the flesh, which by its movements and thoughts makes chastity
most bothersome and acts by its own impure desires, even though the spirit is
unwilling (Inuito spiritu). He who proposes to keep vigil, to pray, to work for
his neighbor will always find rebellious flesh devising and desiring other
things. Hence one must singularly note here that the Apostle distinguishes
between “doing” and “completing” (facere et perficere), as blessed Augustine
copiously teaches at the end of contra Iulianum book 3. Here, “to do” (facere) is
taken to mean to try, to devise, to experience desires, to will, etc., such things
as without intermission the flesh works against the spirit and the spirit works
against the flesh [Gal. 5:17]. For if “to do” meant “to fulfill by a work,” the
Apostle would not have said: “I do the evil I do not want, the good I want I do
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not do,” by which words he most evidently expresses the battle between flesh
and spirit. For he wants something other than what he does. That is, he has
good pleasure and will (voluntatem) through spiritum, by outpoured charity,
prompt toward the good and to hatred toward evil; and nevertheless, with the
flesh and adverse concupiscence resisting, he is not able to fulfill and complete
this will (voluntatem). For if he would complete and fulfill it, he would work
the good without resistance, delightfully; for this is what his will (voluntas)
wants. Now, however, he does not work in this way; therefore, what he wants,
he does not do, but what he does not want, he does. He, however, who is
without a fight and follows the flesh and obeys concupiscences certainly does
not resist. He does not say, “I do what I do not want.” He does not delight in
what is contrary to what he does, but he delights in what he works. But “to
complete” (perficere) is to fulfill what one wants or desires. Thus the Spiritus
completes the good it wants when without rebellion it works according to
God’s law, which is not of this life, because “to complete I do not find” [v. 18].
But flesh completes when, with delight and without repugnance and difficulty,
it works according to concupiscences. And this is of this life, rather of death
and the perdition of the world; for it is easy to work evil. Therefore I have said
that this word proves that Paul speaks here not as a carnal but as a most
spiritual man.671
This, as Luther correctly indicates, is stock-in-trade exegesis of Rom. 7:15-18 (and Gal.
5:17) for the mature Augustine writing contra Iulianum. St. Paul fights against himself,
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non Inuenio’. Caro autem perficit, quando cum delectatione sine repugnantia et difficultate operatur
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because his being is divided between the competing desires that comprise his “spirit”
and his “flesh.” He is a most spiritual man because his renewed self, his spiritus, does
not permit his flesh to gain the upper hand. To be sure, the flesh “does” things
(facere): it titillates, vexes, rebels, etc. But because Paul fights back against it, his flesh
is not able to bring its evil desires (concupiscentiae) to the completion in act that it
longs for (perficere). Contrariwise, Paul’s spiritus does things too (facere): it resists the
impulses of the flesh it is forced to suffer unwillingly; it heartily and promptly wills the
good, through out-poured love (Rom. 5:5); and it longs to act in the purest, freest, and
most joyful manner, in accord with the divine law in which it delights. But in this life,
prior to the eschatological completion of the resurrection, St. Paul must contend
against his flesh, and is not able to complete (perficere) his holy voluntas for the
freedom and delight that marks the unchecked obedience and love of the saints in
glory.672 This is the mature Augustine’s spirit/flesh “simul,” and by both his express
statement of intention and his skillful exposition of its content, Luther shows that he
adopts it in toto.673
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In this light, the several totus homo statements that appear in fifth the through
the twelfth arguments gain considerably in clarity.
(3) The fifth begins with Rom. 7:20: Non ego operor illud, Sed quod habitat in me
peccatum.674 This proves that Paul is a spiritual man who does not sin, “because the
flesh desires evilly while he dissents, yes indeed properly he himself does not desire
evilly, because he dissents from the evil desires of the flesh.”675 The flesh concupiscit,
but spiritual Paul is properly differentiated from the concupiscences of his flesh
because he does not consent to them and, therefore, does not sin. Still, v. 19 stands: “I
do not do the good I want,” etc., because Paul’s flesh with its evil desires—despite his
battle against them—is still Paul’s flesh.
For the same person is spirit and flesh; therefore, what he does by flesh, the
whole man (totus) is said to do. Nevertheless, because he resists, the whole
man (totus) does not do it (facere), but a part of him (pars eius) is rightly said
to do so.676
In other words, in v. 19 Paul speaks improperly the same truth that he speaks properly
in the next v. 20. It is said of the whole Paul that he does not do the good he wants,
and that he does evil instead. But properly, rightly, this ought only to be said of that
“part” of him which is his flesh—i.e., v. 20’s indwelling sin—because the Paul who
unwillingly suffers the flesh’s impulses resists them and refuses to consent to them.
Because spirit and flesh together constitute eadem persona, it is truthful to say both
pugna fidelium, non infidelium Iudaeorum. Crede, si non pugnas; agnosce, si pugnas, et ista pugna
rebellem quoque superbiam Pelagiani erroris expugna. Iamne discernis, iamne perspicis, et cum
baptizatis quasi civile bellum interiorum remanere vitiorum? Luther adds, from 2.4.8 (WA 56.71.3-5):
Et iterum: “Lex peccati repugnans legi mentis, que in tanti quoque Apostoli membris erat, remittitur
in baptismate, non finitur. Cf. NBA I/18.524—just a few lines prior to the above-noted citation from
the same place: Lex itaque peccati repugnans legi mentis, quae in tanti quoque apostoli membris erat,
remittitur in Baptismate, non finitur.
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that Paul operatur (because his flesh is part of him) and that he himself does not do
so, but only the “sin that dwells in me” (because his spirit resists and triumphs), v.
20.677 In all this, Luther anticipates the famous christological analogy we will see him
develop further in a moment. But already, in classic Augustinian fashion, Luther
clarifies the point where the analogy breaks down. Paul is not upholding that spirit
and flesh are two substances that together make up a single person, as a Manichean
might think: “for mind and flesh are not only of one person, but even of one will (vnius
voluntatis).”678 For Luther, following Augustine, “spirit” (or in this case, “mind,” from
Rom. 7:23 and 25) and “flesh” denominate contrary desires, delights, loves, or
affections that divide the renewed person’s will (or heart)—and only the renewed
person’s will. For the one who consents to his flesh becomes flesh pure and simple,
whereas the flesh-fighting homo spiritualis experiences the inner division of his
affections.
(4) The christological analogy comes into its own in the sixth and seventh
arguments, both handling Rom. 7:18. In the sixth, Luther first observes how Paul
attributes flesh to himself quasi he himself were flesh, whereas in fact it is but a part of
him. This is the import of v. 18, and it also explains why and in what sense Paul
confesses carnalis sum in v. 14. He confesses that he is evil, because he “does” evil—in
his flesh. But propter spiritum he is spiritual and good, and does good. “Thus it must
be noted,” explains Luther, “that this word ‘I will’ and ‘I hate’ [vv. 15, 19-20] refer to the
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spiritual man or spirit, ‘I do’ however and ‘I work’ [vv. 15-17, 19-20] to the carnal or ad
carnem.”679 To make better sense of this, he sets out his analogy:
But because the same one total man consists of flesh and spirit, therefore
[Paul] attributes both contraria to the whole man, which come from his
contrary parts. For in this way a communio Ideomatum takes place, because the
same man is spiritual and carnal, righteous and sinner, good and evil. Just as
the same person of Christ is dead and alive simul, suffering and blessed simul,
at work and at rest simul, etc., because of the communionem Ideomatum,
although what is proper to one of the natures does not agree with what is
proper to the other, but they dissent with the greatest contrariety, as is known.
But these things have no place at all in the carnal man, where the whole man is
completely flesh, because God’s Spirit does not remain in him. Therefore, the
carnal man is not able to say: “in me, that is in my flesh” [v. 18], as if he himself
were something different from the flesh per voluntatem. But he is the same
with the flesh per consensum to his evil desires.680
To understand Luther’s Augustinian anthropology of the spiritual human person, we
must grasp (as David Luy has cogently argued) the traditional orthodoxy of his
christology.681 In the one Lord Jesus Christ, what is proprium to his divine nature
disagrees contrariissime with what is proprium to the human nature he assumes into
the unity of his person. Yet because of this real union of the two natures (with their
diverse properties) in his person, what is stricto sensu proper to only one or the other
of the natures may be truthfully predicated of the one person as a whole. This is the
traditional catholic doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum, which Luther gladly
appropriates in his own christology; but here, he puts it to work to explain Rom. 7.
679
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There is only one person, St. Paul, but the apostle is comprised of diverse
affections. These retain their respective properties and apply properly only to the
“parts” of him that they name, viz., either spirit or flesh, righteous man or sinner, etc.
But both can be truly predicated of Paul as a concrete whole, on account of the
communio of competing and contrary desires that he empirically is. He is not actually
either wholly saint or wholly sinner, wholly spirit or wholly flesh, but by virtue of the
communio idiomatum he may be named as either or as both simul. But, Luther insists,
the analogy only applies to the spiritual person, not the carnal. The “carnal man” is socalled because by consenting to his evil desires he has become nothing but flesh,
omnino totus homo caro est. Because the spiritual man retains a voluntas contrary to
the evil desires he still experiences, he is like the orthodox Jesus in being a person
made up of two “parts”: in Christ’s case, two natures or substances in one person; in
Paul’s, contrary affections in one will. But the carnal man is like the heretical Jesus
preferred by some theologians both ancient and modern: pure flesh in the one
matching pure humanity in the other, with nothing divine about either.
It is probably not an accident that the totus/totus dialectical “simul” favored by
some modern scholars (e.g., Theobald Beer) matches the dialectical christologies
championed by the same.682 I do not mean to assert a necessary logical connection
between rejecting Chalcedonian orthodoxy and rejecting an Augustinian account of
embattled holiness. But when the careful distinctions of Luther’s robustly catholic
christology are abandoned, and in its place an alien modern christology is then read
into his analogy, the anthropological result is an ambiguously (or dialectically, or
682
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imputationally) “holy” saint who is a sinner simul et totaliter. And as we have seen,
this is quite mistaken as an interpretation of what Luther actually sets forth in the
text. Only when the orthodoxy of Luther’s christology is fully appreciated can the
basic Augustinianism of its analogical anthropological application be so as well.
(5) The seventh argument starts out from Rom. 7:18b (Velle mihi adiacet,
perficere autem non Inuenio). Alluding to Rom. 5:5, Luther explains that this “willing”
is the “readiness of the spirit” (promptitudo spiritus) which comes from charity. Its
completion is the bonum that Paul confesses he wants but cannot yet attain in v. 19.
Even in its present imperfection, Paul’s spiritual readiness for the good corresponds to
David’s description of the blessed man at Ps. 1:2 Vg., viz., in lege Domini Voluntas eius.
Luther then takes up Ps. 1:2’s Voluntas as the key to interpret Rom. 7:18’s velle, and
explains that both refer to “the pleasure and delight in the good (beneplacitum et
delectatio boni) that the law commands.”683 This brings Luther to Rom. 7:22, and the
second major totus passage:
“I delight in the law of God according to the interior man” [Rom. 7:22], but “to
complete” (perficere), viz., this good of the law, he is not able to do with the
flesh resisting. Because he wills to not desire evilly (Vult non concupiscere) and
judges that it is good to not desire evilly; and yet, he desires evilly, and he does
not complete this willing of his (non perficit hoc velle suum). And so he fights
with himself. But because spirit and flesh are so intimately connected as one
(coniunctissime sunt unum)—even though they feel diversely (diuerse
sentiant)—he therefore attributes the work of both to himself as a whole, as if
he were totally flesh and totally spirit at the same time (quasi simul sit totus
caro et totus spiritus). Nevertheless, by these words he declares his position
and responds to the objection that one might raise: “If you do not do what the
law commands, but do what you do not want, and do not do what you want to
do, how then do you not sin (non peccas)?” Paul responds: “Because he does
(facit) the good, but does not complete (perficit) it, since he does not
extinguish the evil desire of the flesh.” Therefore this willing (Velle) and this
will (voluntatem), which Ps. 1[:2] attributes to the blessed man and the Spirit
683
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alone gives through charity [Rom. 5:5]—how is a merely carnal man able to
have this, who has rather a not-willingness (noluntatem)?684
Once again, a deeply Augustinian vision emerges: the Holy Spirit gives (donat) the
charity that produces delight in and desire for the completion of holiness commanded
by the law,685 and St. Paul thus delighting, willing, and loving is “spirit.” But “flesh”
remains for the fight, with desires of its own. He wants to be free from concupiscentia,
yet continues to desire evilly against his own holy voluntas. He does the good but
cannot yet complete it, fighting against the flesh which resists his holy desire and
yet—at the same time—remains part of his divided self. ita secum ipse pugnat or, in
Jon Foreman’s words, “I am the war I fight.”686 Because Paul is his spirit and his flesh,
what he “feels” in either part, or the “work” of either part, may be attributed to him as
a whole. But he is not wholly the one or the other, and when Paul does use this form
of predication he speaks “as if” he were simul totus caro et totus spiritus.
Luther’s quasi in this sentence must be carefully noted and weighed, for it is an
explicit rejection on his part of the (in Joest’s terminology) “total simul” in favor of the
Augustinian “partim/partim simul” that he has been advocating in his exegesis of Rom.
7 all the while. Oppressed by his own flesh, Paul confesses he has not yet been
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perfected in the holiness of love that he longs for. But because he is filled with the
charity and delight that the Holy Spirit produces in his heart, he resists his flesh and
does not sin. In this regard, Luther’s anticipation—on Paul’s behalf—of a possible
objection to Paul’s words is especially illuminating. “If you do not do what the law
commands, how do you not sin?” Denifle’s and Hermann’s modern Lutheran Paul
might reply: “I do sin, boldly; but I rejoice more boldly still, because Christ’s alien
righteousness covers me!” By stark contrast, Luther’s Augustinian Paul replies: “You
are mistaken, for I do not sin; I delight in God’s law and I do the good—though I
confess not yet completely, as I heartily wish I could.”
(6) The proper role of imputation comes into view in the twelfth and final
argument, replete with striking “simul” statements, on Rom. 7:25b: Igitur Ego ipse
mente seruio legi Dei, Carne autem legi peccati. “This,” writes Luther, “is the most
express proof of them all.”
Look, as one and the same man (vnus et idem homo) he serves the law of God
and the law of sin at the same time, he is righteous and he sins at the same
time! For he does not say: “My mind serves the law of God,” nor “My flesh
serves the law of sin,” but “I, he says, the whole man, the same person (totus
homo, persona eadem), I serve both servitudes.” Therefore he also gives thanks
that he serves the law of God, and he seeks mercy because he serves the law of
sin. Who would assert this about the carnal man, that he serves the law of
God? Now look at what I said above, that at the same time as the saints are
righteous, they are sinners: righteous, because they believe in Christ, whose
righteousness covers them and is imputed to them; but sinners because they
do not fulfill the law, they are not without concupiscence (non sunt sine
concupiscentia). They are like sick people under the care of a physician, who
really are sick, but are healthy in a beginning way and in hope, or rather they
are being healed, i.e., becoming healthy.687
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Grane reads Luther’s “totus” and “simul” language here dialectically and
paradoxically—i.e., the whole person is righteous, the whole person is a sinner,
simul—and sets it against Augustine’s more pedestrian spirit/flesh “simul.”688 This
might perhaps appear to be the case at first glance if extracted from its context in the
scholion on Rom. 7:7. But Luther’s vnus et idem homo and persona eadem clearly link
this passage back to the christological analogy worked out in the preceding
arguments. Once more, Luther is showing why Paul is not a Manichean theologian:
the one person St. Paul, Ego ipse, confesses he serves a twofold servitude, to wit, to
God’s law with his renewed mind or spirit on the one hand, and to the law of the flesh
with his flesh on the other. That he serves the law of sin—or, as Luther has it at the
top of the excerpt, that he “sins” and is a “sinner”—is reduced to a single cause: he is
not without concupiscence, and therefore does not fulfill the law; for the law forbids
evil desire entirely. There are two causes, however, for Paul’s (or any other Christian’s)
being holy and righteous. First, he does in fact serve the law of God: a spiritual reality
for which he gives thanks, this being not the result of his own moral striving but the
gift of God’s grace. Second, Christ’s righteousness covers him and is imputed to his
account. In this, we see Luther’s mature theology of “gift” and “grace” in its germinal
form, with real but imperfect renewal in holiness complemented by the iustitia Christi
imputata.

credunt in Christum, cuius Iustitia eos tegit et eis imputatur, peccatores autem, quia non implent
legem, non sunt sine concupiscentia, Sed sicut ȩgrotantes sub cura medici, qui sunt re vera ȩgroti, Sed
inchoatiue et in spe sani seu potius sanificati i. e. sani fientes. Cf. LW 25.336.
688
Grane, Modus Loquendi, 57.
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What’s more, the “gift”-style sanative analogy that concludes the excerpt—so
favored, in its several permutations, by Karl Holl,689 and firmly emphasized by
Hamel690—points to the rationale behind the abiding need for the “grace” of Christ’s
righteousness imputed to faith, which Hermann, Grane, et al. prefer. The saints in the
care of Christus Medicus really are being healed of the disease of evil desire that afflicts
them.691 But even as the saints convalesce, being not yet fully cured of concupiscence,
they are already entirely sub cura medici, with Christ’s righteousness covering their
sinful imperfections. This is the point where Holl’s analytic theory falters, and the
more confessional emphasis on the free imputation of Christ’s righteousness to faith in
the present stands on firmer ground. Only when the strengths of the two
interpretative schools are held together—thus correcting their respective
weaknesses—can both (a) the Augustinian debt of Luther’s sanative theology of real
progressive sanctification and (b) the Reformer’s genuine novelty vis-à-vis what he
later came to regard as Augustine’s Achilles heel (de imputatione non clare omnia
explicet!)692 be rightly esteemed in their mutual relation one to the other, which I have
referred to in this study as his dogmatics of gift (“a”) and grace (“b”). But in light of
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See Holl’s essay of 1910, “Die Rechtfertigungslehre in Luthers Vorlesung über den Römerbrief
mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Frage der Heilsgewißheit.”
690
Hamel, I/115-19, II/49-50, 57-9, 83-5.
691
On this image in Luther’s theology, see Johann Anselm Steiger, Medizinische Theologie: Christus
medicus und theologia medicinalis bei Martin Luther und im Luthertum der Barockzeit. Mit Edition
dreier Quellentexte (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 3-47. Steiger observes the roots of the metaphor in patristic
theology, especially Augustine and Gregory the Great (p. 3). But in light of my argument here, I
think Steiger’s assumption of a one-sided Simullehre leads him to place too much emphasis on
imputation as the content of Christ’s healing work (e.g., 4-5, 16-8).
692
But cf. the somewhat exceptional c. Iul. op. imp. 1.57, CSEL 85/1.55 (cf. WSA I/25.85): … sic
imputari generatis parvulis iniustitiam primi hominis ad subeundum supplicium, quemadmodum
imputatur parvulis regeneratis iustitia secundi hominis ad obtinendum regnum caelorum; c. Iul. op.
imp. 3.148, CSEL 85/1.454 (cf. WSA I/25.350): Si autem parvuli propter iustitiam secundi hominis, qui
regenerationis est auctor, deputantur iusti, cur non propter peccatum primi hominis, qui generationis
est auctor, deputantur iniusti? Also: c. Iul. op. imp. 3.49, 6.22-3.
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Luther’s unannounced citation of c. Iul. 2.4.8 in the first marginal gloss on Rom. 7:18,
even this real novelty regarding imputation should not be exaggerated beyond its
proper bounds. For in early 1516, Luther very much intends to recover and carry
forward Augustine’s teaching that “God in Christ regenerates the man who was born,
and heals the wounded man: from guilt instantly, from weakness bit by bit.”693

2. The scholia on Rom. 7:17-18
In the concluding portion of his exegesis of Rom. 7, Luther cites nupt. conc. once and
c. Iul. four times: the first four references interspersing his own extensive exegesis of v.
17, the last and longest standing essentially by itself as Luther’s adopted commentary
on v. 18, in place of any substantive exegetical remarks of his own. To grasp the role
played by each quotation, and to assess its textual accuracy and theological fittingness
in Luther’s argument, it is vital to observe their place in the overall flow of his
exegesis. I will therefore examine in turn each Augustinian quotation in Luther’s
scholia on these two verses from St. Paul. I also count nine excerpts from (or strong
allusions to) Augustine’s mature works against Julian in the glosses on Rom. 7:15-24:
one likely alluding to nupt. conc. 1.25.28, the rest taken from c. Iul. itself.694 Some of
these have already factored in my exposition of the scholion on Rom. 7:7 above, and
others will be brought in here to illumine the scholia on Rom. 7:17-18.

2.1. On Rom. 7:17
693

WA 56.70.22-3, NBA I/18.524, PL 44.679. Cf. Hamel, II/83.
1. Interlinear gloss on v. 17, c. Iul. 2.5.14 (citing Ambrose); 2. first marginal gloss on v. 18, quoting
from (but not referring to) c. Iul. 2.4.8; 3. & 4., second marginal gloss on v. 18, c. Iul. 2.3.7 and 2.4.8;
5. first marginal gloss on v. 19, c. Iul. 3.26.62; 6. and 7., second marginal gloss on v. 19, c. Iul. 2.3.5
and 2.3.6 (citing Cyprian); 8. marginal gloss on v. 20, naming Augustine without reference, but
alluding to nupt. conc. 1.25.28 or any number of passages in c. Iul. explicating that contentious text;
9. marginal gloss on v. 24, c. Iul. 2.3.6.
694
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2.1.1. c. Iul. 2.5.12. Luther first sets his interpretation in the context of the question that
would soon factor so critically in the Ablaßstreit, to wit: is “sin” abolished by baptism
and by sacramental penance, such that the baptized/absolved person is without sin
simpliciter, or does it in some real sense remain? As I explained above, modern
scholars recognize that Augustine’s position on this question shifted during the 410s
and 20s, in general viewing postbaptismal concupiscentia as an “evil” that is not
properly sinful apart from the consent of the will in the 410s, but then in the 420s
evincing an increasing willingness to speak of it as sinful (or simply as “sin” or
“iniquity”) already prior to such consent.695 Luther’s use here of three late Augustinian
texts contra Iulianum displays his awareness of Augustine’s two positions, the sense in
which he too can affirm both of them, and his clear preference for the latter.
It was, after all, St. Paul himself who started the controversy by writing at v. 17
that “it is no longer I who do it, but sin (peccatum) that dwells in me.” Hence, says
Luther, when “our theologians” assert that sin is “abolished” (aboleri) in baptism (or
penance), and think it “absurd” for Paul to say what he in fact says in v. 17, it only goes
695

The foundational discussion in c. Iul. op. imp. takes place at 1.47 (CSEL 85/1.35-6, cf. WSA
I/25.73-4), where Augustine distinguishes three types of sin: 1. fully volitional sin, which Augustine
limits to Adam’s original rebellion (peccatum), 2. the penalty of sin, which one suffers rather than
commits, e.g., when a murderer is executed (poena peccati), and 3. sin that is also sin’s punishment
(ita peccatum ut ipsum sit etiam poena peccati). The peccatum in Rom. 7[:19] is of the third sort:
tertium vero genus, ubi peccatum ipsum et poena peccati, potest intellegi in eo qui dicit: Quod nolo
malum hoc ago. Original sin, the just penalty of Adam’s freely chosen rebellion, belongs to the third
category: pertinet originale peccatum ad hoc genus tertium, ubi sic peccatum est ut ipsum sit et
poena peccati. Augustine develops this theme throughout this last great but unfinished work
against Julian, e.g., 2.38, 3.210, 4.48, 4.103, 5.28 (CSEL 85/2.224-5: … hoc autem, ubi facit homo quod
non vult et tamen peccatum esse apostolus clamat [Rom. 7:15-20] … Quomodo enim liberum est
abstinere ubi clamatur: Quod nolo hoc facio? Aliter ergo natura humana peccavit, quando ei liberum
fuit abstinere a peccato, aliter nunc peccat perdita libertate, quando eget liberatoris auxilio; et illud
tantummodo peccatum erat, hoc autem est etiam poena peccati), 5.50, 5.59, 5.61 (CSEL 85/2.276:
Unde [Paulus] posteaquam peccati habitantis in carne sua, quo cogebatur malum agere quod nolebat,
necessitatem poenamque deflevit, mox ad quem confugiendum esset ostendens: [citing Rom. 7:24-5]),
6.8, 6.17.
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to show the depth of their deception at the hands of fallax Aristotelis methaphysica.696
As Oberman, Dieter, Leppin, and others have established over against the monolithic
Antischolastik posited by a Hermann, an Ebeling, or a Hampson, Luther has Gabriel
Biel especially in mind, as well as his Erfurt teachers Trutfetter and Usingen.697 In this
light, it is important to recognize that in 1515/16 Luther is reacting against the position
he himself had held as recently as his (incomplete) 1509/10 Sentenzkommentar, and is
instead championing the bracing Augustinianism of Peter Lombard which—as a good
student of Biel, Usingen, and Trutfetter—he had once rejected in no uncertain
terms.698 Luther had been deceived too: but by 1515 the anti-Pelagian writings bound
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WA 56.349.23-6, cf. LW 25.338.
See Biel, Collectorium II d. 32 q. 1 (W & H II/580-84) on utrum per sacramentum baptismatis
tollatur reatus culpae originalis and IV d. 4 q. 1 a. 2 (W & H IV/1.150-63) on utrum effectus baptismi
in non indigne suscipiente sit infusio virtutum et gratiae ac remissio culpae et poenae. In the first
place, fascinatingly, Biel discusses the mature Augustinian solution of non-imputation, and
explains that God could have dealt this way de potentia eius absoluta—citing Ps. 32:2/Rom. 4:8 to
this effect! But this is purely hypothetical: Deus tamen de potentia sua ordinata non remittit, nisi
illud restituat quod peccatum privat, et hoc in se formaliter vel aequivalenter virtualiter. Biel argues
for the virtual equivalent suggested here: Infundendo autem gratiam tollit debitum habendi iustitiam
originalem et ipsum commutat in debitum habendi gratiam (W & H II/580-1). In the second place,
Biel argues that baptism’s effect includes universalis remissio culpae, which given his position in
book II requires that it tollit omne peccati inquinamentum and tollit mundanam omnem maculam
originalem, etc. (W & H IV/1.150). At IV d. 4 q. 1 a. 2 conc. 3 (W & H IV/1.155-6), however, Biel does
think Paul speaks autobiographically in Rom. 7, only insisting that Paul’s “sin” is really the fully
remitted fomes peccati. This is Augustine’s typical stance in the 410s (Biel cites pecc. rem. 2.7.9) and
would become the doctrine of the Council of Trent. For an overview with bibliography, see Brecht,
Road to Reformation 161-74, esp. 167 and 173-4 for Luther’s personal break with Trutfetter and
Usingen.
698
WA 9.75-6, on Sent. II d. 32. So, e.g., 9.75.11-13: because concupiscentia remains after baptism,
patet, quod peccatum originale non est ipsa concupiscentia seu fomes, quia non tota aboletur, sed
tantum debilitatur, peccatum autem originale totum aboletur. Or ll. 16-19: illa concupiscentia in
carne est nihil aliud nisi inoboedientia carnis ad spiritum quae de se non est culpa, sed poena, quia si
esset aliquo modo culpa et non dimitti in baptismo diceretur, injuria fierit baptismo et gratiae dei.
Indeed, ll. 21-23, after baptism concupiscence non est mala nisi occasionaliter inquantum ratio
contra eam sibi in pugnam pro poena inoboedientiae primae relictam debet certare. Thus in winter
1509/10, Luther rejects Peter’s Augustinian definition of original sin as fomes, languor naturae,
tyrannus, etc. (ll. 26-8), and interprets Paul accordingly, 9.76.1-4: Unde dicit Apostolus, quod
concupiscentia non nocet his qui secundum Christum vivunt, quia non est malum deleta culpa, sed
tantum pondus et inclinatio ad malum quam sic deus esse voluit in poenam Adae. NB that Lombard
compiles copious excerpts from Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings in d. 32, including (at d. 32.1.6)
the momentous line from nupt. conc. 1.25.28: dimittitur concupiscentia carnis in baptismo, non ut
697
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up in vol. 8 of the Amerbach edition have opened his eyes to grasp the real meaning of
the Apostle.699
Thus with the rational force of a settled conclusion obtained by the twelve
arguments in the excursus at Rom. 7:7, together with the zeal of a convert, Luther
asserts that v. 17’s “peccatum”—combined with the bad premise, common to the line
of Pauline interpretation stemming from Origen,700 that as a saint the Apostle “had
absolutely no sin”—plunged his opponents into the false and dangerous opinion that
Paul “was not speaking in his own person, but in that of a carnal man.”701 By thus
framing his debate with nostros theologos as an interrelated choice between (a) either
Paul or Aristotle, either the Bible or human philosophy, on the one hand, and on the
other (b) either a spiritual and apostolic or a pre-conversion and carnal Paul as the

non sit, sed ut non imputetur in peccatum. In spring 1532, Luther declared at table: “Peter Lombard
was adequate as a theologian; none has been his equal. He is quasi the method of theology. He read
Hilary, Augustine, Ambrose, Gregory, and also all the councils. He was a great man. If he had by
chance come upon the Bible, he would no doubt have been the greatest.” WA Tr 1.85.17-20, #192, cf.
LW 54.26.
699
Grane (Modus Loquendi, 59-61) argues that Luther first discovered his theology in Paul, then in
effect read it back into Augustine’s without ever quite realizing it. Apart from the fact that this
theory is basically indemonstrable, and reflects a Protestant historiographical bias (first Bible, then
tradition), Grane assumes the very Hermann-styled Lutheran divergence from Augustine that I am
contending against in this book. In passing, it’s worth noting that Thomas Aquinas experienced a
similar change in mind after reading some of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings in his second
Parisian period, abandoning the semi-Pelagianism of his Sentenzkommentar in favor of the robust
Augustinian doctrine of predestination and grace found in the Summa Theologiae.
700
Origen, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. Books 1-5, trans. Thomas P. Scheck. The
Fathers of the Church, vol. 103 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 55: “In
him who was always carrying around the death of Jesus in his own body, certainly never did the
flesh lust against the spirit, but rather the flesh had been subjected to him since it had been put to
death in the likeness of Christ’s death.” Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. Books 6-10, trans.
Thomas P. Scheck. The Fathers of the Church, vol. 104 (Washington: Catholic University of
America Press, 2002), 37: “When he says, ‘But I am of the flesh, sold into slavery under sin’ (Rom
7.14), as if a teacher of the Church, he has now taken upon himself the persona of the weak.” For an
overview of Origen and Augustine as readers of Paul, and of Augustine’s knowledge of Origen’s
exegesis, see C. P. Bammel, “Augustine, Origen, and the Exegesis of St. Paul,” Augustinianum 32/2
(Dec. 1992), 341-68; idem., “Justification by Faith in Augustine and Origen,” JEH 47/2 (April 1996),
223-35.
701
WA 56.349.26-30, cf. LW 25.338.
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subject of Rom. 7, Luther situates his opponents on both counts squarely in the
position of Julian of Eclanum and volunteers himself for the role of Augustine
redivivus contra pelagianos modernos.702
Luther advances his position—viz., that “sin” remains in the baptized—in two
steps, then supports it with the first major excerpt from Augustine. In the first step,
the earnest young friar blends the penitential spirituality that Jarod Wicks703 has
emphasized with the basic dogmatic components of his Augustinian “simul.” The
Bielish position on sin’s abolition in penance is spiritually pernicious, because it
inculcates false security, presumption, and laziness at just the point where penitents
ought rather to be exhorted to fight against and purge out the sin that remains with
groaning, tears, lamentation, and labor.704 This, in early 1516, is the spiritual doctrine
of lifelong repentance that will commence the famous theses of October 1517, which
Leppin has compellingly linked to Tauler’s mystical Bußtheologie.705 It also shares a
deep (and in the Western Church, common) root in the mature spirituality of
702

As I noted above, this is not quite fair in Biel’s case at least, for he does think Paul speaks
autobiographically in Rom. 7, but in the manner of Augustine in the 410s (Collectorium IV d. 4 q. 1
art. 2 conc. 3) as opposed to Augustine in the 420s. For Augustine the biblical and patristic
theologian versus Julian the Aristotelian philosopher, see e.g. c. Iul. 1.4.12. After citing numerous
patristic authorities, Augustine lectures Julian thus: “I brought you, not into the lecture hall of
some philosopher, but into the peaceful and honorable assembly of the holy fathers. May it be
worth the effort! I beg you, see how they look upon you and kindly and gently say to you, ‘Julian,
our son, are we Manichees?’ I ask you: What will you answer? How will you face them? What
arguments will help you out? What categories of Aristotle? For, when you attack us like a skillful
debater, you want to appear well trained in his categories.” NBA I/18.450, WSA I/24.274. Cf. c. Iul.
2.10.34, 2.10.37 (“As if you, who complain so much that ‘you are denied an episcopal hearing and
judgment,’ could find a council of Peripatetics in which a dialectical decision has been pronounced
against original sin on the basis of subjects and those things which are in subjects [i.e.,
accidents]!”), 3.2.7, 4.15.75-8, 5.14.51, 6.18.53-7, 6.20.64; c. Iul. op. imp. 2.51, 5.23.3: “I am happy to
have as my teacher, not Aristotle or Chrysippus, much less Julian, a fool despite all his banter, but
Christ.” CSEL 85/2.211, WSA I/25.544.
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Jared Wicks, S.J. Man Yearning for Grace. Luther’s Early Spiritual Teaching (Wiesbaden: Franz
Steiner, 1969), esp. 95-125.
704
WA 56.350.1-4, cf. LW 25.338-9.
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Volker Leppin, “‘Omnem vitam fidelium penitentiam esse voluit.’”
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Augustine, which increasingly gravitated to the graced weakness St. Paul speaks of as
the remedy for spiritual pride at 2 Cor. 12:7-10.706 Luther continues: “Therefore sin is
left over (relictum) in the spiritual man for the exercise of grace, for the humbling of
pride, for the repression of presumption.”707 Sin in its fragmentary form, sin as evil
desire in the saints, is useful to them because it humbles them and keeps them in a
spiritual posture of deepening dependence upon God. In the context of this
Augustinian and taulerisch spiritual theology, Luther adumbrates his basic dogmatics
of sin and grace:
… for we are not called to ease, but to labor against passiones. These passions
would not be without guilt (for they are truly sins and indeed damnable), but
for the mercy of God not imputing it. However, he does not impute it only to
those who, assailed by their vices and invoking God’s grace, manfully fight
against them.708
The peccatum relictum which Paul speaks of as a unitary reality in Rom. 6-8 (“sin”) is
in fact a bundle of vicious passions suffered by the spiritual man in his divided soul.709
Being vicious in quality, such passions are intrinsically blameworthy, vere peccata et
quidem damnabilia. But God in his mercy does not reckon these sinful passions to the
account of those who prayerfully fight against them, precisely because they do so.
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On this point in Augustine, see Thomas F. Martin, O.S.A.’s fine study, “Paul the Patient: Christus
Medicus and the “Stimulus Carnis” (2 Cor. 12:7): A Consideration of Augustine’s Medicinal
Christology,” AugS 32/2 (2001), 219-56; Hombert, Gloria Gratiae, 310-12.
707
WA 56.350.5-6, cf. LW 25.339.
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WA 56.350.8-12: Non enim ad ocium vocati sumus, Sed ad laborem contra passiones. Quȩ non
essent sine culpa (sunt enim vere peccata et quidem damnabilia), nisi misericordia Dei non imputaret.
Non Imputat autem solum iis, Qui viriliter aggressi cum suis viciis gratiam Dei Inuocantes pugnant.
Cf. LW 25.339.
709
NB that in the interlinear gloss on Rom. 7:5, Luther simply equates the “old man” with evil
desires. WA 56.65.9-11 (cf. LW 25.59): cum enim essemus in carne extra gratiam passiones
peccatorum affectus, pronitates et motus mali, qui sunt vetus homo et vir prior. In the context,
Luther is referring to a person who is sheer flesh, sub lege et ante gratiam (to use Augustine’s
terms). In the regenerate, the “old Adam” remains in fragmentary form as the reliquiae peccati: but
precisely as such, “he”/they retain this same mode of being as evil affections, propensities, passions,
impulses, etc.
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Once again, the saints are sinners in the one quite exact sense that they suffer the
presence of unlawful passions in their souls. But they are real saints for two reasons:
first, by God’s misericordia and non-imputation; second, by virtue of the real renewal
evidenced in their fight against “sin” and their earnest prayer for gratiam. At this early
stage in Luther’s development, “grace” in this context most likely refers to the gratia
sanans so well-explicated by Wicks; by 1521 at the latest, it will morph terminologically
into the donum I studied in chapter 2 above, while retaining the same dogmatic
content.710 So we have the “grace” of God’s merciful non-imputation together with the
“gift” of inner healing joining hands to deal with the ongoing reality of vicious and
afflictive passions in the renewed soul: not, to be sure, in their mature gratia/donum
form; nor yet with the gladness and parrhesia that will soon characterize Luther’s
theology (and preaching) of the gospel promise of free forgiveness in Christ and new
life in the Spirit. Even so, the seeds that will blossom into the Reformer’s mature
evangelical and creedal theology of holiness are already recognizably present in their
basic dogmatic substance.
In the second step, Luther pauses to clarify the privative ontology of the saints’
“sin,” “flesh,” internum vitium peccati, or even (as he allows here) fomes.711 St. Paul does
not want us to think that
… spirit and flesh are a sort of twosome, but one single reality (quaedam velut
duo, Sed vnum omnino), just as a wound and flesh are one. For although what is
proper to the wound (proprium vulneris) is one thing and what is proper to
flesh (proprium carnis) is another, nevertheless, because the wound and the
flesh are one, and the wound is not some thing besides the wounded or weak
flesh itself, therefore what belongs to the wound is attributed to the flesh. In
710

A point which Wicks has recently noticed in passing: “Half a Lifetime with Luther in Theology
and Living,” Pro Ecclesia 22/3 (2014), 307-36, here 311. See below, chapter 5.3.
711
WA 56.350.21, cf. LW 25.339.
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the same way, the same man is spirit and flesh at the same time. But the flesh
is his weakness or wound. And insofar as he loves the law of God, he is spirit;
but insofar as he desires evilly, it is the weakness of the spirit and the wound of
sin, which has begun to be healed. Thus Christ says: “The spirit indeed is ready,
but the flesh is weak” [Matt. 26:41].712
As the second quotation (c. Iul. 3.20.39) in the Rom. 7:17 scholion shows,713 to which I
will attend in its place below, this is pure Augustine. One single man, St. Paul, is spirit
and flesh “simul,” not because he is comprised of two contrary substances, but because
even the spiritual man undergoing progressive renewal or healing still suffers the
lingering effects of the infirmitas and vulnus that originally besets him as a son of
Adam. Paul’s “flesh” simply names this as yet imperfectly healed weakness or wound.
To the extent that he has been healed, and thus loves (diligit) God’s law, he is spirit:
this is his real being. But to the extent that he still concupiscit—this remnant of
original sin in the form of evil desire (“flesh”) is not an entity of its own, but rather the
wound that scars the really but inchoately and partially renewed person. Indwelling
sin or “flesh” thus names a privation and lack, not a being in its own right; its shadowy
reality as this lack is purely parasitic upon the real being, will, and affections of the
renewed spiritus, the spiritual man. To explain this difficult ontological point further,
Augustine once spoke of seeing darkness and hearing silence (c. dei 12.7). In 1516,
Luther is taking up his teacher’s anti-Manichean metaphysics of good and evil and
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WA 56.350.22-351.2: Est autem Notandum, Quod Apostolus non velit intelligi spiritum et carnem
esse quedam velut duo, Sed vnum omnino, Sicut vulnus et caro sunt vnum; Vbi etsi aliud sit proprium
vulneris, aliud proprium carnis, tamen quia vulnus et caro vnum sunt, et non est aliud quam ipsa
vulnerata caro seu infirma, ideo carni tribuitur, quod est vulneris. Sic idem homo simul est spiritus et
caro. Sed Caro est eius infirmitas seu vulnus, Et inquantum diligit legem Dei, Spiritus est; inquantum
autem concupiscit, est infirmitas spiritus et vulnus peccati, quod sanari incipit. Sic Christus ait:
‘Spiritus quidem promptus est, Caro autem infirma.’ Cf. LW 25.339.
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WA 56.352.10-2. NBA I/18.624: [concupiscentiam carnis] usque adeo malum esse, ut repugnans
expurgando vincatur, donec sicut vulnus in corpore, ita perfecta curatione sanetur.
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applying it to the very polemical and exegetical use that Augustine had already put it
to himself in the late 410s and 20s contra Iulianum.714
This bring us to the first major excerpt, from c. Iul. 2.5.12:
And blessed Augustine, in book 2 against Julian, says: “we understand our vices
(vitia) in a catholic way: they resist the law of the mind because of the law of
sin. When these vices have been separated from us, they will not be somewhere
else, but having been healed in us they will be nowhere. Then why do they not
perish in baptism? Or do you not yet confess that their guilt (reatus) has
perished, but weakness (infirmitas) remains? Not the guilt (reatus) by which
they [sc., vitia] were guilty (rea), but the guilt by which they made us guilty
(nos reos) in the evil works to which they drew us. Neither does their weakness
so remain, as if they were some kind of animals which were weakened, but they
themselves [sc., vitia] are our weakness.”715
Luther’s citation matches our best modern edition closely.716 There is one elision of
some importance: in the first sentence, Luther changes Augustine’s catholice istos
equos intellegimus vitia nostra to Catholice intelligimus vitia nostra. This editorial
redaction affords Luther the freedom to reproduce the substance of Augustine’s
remarks while avoiding the (to his purposes) unnecessary complication of explaining
the matter of istos equos—though it does leave the quasi aliqua animalia near the end
of the excerpt hanging somewhat in the air. For our purposes, however, “these horses”
714

nupt. conc. 2.3.7-10, 2.29.49-50; c. Iul. 1.5.16, 1.8.36-41, 2.3.6-7, 2.8.28, 3.26.63, 4.1.1, 5.6.24, 6.18.53-7;
c. Iul. op. imp. 1.24, 1.63, 1.114, 2.8-9, 2.228, 3.37, 3.53-7, 3.95, 3.153-216, 4.1-2, 4.23, 4.109, 4.120, 5.19,
5.25, 5.30, 5.38, 6.5, 6.14.
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WA 56.351.3-10: Et b. Aug li. 2. contra Iul: ‘Catholice intelligimus vitia nostra, que legi mentis ex
lege peccati resistunt. Non hȩc vitia a nobis separata alicubi alibi erunt, Sed in nobis sanata nusquam
erunt. Veruntamen quare non in baptismate perierunt? An nondum fateberis, quod reatus eorum
perierit, infirmitas manserit? Non reatus, quo ipsa rea fuerunt, Sed quo nos reos fecerant in malis
operibus, quo nos traxerant. Nec ita eorum mansit infirmitas, quasi aliqua sint animalia, que
infirmantur, Sed nostra infirmitas ipsa sunt.’ Cf. LW 25.340.
716
NBA I/18.530-2, reproducing PL 44.682: catholice istos equos intellegimus vitia nostra, quae legi
mentis ex lege peccati resistunt. Non a nobis haec vitia separata, alicubi alibi erunt, sed in nobis
sanata nusquam erunt. Verumtamen quare non in Baptismate perierunt? An nondum fateberis, quod
reatus eorum perierit, infirmitas manserit, non reatus quo ipsa rea fuerant, sed quo nos reos fecerant
in malis operibus, quo nos traxerant? Nec ita eorum mansit infirmitas, quasi aliqua sint animalia
quae infirmantur: sed nostra infirmitas ipsa sunt. I count three minor differences: the first I discuss
in the argument; the second shifts the order of PL’s Non a nobis haec vitia separata to WA’s Non hȩc
vitia a nobis separata; the third, PL’s ipsa rea fuerant to WA’s ipsa rea fuerunt.
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help get to the heart of the position that Augustine contended for in 421 and,
therefore, to a sound evaluation of what Luther was arguing for in 1516.
Horses ruled by a charioteer are a commonplace Platonic metaphor for either
the soul’s parts, its faculties, or its passions, depending on one’s psychology (see
Phaedrus 246a-254e; cf. vera rel. 45.83). In the case at hand, it stems from a passage in
Ambrose’s de Isaac et anima 8.65 that Augustine is urging against Julian in the
catalogue of patristic citations that forms c. Iul. books 1 and 2.717 Ambrose writes:
A good horseman reins in and holds back evil horses, and spurs on good ones.
The good horses are four: prudence, temperance, fortitude, iustitia. The evil
horses are: wrathfulness, concupiscentia, fear, iniquitas.718
This supplies weighty evidence in Augustine’s case for the catholicity of his doctrine of
concupiscentia mala. But because Julian levels the charge of Manichaeism against this
doctrine of evil desire, Augustine must demonstrate that Ambrose’s “evil horses”—
which include concupiscentia in their number—are not substances, but vices: that is,
affective “wounds” which afflict the good soul characterized by the four cardinal
virtues. In the passage cited above, Luther excerpts the central portion of Augustine’s
argument to this effect. I provide it here in full, with the material excerpted by Luther
underlined:
In the book de Isaac et anima, Ambrose says: “A good horseman reins in and
holds back evil horses, and spurs on good ones. The good horses are four:
prudence, temperance, fortitude, iustitia. The evil horses are: wrathfulness,
concupiscentia, fear, iniquitas.” He doesn’t say, A good horseman has good
horses, he does not have evil horses, does he? No, he says: “he spurs on the
good ones, he reins in and holds back the evil ones.” Where do these evil
horses come from? To be sure, if we say or think that they are substantias, we
side with or belong to the madness of the Manichees. But to keep that madness
717

See Mathijs Lamberigts, “Augustine’s Use of Tradition in His Reaction to Julian of Aeclanum’s Ad
Turbantium: Contra Iulianum I-II,” AugS 41/1 (2010), 183-200.
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NBA I/18.530, WSA I/24.314. For de Isaac et anima 8.65, see PL 14.527; cf. Nisula, 33-4.

260

far from us, in a catholic way we understand that those horses are our vices,
which resist the law of the mind because of the law of sin. When these vices
have been separated from us, they will not be somewhere else, but having been
healed in us they will be nowhere. Then why do they not perish in baptism? Or
do you not yet confess that their guilt has perished, but weakness remains? Not
the guilt by which they were guilty, but the guilt by which they made us guilty
in the works to which they drew us. Neither does their weakness so remain, as
if they were some kind of animals which were weakened, but they themselves
are our weakness. Nor should it be thought that among these evil horses he
named that iniquity (iniquitatem) which is destroyed in baptism. For that was
the [iniquity] of the sins which we did, which were all forgiven and now do not
exist at all. The guilt of those sins remained in force, when the sins themselves
happened and then passed away. But this law of sin—which remains after its
guilt is forgiven in the sacred font—he called iniquity (iniquitatem) precisely
because it is iniquitous (iniquum) that the flesh should desire (concupiscat)
against the spirit [Gal. 5:17a]: although there is iustitia in our renovation,
because it is just (iustum) that the spirit desire (concupiscat) against the flesh
[Gal. 5:17b], that we may walk by the spirit and not complete the desires of the
flesh [Gal. 5:16]. And to be sure, we find this, our iustitiam, named among the
good horses.719
Several factors, all central to Augustine’s polemic against Julian, converge in this
paragraph.

First, Augustine defends his basic contention, viz., that inherited

concupiscence is evil, by arguing that this evil is to be understood psychologically,
privatively, and affectively rather than ontologically, i.e., as evil desire that wounds
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c. Iul. 2.5.12, NBA I/18.530-2, PL 44.681-2 (cf. WSA I/24.314-5): In libro de Isaac et Anima idem
dicit: “Bonus ergo rector malos equos restringit et revocat, bonos incitat. Boni equi sunt quattuor:
prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iustitia; mali equi: Iracundia, concupiscentia, timor, iniquitas.”
Numquid ait: Bonus rector bonos equos habet, malos non habet? Sed ait: "Bonos, incitat, malos
restringit et revocat". Unde isti sunt equi? Nempe si eos substantias dicimus vel putamus,
Manichaeorum favemus vel haeremus insaniae: quod ut absit a nobis, catholice istos equos
intellegimus vitia nostra, quae legi mentis ex lege peccati resistunt. Non a nobis haec vitia separata,
alicubi alibi erunt, sed in nobis sanata nusquam erunt. Verumtamen quare non in Baptismate
perierunt? An nondum fateberis, quod reatus eorum perierit, infirmitas manserit, non reatus quo ipsa
rea fuerant, sed quo nos reos fecerant in malis operibus, quo nos traxerant? Nec ita eorum mansit
infirmitas, quasi aliqua sint animalia quae infirmantur: sed nostra infirmitas ipsa sunt. Nec in his
equis malis iniquitatem nominasse putandus est illam, quae deletur in Baptismo: illa namque
peccatorum quae fecimus, fuit, quae cuncta remissa sunt, atque omnino iam non sunt, quorum reatus
manebat quando ipsa fiebant atque transibant. Istam vero legem peccati, cuius manentis reatus in
sacro fonte remissus est, propterea vocavit iniquitatem, quia iniquum est ut caro concupiscat
adversus spiritum: quamvis adsit in nostra renovatione iustitia; quia iustum est ut adversus carnem
spiritus concupiscat, ut spiritu ambulemus, et concupiscentias carnis non perficiamus. Hanc quippe
iustitiam nostram inter bonos equos invenimus nominatam.
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and weakens the renovated spiritus, and not as a substance existing in its own right
(whether in the Manichean sense or, by extension, as the lowest part of the kind of bior tripartite soul theorized paradigmatically by Plato).720 Even the good horseman has
evil horses to deal with: but the metaphor breaks down if carried to the point of
thinking that these unruly and rebellious evils are things, when in fact they name the
lack, wound, disease, or weakness that continues to beleaguer the affections of the
imperfectly renovated soul itself.
Second, Augustine distinguishes between the guilt that accrues to a person
because of this evil desire on the one hand, and its operations in the just soul on the
other. In a way, it was this distinction, classically formulated in nupt. conc. 1.25.2826.29, that animated the vigorous polemics of the 420s.721 In the case of actual sin, its
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Cf. nupt. conc. 1.25.28, BA 23.118: Non enim substantialiter manet, sicut aliquod corpus aut
spiritus, sed affectio est quaedam malae qualitatis, sicut languor.
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BA 23.116-120 (cf. WSA I/24.46-7): 25.28. Si autem quaeritur, quomodo ista concupiscentia carnis
maneat in regenerato, in quo uniuersorum facta est remissio peccatorum, quandoquidem per ipsam
seminatur et cum ipsa carnalis gignitur proles parentis etiam baptizati, aut certe, si in parente
baptizato potest esse et peccatum non esse, cur eadem ipsa in prole peccatum sit: ad haec
respondetur dimitti concupiscentiam carnis in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in peccatum non
inputetur. Quamuis autem reatu suo iam soluto, manet tamen, donec sanetur omnis infirmitas
nostra, proficiente renovatione interioris hominis de die in diem, cum exterior induerit
incorruptionem. Non enim substantialiter manet, sicut aliquod corpus aut spiritus, sed affectio est
quaedam malae qualitatis, sicut languor. Non ergo aliquid remanet, quod non remittatur, cum fit,
sicut scriptum est: Propitius Dominus omnibus iniquitatibus nostris, sed, donec fiat et quod sequitur:
qui sanat omnes languores tuos, qui redimit de corruptione uitam tuam, manet in corpore mortis
huius carnalis concupiscentia, cuius uitiosis desideriis ad illicita perpetranda non oboedire
praecipimur, ne regnet peccatum in nostro mortali corpore. Quae tamen concupiscentia cotidie
minuitur in proficientibus et continentibus, accedente etiam senectute multo maxime. Qui vero ei
nequiter seruiunt, tantas in eis uires accipit ut plerumque, iam aetate deficientibus membris
eisdemque partibus corporis ad illud opus admoueri minus ualentibus, turpius et procacius insanire
non desinat. 26.29. In eis ergo, qui regenerantur in Christo, cum remissionem accipiunt prorsus
omnium peccatorum, utique necesse est ut reatus etiam huius licet adhuc manentis concupiscentiae
remittatur, ut in peccatum, sicut dixi, non inputetur. Nam sicut eorum peccatorum, quae manere non
possunt, quoniam cum fiunt praetereunt, reatus tamen manet et, nisi remittatur, in aeternum
manebit, sic illius, quando remittitur, reatus aufertur. Hoc est enim non habere peccatum, reum non
esse peccati. Nam si quisquam verbi gratia fecerit adulterium, etiamsi numquam deinceps faciat, reus
est adulterii, donec reatus ipsius indulgentia remittatur. Habet ergo peccatum, quamuis illud quod
admisit iam non sit, quia cum tempore quo factum est praeteriit. Nam si a peccando desistere hoc

262

guilt remains in force long after the sinful act itself has transpired. Conversely, argues
Augustine, the reatus owing to mala concupiscentia is abolished in baptism, but its
malicious operations remain in force.
The third factor is the most difficult point to interpret and, at the same time,
the most decisive: the question of whether the evil desire that remains in the holy soul
and is forgiven in baptism retains in itself an intrinsic guiltiness. That is to say, is the
concupiscentia which Augustine emphatically asserts to be mala also rea, even in the
baptized/forgiven person who has been set free from the bond of all guilt? As noted
above, modern scholarship recognizes that Augustine’s position on this point
fluctuates; but there are two strong reasons to count c. Iul. 2.5.12 amongst the places in
his works where he affirms the intrinsic guiltiness of evil desire in sanctis. It is easier, I
think, to begin with the second instance, where Augustine explains the “evil horse”
named iniquitas vis-à-vis baptismal forgiveness and the inner conflict described in Gal.
5:16-17. This Ambrosian horse is not, argues Augustine, to be mistaken for the iniquity
pardoned in baptism: the guilt of all sins was destroyed in that sacred font, including
the guilt of original sin or concupiscence, the lex peccati that binds all Adam’s
children. Rather, explains Augustine, when Ambrose spoke of iniquitas, he meant the
law of sin itself: and he spoke rightly, because it is iniquum for the flesh to lust against
the spirit. The evil operation of the flesh is iniquitous or unjust. By contrast, the
renovated soul or spiritus possesses real iustitia by virtue of the fact that it fights back
against this evil and iniquitous desire with its own holy desire, and does not complete
esset non habere peccata, sufficeret, ut hoc nos moneret Scriptura: Fili, peccasti, non adicias iterum;
non autem sufficit, sed addidit: et de pristinis deprecare, ut tibi remittantur. Manent ergo, nisi
remittantur. Sed quomodo manent, si praeterita sunt, nisi quia praeterierunt actu, manent reatu? Sic
itaque fieri e contrario potest, ut etiam illud maneat actu, praetereat reatu.
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the desires of the flesh. Now, to call concupiscence iniquitas and to assert that its
operation in the baptized is iniquum is at most a hair’s breath from naming it
peccatum and affirming its intrinsic reatus; and a cursory glance at (say) Augustine’s
sermon on Ps. 5o[51] demonstrates the real semantic equivalence that obtains amongst
these overlapping scriptural terms.722 It is, I suggest, reasonable to assume that
Luther’s interpretation of the material he excerpted from c. Iul. 2.5.12 is influenced by
its immediate context. But we must look into the first and more important instance
directly, which so greatly interested Luther in 1516.
Augustine first repeats the familiar refrain: the guilt (reatus) of the vices that
comprise the believer’s flesh perishes in baptism, but their weakness (infirmitas)
remains. But then he continues: non reatus quo ipsa rea fuerant, sed quo nos reos
fecerant in malis operibus, quo nos traxerant. This sentence is a further specification of
the guilt that is forgiven in baptism. In the context, it is clear that the antecedent of
the ipsa that Augustine says had been rea is vitia. So the sentence, somewhat amplified
to clarify its meaning, comes roughly to this:
The guilt of the vices perishes in baptism, but the weakness remains. The guilt
that perishes is not the guilt by which the vices themselves had been guilty.
Rather, the guilt that perishes is that by which the vices made us guilty by
doing the evil works to which our vices drew us.
There would be little to perplex in Augustine’s sentence if his fuerant read sunt
instead: if it did, this would amount to an unambiguous statement of the intrinsically
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CCSL 38.599-616, WSA III/16.410-29. This semantic equivalence arises naturally from the Psalm
itself, in Augustine’s old Latin version of the Psalter: v. 3, dele iniquitatem meam (CCSL 38.603.6.12);
v. 4, lava me ab iniustitia mea, et a delicto meo munda me (38.603.7.1-5); v. 5, quoniam iniquitatem
meam ego agnosco, et delictum meum contra me est semper (38.603.8.1-2); v. 7, in iniquitatibus
conceptus sum, et in peccatis mater mea in utero aluit (38.606.10.3-29); v. 11, averte faciem tuam a
peccatis meis, et omnes iniquitates meas dele (38.610.14.1-2).
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guilt-bearing quality of the vicious and evil passions with which the just soul must
contend by grace. But even as it stands, the text leans in this direction. From the
momentous nupt. conc. 1.25.28 on in his debate with Julian, Augustine upholds his key
distinction between reatus and vitium. But it appears that here he makes a further
distinction. There is, on the one hand, a guilt by which the renewed soul’s vices were
themselves guilty (ipsa rea). On the other, there is a guilt by which the pre-baptized
person as a morally responsible person had become guilty (nos reos) when his vicious
passions had led him into consensual sinful acts. In my judgment, this signals an (at
this point) still somewhat opaque yet latent and ultimately germinal distinction
between the guiltless person and his guilt-bearing flesh: and it begs the question how
a baptized person battling intrinsically guilty vitia in his soul can nonetheless be fully
set free from guilt. The most plausible solution, which is arguably already present at
nupt. conc. 1.25.28, is that God in his mercy does not impute to the baptized person the
guilt that ought to accrue to him by right on account of his evil flesh.
This, as it happens, is the solution Augustine himself provides explicitly at c.
Iul. 6.17.51—note well, in defense of nupt. conc. 1.25.28:
I said that “the concupiscence of the flesh is forgiven in baptism, not so that it
does not exist, but so that it is not imputed as sin; although its guilt has already
been released, it remains nevertheless.” Against these words of mine you argue,
clever fellow that you are, as if I had said that concupiscence itself is set free
from guilt through Baptism (tamquam ipsam concupiscentiam dixerim per
Baptismum reatu liberari), since I said, “its guilt has already been released”
(reatu suo iam soluto)—as if I had said “its (suo)” [guilt, meaning the guilt] by
which concupiscence itself is guilty (quo ipsa rea est); and its guilt having being
released, concupiscence itself would remain, absolved. If I had really thought
that, I would surely not have said that concupiscence is evil, but that it had
been so. And in this way, according to your marvelous understanding, when
you hear that the guilt of murder in some person has been released, you think
that the murder itself, not the man, has been absolved from guilt! Who would
think this way, except someone who is not embarrassed to praise that with
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which he is compelled to fight? And how can you boast and exalt in refuting
this opinion, which is plainly not mine but yours? You say the sort of things
that ought to be said to those who affirm that through Baptism the
concupiscence of the flesh has become sanctified and faithful in the regenerate
people in whom it remains. But it is fitting rather for you, who declare it to be
good, to say that “the good of sanctification is added to its natural goodness,”
as you say to infants, and that the concupiscence of the flesh is God’s holy
child. We, however, who say that concupiscence is evil, and that it nevertheless
remains in the baptized, although its guilt—not the guilt by which it itself was
guilty (for it is not some persona), but the guilt by which it was making a man
guilty from his origin—was forgiven and wiped away: heaven forbid that we
should say that it is sanctified since, if they have not received the grace of God
in vain, the regenerate must fight with it as though with an enemy in a civil
war, and they must desire and pray to be healed of that plague.723
Augustine’s quo ipsa rea est here in bk. 6 closely matches his quo ipsa rea fuerant in
bk. 2: in fact, it is just the hypothetical shift in verb tense that I had suggested might
clear up Augustine’s meaning. And here it is: concupiscentia ipsa rea est, in the
present, in the regenerate; but it is not imputed to the person who has been baptized,
absolved, and set free from all his guilt. A murderer can be set free from guilt by God’s
grace, but the act of murder itself is always guilty. In the same way, the evil desire of
the flesh is and can only ever be guilty per se, but the flesh-bearing regenerate person
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NBA I/18.930-2, PL 44.852-3 (cf. WSA I/24.510-11): a me dictum est, “dimitti concupiscentiam
carnis in Baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in peccatum non imputetur; quamvis autem reatu suo iam
soluto, manet tamen.” Adversus haec mea verba sic argumentaris homo acutissimus, tamquam ipsam
concupiscentiam dixerim per Baptismum reatu liberari; quoniam dixi, “reatu suo iam soluto”: velut
“suo” dixerim, quo ipsa rea est, eoque soluto illa permaneat absoluta. Quod utique si sensissem,
profecto eam malam esse non dicerem, sed fuisse. Ac per hoc, secundum mirabilem intellegentiam
tuam, quando audis in aliquo homicidii reatum solutum, non hominem, sed ipsum homicidium a
reatu existimas absolutum. Sic intellegat quis, nisi qui non erubescit laudare, cum qua compellitur
dimicare? Et quomodo te iactas et exsultas in redarguendo istam sententiam, non meam plane, sed
tuam? Talia quippe dicis, qualia dicenda sunt in eos, qui per Baptismum sanctificatam et fidelem
factam concupiscentiam carnis affirmant in eis, in quibus regeneratis manet tamen. Sed hoc tibi
potius qui eam bonam praedicas, convenit dicere, “ut bono eius naturali,” sicut de infantibus dicitis:
“bonum sanctificationis accedat,” et sit carnis concupiscentia sancta Dei filia. Nos autem qui eam
malam dicimus, et manere tamen in baptizatis, quamvis reatus eius, non quo ipsa erat rea (neque
enim aliqua persona est), sed quo reum hominem originaliter faciebat, fuerit remissus atque
vacuatus; absit ut dicamus sanctificari, cum qua necesse habent regenerati, si non in vacuum Dei
gratiam susceperunt, intestino quodam bello tamquam cum hoste confligere, et ab ea peste desiderare
atque optare sanari.
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emerges from the water of baptism washed entirely clean from all guilt. And, to be
sure, the regenerate and forgiven person is instantly enrolled in a lifelong prayerful
“civil war” against the evil of his flesh, which God does not reckon to his account,
longing to be completely healed (sanari) from the affective disease that afflicts him
and displeases God.
That, at any rate, may serve us as Augustine’s own interpretation (from the
same work) of the text from c. Iul. 2.5.12 that Luther cites in his scholion on Rom.
7:17.724 And it will be remembered that at the head of the great excursus on Rom. 7:7,
Luther had pointed to the end of c. Iul. 6—which of course includes the striking
passage at 6.17.51—as “the clearest explanation of all.”725 Well, here is the
interpretation of c. Iul. 2.5.12 that Luther offers himself:
From this beautiful authority it is clear how concupiscence is our very
weakness toward the good, which in itself is certainly guilty (rea), but
nonetheless does not make us guilty (reos nos) unless we consent and work.
Now something marvelous follows from this: that we are guilty and not guilty.
For we ourselves are that weakness, therefore it is guilty and we ourselves are
guilty, until it ceases and is healed. But we are not guilty, so long as we do not
work in accord with it: for God’s mercy does not impute the guilt of the
weakness (reatum infirmitatis), but the guilt of the one who consents to the
weakness of the will (reatum consentientis infirmitati voluntatis).726
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According to Hans-Ulrich Delius, though Luther cites nupt. conc. 1.25.28 with great frequency he
does not seem to have quoted c. Iul. 6.17.51. Augustin als Quelle Luthers, 181-6. That said, we do
know that Luther read c. Iul. as a whole, and in the introduction to his long excursus at Rom. 7:7 he
states that omne clarissime li. 6. contra eundem c. XI vsque in finem (WA 56.340.3-4). So it is
plausible to infer that impressions formed from his reading of book 6 informed his interpretation of
2.5.12 and, for that matter, nupt. conc. 1.25.28.
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WA 56.340.3-4: Et omne clarissime li. 6. contra eundem c. XI. vsque in finem. Cf. LW 25.328.
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WA 56.351.10-7: Ex ista pulchra authoritate patet, Quomodo Concupiscentia sit ipsa infirmitas
nostra ad bonum, que in se quidem rea est, Sed tamen reos nos non facit nisi consentientes et
operantes. Ex quo tamen mirabile sequitur, Quod rei sumus et non rei. Quia Infirmitas illa nos ipsi
sumus, Ergo ipsa rea et nos rei sumus, donec cesset et sanetur. Sed non sumus rei, dum non operamur
secundum eam, Dei misericordia non imputante reatum infirmitatis, Sed reatum consentientis
infirmitati voluntatis. Cf. LW 25.340.
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This is the place where Rudolf Hermann exclaimed: “Grave words, which sound just
like Augustine!”727 In arguing that this resonance is merely apparent, Hermann takes
two steps to pit the two theologians’ real positions against each other. First, he points
out that Luther speaks of a reatus that belongs to one’s infirmitas as such: and this
Hermann regards as a material advance beyond Augustine’s actual position.728 Second,
he asserts that Luther’s non consentire cannot be the same as Augustine’s, because
Luther’s claim that (a) the flesh’s weakness is guilty per se, combined with (b) the
claim that we are this guilty weakness, must mean (c) that there is a kind of consensus
in operation within the saint’s rea concupiscentia, i.e., a consent already in being prior
to the full-blown consent of which Luther speaks in such a beguilingly Augustinian
way. Thus unlike Augustine, concludes Hermann, when Luther sets forth his non
consentire as the condition for God’s merciful non-imputation, it is not a matter of
refusing consent to an individual sinful act, but rather of refusing consent to one’s
total self-destruction: “a whole-hog messing up of one’s life.”729 Otherwise, as I noted
above, an Augustinian Luther would send his modern spiritual descendants back to
the confessional, quod impossibile est. Q.E.D. And thence, perhaps, to what Michael
Root identifies as one of the central “constructions” at bottom of twentieth-century
Lutheranism: the radical “simul” and the indifference/hostility to real growth in
holiness that attends it.730
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Hermann, 192.
Hermann, 193-4.
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Hermann, 194-5. For similar reasons but with greater reserve, Adolf Hamel’s (II/18)
interpretation of the same passage concluded: “that is more than Augustine, in the texts cited,
actually says.”
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Michael Root, “The Work of Christ and the Deconstruction of Twentieth-Century Lutheranism,”
esp. 7-8, 12-14.
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But let us examine the two fateful steps which Hermann took in 1930. Luther at
the very least intends to be restating in his own words the doctrinal content of the
excerpt he has just related from c. Iul. 2.5.12. On this attempted reditio of Augustine’s
traditio, all sides are agreed. In essence, Luther states that concupiscence is
intrinsically guilty, but that it does not make the regenerate person guilty apart from
his consenting to its evil desires: God mercifully declining to impute the real and
intrinsic reatum infirmitatis to the person who refuses to consent to his own infirmitas
voluntatis. Hermann first asserts that Augustine does not hold concupiscence to be
guilty in itself. But as I have proven at least plausibly with respect to c. Iul. 2.5.12, and I
believe demonstrably with respect to c. Iul. 6.17.51, Augustine upholds this very point:
tamquam ipsam concupiscentiam dixerim per Baptismum reatu liberari! ipsa rea est.
Luther thus proves himself both a better interpreter of the “420s Augustine” than
Hermann and, at least in this respect, a faithful “Augustinian” in his own right.
Secondly, Hermann posits that Luther’s infirmitas illa [rea] nos ipsi sumus
involves a kind of consent within the flesh’s evil desires which dramatically erodes the
significance of refusing consent to these evil desires. But as we have seen in the entire
scholion on Rom. 7 up to this point, when Luther teaches that the saints are their own
weakness, he stands on firm Augustinian ground. This is the whole force of the
affective and privative vulnus psychology that Luther had exposited immediately prior
to the excerpt from c. Iul. 2.5.12,731 and of the spirit/flesh communio idiomatum
elaborated in the scholion on Rom. 7:7.732 Augustine argues that our vices are not
some separate substance, but that they belong to us as the affective defect, weakness,
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sickness, or wound afflicting our partly renovated souls. When Luther says that we are
this weakness, he is simply reiterating—via the synecdoche of the communio
idiomatum—the anti-Manichean ontology of privation that factors so centrally in
Augustine’s psychology of the affectively divided regenerate will. Luther is thus not
claiming that the regenerate are nothing but this weakness. Rather, he is upholding
the basic Augustinian conviction that this weakness belongs to the regenerate as
intimately as a wound belongs to a man being healed: which is why Luther affirms
Augustine’s sanata with a sanetur of his own, and proceeds directly to the Parable of
the Good Samaritan to explain the ongoing nature of this healing further.733 For Luther
the Augustinian, the sick or sinful desires of the “flesh” are precisely that privative
“part” (so to speak) of the divided will to which this same embattled will does not
consent,734 because holy delectatio victrix, infused into the heart by the Holy Spirit to
renew the will into “spirit,” holds its ground.
Once this point is grasped, Hermann’s hypothesis of a consensus within the
flesh itself is not only rendered unnecessary, it is shown to be groundless. Like
Augustine in c. Iul. 2 and 6, Luther upholds the intrinsic reatum infirmitatis. And
when Luther maintains that the regenerate are this remaining (and in itself, guilty)
weakness, he does so in the Augustinian fashion I have just described. For Luther as
for Augustine, the partially renewed will’s refusal to succumb to its own weakness is
the condition sine quo non for God’s merciful non-imputation of the reatum
infirmitatis. On the surface, Luther’s “we are guilty and we are not guilty” appears to
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be the sort of paradox that Hermann, Grane, et al. have taken it to be. But upon close
examination of its meaning in light of the Augustinian theology that Luther is
explicitly (and rather learnedly) appropriating, the soon-to-be Reformer’s nascent
rhetorical verve communicates more forcefully essentially the same position that
Augustine held against Julian centuries before. The regenerate Christian is “guilty” in
the restricted sense that his evil and guilt-laden fleshly desire would make him so
personally if God held his concupiscentia rea against him. But so long as he keeps up
the fight against the evil desires that remain within him by not consenting to them,
God forgives the intrinsic guilt of these desires and does not impute any guilt
whatsoever to the baptized person’s account. God does not impute the guilt of the
weakness that wounds the renewed person’s will: he only imputes the guilt of the
person who consents to this weakness, and in so doing foolishly flees from the
medicus whose grace had begun to heal his soul. Whether or not such words are
“grave” depends on one’s own theological convictions, but I believe Hermann is right
to think that they sound just like Augustine.
We can afford greater brevity in considering the final three excerpts from
Augustine’s works against Julian in the scholion on Rom. 7:17.

2.1.2. c. Iul. 3.20.39. On the heels of his traditio of the excerpt from c. Iul. 2.5.12, Luther
explains the logic of progressive sanative renewal amidst the disease of residual sin via
the christological interpretation of Luke 10:25-37. Taking the homo semivivus into his
care and pouring (Infundens) wine and oil into his wounds, the Good Samaritan did
not heal him instantly, but began to heal him (incepit sanare). Luther shifts quickly to
the now familiar Augustinian language of one and the same man (idem homo) who is
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rightly described in various ways insofar as (Inquantum) the gracious healing of his
affections has progressed. The same sick man is both weak and getting well: insofar as
he is healthy he desires good things, but as one who is still weak he desires alia;
indeed, he is “compelled” (cogitur) to yield to his weakness, “which he himself does
not want.”735 This is an unremarkable restatement of the theory of involuntary
affective “peccatum” that became increasingly important for Augustine’s
interpretation of Rom. 7 in the late 420s,736 here set within the overarching context of
the partially renewed person’s ongoing healing by grace. Christ’s patient suffers the
ongoing operations of his affective disease invitus,737 against the good desires of his
own holy will which Christ’s Spirit pours into him: reading Luther’s Infundens as a
implicit reference to gratia infusa et sanans.
At just this point and from this Augustinian vantage, Luther engages in a brief
and highly allusive debate with ancient and medieval philosophical psychologies; and
this forms the context for his citation of c. Iul. 3.20.39:
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In light of these points the frivolous and delirious commentum of the
metaphysical theologians is plain to see, when they dispute about contrary
appetites, whether they are able to exist in the same subject (de appetitibus
contrariis, an possint in eodem esse subiecto). They invent the idea that spirit,
sc. reason, is a thing separate by itself and absolute and integral and perfect in
its own kind. Likewise sensuality or flesh by opposition is some contrary thing,
equally integral and absolute. And because of these, their foolish phantasies,
they are driven to forget that flesh is the weakness itself or wound of the whole
man, who through grace has begun to be healed in the reason or spirit (Caro sit
ipsa infirmitas velut vulnus totius hominis, qui per gratiam in ratione seu spiritu
cȩptus est sanari). For who imagines that in a sick man there are thus two
contrary realities (duas res contrarias)? since it is the same body, which seeks
health and yet is compelled to do things which belong to its weakness: the
same body under both conditions. Book 3 contra Iul. c. 20: “concupiscence is so
great an evil, that as it resists it is conquered by being assaulted until, like a
wound in a body, it is healed by the perfect cure” (Concupiscentia vsque adeo
malum est, Vt repugnans expugnando vincatur, donec sicut vulnus in corpore
perfecta curatione sanetur).738
In the first place, I note that Luther’s text in the excerpt matches our best modern
edition’s without any substantial variations.739
As to the content of the passage: from what I can gather from the detailed
researches of Pekka Kärkkäinen and Theodor Dieter,740 Luther seems to be taking up
some tenets of his Erfurt teachers’ philosophical psychology. Kärkkäinen has shown
that in the Buridanian strand of the via moderna regnant in early sixteenth-century
Erfurt, Trutfetter and Usingen rejected the plurality of substantial forms in one subject
in favor of the real unity of the soul and, in the course of their commentaries on
Aristotle’s de anima, defended their positions against both live philosophical
alternatives (e.g., Thomas’, Scotus’, or Ockham’s psychology) and historical stances no
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longer currently held by a particular school. Amongst the latter category, Usingen
discussed Anaxagoras, Plato, and Averroës.741 Is it possible that Luther the Erfurt
magister artium turned Wittenberg doctor in biblia is doing something similar here?
Of the three historical positions mentioned by Usingen, it seems to be Plato’s
psychology (in Phaedo, as opposed to Republic) that most nearly resonates with what
Luther dismisses as a frivolous invention, to wit: reason or spirit juxtaposed with
sensualitas as contrary entities with contrary appetites that together make up a single
subject, with the nod going to ratio as the better and more real of a human being’s two
constituent parts. On this reading, Luther sets the Erfurt/Buridanian rejection of the
soul’s division into real parts (or faculties really distinct from the essentia animae)
against a broadly Platonic interpretation of Rom. 7:14-25’s confessing subject as an
akratic spirit or mens unable to control its lower and impassioned partes.742
There is, I think, a more plausible interpretation to consider. When Luther
denounces the “frivolous and delirious commentum of the metaphysical theologians,”
he probably has the de anima commentaries contained within the eighth book of
Trutfetter’s Summa in totam physicen and Usingen’s Exercitium de anima especially in
mind,743 and perhaps relevant loci from Biel’s Collectorium.744 Luther had, after all,
introduced his comments on Rom. 7:17 just a few pages earlier by lamenting the fallax
Aristotelis methaphysica that has deceived “our theologians.”745 But if this is the case,
we must inquire farther into the exact nature of Luther’s disagreement with his
741
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teachers, for his rejection of an aspect of their philosophical psychology does not
involve a blanket repudiation of philosophical psychology as such, as is commonly
assumed.746 Take, for example, the specific question at hand: Luther clearly agrees
with his Erfurt teachers in rejecting a real partition of the soul. So what is the issue at
stake between them?
Dieter’s research is particularly useful in answering this question. He has
shown that Usingen still uses the conceptual (as opposed to real) distinctions amongst
the soul’s several faculties to diversely apportion the conflicting desires that exist
within the single subject of the soul as if its faculties were really distinct after all.747
This is just the philosophical problem that Luther names here: disputant de appetitibus
contrariis, an possint in eodem esse subiecto. What Dieter has recognized is that
Luther rejects Usingen’s solution to this problem as self-defeating and illusory, for
Usingen’s treatment of contrary desires ends up maintaining de facto a kind of real
partition that contradicts the deeper tenets of his own psychology. That is to say,
Usingen ends up with a division between spiritus/ratio as one integral res and
sensualitas/caro as another integral res separate therefrom.748 So does Biel: gratia and
the concupiscent fomes are not formally opposed to one another, because grace is
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infused into the soul (anima) while concupiscence is merely in carne vel in aliqua
virtute corporali.749 Ironically, Luther attacks this in the scholion on Rom. 7:17 at least
in part because he actually shares with Usingen a common belief in the real unity of
the soul. This is all quite helpful.
However, Dieter’s interpretation of the constructive position that Luther
advances against “the metaphysical theologians” of Erfurt is unsatisfying. He realizes
the Augustinian influences in play in the text, noting in particular the presence of the
familiar spiritus/caro, facere/perficere, non consentire, and vulnus themes. But in a
book on Luther und Aristoteles, Dieter’s attention fixes a little too quickly on the
young Luther’s evolving concerns with the traditional language of sin as a bad
qualitas, habitus, or vitium of the soul. No one can possess the moral disposition
“virtue” and the moral disposition “vice” at the same time; as Usingen put it in a
textbook example taken up endlessly by his pupil Luther, Inest autem contrarietas
qualitati ut album, nigrum.750 Any given subject can only be qualified by the one or the
other at a given time. Thus, continues Dieter—still soundly at this point—it is Luther’s
judgment that if a theologian thinks consistently in these Aristotelian terms, St. Paul’s
spirit/flesh “simul” cannot be adequately grasped and thematized. But then to resolve
the matter, Dieter turns to Luther’s Worttheologie as a kind of deus ex machina: when
the Word of God seizes a person, it sets his identity into a conflict which can only be
expressed in the form of two contradictory “total” definitions.751 There is, I think, more
of Hermann, Ebeling, Joest, and Grane in this than Dieter might care to admit, and
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not a little of his teacher Bayer too. But on my reckoning, the real problem is that
there is not enough of Augustine.
Taking up Dieter’s sound diagnosis of the problem, I propose a different
interpretation of Luther’s solution. He does take up his teachers’ emphasis on the real
unity of the soul. But when he addresses the philosophical-psychological problem
posed by appetitus contrarii—which is at once the exegetical problem posed by Rom.
7:14-25—Luther outmaneuvers Usingen’s failed effort to uphold this unity in terms of
nominalistic Aristotelianism by instead appropriating the heavily modified Stoicism
embedded within the mature Augustine’s theology of grace.752 To be clear, I am not
suggesting that Luther quite realized he was doing this: hence my emphasis on its
embeddedness in Augustine’s theology. In Luther’s mind, he was simply recovering
the anti-Pelagian theology of grace common to both St. Paul and Augustine and
setting it against the Aristotelian (and Pelagian) aberrations of his teachers. But
Luther’s straightforwardly Augustinian reply to the “metaphysical theologians”—
which culminates in the citation of c. Iul. 3.20.39 as a proof from authority—contains
within it a prepackaged affective philosophical psychology better suited to achieving
the twofold end of maintaining both the real ontological unity of the soul and the
mysterious reality of its inner division. Augustine’s modified Stoicism accomplishes
this end, not by positing separate psychological parts, but by confessing the diverse
passions that rend apart the entire regenerate soul.753 St. Paul’s “flesh” does not name a
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part of the soul, or even a vicious qualitas animae, but rather a vicious affectio animae
operating within and vitiating all the soul’s faculties in a habitual manner.754 Likewise,
Paul’s “spirit” and “mind” refer to neither Plato’s immortal logistikon nor Aristotle’s
nous, but to the good, virtuous, and holy affections which vie against the vicious
desires of the flesh within the battlefield of the one graced soul. This is all basic to
Augustine’s simultaneously anti-Manichean and anti-Pelagian psychology. Classically
stated at nupt. conc. 1.25.28, the “weakness” left behind in the regenerate after baptism
does not remain “substantially,” for it is not a body or a spirit of some kind, but a
vicious desire afflicting the holy soul: “a certain affection of an evil quality, like a
disease” (affectio est quaedam malae qualitatis, sicut languor).755 Thus as Timo Nisula
nicely has it, Augustine labors to unsettle Julian’s confidence in the “citadel of virtue”
that is the magnanimous (pagan and Pelagian) soul by stressing that for the Christian,
“no intact ground is left: the battle has to be fought inside the citadel.”756
In the scholion on Rom. 7:17, Luther sets a philosophical psychology (and
theology of healing grace) formulated in just these characteristically Augustinian
terms against the substantia- and qualitas-oriented positions of his Aristotelian
teachers. To wit: Christ progressively heals the half-dead man, who is healthy insofar
as he desires (cupit) good things but sick to the extent that he still desires other things
against his own will; “flesh” is a vulnus affecting not just a part, but the whole man;
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through grace the man’s “spirit” has begun to be healed (sanari) of this evil affective
disease; and, on the authority of c. Iul. 3.20.39, this disease and wound is conquered in
this life by battling against it, till the day it will be healed with the perfect cure of the
eschatological resurrection.757 Luther then expands upon Augustine’s analogy of the
wounded man being healed with one of his own devising: a dilapidated house
undergoing renovations. Like the wound and the wounded man in process of being
healed, the remaining imperfectio of a ruined house and its constructio upon
beginning to be restored (instaurari) are not two separate things: eadem res est.758 On
account of the fact that it is being rebuilt, the house is truly said to be a house and to
be making progress (proficere). But on account of its imperfection, it is also said simul
to not yet be a house and to fall short of what is proper to a house (deficere a
proprietate domus). In both cases, true predications are made of one and the same
house, but in different respects and on the basis of the mechanism of suppositional
carrying that Luther has translated from its native christological sphere of discourse to
make sense of Paul’s anthropology. As in Augustine’s vulnus analogy, Luther’s domus
analogy moves firmly and unequivocally from the terminus a quo of the house’s
original state of ruination, through its progressive renovation, to the terminus ad quem
of its eventual completion. This is why Luther momentarily leaves off the analogy to
cite Rom. 8:23 and Jas. 1:18: “we have the firstfruits of the spirit, we have become the
beginning of God’s creature,” then returns to it via 1 Pet. 2:5 and Eph. 2:21: “we are
being built up into a spiritual house, and a building thus constructed grows into a holy
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temple in the Lord.”759 Luther’s new analogy, which is meant to explain Augustine’s
old one, demonstrates how deeply he has grasped the logic of Augustine’s idem homo
spirit/flesh “simul” within the overarching context of Augustine’s theology of
progressive renewal, healing, or renovation by grace.
Once Luther’s appropriation of Augustine’s philosophical psychology, precisely
as an integral thread in the fabric of the church father’s theology of grace, is
adequately grasped, it should be plain to see that his polemic against the
“metaphysical theologians” does not signal a proto-Heideggerian rejection on his part
of the Substanzmetaphysik that (per Ebeling et al.) dominated medieval Scholasticism.
Luther the young O.E.S.A. lecturer on Romans is not anticipating the philosophy of
late modernity. Nor, for that matter, is he rejecting philosophy per se for the Bible, as
his rhetoric (and Augustine’s before him) might lead us t0 think. Rather, Luther is
recovering a kind of paleo-Augustinianism that champions the very same affective
psychology and theology of efficacious grace that had perplexed and indeed enraged
Julian, the virtue-oriented Aristotelian moral philosopher, in late antiquity. On the eve
of the Reformation, Luther is at least beginning to realize that “our theology and St.
Augustine” would have much the same effect upon the early modern Church and its
several schools of theology.760
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2.1.3. c. Iul. 2.9.32. Both the third and fourth Augustinian excerpts appear in Luther’s
comments on Rom. 7:17b: Sed quod habitat in me peccatum. Indeed, Luther begins his
exegesis by yielding the floor to Augustine:
Blessed Augustine book 2 contra Iulianum: “How then is sin dead, since it
operates so many things in us even with us struggling against it? What are
these many things? Nothing except foolish and harmful desideria, ‘which
plunge those who consent (consentientes) into destruction,’ etc. [cf. 1 Tim. 6:9].
How then do we say that this sin is dead in baptism and how do we confess
that it dwells in our members and operates many desideria, unless that it has
died in its guilt (reatu), by which it was holding us (quo nos tenebat), and that
until it is healed by the perfection of burial, it both rebels and is dead?
Although now it is not called sin in the same way, by which it makes guilty
(facit reum), but because it came about by the first man’s guilt, and because by
rebelling it strives to draw us into guilt (ad reatum).”761
Comparison with our best modern edition shows that although Luther has
compressed Augustine’s text through three elisions, the sense remains intact. After
quoting Rom. 7:23 and 7:18, Augustine writes:
Behold, that mighty soldier of Christ and faithful doctor of the Church [i.e.,
Ambrose] shows what a great fight we have with dead sins. How then is sin
dead, since it operates so many things in us even with us struggling against it?
What many things, if not foolish and harmful desideria which plunge those
who consent into destruction and perdition? Certainly to endure such things,
and not consent to them, is a struggle, a conflict, a fight. A fight between
whom, if not good and evil: not of nature against nature, but of nature against
a wound (vitium) that is already dead, but that still has to be buried
(sepeliendum), that is, to be completely healed (sanandum)? How then do we
say that this sin is dead in baptism, just as that man [i.e., Ambrose] said, and
how do we confess that it dwells in our members, and operates many desideria
even though we struggle against them and resist by not consenting to them,
just as this man confesses—unless that it has died in its guilt, by which it was
holding us, and that until it is healed by the perfection of burial, it both rebels
and is dead? Although now it is not called sin in the same way, by which it
761
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makes guilty; but because it came about by the first man’s guilt, and because by
rebelling it strives to draw us into guilt, unless the grace of God through Jesus
Christ our Lord helps us, lest even the sin that is dead in this way should rebel
and, by thus conquering us, come back to life and reign.762
For Luther exegeting Rom. 7:17b, the main object is to illumine what Paul means by
the “sin” which he confesses still indwells him, and the c. Iul. excerpt is suitable to this
purpose. Taking up Ambrose’s apt remarks and then drawing them further into the
decisive Pauline context of Rom. 6 and 7, Augustine maintains essentially the same
position I exposited above vis-à-vis c. Iul. 2.5.12, 6.17.51, and 3.20.39. St. Paul’s “sin” is
not a Manichean nature of darkness, but an evil affective and privative wound that
continues to operate many vicious desideria despite the fact that in baptism it has
“died” with respect to the guilt by which it had once held the unbaptized person
bound in the chains of Adam’s sin and guilt. Though already “dead” in this guiltrelated sense, Paul’s “peccatum” has not yet been “buried”: an implicit allusion to Rom.
6:4. En route to its burial, the grotesque corpse of dead indwelling sin continues to
fight its fate, rebelling against its burial through the operation of its evil desires and
even coming back to life if the baptized person consents to them. By contrast, when
the Christian fights against the evil desires he continues to suffer by not consenting to
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them, the ongoing “burial” of dead (but operative!) indwelling sin carries on apace;
that is—switching back to Augustine’s preferred metaphor—the baptized and forgiven
person’s wounded nature continues to be healed. Meanwhile, Augustine clarifies, this
“dead sin” (whose rebellious operations Mary Shelley might have admired) is not
called “sin” in the same way it had been so called prior to the great disruption of
baptismal grace, i.e., in the sense that previously it had made the unbaptized person
guilty of Adam’s rebellion. The grace of forgiveness in baptism breaks the chain that
held the heirs of Adam’s vitiated nature bound by Adam’s guilt. But as the regenerate
still endure the lamentable effects of the original wounding, the “dead” or guiltreleased “sin” that indwells them is called “sin” both on account of its source in
Adam’s reatus and because it strives to entice the reborn to consent to its allurements
and thus drag them out of life in Christ and back into Adam’s death, ad reatum.
Luther adds only one brief comment: “Therefore, it [i.e., Rom. 7:17b’s
peccatum] is the original vice of the tinder” (est ipsum originale vitium fomitis).763 In
itself, and given the content of the excerpt from nupt. conc. 1.23.25 that follows shortly
thereupon (and indeed the tenor of the entire scholion), this suggests that Luther has
adopted the excerpted material from c. Iul. 2.9.32 without modification as a
satisfactory explication of Rom. 7:17b. I shall comment further on the conceptual links
between these two excerpts in §4 below, especially regarding the nature and role of
Augustine’s non consentire as it relates to the sinfulness of concupiscentia. But just
prior to the next excerpt, Luther inserts a short back-reference to his comments in the
first corollarium in the scholion on Rom. 7: “about this original vitium fomitis, it was
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said above that we are more aptly said to die to it than it to us, and that while it
remains, we are turned away (diuerti) from it in this life through grace.”764 Since this
earlier text is sometimes taken to signal a complete break on Luther’s part with any
kind of broadly Augustinian theology of progressive renovation, I need to look into it
farther here. Given what we have seen thus far in the scholion on Rom. 7 both vis-à-vis
Luther’s defensible grasp of Augustine’s meaning in its original context and his
intention to appropriate this “420s Augustine” in his own theology, it is prima facie
unlikely that the interpretations advanced by Grane, Forde, and others are sound. But
let us see for ourselves what Luther wrote.

Excursus on the corollarium at Rom. 7:1: Paul’s Augustinian modus loquendi
As Grane has famously observed, Luther contrasts Paul’s apostolic modus loquendi
with the metaphysical or moral modus in vogue in late medieval theology. Thus Paul
says
… that a man rather is taken away, with sin remaining as a relic, and a man is
purged (expurgari) from sin rather than the contrary. However, the human
sense says the contrary: sin is taken away, with the man remaining, and the
man rather is purged (purgari). But the Apostle’s sense is the best of all, and
more proper, and perfectly divine.765
Luther’s exact meaning in these few lines is cryptic: peccatum remanens or relictum is
familiar enough and resonates with what Luther writes in his back-reference at Rom.
7:17b. But what is the import of the contrast he draws between (a) taking the man
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away from sin, which is St. Paul’s sense, and (b) taking the sin away from the man,
which is the all too human sensus Luther sets out to oppose? The initial obscurity is
further complicated by the fact that in both cases Luther states that man is “purged”
or “cleansed,” first using the more emphatic expurgari, then purgari in the second
instance. Grane argues that Luther is drawing a contrast between his (or Paul’s)
theology and that of die Scholastik. But the great Dane too hastily explains this in
terms of a contrast between Lutheran or Pauline justification on the one hand, and the
Scholastic or Catholic theologies of qualitative transformation on the other.
Rechtfertigung is not about etwas am Menschen being transformed, states Grane, but
about the man himself being changed. He is paraphrasing Luther’s own words at this
point, and out of context it might sound as if Grane is envisioning a real renovation of
some kind. Not exactly. Grane explains that the
… renovatio or mutatio of grace expresses itself in the attitude (Haltung) of the
person who expects only the action of God, and completely abandons a
fulfilling of the law of his own. Where this renewal takes place, sin has died,
even though it still remains in the flesh.766
In other words, the “change” that takes place in justification is seated in the attitude,
bearing, or self-understanding of the person who confesses his status as a total sinner
before God, and thus awaits God’s gracious bestowal of iustitia aliena. Sin ist
gestorben in such a person—the emphasis is Grane’s—because “sin” is correlative to
the wrath-working law (Rom. 4:15); and the sinner who thus postures himself before
God, renouncing all claims to a righteousness of his own, no longer stands under the
law’s sentence. But sin in itself still remains in the flesh, indeed it must remain, for the
whole rationale behind the justification of the sinner is his (self-) recognition of his
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total sinfulness. Thus sin has “died” only in the person in whom it remains, and who
confesses its totalizing effect upon himself. This is the (I dare say) rather paradoxical
Erneuerung that Grane sets forth to explain the obscure Lutherrede that opens the first
corollary in the Rom. 7 scholion. This he sets against the “metaphysical” and “moral”
theories of die Scholastik, with their literally misplaced concern for the transformation
of psychological qualities or external works in advance of the deeper renovation of the
person in his “psyche” (in the modern sense of the word) that Luther upholds.767
What are we to make of this? Dieter has properly upbraided Grane (and
Ebeling) for their monolithic accounts of scholastic theology. (Not unjustifiably, he
has also taken Luther to task for much the same reason.)768 That said, the often
impassioned polemics against scholastic Sawtheologen in the Romans lectures are
plain as day,769 and Grane is right to emphasize the either Paul or Aristotle/Scholastik
dichotomy (which is, after all, Luther’s own invention) as a crucial factor in the scholia
on Rom. 7 and 4 in particular. But as I have shown above, the roots of this very
dichotomy lie in Augustine’s own polemical self-definition as a simple biblical
theologian of grace over against Julian the clever Aristotelian moralist: and the modus
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loquendi that Luther advocates here contra pelagianos modernos has much in common
with both the technical terminology and the theological substance developed by
Augustine in his debate with Julian. If Grane falters in failing to diagnose the problem
Luther takes himself to be facing with quite the degree of sophistication that Dieter
provides, on my reading the real issue at stake is Grane’s failure to recognize the
mature Augustinian character of the solution that Luther commends here as truly
apostolic theology. A close reading of Luther’s elaboration of his puzzling claim that
the man must be taken away from his sin, rather than the sin from the man, bears this
out.
Luther confirms Paul’s modus loquendi by supplying parallel texts from Ps. 81:6,
Rom. 6:17, the Exodus narrative, and Ps. 21:12, then explains:
The reason for this kind of speaking is this: that grace and spiritual
righteousness destroy and change (tollit et mutat) the man himself, and turn
him away from sins—although sin is left behind (relinquat), so that while it
justifies the spirit, it leaves behind (reliquit) concupiscence in the flesh and in
the midst of the sins in the world. And this way of speaking is a most powerful
engine against the self-righteous. But human righteousness endeavors to
destroy and change (tollere et mutare) sins first, and to preserve the man
himself; therefore, it is not righteousness, but hypocrisy. Therefore, as long as
the man himself lives and is not destroyed and changed through the
renovation of grace (tollitur ac mutatur per renouationem gratiȩ), by no works
is he able to forestall his being under sin and the law.770
Thomists (et amici evangelici like Hooker, Owen, or Bavinck) accustomed to the axiom
that gratia non tollit naturam sed perficit instinctively cringe at Luther’s language at
this point; and for that matter, in the Lectures on Genesis Luther himself energetically
upholds this very axiom in his polemics against “the monks” (and Thomas Müntzer)

770

WA 56.334.24-335.4, cf. LW 25.323.

287

who aim to destroy human nature by their asceticism.771 But we should not jump too
quickly to the conclusion that Luther in 1516 is actually affirming that grace destroys
nature: which, to be clear, he never actually says here. Rather, grace destroys ipsum
hominem, that is, the man himself as a son of Adam apart from Christ, and changes
him: which is why Luther can and does speak of the entire process of destruction and
change—in St. Paul’s terms, of death and new life—as renovatio gratiae. Luther is
presupposing a bleak Augustinian account of human nature’s vitiation in Adam, but
not its abolition. Grace and spiritual righteousness abolish the old Adam’s inherited
vitiation in order to change and renovate the graced man himself in the depths of his
being. Not, to be sure, all at once: grace iustificat spiritum, but concupiscentia in carne
is left behind as a kind of relic. This, then, is what Luther means when he says that the
man must be taken away from his sin, rather than the other way around.
And this is why he forcefully opposes the alternative. So long as homo ipse as a
son of Adam remains intact, it will do no good—as the iustitiarii presume—to take
away this or that sinful deed or vicious quality and in its place to cultivate a virtue or
do a good work. For as Luther will say in the 1518 Heidelberg Disputation, “Adam is
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rather edified by good works.”772 This is ramped-up Luther rhetoric at its finest, but in
the sequel Luther explains with necessary precision exactly what he means: “For it is
impossible for a person not to be puffed up by his own good works, unless he has first
been emptied out and destroyed by sufferings and evils, until he knows that he
himself is nothing and that the works are not his own, but God’s.”773 The theologus
gloriae in 1518 and the iustitiarii in 1516 are identical, and suffer from the same deadly
brew of a Bielish theology and a Pelagian spiritual pathology, to wit: the presumption
of their own fundamental integrity; the failure to grasp the depths of their perversion;
the vain notion (at once dogmatic and spiritual) that just a little bit of gratia elevans is
needed to boost their naturalia integra into the state of grace that will permit them to
achieve condign merit and, in the end, eternal life.
No, says Luther—as theologian certainly, but also as Staupitzian Seelsorger—
that path only leads the “penitent” to re-inscribe ever more deeply in his proud heart
the lust for his own autonomous “self” that felled Adam in the Garden.774 It is not
enough to take away this or that sin from the man and lift him up to a state of grace,
so long as he remains in the depths of his being the filius Adae he had been all along,
originaliter. A more powerful remedy is needed to match the severity of the case facing
Adam’s ruined children: who, on top of it all, are blind to their own ruination! They
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are in desperate straits calling for desperate measures: gratia sanans as a kind of
spiritual chemotherapy, grace that puts the congenitally cancerous Adam infecting
them to death, and changes and renews the whole person (homo ipse) in Christ.775 The
man himself must be ripped away from his sin, emptied and destroyed and crucified
with Christ in order to be torn out of the first Adam’s flesh and changed and raised up
per renovationem gratiae into the newness of life that is to be had only in the Last, the
Life-Giving Spirit (1 Cor. 15:45). This gracious and “radical” (in the sense that it reaches
down to the roots) renovation must take place first if one’s works are to become truly
good: otherwise, the most pious and industrious doer of good works manu is only
reinforcing his inherited Adamic pathology in corde, and fooling himself as to his own
holiness in the bargain. There is not a little of John Tauler and the Theologia Deutsch
in this.776 But for my present purposes, it is more vital to recognize (as Grane failed to
do) that this complex of doctrines—involving the depth of human nature’s vitiation in
Adam, the corresponding necessity of a strong healing grace to renovate what had
fallen into disrepair, the fragmentary “relic” of the old Adam left behind as the new
justified spiritus advances in the course of its ongoing renewal—bears upon it the
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characteristic marks of Augustine’s mature theology, which, as I have shown, Luther
begins to quote copiously just a few pages farther on in his scholion on Rom. 7.
This interpretation is further confirmed if we follow Luther’s argument just a
few lines farther down this page in the WA. Keep in mind the perplexing contrast that
orients these paragraphs: for the moral philosopher, man remains intact and sin is
taken away; for the Apostle, the man is taken away but sin remains. Paul’s repeated
statements about “dying to sin” in Rom. 6-7 form the immediate context for Luther’s
paradox. In his comments on Rom. 7:1-6 in particular, Luther as exegete needs to
explain what it means that “the law is binding on a person only as long as he lives” (v.
1), and, relatedly, what it means to be set free from the law by dying to sin. This is just
the kind of context where an interpreter of Grane’s persuasion might expect the young
Luther’s nascent forensicism (or existential personalism) to come to the fore. In fact,
what we find is an Augustinian account of the inner renovation of the will by grace
and the Spirit.777 Thus Luther:
When a man has been mortified from sin and been taken away from it, then sin
has already been beautifully taken away and has died. But when a man has not
been mortified and taken away, with utter vanity is sin taken away and
mortified. It is therefore plain to see that the Apostle understands that sin is
taken away spiritually (i.e., the desire for sinning [voluntatem peccandi] is
mortified). They, however, want the works of sin and sinful desires
(concupiscentias) to be taken away metaphysically, like whiteness from a wall
or heat from water.778
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The “metaphysical” way to holiness proceeds by replacing evil deeds with good ones
and, at the deeper level of motivation, extinguishing the sinful desires that prompt
them: all of which lies in the hands of the devout person qui facit quod in se est, whose
“self” remains intact—and in control—as the acting subject propelling, directing, and
mastering the project of self-cultivation in virtue. Luther’s “spiritual” and apostolic
alternative begins, as we saw above, with the dismantling of this “self” (however
impressive its show of virtue may appear) in the gracious death of the Adam within.
The person who boasts, with William Ernest Henley, “I am the master of my fate: I am
the captain of my soul,” even—and precisely!—the person who would manfully steer
the ship of his soul into the placid waters of moral excellence, must die.779
Now, when this actually happens by grace, and homo ipse dies and has been
mortified and taken away from sin: then, Luther explains, sin does in fact die too.
Indeed, it is taken away pulcherrime. But what does this actually mean? Not, as
Luther’s opponents maintain and as he himself once thought, the complete
eradication of that “sin” which is evil desire, but rather the mortification of one’s
voluntas peccandi. The renewed person has fleshly concupiscentiae as his perpetual
foe: but because, as justified spiritus through the renovation of grace, his will has been
changed, he no longer wants to sin and, therefore, does not in fact commit sin by
consenting to the evil desires that continue to afflict him. The moralist refrains from
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sinful acts out of fear of punishment or hope of reward, i.e., ex amore sui, the primal
and morbid drive for self-preservation and exaltation impelling all Adam’s orphaned
children, which lies hid beneath the dazzling fig leaves of the virtuous self like a
rotting corpse in a whitewashed tomb (Matt. 23:27). St. Paul’s homo spiritualis refrains
from sinful acts too, but he does so because his will to sin has been put to death and
he, in his heart’s deepness, has been made alive voluntate per spiritum.780
Luther sums up his corollarium with a compact statement of the same
doctrine: “First, therefore, one must beg for grace, that a man may be changed in
spiritu, and will and do all things with a glad and voluntary heart, not in servile fear or
puerile cupidity, but with a free and manly soul. And this the Spirit alone
accomplishes.”781 Gratia sanans infused into the heart by the Holy Spirit to transform
one’s self-bent will from within: nothing less than this can set a son or daughter of
Adam free for holiness and joy. In the end, therefore, Luther’s perplexing and obscure
contrast between St. Paul and the philosophers turns out to be yet another iteration of
his stoutly Augustinian opposition to the high Ockhamist theology and popular pious
meritocracy of his day.

2.1.4. nupt. conc. 1.23.25. We return now to the scholion on Rom. 7:17b. I left hanging in
the air Augustine’s claim, in c. Iul. 2.9.32, that “dead,” guilt-denuded “sin”
(concupiscentia) is no longer called “sin” in the baptized for two reasons or better, in
two respects: first, it no longer makes the forgiven person guilty; second, because it
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stems from Adam’s guilt originally, and by its rebellion strives to draw us back into a
state of guilt through consent to its desires. At first glance, this appears to fit the
evaluation of concupiscentia mala more characteristic of Augustine in the 410s, viz.,
that it is not intrinsically guilty apart from consent, rather than the farther advanced
position evinced at c. Iul. 2.5.12 and 6.17.51. That said, Augustine’s basic distinction
between (a) the person no longer rendered guilty because of concupiscence, and (b)
the evil and dangerous nature of concupiscence itself, is still very much in play. For
our present purposes, we must bear in mind that on Luther’s reading of the texts,
Augustine articulates exactly the same point at nupt. conc. 1.25.28 in the distinct but
related terms of the non-imputation of concupiscence as “sin”: dimitti
concupiscentiam carnis in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in peccatum non inputetur.
At any rate, in commenting on Rom. 7:17b Luther adopts c. Iul. 2.9.32 without critique
or redefinition within paragraphs of explaining c. Iul. 2.5.12 at Rom. 7:17a, where he
had set forth the nuanced sense in which evil desire is rea in sanctis without making
the saints guilty as persons. One might be led to think that Luther can do this because
he has not recognized the two different ways Augustine tackles the problem. But I
think it is more likely that he has, and that he is either interpreting Augustine in the
charitable medieval fashion by reconciling contradictions into a coherent whole, or
has perhaps concluded that there is no real contradiction at all. I am inclined to this
judgment in large part because at just this point in the scholion, Luther quotes
approvingly—with some modifications—the unequivocally “410s”-styled evaluation of
concupiscentia at nupt. conc. 1.23.25:
And book 1 to Valerius, c. 23: “Concupiscence is not now a sin in the
regenerate, so long as there is no consent to it: so that even if what is written
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doesn’t happen: ‘Non concupiscas’ [Exod. 20:17, Rom. 7:7], at least let what is
read elsewhere happen, Ecclesiast. 18[:30]: ‘Do not go after concupiscentias
tuas.’ But in a certain modo loquendi it is called sin, because it was both made
by sin and if sin conquers the sinner, it makes him guilty.”782
Our best modern text reads:
To be sure, concupiscence itself now is not a sin in the regenerate, so long as
there is no consent to it resulting in forbidden works, and the members are not
given up to perpetrate them [cf. Rom. 6:12-13] by the ruling mind; so that even
if what is written doesn’t happen: ‘Non concupiscas,’ at least let what is read
elsewhere happen, ‘Do not go after concupiscentias tuas.’ But because in a
certain way of speaking it is called sin, because it was both made by sin and it
makes sin if it conquers, its reatus prevails in one who has been born, quem
reatum Christ’s grace—through the forgiveness of all sins—does not permit to
prevail in the reborn, if the reborn does not obey it [Rom. 6:12] when it
somehow commands him to do evil works.783
There follows Augustine’s famous analogies: we call speaking a “tongue” because our
tongues produce it, and we call one’s handwriting his “hand” because his hand
produces it. So too concupiscence is called “sin” because sin (i.e., Adam’s sin)
produced it, and it in turn produces sin through consent. But in the regenerate, who
withhold consent and do not obey the desires they still suffer, non sit ipsa peccatum:
concupiscence per se is not “sin.”784
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WA 56.353.5-10: Et li. 1. ad Vale c. 23.: ‘Concupiscentia iam non est peccatum in regeneratis,
quando illi non consentitur, Vt si non fit, quod scriptum est: “Non concupiscas”, fiat saltem, quod
alibi legitur, Ecclesiast. 18.: “Post concupiscentias tuas non eas”. Sed modo quodam loquendi
peccatum vocatur, quod et peccato facta est et peccatum peccantem si vicerit, reum facit.’ Cf. LW
25.342.
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BA 23.110-12: Nam ipsa quidem concupiscentia iam non est peccatum in regeneratis, quando illi ad
inlicita opera non consentitur, atque ut ea perpetrent a regina mente membra non dantur, ut si non
fit quod scriptum est: Non concupiscas, fiat saltem quod alibi legitur: Post concupiscentias tuas non
eas. Sed quia modo quodam loquendi peccatum uocatur, quod et peccato facta est et peccatum, si
uicerit, facit, reatus eius ualet in generato, quem reatum Christi gratia per remissionem omnium
peccatorum in regenerato, si ad mala opera ei quodam modo iubenti non obediat, ualere non sinit. Cf.
WSA I/24.44.
784
BA 23.112, WSA I/24.44. On the role of this text at Trent, and Seripando’s gallant but futile
advocacy for the “420s Augustine” that I am arguing Luther appropriated, see Peter Walter, “Die
bleibende Sündigkeit der Getauften in den Debatten und Beschlüssen des Trienter Konzils,” in
Theodor Schneider and Gunther Wenz, eds., Gerecht und Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen
(Freiburg: Herder and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 268-302; Anthony N. S. Lane,
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Luther’s excerpt differs subtly from our modern critical text: most significantly,
near the end of his excerpt the second rationale Augustine gives for Paul’s modus
loquendi shifts from Augustine’s “[conc.] makes sin, if it conquers” to Luther’s
confusing “if sin conquers the sinner, it makes him guilty.” In the context of nupt.
conc. 1.23.25, Luther’s alteration seems to amount to a telescoping of the following
sentences—which concern reatus, grace, baptism, and non-consent—into one
compressed claim: “sin”/concupiscence, if it triumphs over the regenerate person,
brings him back into a state of guilt. The question is: Does this change Augustine’s
meaning? Or is this a legitimate summary of his position? What Augustine writes here
comes quite close to c. Iul. 2.9.32. In both places, concupiscence is called “sin” for two
reasons: (a) it was caused by Adam’s “sin” (nupt. conc. 1.23.25) or “guilt” (c. Iul. 2.9.32),
and (b) when the regenerate person consents to it, it leads him back into guilt or “sin,”
meaning actual and guilt-laden sinful acts, reatus being emphasized in both places. In
light of this comparison, Luther’s editorial compression appears to retain the
substance of Augustine’s original text; what’s more, the comparison helps to explain
how Augustine’s assertion of the non-sinfulness of the regenerate person’s
concupiscentia fits with both his more ambiguous claim just a few paragraphs later at
nupt. conc. 1.25.28 and with his bolder pronouncements in the 420s. The grace and
forgiveness of Christ in baptism liberate the regenerate person from the guilt of all
sins, both original and actual. Inherited evil desire, which had naturally (or racially)
bound this person to Adam’s guilt prior to the great interruption of baptism,
continues to infect and afflict the regenerate person as his “flesh,” but it no longer
Justification by Faith in Catholic—Protestant Dialogue: An Evangelical Assessment (New York: T & T
Clark, 2002), 60-5.
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binds him to Adam’s guilt—unless, that is, by consenting to his evil desires he falls out
of Christ’s grace and plunges himself back into Adam’s guilt. If Augustine’s evaluation
of the intrinsic sinfulness of concupiscentia in the baptized is something of a moving
target, his dogmatic and spiritual response to the problem it poses stays basically the
same: Christ’s grace does not permit its guilt to prevail in the regenerate (1.23.25), that
is, it is forgiven and not imputed as sin (1.25.28), so long as—by the same grace of
Christ, and the operations of his Spirit—the regenerate do not consent to it.
In 1516, Luther solidly grasps Augustine’s nuanced interpretation of how gratia
Christi liberates ruined and guilty people from both reatus and concupiscentia. At this
early stage in his development, flat-out concupiscentia rea texts like c. Iul. 2.5.12 (“420s
Augustine”) and non sit ipsa peccatum texts like nupt. conc. 1.23.25 (“410s Augustine”)
can stand alongside one another. Indeed, as he does on the heels of quoting nupt.
conc. 1.23.25, Luther can even adopt a faintly Thomist solution to the discrepancy—
which he probably learned from Biel785—by distinguishing between the “weak” (if you
will) sinfulness of concupiscence causaliter et effectualiter in non-consenting
regenerate people on the one hand, and on the other its full-blown sinfulness/guilt
formaliter upon the grant of consent to its evil desires.786 But from the initial
Reformation crisis on into the works of his maturity, this distinction will no longer
appear serviceable to Luther. Concupiscentia rea increasingly takes the field, and to
the extent that it does so, the non-imputation of its intrinsic guiltiness (which is
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See Biel, Collectorium II d. 3o q. 2, utrum peccatum originale sit aliquod positivum in anima vel in
carne, esp. art. 1 (W & H II/562-8).
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WA 56.353.8-10: ‘… Sed modo quodam loquendi peccatum vocatur, quod et peccato facta est et
peccatum peccantem si vicerit, reum facit’ i. e. causaliter et effectualiter, non formaliter. Cf. LW
25.342.
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already there in the mature Augustine) and the positive imputation of Christ’s iustitia
aliena (which but for a few rare exceptions is not) grows in equal proportion. But as I
demonstrated above in chapter 2—and now in concert with what I have shown in this
chapter regarding both Augustine in the 410s and 20s and Luther in 1516—right up
into the 1540s the regenerate Christian’s refusal of consent (non consentire) to the
“sin” that indwells him continues virtually unaltered as the moral-psychological
lynchpin that holds together Luther’s “simul” within the overarching dogmatic reality
of forgiveness by Christ’s grace and renewal by the Spirit’s gift. For the old Luther not
a whit less than for Augustine in either of the two decades of his controversy with
Pelagius and Julian, Spirit-empowered non-consent to the regenerate person’s flesh is
the conditio sine qua non for his abiding in statu gratiae (et doni).
This brings us to the scholion on Rom. 7:18.

2.2. On Rom. 7:18
2.2.1. c. Iul. 3.26.62. Luther follows the subject-line heading Perficere autem non Invenio
with the terse but telling comment: “There is a difference between to do/to complete
(facere/perficere) in this place,” then relates Rom. 7:18 to its parallel at Gal. 5:16-17 by
relaying the longest of his many Augustinian excerpts:
Blessed Augustine book 3 against Julian at the end: “Remember what the
Apostle writes to the Galatians, who were certainly baptized people: ‘But I say,’
he says, ‘walk by the spirit (Spiritu) and do not complete (non perfȩceritis) the
concupiscences of the flesh’ [Gal. 5:16]. He does not say: Do not do (Ne
fȩceritis), because they were not able to not have them, but ‘do not complete’
(ne perfeceritis), that is, do not fulfill the works of these [concupiscences] by
the consent of the will (consensu voluntatis). If, therefore, one does not
consent to the concupiscences of the flesh, although they are incited by
emotions (agantur motibus), nevertheless they are not brought to completion
(perficientur) by works. Accordingly, when flesh desires (concupiscit) against
spirit and spirit against flesh, so that we do not do (faciamus) the things we
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want to do, neither are the flesh’s concupiscences completed (perficiuntur),
although they happen, nor are our good works completed (perficiuntur),
although they happen. For just as the concupiscence of the flesh is completed,
when the spirit consents to it in order to bring it into operation—so that the
spirit does not desire against it, but with it—so too our good works will then be
completed, when the flesh will so consent to the spirit that even it will no
longer desire against the spirit. To be sure, this is what we want (volumus)
when we desire (concupiscimus) the perfection of righteousness. But because
we are not able to complete this in this corruptible flesh, therefore [Paul] said
to the Romans: ‘To want (Velle) lies at hand for me, but to complete (perficere)
the good I do not find’ [Rom. 7:18] or, as Greek codices have it, ‘To want lies at
hand for me, but not to complete the good,’ i.e., to complete the good does not
lie at hand for me. He does not say: To do (facere), but ‘to complete (perficere)
the good.’ Because to do the good is to not go after concupiscences [Ecclus.
18:20]: but to complete the good is non concupiscere. Therefore, what’s written
to the Galatians: ‘Do not complete the flesh’s concupiscences’ [5:16], this from
the opposite angle is written to the Romans: ‘To complete I do not find’ [7:18].
Because neither are those [concupiscences] completed in evil, when the assent
of our will (nostrȩ voluntatis assensus) does not accede to them, nor is our will
completed in good, so long as the movement of those concupiscences—to
which we do not consent—remains. The spirit therefore does (facit) a good
work by not consenting to evil concupiscence, but it does not complete it
(perficit), because it does not destroy the evil desires (desideria) themselves.
And the flesh does (facit) an evil desire (desiderium), but it does not complete
it (perficit) either, because when the spirit does not consent to it, it too does
not arrive at works subject to damnation.’787
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WA 56.353.14-354.13: B. Aug li. 3. contra Iul in fine: ‘Recole, quid scribat Apostolus ad Gal, certe
homines baptisatos: “Dico autem”, inquit, “Spiritu ambulate et concupiscentias carnis non
perfȩceritis.” Non ait: Ne fȩceritis, quia eas non habere non poterant, Sed “ne perfeceritis”, idest, ne
opera earum consensu voluntatis impleatis. Si ergo non consentiatur concupiscentiis carnis, quamuis
agantur motibus, non tamen perficientur operibus. Proinde cum Caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum
et spiritus aduersus carnem, vt non ea, que volumus, faciamus, nec carnis concupiscentiȩ
perficiuntur, quamuis fiant, Nec nostra perficiuntur bona opera, quamuis fiant. Sicut enim tunc
perficitur carnis concupiscentia, cum consentit ei spiritus ad operanda, vt non concupiscat aduersus
illam, Sed cum illa, Sic et bona opera nostra tunc perficientur, quando ita spiritui caro consenserit, vt
aduersus eum etiam ipsa non concupiscat. Hoc enim volumus, cum perfectionem Iustitiȩ
concupiscimus. Sed quia id perficere in ista corruptibili carne non possumus, ideo dixit ad Romanos:
“Velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non Inuenio”, Vel sicut habent Codices grȩci: “Velle
adiacet mihi, perfi ere autem bonum non”, i. e. non adiacet mihi perficere bonum. Non ait: facere, Sed
“perficere bonum”. Quia facere bonum est post concupiscentias non ire; perficere autem bonum est
non concupiscere. Quod ergo est ad Gal: “Concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis”, hoc econtrario est
ad Ro: “Perficere non Inuenio.” Quia nec illȩ perficiuntur in malo, quando non eis accedit nostrȩ
voluntatis assensus, Nec nostra voluntas perficitur in bono, quamdiu illarum, cui non consentimus,
permanet motus. Spiritus ergo facit bonum opus non consentiendo concupiscentiȩ malȩ, Sed non
perficit, Quia ipsa mala desideria non absumit. Et caro facit malum desiderium, Sed nec ipsa perficit,
Quia non sibi consentiente spiritu et ipsa ad opera damnanda non peruenit.’ Cf. LW 25.342-3.

299

When compared to our best modern edition of c. Iul., it is clear that apart from a
handful of minor reversals in word order, and three ellipses to pare away redundancies
in the argument, Luther reproduces Augustine’s text accurately.788 In context,
Augustine is arguing that Adam’s sin vitiated human nature and that—against Julian’s
interpretation of Rom. 7—the holy Apostle confesses that he too suffers the lingering
effects of this deeply set wound (c. Iul. 3.26.59-61). He next turns from Rom. 7:18-25 to
Gal. 5:16-20: even if Julian stubbornly insists that Rom. 7 refers to an as yet unbaptized
catechumen, he cannot deny that in Gal. 5 Paul addressed baptized Galatian
788

NBA I/18.650-2, PL 44.733-4: recole tamen quid scribat ad Galatas, certe homines baptizatos. Dico
autem, inquit, spiritu ambulate, et concupiscentis carnis ne perfeceritis. Non ait: Ne feceritis, quia eas
non habere non poterant; sed: Ne perfeceritis; id est, ne opera earum, consensu voluntatis impleatis.
Caro enim, inquit, concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem: haec enim invicem
adversantur; ut non ea quae vultis faciatis. Vide si non hoc est ad Romanos: Non enim quod volo facio
bonum, sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Deinde ad Galatas addit et dicit: Quod si spiritu ducimini, non
adhuc estis sub lege. Vide si non hoc est ad Romanos: Iam non ego operor illud; et: Condelector legi
Dei secundum interiorem hominem; et: Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore, ad
oboediendum desideriis eius. Si enim non oboediatur concupiscentiis, quas necesse est esse in carne
peccati atque in corpore mortis huius, non perficietur quod perfici vetat Apostolus dicens:
Concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis. Ipsa quippe sunt opera, de quibus totum mire sequitur, et dicit:
Manifesta autem sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicationes, immunditiae luxuriae, idolorum servitus,
et cetera. Si ergo non consentiatur concupiscentiis carnis, quamvis agantur motibus, non tamen
perficientur operibus. Proinde cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem, ut
non ea quae volumus faciamus; nec carnis perficiuntur concupiscentiae, quamvis fiant; nec nostra
perficiuntur bona opera, quamvis fiant. Sicut enim tunc perficitur carnis concupiscentia, cum
consentit ei spiritus ad opera mala, ut non concupiscat adversus illam, sed cum illa: sic et bona opera
nostra tunc perficientur, quando ita spiritui caro consenserit, ut adversus eum etiam ipsa non
concupiscat. Hoc enim volumus, cum perfectione[m] iustitiae concupiscimus; hoc intentione non
intermissa velle debemus, sed quia id perficere in ista corruptibili carne non possumus, ideo dixit ad
Romanos: Velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio. Vel, sicut habent codices graeci:
Velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non; id est, non mihi adiacet perficere bonum. Non ait:
Facere; sed: perficere bonum. Quia facere bonum, est post concupiscentias non ire: perficere autem
bonum, est non concupiscere. Quod ergo est ad Galatas: Concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis; hoc e
contrario est ad Romanos: Perficere autem bonum non invenio. Quia nec illae perficiuntur in malo,
quando eis non accedit nostrae voluntatis assensus; nec nostra voluntas perficitur in bono, quamdiu
illarum cui non consentimus permanet motus. Ipse autem conflictus, in quo etiam baptizati velut in
agone decertant, cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem; ubi et spiritus
facit bonum opus, non consentiendo concupiscentiae malae, sed non perficit, quia ipsa mala desideria
non absumit; et caro facit malum desiderium, sed nec ipsa perficit, quia non sibi consentiente spiritu,
et ipsa ad opera damnanda non pervenit: iste ergo conflictus non Iudaeorum, nec quorumlibet
aliorum, sed plane Christianorum fidelium et bene vivendo in hoc certamine laborantium, breviter
ostenditur ad Romanos, ubi ait: Igitur ipse ego mente servio legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati. Cf.
WSA I/24.374-5.
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Christians. Therefore, to quote the passage which immediately follows Luther’s
excerpt, the spirit/flesh conflictus narrated in Gal. 5:16-17 refers to the agonizing
struggle of “Christians who are faithful and are laboring in this contest by living well.”
In the excursus at Rom. 7:7, Luther has already made his case that St. Paul
himself, as the paradigmatic homo spiritualis, is the subject of the chapter. What
interests him in c. Iul. 3.26.62 is the light it sheds on the nature of the spiritual
person’s struggle with his residual flesh. Augustine’s explanation of the two
interwoven texts from Paul supplies all the vital concepts for grasping the precise
nature of the Christian’s agon with himself. The flesh has its desires, but in the
Christian flesh only “does” (facere) these evil desires, i.e., the Christian experiences or
suffers them as loathsome impulses, desideria, or motus to which he does not yield the
consent (or assent) of his will. Thus the still lamentably active flesh cannot bring the
desires it “does” to their “completion” (perficere) in act, for the renewed person’s
refusal of consensus voluntatis suae stands in the way. On the other hand, as renewed
spiritus the baptized Christian “does” (facere) good deeds, both in terms of the
internal renovation of the heart and its desires and in terms of the good works that
flow therefrom. But because of his residual flesh, which divides his affective being and
therefore blemishes his nonetheless real holiness, the baptized Christian cannot yet
bring to completion (perficere) the single-minded and whole-hearted love for God that
he longs for. In terms of Rom. 7:18, St. Paul can and does “do” the good, i.e., he does
not go after his evil desires by consenting to them (Ecclus. 18:20); but he cannot yet
“complete” the good as he heartily wishes to do, i.e., he is not yet entirely free from the
very presence of such desires, as he will be in the eschatological resurrection and as
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God’s holy law already requires of him in the present (Exod. 20:17/Rom. 7:7). In short,
the spiritually-renewed Christian’s will is itself divided by the new and holy desires
that are his being as spiritus and the old and evil desires that comprise his residual
caro—yet with the upper-hand unequivocally belonging to his new affective and
volitional being as “spirit,” for (a) he battles against his flesh by not consenting to it,
and (b) he wishes for and desires the end of this battle in the total victory of spiritual
delight. “That,” says Augustine, “is what we want when we desire (concupiscimus) the
perfection of righteousness.” In 1516, Luther quite simply agrees, and so much so that
he lets his long excerpt from c. Iul. 3.26.62 speak for itself and offers no comment of
his own upon Rom. 7:18.
That is to say, apart from the brief but significant paragraph that follows the
excerpt and completes the Rom. 7 scholion. In it, Luther bears autobiographical
witness to the consolation which Augustine’s interpretation of Paul affords weak,
suffering, battle-scarred, angefochtenen Christians like himself. Granted, he allows,
“the more recent doctors” have said the same things about first motions, extinguishing
the tinder, delight, and consent.789 But because they do so in the Aristotelian or
human way, rather than the genuinely scriptural and divine manner, they do not really
understand the Augustinian terms they are parroting. “Now, however, since the
ancient doctors, thinking with the Apostles, say the same thing more clearly, we are
warmed by the gift of a more quiet comfort and more easily healed from scruples of
conscience.”790 Luther can (without scruple) use the plural Doctores antiqui largely on
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WA 56.354.14-19: licet Recentiores doctores eadem dicant de primis motibus, de fomite
extinguendo, de delectatione et consensu.
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WA 56.354.17-19, cf. LW 25.343.
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the strength of the references to Ambrose and others in c. Iul. 1-2, including 2.5.12. But
as we have seen in this study, and as Hilton Oswald nicely puts it in a footnote to
another place in the lectures on Romans, “for Luther antiqui patres often means
Augustine.”791 High and late medieval theologians could not but have rehearsed—and
to varying degrees adopted—the terminology that lies at the heart of the complex
intersection of Augustine’s theology of grace, moral-psychology, anti-Pelagian
spirituality, and Pauline exegesis: for those verba (and no little of their Augustinian
res) are there to be dealt with on the pages of Peter Lombard’s Sententiae. But Luther
is convinced that the intrusion of an Aristotelian metaphysics of the soul, together
with its attendant moral psychology, into the Church’s Augustinian inheritance has
cut off from the start the very possibility of grasping what these words actually mean.
There is no need to repeat here what we saw above regarding Luther’s
opposition to Biel and Usingen de appetitibus contrariis in eodem subiecto and their
corresponding interpretation of “spirit” and “flesh” in Paul. In this seelsorgerlich finale
to his exposition of Rom. 7, Luther now concludes that to the extent that a theory of
virtue and vice drawn ex Aristotele holds the ascendency in an exegete’s philosophy,
“the distinction of spirit and flesh has completely ceased to be understood.”792 That is
to say, St. Paul’s meaning is obscured in medieval commentaries on the Bible, and
Augustine’s meaning—which Luther champions as identical to Paul’s—is obscured in
medieval commentaries on the Sentences. Reading the undiluted Augustine’s works in

791

LW 25.300, note 13.
WA 56.354.22-6: Quocirca futilis est et noxia eorum phantasia, dum ex Aristotele Virtutes et vitia
velut albedinem in pariete, Scripturam in assere et formam in subiecto occidentissimis verbis et
metaphoricis docuerunt in anima herere. Sic enim Spiritus et carnis differentia penitus cessauit
intelligi. Cf. LW 25.343.
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the Amerbach edition has opened Luther’s eyes to the original meaning of well-worn
traditional terms like motus, fomes, delectatio, and consensus, and thus provided the
at once dogmatic, moral-psychological, spiritual, and hermeneutical key he needed (as
doctor in biblia) to open up the locked door of St. Paul’s perplexing teaching de spiritu
et carne. And this, in turn, gave Luther the spiritual solatium he needed, not as a
learned doctor of theology, but as a perplexed and suffering penitent.
As a devout monk, and thus at a much deeper level than the “merely”
theological, Luther had taken as granted that extinguishing every last bit of fleshly
desire from his soul was the goal of his severe asceticism. But try as he had, frater
Martinus failed to attain this end; and being the devout man that he was, the
undeniable (and endlessly confessed) experientia of evil desire—which lesser men
think less or little of—drove him to the point of despair. Dr. Staupitz, the kind and
compassionate father-confessor, pointed Luther away from himself to the bleeding
wounds of Christ crucified: an indispensible remedy for the scrupulous and selfobsessed soul.793 But it was the polemicizing old Augustine who taught young
suffering Luther that right up to drawing their last breath, the little homines
spirituales who look to such a Christ as this still have wounded and bleeding souls.794
What John Wesley might have thought of all this I dare not venture to say; but in this
concluding paragraph to the scholion on Rom. 7, Luther bears unmistakable witness

793

Prof. David Steinmetz’s summary of Staupitz’s counsel to Luther is without peer: Luther and
Staupitz, 30-4.
794
On this point in Augustine, see John Cavadini’s beautiful article, “The Darkest Enigma:
Reconsidering the Self in Augustine’s Thought,” AugS 38/1 (2007), 119-32.
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to the way reading Augustine’s trenchant works against Julian had left his troubled
heart strangely warmed.795
With this I conclude my study of the Augustinian roots of Luther’s theology of
grace, gift, and the “simul” as he—like Augustine before him—painstakingly worked it
out in the exegetical laboratory of Rom. 7.796 The emphasis on spiritual consolation in
its conclusion is an especially fitting segue backwards in the lectures to the scholion
on Rom. 4:7, where the experiential depths of penitential suffering, the false comforts
of die Sawtheologen, and the true solace of St. Paul’s “Augustinian” theology are
driving concerns for Luther.
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WA 56.354.17-19: Nunc Vero Cum Doctores antiqui cum Apostolis sentientes eadem apertius
dicunt, quietioris solatii nos munere fouemur et Scrupulis conscientiȩ facilius medemur.
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In his Marquette lectures on Augustine, Prof. Michel René Barnes describes Rom. 7 as
Augustine’s moral-psychological laboratory.
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4. AUGUSTINE CONTRA IULIANUM IN THE LATE 1515 SCHOLIA ON
ROMANS 4:5-8: THE SAINTS’ “SIN,” THEIR RENEWAL, AND
GOD’S MERCIFUL NON-IMPUTATION
Some of the most influential Lutherreden for twentieth-century theology, both
historical and dogmatic, are found in the scholia on Rom. 4:7. Its first, thesis-type
sentence reads: “The saints are always sinners intrinsically, and therefore are always
justified extrinsically.”797 From this point forward, eye-popping—a Gerhard Forde
might say “radical”—declarations of the sinner’s justification ex sola Dei reputatione
punctuate Luther’s exegesis like the refrain in a Psalm. These include in their number
explicit statements of the “simul,” e.g., to God the saints “are righteous and
unrighteous at the same time,”798 or near equivalents, e.g., the saints “are sinners in
reality, but righteous by the imputation of God, who has mercy.”799 Denifle, Hermann,
Elert, Joest, Ebeling, Pinomaa, Nilsson, Grane, Beer, Forde, Hamm, Jüngel, Hampson,
et al. have found in these and other like assertions ample proof for a Simullehre that
ignores, sidelines, downplays, or even disparages real renewal in holiness in favor of a
purely forensic/imputational interpretation of justification.800 In the 1910 essay to
which I referred briefly above, Karl Holl offered a quite different interpretation of the
same texts; broadly speaking, post-Lortzian Roman Catholic and/or Finnish scholars
like Iserloh, Peter Manns, Wicks, Mannermaa, Peura, Saarinen, Vainio, and Pereira
have followed his lead. In certain respects, my own interpretation does so as well: I
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share Holl’s concern to recognize Luther’s teaching in the Rom. 4:7 scholia regarding
the ongoing “healing” (sanari) of the saints. However, it seems to me that the great
Berliner’s “analytic theory” failed to do full justice to the imputational side of the
iustitia fidei rightly (if disproportionately) emphasized by the other school of
interpretation.
As in the scholia on Rom. 7, but to an even greater degree, I believe this failure
to hold together the two aspects of Luther’s theology of “grace”—which in 1515/16 he
does not yet distinguish terminologically from “gift”—and the correlative failure to
grasp the real meaning of his striking “simul”-statements stems from an anterior
scholarly misapprehension of the role played in these scholia by the “420s Augustine.”
As I explained above in the introduction to Part II, it was Denifle’s polemics that set
the ball rolling: Luther, he charged, had intentionally misquoted the all-important
sentence from nupt. conc. 1.25.28. Hermann pushed it along by basically agreeing with
Denifle’s historical analysis—touché, as it were—but then, as a modern Lutheran
theologian, he championed what Denifle derided, i.e., the clean dogmatic break in loco
iustificationis from Augustinian Catholicism that Luther’s newly-discovered “simul”
powerfully encapsulated and symbolized. One is tempted, at this point, to try his hand
at an allegorical interpretation of Luke 23:12—but I hold my peace. To rightly
understand the young Luther’s ruminations on St. Paul, we shall have once more to
retrace the steps he took with Augustine as his principal guide.
Two interrelated comments are in order before turning to Luther’s exegesis of
Rom. 4:7. First, St. Paul supplies the words “reputare” in vv. 3-5 (from Gen. 15:6) and
(non-) “imputare” at v. 8 (from Ps. 32:2). For Luther, immersed in vol. 8 of the
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Amerbach edition of Augustine’s works, this ineluctably evokes Augustine’s mature
baptismal theology of the non-imputation of concupiscentia carnis as “sin” in the
regenerate. Luther gives us the crucial excerpt from nupt. conc. 1.25.28—with one
highly significant variation, so obnoxious to Denifle—several pages into the
scholion,801 but the doctrine he believed to be contained in it is in play from the very
start. I will substantiate this claim shortly.
Second, much as I urged in the introduction to chapter 1 regarding Luther’s
1532 comments on Ps. 51, we must keep in mind (as Wicks rightly stresses) the ethos of
penitential spirituality that shapes this entire scholion. Luther is, after all, expositing
Ps. 32 in order to exposit Rom. 4; and Ps. 32 is fertile scriptural soil for a decidedly
monastic and experiential theology of sin, repentance, forgiveness, and renewal. Is this
not just the sort of theology we should expect from Luther, the earnest, scrupulous,
and observant Augustinian Eremite, in 1515? Thus his short comments on Rom. 4:6 in
effect draw a contrast between two kinds of monks: the one content with the external
performances of piety, the other longing for his “heart” (cor) to be “justified and
healed from base desires.”802 “Iustificari” here is synonymous with “Sanari,” and their
common object is the heart’s renovation through its being healed of its evil
concupiscentiae.803 This is the unmistakable stuff of an Augustinian theology of inner
renewal by grace; and the presence or absence of this renewal in one’s heart, explains
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Luther, is the factor that determines whether or not “God counts righteousness apart
from works” to him. The time-serving churchman and the devout monk do exactly the
same works, “but not with the same heart.”804 The former confidently presumes—
whether by virtue of popular piety’s common sense (think Johannes von Paltz), or in
the learned “Aristotelian” fashion of the schools (Biel et al.), or both—that doing
righteous works has made him a righteous person.805 He knows “how much and what
one must do, in order to be righteous.”806 But the latter sort, being true penitents of
vintage late medieval variety, humbly confess their sinfulness before God, live
vigilantly poised between fear and hope, and
… do not know when they are righteous, because they are only righteous ex
Deo reputante. And no one knows God’s reputationem, but ought only to ask
and hope. Therefore, the former sort have a time when they do not think that
they are sinners. But the latter always know that they are sinners.807
Jacob A. O. Preus tidied up Luther a bit here in his translation for Luther’s Works, so
that “no man knows His accounting fully” (my italics). But in 1515 Luther is still far too
Augustinian and “medieval” in his theology and piety to admit Preus’ consolatory
adverb. No one knows God’s accounting—Punkt! This is the precarious hinge on
which the great matter of one’s eternal destiny turns. Only the self-righteous presume
to know God’s just reputatio, on the basis of their piety and good works. By stark
contrast, Luther’s ideal penitent—praying his Psalter ex corde contrito—knows that
God reckons righteousness apart from works only to the kind of person who humbly
804
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confesses that God’s merciful reputatio is his sole hope of salvation. Luther’s true
penitent does not know, and by definition cannot know, if in fact God’s mercy pertains
to him. What he does always know is that he is a “sinner.”
But in what sense? He does his good works as zealously as the hypocrite, but as
he does them he prays for the healing of his heart a pravis concupiscentiis. The very
presence of these base desires requires the perpetual confession that he is a peccator.
But as the “very rare man who confesses and believes he is a sinner,”808 and therefore
longs for the justification and healing of his broken heart, this lifelong confession no
longer needs to be exacted from him invitus. This is the major theme of the scholia on
Rom. 3:4ff, where St. Paul quotes—not incidentally—Ps. 51:4: quite as it had been two
years earlier in Luther’s Dictata on the same verse.809 Just a few paragraphs farther
into the scholia on Rom. 4:7, Luther states in classic monastic fashion, and in terms
virtually identical to those of the 1513 Psalter lecture,810 that “the righteous man, in
principle, is his own accuser.”811
This “inward”-oriented penitential spirituality—with its Augustinian focus on
the Rom. 7-styled battle against the evil desires at work in one’s heart, and the longing
for heart-deep renovation that accompanies it—forms both the historical Sitz im
Leben in which Friar Martin wrote and the monastic-theological context for his
brooding meditations on God’s merciful reputatio/imputatio in the scholia on Rom.
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4:7.812 Hence it is right on the heels of describing the confession of the true penitent—
semper peccator—and his “yearning” (as Wicks styles it) for both the gratia sanans
that will heal his evil desires and the merciful imputation of iustitia to his account
despite these desires, that Luther transitions from 4:6 into 4:7:
Therefore, in order that Beati, quorum remisse etc. [Rom. 4:7/Ps. 32:1] may be
understood—
and then elaborates the two-sentence thesis that sets the tone for the rest of the
scholion:
The saints are always sinners intrinsically, therefore they are always justified
extrinsically.
But hypocrites are always righteous intrinsically, therefore they are always
sinners extrinsically.813
Here we have in embryonic fashion the powerful—but often misunderstood—
paradoxes that Luther would soon become famous for. Taken out of its textual context
in the scholion, and its monastic or “spiritual” setting in Luther’s life, the first sentence
at least can be construed as a bold assertion of a purely forensic doctrine of
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justification: in themselves, the saints are always and nothing but sinners; but in God’s
mercy, they are forgiven, justified, and so forth. But in light of what I have shown from
Luther’s exposition of Rom. 4:6, this is clearly not the case. For precisely by confessing
their sinfulness, the saints demonstrate the reality of the inchoate renovation of their
hearts: which, to be sure, is hidden from their own eyes. For how else could their
confession of sin be truthful ex toto corde? To take pleasure in the humility of one’s
confession is the quintessence of spiritual pride. So Luther, friar and
Humilitastheologe, explains his meaning: “I say Intrinsece, i.e., how we are in
ourselves, in our own eyes, in our own estimation.”814 This is not an “objective”
dogmatic claim about the ontology of the saint, i.e., it is not an assertion that the saint
is a sinner totaliter, nothing more. This is spiritual theology in its monastic vein, and
the decisive question at this juncture for Luther is this: What does the truly—not just
apparently—holy person, that is the “saint,” think about himself? The answer to this
question lies ready to hand in Rom. 7, once that chapter has been shown—with the
mature Augustine’s help—to express the autobiographical confession of St. Paul as a
spiritual man. That answer is: ego carnalis sum (v. 14), i.e., I am a sinner. As I have
demonstrated above, this by no means implies that St. Paul is not a spiritual man after
all. To the contrary, it is because of his heightened “spirituality” (if you will) that Paul
recognizes and confesses the depths of his fleshly and sinful affectivity. The confessing
saint who passes experientially through Rom. 7 arrives at Rom. 8:1—though in late
1515, the true penitent has no assurance of his arrival into the grace of St. Paul’s great
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nihil damnationis in Christo (as Bayer rightly argues815). Here in the scholion on Rom.
4:7, Luther’s confessing saint is very much passing through the Rom. 7 experientia, but
now he arrives at the same (though to himself painfully hidden) evangelical truth by
way of Ps. 32:1-2. They who confess that they are sinners in their own eyes, and mean
this and feel it in their hearts, are the saints of God: the Beati. Despite the reality of
their sinfulness—which is the only thing they see in themselves and yet which,
paradoxically, they could not possibly see if they had not first begun to be renewed—
these sinner-saints are righteous Extrinsece or apud Deum or in his reputatio.816
In short, and to summarize Luther’s “monastic” exegesis in terms of Rom. 4:56: To the person broken in his own self-estimation by the experience of evil desire,
who therefore does not rely on his good works to establish his righteousness before
God, and instead trusts in the God who justifies the ungodly—his faith reputatur ad
iustitiam (Rom. 4:5). In the same way, David pronounces that man beatus to whom
God reputat Iustitiam sine operibus (Rom. 4:6).817 Or, as St. David goes on to say in Ps.
32:2/Rom. 4:8, “Blessed is the man to whom the Lord does not imputavit peccatum.”
This is the real dogmatic and spiritual substance that underlies and—rightly
interpreted—finds expression in the first of Luther’s several intrepid paradoxes in the
Rom. 4:7 scholion, quoted above. At the heart of it—as of the entire scholion and
indeed the lectures on Romans as a whole—lies this intensely “inward” monastic piety
815
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revolving around the experience of concupiscentia in the regenerate after baptism and
penance alike, which for Luther gave rise to the need for a dogmatic explanation of
this undeniable (and intractable: though not invincible) phenomenon. In what
follows, we shall see this again and again. And as in the comments on Rom. 7 studied
in chapter 3, here too it is the “420s Augustine” who decisively aids Luther’s exegetical
efforts to untie the dogmatic and spiritual knot that puzzled his mind and afflicted his
soul.

1. Mirabilis Deus in sanctis suis
Luther’s second set of paradoxical theses comes on the next page of the WA:
“God is marvelous in his saints” [Ps. 67:37 Vg.], to whom they are righteous and
unrighteous at the same time.
And God is marvelous in hypocrites, to whom they are unrighteous and
righteous at the same time.818
In slightly different forms, Luther read that God is “marvelous” in his saints in Ps. 4:4
and 67:37 Vg.819 Commenting on Ps. 4:4 in his 1513 Dictata on the Psalter, Luther
interpreted its singular mirificavit dominus Sanctum suum christologically: “God is
indeed marvelous in his Holy One, because he hands him over to tribulations and thus
crowns him.”820 In the long run, it is the moral/tropological or “mystical”
interpretation of these verses—itself intimately related to Christ’s cross—that gains
the upper hand. This is already present in the Dictata on Ps. 51:4, where (as I hinted
earlier) Luther expounds the same “monastic” and humility-oriented spiritual theology
818
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we find in the Rom. 4:7 scholion. Referring to Job 25:1-6, Isa. 40:17, and 1 Tim. 1:15,
Luther explains that as the stars are unclean before God, so “the saints are not saints
before him.” For God’s humble sancti confess readily that they themselves maxime are
unclean, and therefore always pray Ps. 51:4.821 This, says Luther, is why “God is
marvelous in his saints” (67:37 Vg.):
‘Mirabilis est Deus in sanctis suis.’ For it is true: he who is most beautiful before
God, the same person is most deformed. And vice versa: he who is most
deformed is the most beautiful. In this way: he who is most beautiful to himself
(pulcherrimus sibi) is the ugliest before God.822
The 30/1 year old Psalter-praying and exegeting Augustinian friar goes on to cite St.
Mary’s Magnificat (Luke 1:48), then adds: “These things are the marrow of Scripture
and the fat of the heavenly grain, amabilior than all the glory of riches.”823
From the first page of the 1515 lectures on Romans, Luther announces that this
same humility-theology is the Summarium of Paul’s epistle, which purposes “to tear
down and uproot and destroy all the wisdom and righteousness of the flesh.”824 That
Luther cites Augustine’s sp. litt. 7.12 to back up his claim825 becomes especially
intriguing in light of Pierre-Marie Hombert’s magisterial study of the way “boasting in
the Lord” (gloriari in Domino, from 1 Cor. 1:31) rather than in one’s self (1 Cor. 4:7) is
the spiritual glue that holds together Augustine’s theology of grace. In particular,
Hombert draws attention to Augustine’s claims about Paul’s intentio in Rom. 9 (at
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Simpl. 1.2826) and indeed the uniuersa facies and uultus of the entire Bible (at Ench.
25.98827). The gospel of God’s undeserved grace in Christ humbles the proud heart and
reorders its vain “glorying” from the idol of one’s “self” back to the true praise of God.
This, for Augustine, is the Bible’s main point.
Augustine’s claim to this end at Ench. 25.98 is especially similar to Luther’s
statement regarding the Bible’s “marrow,” “fat,” and amabilia in the Dictata. The
humility-driven Frömmigkeitstheologie epitomized in Mary’s Magnificat and summed
up in the paradox that God is “marvelous” in his saints is the richest portion of the
Scriptures. For Luther in 1513/14, nothing is more loveable than the sweetness of
humility tasted in God’s Word, and nothing more spiritual than the confession of
one’s misshapenness before the God who is only ever marvelous in such “ugly” saints
as these. For Luther in 1515, it is St. Paul’s object in his great letter to establish this
same spiritual theology of sin, grace, humility, and right boasting in God. “What else
does the whole Scripture teach,” asks Luther in the scholion on Rom. 2:12, “but
humility?”828
Thus from the initial Summarium and the excerpt from sp. litt. Luther proceeds
for several pages to sketch the Augustinian contrast between false and true “boasting.”
The most noble of the self-righteous in history—i.e., the virtuous pagans of antiquity,
held in highest esteem by Renaissance humanists like Erasmus—“would take pleasure
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in themselves and would at all events glory (gloriarentur) among themselves in their
hearts as wise, righteous, and good men.”829 This self-complacence and vain-glorying
vitiated their semblance of virtue at its core: like the rotting corpses in white-washed
tombs denounced by the Lord Jesus (Matt. 23:27), these are of course the vitia
splendida meticulously accounted for in civ. dei 14 and 19 and c. Iul. 4.3.14-33—even if
Augustine himself never quite employed that splendid phrase.830 Luther’s well-known
(and sometimes abused) exhortation to “an exodus from the virtues to Christ’s
grace”831 is thus in its substance an Augustinian summons to repent and turn away
from the false-boasting of self-cultivated virtue to the true boasting in God’s grace in
Christ that characterizes humble misshapen saints. God’s lavish gift of gratia in Christ
redounds to the praise of the gloria gratiae (Eph. 1:3-14). Christ wills for “our whole
affective being” to be “so stripped bare” that we will neither fear embarrassment for
our vices, nor love gloriam and vain joy for our virtues, nor “glory” (gloriari) before
men on account of the true righteousness which is in us from Christ, nor be dejected
because of the sufferings and evils which are brought upon us by Christ.832 In short,
nothing, not one’s virtue nor even his iustitia ex Christo, is in fact “his”: “The true
Christian ought to have absolutely nothing that belongs to himself.”833 The spiritual
conclusion follows apace from the Pauline premises: the saints praise, thank, and glory
in God alone. Soli Deo gloria.
829
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Now, at one level Luther’s nihil proprium has a straightforward monastic
connotation vis-à-vis the vow of poverty. But in the Augustinian polemic against selforiginated “virtue” that constitutes this prelude to the Romans lectures, Luther refers
primarily to the iustitia sua at Rom. 10:3 or mea at Phil. 3:9, i.e., to iustitia (and
sapientia) propria. This, of course, is just the sort of “righteousness” that the radical
ascetic is invariably tempted to claim as his own. In Luther’s judgment, Biel et al. had
fashioned it into the “half-merit” (meritum de congruo) acquired by that soul who does
what lies within his power to do. Thus iustitia propria—which St. Paul delicately
defined as “rubbish,” “dung,” or “crap” (σκύβαλα) at Phil. 3:8—became the late
medieval entryway to obtaining gratia gratum faciens. Monasticism provided the fast
track—or at least the safer route, via securior—through that entryway to the “fullmerit” (meritum de condigno) acquired in a state of grace and leading up to the state of
glory.834 In this dogmatic and spiritual schema, each step in the Christian’s via en
route to eternal glory affords the possibility of an affirmative answer to Paul’s question
at Rom. 3:27: “What then becomes of our boasting?” For in this schema, gloriari in se is
not excluded, but established.
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Mönchsideal des Mittelalters (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963), 171: “Tatsächlich ist das
Mönchtum bei Paltz zu einem himmlischen Versicherungsunternehmen geworden”; Berndt
Hamm, Frömmigkeitstheologie am Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts. Studien zu Johannes von Paltz und
seinem Umkreis (Tübingen, 1982), esp. 291-99.
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But St. Paul replied: “It is excluded.” For he had just announced the gospel of
God’s freely given righteousness, through Christ’s atoning blood, for everyone who
believes in Rom. 3:21-26, and will declare emphatically in v. 28 that “one is justified by
faith apart from works of the law.” Therefore: no more boasting (cf. Eph. 2:8-10). The
Pauline and (as Hombert has magnificently documented) Augustinian Christian has
nothing of his own of which he might boast before God, for all he has came to him
from God as a free gift in Jesus Christ (1 Cor. 1:26-30). Hence the twin verses from 1
Corinthians that Hombert has shown to stand at the center of Augustine’s spiritual
theology of grace:
What do you have that you did not receive? If you received it, why then do you
boast (quid gloriaris), as if you had not received it? (1 Cor. 4:7)
It is from God that you are in Christ Jesus, who became for us wisdom from
God, and righteousness and sanctification and redemption: in order, as it is
written, that the one who boasts might boast in the Lord (ut qui gloriatur, in
Domino glorietur, 1 Cor. 1:30-1).
It is no accident that Luther concludes his Augustinian prelude on false and true
boasting by pitting the natural desire for—and Bielish theology of—acceptance and
reward on the basis of one’s works over against the fixa sententia of Rom. 9:16,835 a
proof-text ubiquitously cited by Augustine in defense of his spiritual doctrine of
predestination and grace. As for Augustine, so for Luther, the object of true “glorying”
lies not in the one who wills or the one who runs, but in God alone, who has mercy.
But to return to Rom. 4:7—This Augustinian and monastic spiritual theology
forms the real content of Luther’s otherwise perplexing (and perhaps startling)
assertion that “God is marvelous in his saints, to whom they are righteous and
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unrighteous simul.” In fact, what he writes here is essentially identical to the passage
from the Dictata noted above. Ps. 67:37 Vg. attests the “marvelous” truth of the God of
grace, who is seated on high yet regards the lowly, who is incomparably beautiful in
his holiness yet dwells with those who confess the ghastliness of their sinful hearts.
The man who is most beautiful in his own eyes is the ugliest in God’s, but the man
who abases himself in confession before God is beautiful in God’s sight (cf. Luke 18:914). For in confession, this self-abasing person begins to become true. Thus Luther’s
explanation of his bold thesis runs as follows:
For while the saints always have their own sin before their eyes, and implore
righteousness from God according to his mercy, for this very reason (eoipso)
they are always also reputed (reputantur) righteous by God. Therefore to
themselves and in truth they are unrighteous, but they are righteous to God
reckoning them so because of (propter) this confession of sin. In reality sinners,
but righteous by the reckoning of the God who has mercy [Rom. 9:16].
Unknowingly righteous and knowingly unrighteous. Sinners in fact, but
righteous in hope. And this is what he says here: “Blessed are they whose
iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are covered” [Ps. 32:1]. Hence it follows:
“I said, I will confess against myself my unrighteousness” [Ps. 32:5] (i.e., I will
always have my sin before my eyes, because I confess to you). Therefore, “and
you forgave the ungodliness of sin” [Ps. 32:5], not only to me, but to all. Hence
it follows: “For this, every saint will pray to you” [Ps. 32:6]. Behold, every saint
is a sinner and prays for his sins. In this way, the righteous man is, in principle,
his own accuser.836
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My reader may recall from chapter 2 how Luther wove together these very verses from
Ps. 32 in just this way in late 1538, adding playfully, “Rhyme that if you can!”837 At this
early stage in his development, the gist of his mature exegesis and theology is already
in place; but I think it is fair to say that young Luther “yearning for grace” (Wicks) and
still unassured of its reality in the promissio evangelii (Bayer) has yet to gain a playful
soul. But farther on this point in its place. Three observations are in order here,
leaving aside for the moment the precise nature of the “sin” that the saints confess
they have for the next section of this chapter.
First, note that while Paul only quotes Ps. 32:1-2, Luther reads Rom. 4 in light of
the rest of the Psalm: and in a way, it is vv. 5-6 of Ps. 32 that spiritually and logically
drive Luther toward his “simul.”838 If one prays Ps. 32—and for that matter the rest of
the Psalter, as Luther did “religiously” as an Augustinian—the notion that saints pray
to God for their sins seeps into the very bones of one’s soul. Second, note Luther’s
clear allusion to Rom. 9:16. The true penitent who always has his sin before his eyes
lodges all his hope for salvation in the merciful reputatio of the miserentis Dei. This,
and not just the spe/re contrast, ties Luther’s meditations here unmistakably to
Augustine. Third, notice “Holl’s propter”: for the very reason (eoipso) that the saints
confess their sin and beg God for iustitia to be granted to them by his mercy, God does
in fact reckon them as righteous; again, although they are truly unrighteous and see
this fact all too well, God reckons them righteous because of (propter) their confession
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of sin. In his 1910 essay on justification in the Romans lectures, Holl emphasized these
and other like claims in Luther’s writings and set them over against the propter
Christum of the Lutheran confessions. Holl posed the question: does Luther’s propter
smuggle “Catholic” merit or “Melanchthonian” synergism into Reformation theology?
An appeal to God’s Alleinwirksamkeit freed Holl to answer his own question with a
decisive “No,” for the faith, humility, or confession propter quod God justifies the
sinner is always itself the gift of God’s prevenient grace and thus the temporal effect of
his eternal predestination.839 This will not be the last time we meet “Holl’s propter.”
For the time being, what matters is that we recognize how God’s marvelous and
merciful reputatio of the sinner as “righteous” does indeed have a point of contact in
the real renewal of the sin-confessing, Psalter-praying sanctus. Holl grasped this point
well. In reality, the saint is a sinner, and his sin is all that he can see when he kneels
before the Holy One in prayer. But the very fact that he sees and acknowledges his
sinfulness with even the smallest measure of truth, and confesses his sin as sin before
God, and seeks God’s mercy in hope’s humble prayer, shows that Luther’s sinful saint
is not nothing but a peccator without remainder—and this “in re,” too, however
hidden, inchoate, partial, and fragile the present reality of one’s gracious renewal in
holiness may be.

2. The kind of “sin” that saints have, and its healing and forgiveness
This becomes clearer in the following corollarium, which takes its initial bearings from
Rom. 7 and Ps. 32. Luther first states that in Ps. 32—as well as Ecclus. 39:5 and Ps.
38:18, which had also been cited—the “sins” in question are not only sinful deeds “in
839
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work, word, and thought,” but also regard “the tinder” (de fomite). He immediately
directs the reader infra 7., and quotes Rom. 7:17/20 (“Not I, but the sin that dwells in
me”). “In the same place,” explains Luther, referring to Rom. 7:5, Paul “calls it [ipsum,
viz. peccatum] ‘the passions of sins’ i.e., desyderia, affectiones et inclinationes for sins,
which he says operate fruit for death.”840 St. David did not think in the first place of
adultery and murder when he wrote his great Psalms, and neither did St. Paul in Rom.
7:
Therefore actual sin (as it is called by the theologians) is more truly the sin, i.e.,
the work and fruit of sin; sin, however, is the passion itself, the tinder, and
concupiscence or proneness toward evil and difficulty toward good, just as it
says below: “I would not have known that concupiscence is sin” [Rom. 7:7]. If
indeed they “work” (operantur) [7:5, 13, 15, 17, 20], therefore they are not
themselves works (opera), but workers (operantes), in order that it may bear
fruit (Vt fructificet); therefore, they are not the fruit.841
Grane was right to underline that for Luther the decisive matter was grasping Paul’s
meaning, not Augustine’s per se: but here once more, as in the Rom. 7 scholia, Luther
is evidently employing Augustinian conceptuality to interpret the apostolic modus
loquendi. In Rom. 7, “sin” means sinful passion itself—not actual sin—which in its
residual being in the regenerate “operates” all manner of evil desires by its bent toward
evil and aversion from the good. Drawn from Augustine through Peter Lombard,
violent (and indeed, tyrannical) affective pronitas ad malum et difficultas ad bonum are
amongst the terms Luther will use shortly to define original sin in the scholion on
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Rom. 5:12.842 It is this sin—not peccatum actuale—for which the saint pleads
forgiveness in Ps. 32:1-6: “the very bending away from good (declinatio a bono) and
propensity for evil (inclinatio ad malum)” that he inherits originally from Adam. The
“works” or “fruits” of this root sin are the sinful deeds that grow organically and
necessarily therefrom in the unregenerate.843
But as I have argued above and as we shall see again presently, in the
regenerate person—who suffers the presence of his vicious affectivity unwilling—sin’s
“fruits” only grow back into being in opere, verbo et cogitatione through the consent of
his will. This distinction between “sin” as evil affectivity and sin’s “work”/“fruit” as
peccata actualia “will be seen more clearly below in chapters 7 and 8,” writes Luther;
but just as importantly, he clarifies that “all the previously related texts must be
understood de tali peccato.”844 Just to be sure we grasp his point, Luther then repeats
Ps. 32:1, 32:5-6, and 51:3-4, and throws in 1 John 1:8 for good measure. In short, the
affective malum that St. Paul bluntly names as “sin” in Rom. 6 and 7 is re vera
842
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incompescibilis, Et Anthȩus in terra dimissus insuperabilis. Cf. LW 25.299-300.
843
WA 56.271.13-15, cf. LW 25.259.
844
WA 56.271.15-16, cf. LW 25.259.

324

peccatum; and the reason St. David pled with God for mercy in the Psalter is that he
grasped the marrow of Paul’s theology. The saints, then, are “sinners” in the precise
“420s Augustine” sense that they bear in their souls, against their own renewed wills,
the residual evil of vicious desire. This matches exactly what we found earlier in
Luther’s scholia on Rom. 7 and, indeed, in the works of his maturity.
Having clarified the nature of the saints’ “sin,” Luther presses on to explain
both the manner of its non-imputation and the rationale for the same. This brings us
to the early roots of his theology of gift and grace. Parallel to his distinction between
“sin” and its “fruit,” Luther distinguishes between “our righteousness from God”
(Iustitia nostra ex Deo) on the one hand and its fruits in good works on the other. The
saint’s iustitia ex deo consists in the inner reversal of the deepest inclinations of his
heart. This reversal is brought about by the heart’s renovation through the infusion of
grace. “Our righteousness from God” is itself “the very propensity toward good
(Inclinatio ad bonum) and turning away from evil (declinatio a malo) which is given
inwardly through grace.”845 And as “sin” brought forth its “fruit” in peccata actualia, so
this inner righteousness—received as a gift by grace, renovating the heart, and thus
reversing its affective propensities—brings forth its fruits in good works: opera autem
sunt potius fructus Iustitiȩ.846 This real renewal of the heart is the foundation-stone
upon which Luther proceeds, in two successive attempts, to erect a nuanced spiritual
theology of sin, confession, mercy, non-imputation, and progressive healing by
Christ’s grace. As I now exposit each in turn, we do well to keep this real affective
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renewal in mind: Iustitia nostra ex Deo est ipsa ipsa inclinatio ad bonum et declinatio a
malo interius per gratiam data.
(1) The evil passions of sin that remain, that is the “concupiscence” unmasked
by the 10th Commandment as “peccatum,” are truly sin and require the confession of 1
John 1:8. Of itself, as sin, it is by nature worthy only of damnation. But God forgives it
… through his non-Imputation, out of mercy, to all who acknowledge and
confess and hate it and plead to be healed from it (ab eo sanari).847
In other words, God mercifully forgives and/or declines to reckon the intrinsic guilt of
evil desire to the kind of true penitents described earlier, despite the fact that this evil
desire is at work within their hearts. As true penitents, the forgiven do not hide, but
confess and hate their “sin” and therefore plead with God to be healed of it (sanari).
That is, they beg for an increase of gratia sanans to carry on the renewing work—
hidden to the saints, but evinced by their very yearning for grace—that God has begun
in their hearts. Luther next contrasts this penitential spirituality of healing grace and
undeserved mercy with its mistaken counterfeit: the “error” that “this evil can be
healed through works.”848 As I argued above regarding the autobiographical
conclusion to the scholia on Rom. 7, so here, Luther is not merely taking aim at
alternative late medieval spiritualities/theologies. Rather, he writes as a man who tried
valiantly to extinguish his concupiscentiae through the normally suggested means, and
failed. This, I think, is why Luther appeals immediately not to Scripture, but to
experience: “For Experientia testifies, that in whatsoever we work well, this
concupiscentia ad malum is left behind (relinquitur), and no one is clean from it, not
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even an infant one day old.”849 Job 14:5 (in the Old Latin rendering of the LXX known
to Luther either through Augustine, e.g., c. Iul. 5.13.49,850 or perhaps through a living
spiritual tradition in the O.E.S.A.851) enters in at the tail-end of Luther’s confession,
but the real weight in the argument is his appeal to this eminently monastic
experience.
Pace Denifle, however, Luther does not find release from this experience of
spiritual failure in a doctrine of invincible concupiscence; nor, relatedly, does he take
refuge in a doctrine of sheer imputation and a totus/totus “simul.” The brute
experience of illicit desire in the regenerate is for Luther an incontestable fact of the
godly life. But while the unwanted presence of this “sin” (together with its unruly and
vexatious operations) is intractable in this life, for the regenerate person this
concupiscentia—“evil” and indeed “guilty” as it intrinsically is in Luther’s judgment—is
certainly not invincible. Luther did not find consolation in the kind of “cheap grace”
that proclaims free justification to the sinner who gives way to his evil desires rather
than calling him to fight against them in repentance. Far from it. Instead, the battleweary Augustinian friar found consolation in the battle-proven old Augustine’s
teaching that even the most furious sin-fighters are obliged to suffer in their “flesh”
the very emotions, passions, desires, or affections which they hate with the pure and
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holy odium peccati (Ps. 139:22, Rom. 7:15) that is only ever found in spiritually
renovated, law-delighting hearts (Ps. 1:2, Rom. 7:22). So long as they keep up the holy
war against their own old selves by not consenting to the affective vetustas they bear
within, the regenerate continue both in the process of healing (or renovation)
underway in their hearts and in the forgiveness of God. As Luther sets forth this
doctrine of residual sin, renewing grace, and pardoning mercy, he alludes to nupt.
conc. 1.25.28 for the first time in the scholion:
But it is the mercy of God that this (hoc, viz., peccatum or concupiscentia)
remains and is not reckoned for sin to those who call upon Him and groan for
their liberation [cf. Rom. 8:23-6]. For such people also take care for works
easily, because they seek to be justified with all zeal. Sic, ergo, in ourselves we
are sinners and nevertheless we are righteous by God’s reckoning through
faith. For we believe the One who promises that he will liberate us, provided
that (dummodo) in the meantime we persevere, lest sin should rule [cf. Rom.
6:12]; but we bear with it, until He takes it away.852
Note well Luther’s little Sic ergo! Evil affective “sin” remains in the saints, to be sure,
but they “groan” (gemunt) in the manner of Rom. 8:23-6 for liberation from this evil.
And since they are the sort of holy people who zealously seek to be justified—
Iustificari, in this case as in the Rom 4:6 scholion a rough equivalent for sanari—they
see to it that they do good works facile. For real saints, doing good works manu is the
easy part: for the duration of his theological career, Luther more or less takes this for
granted. The real issue is the complete renovation, healing, or liberation of the heart
itself from its evil affective vitiation, disease, or bondage. The reality of the saints’
renewal is not in question. But the present imperfection of this renewal, owing to the
852
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indwelling peccatum the saints continue to groan about to God, requires God’s
merciful non-reckoning of their residual evil desires pro peccato. That they still have
“sin” in this quite restricted sense (and 1 John 1:8 requires their confession of this fact)
is enough to render the saints peccatores coram Deo. But through God’s merciful
“overlooking” of this sin, the saints are Iusti per fidem.
At just this point, the eschatological orientation of justification (which Holl did
well to emphasize) enters the scene. The mercifully pardoned Iusti believe the God
who promises to bring to completion the liberation he has already begun. In this text,
faith in deus promittens does not entail the free bestowal of Christ’s alien
righteousness in the present (as it will more or less consistently by 1520), but rather a
Rom. 8:23-26-style “hope” for eschatological liberatio from one’s bondage to affective
evil.853 This liberation has begun; and until it reaches its completion, what is left of the
old dominion of sin cannot bring the saints into condemnation, sheltered as they are
853
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beneath the mercy of God. But all this is conditioned by “Holl’s propter,” in this case a
dummodo interim. The saints’ residual “sin” is not reckoned to their account—
“provided that” they persevere in the way of renewal while awaiting their ultimate
liberation from sin’s enslaving power. What does this perseverance entail? Patiently
battling against the affective remnants of one’s old “self,” ne peccatum regnet. Luther’s
allusion to Rom. 6:12 is unmistakable: non ergo regnet peccatum, admonishes the
Apostle, ut obediatis concupiscentiis eius. Translated into Augustine’s moralpsychological terminology, Luther is saying that the saints remain sheltered by God’s
non-reckoning of their “sin” so long as—and only so long as—they refuse to consent to
its evil desires, the presence of which they are summoned to bravely endure
(Sustineamus) till God clean takes it away.
In short, Luther’s edgy-sounding “in ourselves we are sinners, but by God’s
reckoning we are righteous through faith” is not inimical to an Augustinian theology
of renovation. On the contrary, it depends upon just such a theology; and apart from
the spiritual reality that such a theology attests—viz., hidden, fragile, embattled, but
nonetheless real holiness—Luther’s impressive (“simul”) peccatores et Iusti simply
breaks down.
(2) In the next and long paragraph that follows, Luther elaborates the same
theology of residual sin, ongoing healing by Christ’s grace, and merciful nonimputation in terms of the Christus Samaritanus. To wit:
It’s just like with a sick person: he believes the doctor who promises most
certain health, and in the meantime, obeying the doctor’s order in hope of the
promised health, he abstains from those things which are prohibited to him—
lest he impede the promised health and increase the disease—until the doctor
fulfills what he promised. Now this sick person, is he healthy? Indeed, he is sick
and healthy at the same time. Sick in the truth of the matter, but healthy by
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the certain promise of the doctor, whom he believes, who already reckons him
as healthy because he is certain that he will heal him, because he has begun to
heal him and he has not imputed to him sickness unto death. In the same way,
our Samaritan Christ took up the half-dead man to cure his sickness in the inn,
and has begun to heal him, having promised most perfect health in eternal life,
and not imputing sin i.e. concupiscences unto death, but prohibiting
meanwhile in hope of the promised health to do or omit those things by which
that health would be impeded and sin i.e. concupiscence increased. Now, then,
is he perfectly righteous? No, but simul peccator et Iustus; sinner in fact, but
righteous by the certain reckoning and promise of God, that he will liberate
from that (ab illo, sc. peccatum), until he perfectly heals. And for this reason,
he is perfectly healthy in hope, in reality however a sinner, but having the
beginning of righteousness so that he always seeks it more fully, always
knowing that he is unrighteous. Now if this sick person, loving his weakness,
does not will to cure it all, won’t he die? Sic he who follows his concupiscentias
in the world. Or, if someone does not seem sick in his own eyes, but healthy,
and therefore rejects the doctor—this is the kind of person who is justified
through his own works and is healthy.854
In theological substance, Luther adds nothing new here. But the analogy is powerful.
For Luther, sin’s sick longings and impulses in the saints are pathological, lethal, and
absurd. To indulge them is—not just in terms of the metaphor, but quite literally—to
succumb to one’s inveterate bent toward insanity and self-destruction. For when the
regenerate Christian consents to his residual concupiscence, it is like a mad
convalescent fleeing from a skillful and trustworthy physician (who has promised
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Sed sanus ex certa promissione medici, cui credit, qui eum iam Velut sanum reputat, quia certus,
quod sanabit eum, quia incepit eum sanare nec imputauit ei egritudinem ad mortem. Eodem modo
Samaritanus noster Christus hominem semiuiuum ȩgrotum suum curandum suscȩpit in stabulum et
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complete restoration to wholeness) in order to commit suicide. No less mad is the sick
person who thinks he is well and refuses the care of the doctor altogether. “Those who
are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick,” taught the Lord Jesus, to
the outrage of the Pharisees: “I came not to call the righteous, but sinners” (Mark 2:17).
The great thrust of Luther’s long paragraph, however, is the real sanatio begun and
progressively carried forward to its completion by Christ’s grace. The Good Samaritan
and wise medicus has taken the semivivus into the inn and begun to heal him. His
graced patient is by no means out of the woods: precisely in his convalescence by
grace, he remains a sinner sick with the deadly morbus concupiscentiae. But because
Christ really has begun to heal him, his patient really does possess the initium Iustitiȩ.
Furthermore, Christ has promised to finish the healing he has begun; and in the
meantime, he does not impute the affective sin-sickness that remains in his patient as
a sickness unto death.
Simul peccator et Iustus, indeed. But there is only one reason for the first term,
and perhaps three for the second. The chronic disease of evil desire renders Christ’s
patient a sinner re vera. But the same patient, at the same time, is healthy and
righteous, because (a) Christ has begun to make him healthy and righteous; (b) Christ
has promised to finish the job; (c) until he does so, Christ does not impute his
patient’s remaining morbus, infirmitas, aegritudo, or “sin” as a sickness unto death,
i.e., destruction or condemnation.855 Is there a forensic element in this picture? There
is: for in itself, the deadly disease of evil desire, which originated in Adam’s treachery
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and rebellion, is worthy of damnation. But to myopically focus on this theme at the
expense of Luther’s emphatic stress on real healing through grace, and to then set the
former over against the latter—as Grane ill-advisedly asserts—does real injustice to
both the intricate details and the overall tenor of the passage.856 For Luther fits his non
imputavit into a far more complex theological and spiritual vision than Grane
recognized: so much so, that interpreting Rom. 4/Ps. 32—i.e., explicitly imputational
and “forensic” texts—proves for Luther a vital occasion for expositing his Augustinian
theology of sanatio through the grace of Christus medicus.
Thus we arrive at the folly of the “pig theologians,” and the spiritual wisdom
and consolatory power of nupt. conc. 1.25.28.

3. Nupt. conc. 1.25.28 and die Sawtheologen
In the next few pages, Luther intersperses autobiographical remarks amidst highly
charged polemic against the Bielish theology of nature, sin, grace, and good works. Its
fierceness tells us much about Luther’s own sense of having been betrayed by a false
(or non-catholic) theology, his anger toward hypocrisy in the Church, his pastoral
concern for “the simple Christians” affected thereby,857 and his passionate
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commitment to his program of scriptural and patristic (that is, Augustinian, plus one
quote from Ambrose) ressourcement.858
“The scholastic theologians”—in this case, Scotus, Ockham, and Biel all fit the
bill—teach inadequately about sin and grace, “for they dream that the entire original
sin (Originale totum) is taken away just like actual sin, as if they were the kind of
things that can be clear taken away in the blink of an eye, like darkness by light.”859
The bad grammar of Luther’s plural “as if they” (quasi sint) conveys a good
Augustinian theology of original sin. Since its antecedent is peccatum originale, the
reader expects quasi sit. But the plural sint evinces Luther’s operating assumption
about the nature of original sin as a bundle of vitiated and unruly desires; and when
paired together with the important little adjective totum, both his own theology of
baptismal grace and his complaint vis-à-vis the late medieval alternative he had once
held himself are greatly illumined.
Biel (and his pupil Friar Martin in 1509/10) held that baptism took away “the
whole original sin.” In 1516, does Luther now hold that baptism has no real effect on
original sin at all? No, he does not. Instead, he asserts that peccatum originale totum is
not taken away, i.e., original sin as a whole is not taken away. For the evil
concupiscentiae of which it is comprised remain partially left over—hence the quick
shift to the plural quasi sint quaedam amouibilia. But Luther’s totum must be held
closely together with this, because the evil desires that remain do so only in
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fragmentary and residual form: the grace of baptism having broken, if not yet entirely
obliterated, original sin’s dominion in the regenerate. For Luther, baptism wreaks
havoc on original sin, but it does not sweep out its every affective remnant in the
regenerate in the blink of an eye. The whole of it is not taken away, but neither is the
whole of it left over. For concupiscentiae remain in the saints after baptism. And by
1515/16, Luther—after the manner of the “420s Augustine”—has come to speak frankly
about evil desires in the saints as the remnants (or relics) of original sin itself. The
conclusion follows rapidly from the premises. If concupiscence remains in the saints,
then original sin—however debilitated, crippled, and overruled by the invasion of
grace—remains a reality after baptism. And if “sin” is thus present, it must be dealt
with one way or another if the sin-bearing saint is to stand in reconciled fellowship
with the Holy One. Enter nupt. conc. 1.25.28—well almost, at any rate:
Blessed Augustine said most clearly: “sin concupiscence is forgiven in baptism, not
so that it no longer is, but so that it is not imputed” (peccatum concupiscentiam in
baptismate remitti, non vt non sit, sed vt non imputetur).860
The superscript in the excerpt reflects the fact that in the handwritten notes,
concupiscentiam is added above the word peccatum. Here is what Augustine wrote:
Concupiscence of the flesh is forgiven in baptism, not so that it no longer is,
but so that it is no longer imputed as sin (dimitti concupiscentiam carnis in
baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in peccatum non inputetur).861
Plainly, Luther did not quote Augustine’s text with literal accuracy. Did Luther
perhaps cite Augustine from his capacious memory, as he would with remarkable
accuracy in the 1521 Antilatomus, holed up in the Wartburg without benefit of a
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library, and in the event do so imprecisely?862 I do not know for sure. The first positive
reference to nupt. conc. 1.25.28 that I can locate in Luther’s works is found in the 1514
sermon “On the Conception of Blessed Mary the Virgin, and about Congenital Sin” to
which I referred in the introduction to Part II of this book. (Notably, Luther does not
cite it in the 1513 Dictata on Ps. 32.)863 In this sermon, Luther’s text differs from both
our modern critical edition and the excerpt in the Rom. 4:7 scholion:
Cum dicitur in baptismo originale peccatum dimitti, quomodo ergo tu dicis,
quod remaneat et cum eo pugnandum esse? Respondet Divus Augustinus:
‘Dimittitur quidem peccatum gentilitium in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut
non imputetur.’864
There may be a hint toward a solution in this sermon. The way Luther posits a serious
theological question and then answers it with an authoritative text reflects, I think,
the dialogical form of scholastic theology. Now, it was almost certainly in Lombard
that Luther first encountered nupt. conc. 1.25.28, and this by the winter semester of
1509/10 at the latest, when he rejected it out of hand. Evidently by the time he
preached this sermon in 1514, Luther had come to reverse his position. Does this mean
he had already undertaken his intensive study of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings?
As I noted above, Hamel, Grane, and Leppin date Luther’s reading of vol. 8 of the
Amerbach edition to the vicinity of 1515, and speak of a kind of “breakthrough” to an
Augustinian sola gratia in the same year. In terms of Luther’s full digestion of
Augustine’s theology of grace, this judgment is basically sound: and indeed it is, as I
acknowledged above, a major premise underlying my decision to skip to the Romans
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lectures as the main focus of this second part of my study. The 1514 sermon shows it is
at least possible that Luther had begun his readings in Augustine’s anti-Pelagian works
one year earlier than is often assumed. Possible, but not necessary: for nupt. conc.
1.25.28 was a text already known to Luther from the Sententiae. And in addition to the
dialogical form of the extract’s presentation in the sermon, there are strong enough
verbal echoes to suggest that Luther drew his not-quite citation of Augustine from
Sent. II d. 32.
Unlike Luther, when Peter cites nupt. conc. 1.25.28 near the end of d. 32 cp. 1 he
does so accurately, with only the slightest variations: Dimittitur concupiscentia carnis
in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut non imputetur in peccatum.865 However, from the
first line of d. 32 cp. 1.1 (and in accord with his teaching in d. 30 cp. 8), Peter identifies
original sin with concupiscence and vice versa:
1. Quomodo originale peccatum dimittatur in baptismo, cum et post sit illa
concupiscentia quae dicitur originale peccatum. Quoniam supra dictum est
originale peccatum esse vitium concupiscentiae, assignatumque quomodo a
parentibus trahatur et originale dicatur, superest investigare quomodo
baptismo dimittatur, cum etiam post baptismum remaneat concupiscentia
quae ante fuerat: unde videtur vel peccatum originale non esse
concupiscentiam, vel non remitti in baptismo.866
Not only the dogmatic question, but Luther’s very wording in the 1514 sermon
approximates what Peter writes here in d. 32 cp. 1.1. Peter asks: “How is original sin
forgiven in baptism, when also afterward there is that concupiscence which is said to
be original sin?” Luther asks: “If it is said that original sin is forgiven in baptism, how
then do you say that it remains and that one has to fight with it?” Peter goes on, in cp.
1.2-3, to explain that original sin is forgiven in two ways, viz., extenuatione sui et
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Sent. II d. 32 cp. 1.1 (Grott. I/511).
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solutione reatus, “by its diminishment and by the releasing of its guilt.”867 “Neither
does it”—i.e., concupiscence/original sin—“remain after baptism ad reatum, because it
is not imputed in peccatum.”868 This marks the first (unnoted) reference to nupt. conc.
1.25.28 in d. 32 cp. 1, and interestingly enough this allusion follows on the heels of an
explicit citation of sentences from the same passage that come after Augustine’s
decisive remark on baptism and non-imputation.869 In cp. 1.4-6, Peter then defends his
solution with numerous proofs from authority, above all Augustine, culminating in a
catena of three lines taken from continuous sections of nupt. conc. (1.24.27, our 1.25.28,
and 1.26.29). Read in light of the whole of d. 32 cp. 1, it is an at least plausible
conjecture that Luther’s variations on nupt. conc. 1.25.28 in 1514/15—and thenceforth
right up to 1546—stem from the fact that he read into it both (a) the identification of
concupiscentia and peccatum originale, and (b) the distinction between the
diminution of original sin’s powers and the absolution of its guilt, which Peter’s
Augustinianism had already achieved in this very chapter. On this supposition, by
Advent 1514 Luther has tucked away his glossed version of nupt. conc. 1.25.28—as a
kind of pithy summary Sent. II d. 32 cp. 1 taken as a whole—in his memory, and he
runs with it for the rest of his life.
I grant that this is a speculative and thus tentative historical hypothesis. But it
does fit with the impression given the reader at this specific juncture in the scholia
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that Luther is writing furiously—i.e., both rapidly and angrily—and in process quoting
authorities from memory. The reference to nupt. conc. 1.25.28 under consideration
here is the first appeal to a non-scriptural authority in the Rom. 4:7 scholia. In the
following pages, Luther refers once to “the books of blessed Augustine”870 in general
and then—accurately enough with respect to its content, but nonetheless
indefinitely—to “how beautifully and richly blessed Augustine has written in many
books” about the velle/perficere distinction, “especially book 2 against Julian.”871 The
next extensive excerpt, to ep. 167.5, turns up seven pages farther on in the WA.872 The
slight changes in the excerpt itself (e.g., baptismo to baptismate, dimitti to remitti, and
shifts in word order) also point in this direction. So does the very brevity of both the
Augustine citation and the reference to Ambrose’s de sacramentis 4.6.28 which
immediately follows it. Finally, there is the fact that ad litteram Luther misquotes
Ambrose too, yet despite this successfully conveys the substance of Ambrose’s
remarks.873 Here, it would seem, are two patristic texts that had deeply impressed
Luther by 1515. He had digested their basic substance and committed them to
memory. In this instance, he remembered them with an imprecision that falls short of
the rigorous standards of modern scholarship.
Thinking along these lines, I suggest we take the old Luther’s frequent advice
and attend to his reference to nupt. conc. 1.25.28 in terms of its res rather than its
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verba. The question must be asked, despite the obvious variations between his text
and Augustine’s, and apart from my proposed theory as to the provenance of those
variations, whether Luther did in fact render its theological substance faithfully (as he
did Ambrose’s). There are, I think, two reasons to judge in Luther’s favor in this
regard, one quite simple and the other a tad more subtle.
First, when the two sentences are held alongside one another, a fairly impartial
reader will find them to be virtually identical. It seems tedious to point this out. But
since Denifle went to such great lengths to prove Luther’s divergence from Augustine,
and since even more sympathetic readers of Luther have been influenced (or
intimidated) by the dark shadow of Denifle’s non-Augustinian Lutherdeutung, I do
think this simplest point of all needs to be urged in Luther’s defense. Luther has:
peccatum/concupiscentiam in baptismate remitti, non vt non sit, sed vt non imputetur.
Augustine has: dimitti concupiscentiam carnis in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in
peccatum non inputetur. Both hold that prior to baptism into Christ, concupiscence is
the inherited original sin that naturally binds the vitiated filii Adae in chains of death
and damnation. Both assert that this concupiscence/sin is forgiven in baptism. Both
hold that this happens in such a way that “it”—whether concupiscence, “sin,” or
both—though forgiven, nonetheless remains after baptism. Luther teaches that “sin”
remains, but is not imputed: and by “sin,” he means concupiscentia rea. Augustine
teaches that concupiscence remains, but is not imputed as (or for, or into) “sin”: and
in his subsequent explanation of his meaning at c. Iul. 6.17.51 in 421, Augustine clarifies
that the mala concupiscentia still present in the baptized is indeed intrinsically rea. I
submit that this amounts to either a distinction without a real difference, or else a
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simple identity of theological substance. In any case, just a few lines below his notquite citation of nupt. conc. 1.25.28, Luther writes that grace begins to take “sin” away,
“in order that it not be imputed henceforth for sin”—vt non Imputetur ammodo pro
peccato, which is just a hair’s breath away from Augustine’s ut in peccatum non
inputetur.874
Second, whereas Denifle read all of Augustine’s later writings contra Iulianum
in light of the Tridentine orthodoxy of the “410s Augustine”—which, to be sure, is
reflected in nupt. conc. 1.23.25—Luther did just the reverse, and read texts from even
the 390s in light of the “420s Augustine” whom he regarded as the real and catholic b.
Augustinus noster. This is clear, for example, in the scholion on Rom. 6:2, where
Luther offers a long extract from the 394/5 ex. prop. Rm. and interprets its references
to caro, lex peccati, desiderium peccati, concupiscentiae, desideria prava, and Rom.
6:12’s “peccatum” in the stronger anti-Julian sense that Augustine will indeed find in
these same terms in the 420s.875 At nupt. conc. 1.25.28, Augustine writes that the
concupiscence of the flesh remains in the regenerate after baptism. As I have argued
thus far, Luther well knows that Augustine sometimes identifies postbaptismal
concupiscence as “sin,” and he prefers this “420s Augustine” because he finds him the
more helpful interpreter of the literal meaning of St. Paul in Rom. 6—8 and Gal. 5, St.
John in 1 John 1, St. David in the Psalter, etc. This Augustine, Luther has concluded by
1515, is in fact the orthodox and catholic Augustine. And as catholic theologians
know—Augustine’s relation to Cyprian on the rebaptism of traditores or Thomas
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Aquinas’ relation to Augustine on illuminationism being two cases in point—it is best
practice to cover the nakedness of our fathers, and in ambiguous cases to offer a
generous construction of their meaning.
This is the practice Augustine himself engaged in (whether wittingly or
unwittingly is hard to say) in c. Iul. 1 and 2 vis-à-vis a Greek father like John
Chrysostom, whose theology of sin and grace is, well, less “Augustinian” than
Augustine’s. Nearer to Luther’s time, Heiko Oberman has shown that Biel’s successor
at Tübingen, Wendelin Steinbach, did much the same thing in order to claim
Augustine and St. Paul—despite the excesses of their modus loquendi—for his defense
of human initiative in salvation over against the trenchant medieval Augustinianism of
Thomas Bradwardine and Gregory of Rimini.876 “When disputing against the enemies
of grace and infused charity, Augustine seems to have spoken excessively (excessive) a
great number of times”—thus the Bielish Steinbach in 1513; but no matter, for the
incautious Augustine and the judicious Biel are really at one. In the same manner, but
in clear the other direction in terms of dogmatic substance, by 1515/16 Luther has
already arrived at the conclusion (as he will put in the first thesis of the 4 Sept. 1517
Disputation against Scholastic Theology) that
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To say that Augustine speaks excessively (excessive) against heretics is to say
that
Augustine lied almost everywhere.877
Or, as he declares at table in 1538,
Augustine writes nothing penetrating about faith, except when he writes
against the Pelagians: they woke Augustine up and made him into a man.878
The old Augustine, der Mann awoken from his dogmatic slumbers and pushing the
logic of the argument to its farthest point against the arch-Pelagian Julian—this, for
Luther in 1515/16 right up to his death three decades later is the “catholic Augustine”
par excellence: “the illustrious and distinguished Doctor ecclesiae,” as he stated with
marked admiration in 1544, “who freed countless souls from multiple errors and (after
the Apostles) conquered so many monstrosities of the heretics.”879 Or, as Risto
Saarinen puts it with a touch greater reserve, for Luther “the aged Augustine who
writes against Julian is the definitive doctrinal authority.”880
This being the case, when Luther read a text like nupt. conc. 1.25.28 in 1515, he
read it in light of what he regarded to be the orthodox, catholic, and scriptural “420s
Augustine.”881 Concupiscence is sin; it is forgiven in baptism; it remains
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WA 1.224.7-8: 1. Dicere, quod Augustinus contra haereticos excessive loquatur, Est dicere,
Augustinum fere ubique mentitum esse. Contra dictum commune. Cf. LW 31.9.
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WA Tr 4.56.3-5, #3984 (1538): Augustinus nihil acriter de fide scribit, nisi cum contra Pelagionos
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“Augustine and Pelagianism,” AugS 24 (1993), 27-47, endnote 1. Cf. WA Tr 1.18.11-16, #51 (1531):
Augustinus ex contentione cum Pelagianis magnus est factus et fidelis gratiae assertor. Gregorius est
leprosus ceremoniis; statuit peccatum mortale esse, si quis emittat crepitum. Ambrosius simplex fidei
est assertor contra fiduciam operum; si contradictores passus fuisset, forte omnes antecelleret.
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Risto Saarinen, “Desire, Consent, and Sin,” 474. Cf. Hamel, II/2; Markus Wriedt, “Via Augustini,”
14; idem, “Produktives Mißverständnis?” 216.
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Later in life, Luther uses the same tactic in the reverse direction to excuse what he came to
regard as Augustine’s weak points (e.g., on imputation), and thus ensure both his own and
Augustine’s catholicity in one fell swoop. See, e.g., WA Tr 1.130.1-6 (#316, Summer/Fall 1532): De
commentario Philippi in Rom. edito anno 32. dicebat: Augustinus si iam viveret, gauderet hunc librum
legere, quanquam saepe eum perstrinxerit, sed S. Hieronymus, wenn der lebt, solt er wol dawider
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fragmentarisch in the regenerate: but it is not imputed to their account—provided,
that is, that the baptized do not consent to its vicious impulses. For Roman Catholics
after Trent to cry foul at this point is anachronistic: Girolamo Seripando’s grief in
December 1546 speaks well to this point,882 as does the tragic witness of the
theologians of l’abbaye de Port-Royal.883 But for modern Lutherans to celebrate
novelty instead is a failure to appreciate the formal and—by the standard of the late
Augustine, at any rate—material catholicity of Luther’s theology of original sin,
baptism, and grace. It is, I think, only a failure of historical imagination (or perhaps
catholic generosity) that would preclude one from seeing—mutatis mutandis, to be
sure—that the superior general at Trent, the district vicar in Wittenberg, and the

schreyben wie ein ander parfusser munch. Ergo nisi sit singularis quaedam remissio peccatorum
praeter illam communem, qua omnes indigemus, so ist er verlorn. (cf. LW 54.44). If only Augustine
could have read Melanchthon on Paul, he would have rejoiced to admit his error and embraced the
Reformation theology of justification. Not so Jerome!
882
On Seripando, see Peter Walter, “Die bleibende Sündigkeit der Getauften in den Debatten und
Beschlüssen des Trienter Konzils,” and Anthony N. S. Lane, Justification by Faith, 60-5.
883
Anthony Lane (Justification by Faith, 5 n. 4) relates that Otto Herman Pesch has suggested that
Rome rehabilitate the “radical Augustinianism (of those like Jansen and Pascal) which was
condemned after Trent,” referring to Pesch’s essay “The Canons of the Tridentine Decree on
Justification. To Whom Did they Apply?” in K. Lehmann, ed., Justification by Faith: Do the
Sixteenth-Century Condemnations Still Apply? (New York: Continuum, 1997), 214 n. 76. On
Jansenism, see Leszek Kolakowski, God owes us nothing: a brief remark on Pascal’s religion and on
the spirit of Jansenism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). If Jean Daniélou and Henri de
Lubac could successfully rehabilitate Gregory of Nyssa and Origen as Catholic theologians, why in
principle could not the same be done for Jansen and Arnauld—or Luther? This seemingly simple
question raises historical, dogmatic, and ecumenical issues of immense complexity that cannot be
dealt with here. For a start, in addition to Lehmann’s (ed.) op. cit., see Eero Huovinen, “Doctor
Communis? The ecumenical significance of Martin Luther’s theology,” Lutherjahrbuch 80 (2013), 1330; Theo M. M. A. C. Bell, “Roman Catholic Luther Research in the Twentieth Century: From
Rejection to Rehabilitation,” OHMLT, 584-97; and Peter Manns, Vater im Glauben: Studien zur
Theologie Martin Luthers, ed. Rolf Decot (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1988), esp. chapters 6, 7,
9, 10, and 11. Though it must be admitted that reading Manns’ essays in 2015 at times feels like an
exercise in nostalgia. In the ecumenical chill that has set in since the 1999 JDDJ, the mere 45 years
since Jan Cardinal Willebrands, in his official statement to the Fifth Assembly of the Lutheran
World Federation at Evian in 1970, acclaimed Luther “notre maître commun”—i.e., doctor
communis, and precisely in articulo iustificationis—seem to have grown longer.
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bishop in Hippo might all have made for rather stout Jansenists had they lived in
seventeenth-century Paris.
But let us press on farther in the scholion on Rom. 4:7 to see where Luther
takes his variant text of nupt. conc. 1.25.28. He had appealed to Augustine, Ambrose,
and the Bible against the “Aristotelian” theology of the scholastics, who made actual
evil or good works the locus for evaluating one’s sinfulness or righteousness, and who
did so because of (a) their theological commitment to the complete eradication of
original sin in baptism (or sacramental penance)884 and (b) their positive assessment
of the integrity of human nature and its faculties after the fall.885 For reasons rather
elementary to a spiritually-minded and theologically informed late medieval ascetic in
hard pursuit of true humility, this deeply puzzled Friar Martin:
On this account, foolish me could not understand how I ought to repute myself
a sinner like others and thus prefer myself to no one, since I was contrite and
had confessed. For then, I was thinking that all sins had been taken away and
evacuated, even intrinsically. For if it was because of past sins, which they say
must always be remembered (and they speak the truth, just not enough), then I
would think that they had not been forgiven: which, nonetheless, God has
promised have been forgiven to those who confess. Thus I battled with
myself…886
Luther’s formation in late medieval “piety-theology” as an Augustinian friar had taught
him to strive for humility. But his Erfurt training in late medieval Scholastik had
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WA 56.273.3-9: Aut ego nunquam intellexi, aut non bene satis de peccato et gratia theologi
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eliminated in principle the most powerful rationale for refusing to prefer himself to
others. After passing through the penitential stages of contrition and confession, the
guilt of all postbaptismal sin was forgiven afresh in priestly absolution, its eternal
poena being commuted to the temporal pains for which satisfaction must be rendered
either in this life or in purgatory (unless, of course, mitigated or removed through
indulgences). As for the concupiscentia which had been kindled into the fire of mortal
sin through consent: it went back to being the sinless “tinder” which the grace of
baptism had rendered it prior to one’s lapse into actual sin. Luther had taught this
doctrine himself as sententiarius at Wittenberg in 1509/10.887 Because of it, he knew
that when he left the confessional, he left it as one who was no longer a sinner.
At some point between 1510 and 1514/15, Luther realized he could no longer
square this scholastic theology of sin and penance with either (a) the affective facts of
his own monastic experience or (b) the spiritual wisdom embodied in at least some of
the monastic theology he had been taught since his admission to the novitiate in the
Erfurt Augustinian cloister in 1505. He needed to be humble, and to consider others
better than himself. But after confession—a sometimes daily practice for Friar
Martin—he knew, at the theological level, that he was no longer a sinner and
therefore was in fact better than others who were. The suggested remedy was
counterproductive: calling past sins to mind in order to engender humility only sent
scrupulous young Luther into the self-obsessed spiral of despair that Staupitz was
887

WA 9.75-6, on Sent. II d. 32. So, e.g., 9.75.16-19: illa concupiscentia in carne est nihil aliud nisi
inoboedientia carnis ad spiritum quae de se non est culpa, sed poena, quia si esset aliquo modo culpa
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346

laboring to pull him out of. Thus specific aspects of scholastic theology pushed Luther
to presumption, while specific strains within monastic piety led him to despair. As I
argued above, Staupitz’s pastoral counsel to “look to Christ” proved indisputably vital
both for helping the afflicted Luther find spiritual consolatio and for midwifing the
birth of Luther’s relentlessly (and joyfully) christocentric evangelical theology.888 But
in this autobiographical confession from 1515, Luther acknowledges the Augustinian
wisdom summed up in nupt. conc. 1.25.28 as the source of the simultaneously
dogmatic and spiritual solution to his prior perplexity and folly:
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347

… Thus I battled with myself, not knowing that forgiveness (remissio) is true
indeed, but that there is nevertheless no removal of sin (ablatio peccati) except
in hope, i.e., that it is to be taken away and that grace has been given (data
gratia), which begins to take it away so that (vt) it is not imputed henceforth
for sin.889
This is a paraphrase of the excerpt from nupt. conc. 1.25.28 cited just a few lines earlier,
in substance adding only (a) the notion that “grace” does indeed begin to take away
the “sin” that remains after baptism/penance, and (b) the linkage (vt!) between this
inchoate renewal by grace on the one hand, and the non-imputation of the remaining
“sin” pro peccato on the other. Both additions are themselves eminently Augustinian,
and together function to explain how the Ps. 32:2/Rom. 4:8 non imputare coheres with
the robust theology of sanative renewal which Luther has been developing thus far in
the scholion. “Grace”—in this context, gratia sanans/iustificans—is really given, and it
is given to the end that the “sin” that remains after baptism (or penance) really begins
to be taken away. So long as this process is underway, the “sin” that remains is not
imputed to the penitent’s account: with Luther’s vt implying strongly that one’s
inchoate renewal relates to the forgiveness or non-imputation of the “sin” that
remains as the cause to its effect. But it is, I think, better to read this as another
instance of Luther’s consistent conviction that the penitent’s abiding in statu gratiae
through the actual exercise of the non consentire desideriis, concupiscentiis, etc.
constitutes the conditio sine qua non for the non-imputation of the affective sin that
remains for the fight.
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Regardless, here we have Luther presenting an accurate summary of
Augustine’s mature theology of sin, grace, renewal, forgiveness, and (implicitly) nonconsent as the solution to his dogmatic and spiritual conundrum. Against the
temptation to despondency, he did not need to doubt the reality of the forgiveness
bestowed upon him in the sacrament of penance: remissio quidem vera—non
imputetur. But neither did Friar Martin have reason to boast of sinless perfection,
finding a deep spiritual anchor for the monastic virtue of humility in the dogmatic
redefinition of the penitent as peccator re vera on account of his residual sinful desires:
non vt non sit. Reading the “420s Augustine” in 1515 thus gave Luther the dogmatic
(and exegetical) equipment he needed as a monastic to continue in the path of
deepening humility he had chosen in 1505, and to do so without losing the hope of
true forgiveness in Christ that Staupitz was urging upon him with increasingly salutary
effect at just about this time.
The following pages in the WA orbit around the explosive interaction of these
same scholastic, monastic, and Augustinian themes. Luther had once been a Bielish
“fool” himself (ego stultus). Now, in the first-person grammar of confession and the
second-person grammar of mind-to-mind dogmatic combat, he attacks his erstwhile
scholastic teachers with the zeal of a convert and the incisive substance of the contra
Iulianum Augustine. O stulti, O Sawtheologen! Luther begins by summarizing a
doctrine of merited justification common in its basic outline to Scotus, Ockham, and
Biel.890 Each had taught that a sinner could merit the first grace of justification de
congruo by doing what was within his power to do, to wit: keep the law by loving God

890

WA 56.274.11-14, LW 25.261.

349

above all things. In his Collectorium II d. 28, e.g., Biel paired his version of the
distinction between “half” and “full” merit together with a second, viz., that of (a)
keeping God’s commandments “insofar as the substance of the act is concerned”
(quoad actus substantiam), on the one hand, and (b) keeping them “according to the
intention of the law-giver” (ad intentionem precipientis) on the other.891 Through his
free decision, a sinner could keep the law in the first, weaker sense by virtue of his
own natural powers, and thus earn the half-merit which—by the generous terms of
God’s ordered pactum—deserved de congruo the infusion of justifying grace. This
grace, in turn, would empower the justified person to act supernaturally, keep the law
in its deeper sense, and thus merit eternal life de condigno.892
Luther’s response is twofold. Its first part is rooted in the Pauline theology of
law and grace explored by Augustine in sp. litt. (and for this reason, I think, more
attended to in the scholarship). Luther observes that for Biel et al., grace is not
necessary for keeping the law—quoad actus substantiam, this can be done ex
naturalibus—but “only for the fulfillment of a new exaction imposed by God above the
law.”893 This turns grace into a new law, nova lex, a fatal move which a theologian can
only make if he fails to grasp the law’s true purpose in the economy of grace. To
explain what the law can and cannot do, Luther cites Rom. 4:15 and 8:3: in the first
place, “the law works wrath”—not grace—and in the second, “weakened through
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flesh” as St. Paul says it is, the law cannot be fulfilled sine gratia.894 This theology of
law (which exacts impossibilia from vitiated human beings) and grace (which heals
such humans and thus empowers law-keeping) is in essence the familiar
Augustinianism of sp. litt. and other anti-Pelagian writings from the 410s.
In the second part of his reply, Luther advances his argument with tools
supplied by the “420s Augustine,” intensifying the theology of sinful concupiscence
already germinally present in sp. litt. but brought to full flower in the works against
Julian. In general, but also specifically for Augustine and Luther, the role played in
one’s theology by both (a) the non-imputation of “sin”/concupiscence and (b) the
necessity of inner grace to renovate human nature vitiated by this concupiscence
expands in proportion to the extent that concupiscence itself is regarded as sinful.
And vice versa: for a Pelagius, a Julian, or a Biel, the relative moral neutrality of
concupiscence in the regenerate diminishes (or eliminates) the need for either kind of
“grace,” broadly construed. Taking up late Augustinian cudgels against die
Sawtheologen along just these lines, Luther’s first thrust consists in a forthright appeal
to honest experience; but this becomes the point of departure for a concise
elaboration of his maturing monastic/experiential and Augustinian/dogmatic theology
of residual sin, healing grace, and merciful non-imputation:
… “the law works wrath” and “is weakened through flesh,” and it certainly
cannot be fulfilled without grace. And they could have been admonished about
their own most foolish sententia to be ashamed and to repent at least by their
very own experience. Because, willy-nilly, they feel (sentiunt) base
concupiscences in themselves. Therefore I say: Hey! Now, I beg you, get to
work! Be men! Work, with your whole powers (Ex totis viribus vestris), so that
these concupiscences will not be in you. Prove what you say, that it is possible
to love God “ex totis viribus” by nature (naturaliter), without any grace. If you
894
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are without concupiscences, we will believe you. But if you dwell with and in
these concupiscences, then neither do you fulfill the law. For the Law says: “Do
not desire evilly” (non concupisces, Exod. 20:17), but “love God” (Deum diliges,
Deut. 6:5). But he who desires and loves (concupiscit et diligit) something else,
is he able to love God (Deum diligere)? And this concupiscence is always in us;
therefore, the love of God (dilectio Dei) is never in us, unless it has begun
through grace (nisi per gratiam incepta); and the relic of concupiscence that
still needs to be healed—because of which we do not yet “love God with a
whole heart” [Luke 10:27]—through mercy is not imputed as sin, until the
whole thing (totum) is taken away and until the love of God has been perfected
(perfecta Dei dilectio) in those who believe and perseveringly knock right up to
the end [cf. Luke 11:9-13].895
Here, in polemical and dialogical form, is a compressed statement of Augustine’s
mature theology of sin and grace. At its hearts stands both the lived experience and
the dogmatic evaluation of concupiscentia. As we saw in the Rom. 7 scholia, Luther
sometimes follows Augustine’s typical coupling together of Exod. 20:17 and Ecclus.
18:30 to explain the moral-psychological logic of their theory of refusing consent to the
evil desires that remain in the regenerate. Setting this late ancient anthropology
against his “modern” opponents, Luther now places the 10th Commandment’s
universal prohibition of evil desire—which, Augustine had argued in sp. litt. 4.6, St.
Paul cites with profound intention and care at Rom. 7:7896—in sharp contrast with the
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Great Commandment’s summons to wholehearted love for God (Deut. 6:5, Matt.
22:37-8, Luke 10:27, etc.; cf. section 6 below, on Augustine’s ep. 167). Scotus and Biel
taught that fallen humans could love God super omnia if they did what laid within
their natural powers to do: even if they did so “with clenched teeth,” as Dieter has it.897
But Luther insists that the very slightest holding-back of unadulterated, unrestricted,
pure, and total love for God amounts to simply breaking the Great Commandment:
and this, on the part of the regenerate heart. To quote Dieter once more, it is the
“refused totality” of one’s love for God that makes a person a sinner.898 And the reason
the regenerate fall short of this total love, is that they still—however slightly—infringe
upon the 10th Commandment. For even if they do not “go after” their evil desires
(Ecclus. 18:30, Gal. 5:16, 1 John 3:9), the regenerate still suffer their unwanted presence
in their renewed but affectively divided hearts. And the infinitesimally smallest
deflection of the regenerate person’s affective life from wholehearted love for God
amounts per definitionem magni mandati to a total failure to keep the Great
Commandment. Nothing less than complete and undivided love for God ex toto corde
will do. If a person suffers (and at the same, perplexingly, possesses as his own) malae
concupiscentiae in his heart, he breaks the command non concupisces, fails to exercise
perfecta Dei dilectio, and therefore fails to fulfill the law.899
Thus Luther, a little like Elijah on Mount Carmel (1 Kgs. 18), dares his
imaginary Scotist or Bielish interlocutor to make good on his theological claim
regarding the natural ability to love God super omnia. Prove that you have no evil
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desire at all, and I’ll believe your theology! Do what lies within your power to do, “so
that these evil desires will not be in you”—Luther’s vt non sint istȩ concupiscentie in
vobis mirroring in the plural Augustine’s non ut non sit at nupt. conc. 1.25.28. Once one
accepts (on the basis of Augustine’s and Luther’s shared scriptural reasoning) the
major premise that the slightest concupiscence in the regenerate person is lawbreaking “sin,” and then admits (on the basis of his own experience) the minor
premise that evil desires still exist within his heart, the conclusion follows that Scotus’
and Biel’s theorem regarding self-elicited love for God in the unregenerate person is
groundless, indeed, foolish and blasphemous (Rom. 9:30-10:4, Gal. 2:21, 3:1, 3:10, 5:1-6,
Phil. 3:2-14). Together with their theorem, the superstructure of the half-merited first
grace of justification which they built upon it tumbles to the ground. Some other
solution is therefore needed. Rather than calling down fire from heaven, Luther
invokes the mature theology of Augustine. Because concupiscence is always with the
saints in this life, perfect love for God never is. But an imperfect love for God has
begun to take root in their hearts, through the inner operations of healing grace.
Meanwhile, through the mercy of God, the reliquus concupiscentiae is not imputed as
sin; and this merciful non-imputation holds fast till the day when evil desire as a
whole will be perfectly taken away, and perfect love for God will be given in its place.
But this mercy holds fast only for those “who believe and perseveringly knock right up
till the end”: a clear allusion to Luke 11:9-13 and with it, an entire monastic spirituality
of yearning and begging for ever increasing supplies of grace.
Two final observations on this portion of the Rom. 4:7 scholion are in order
before pressing on further.
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(1) First, as Luther renews his attack on the “Aristotelian” theologians’
understanding of sin, he does so in a potentially confusing way. With nupt. conc.
1.25.28 still setting the tone, Luther writes that all the scholastics’ monstrous errors
resulted from the fact that they failed to grasp the quid sit of either sin or forgiveness.
They thus limited their definition of sin to “a certain minutest motus animi, just like
righteousness.”900 Luther promptly leaves sin aside to discuss righteousness, and in
this context treats the scholastic—and in some cases also mystical—doctrine of the
soul’s “synteresis,” viz., its ineradicable baseline orientation to the good, however weak
and faint this scintilla conscientiae may prove to be in a given soul.901 This, Luther tells
us, the scholastics also defined as a “small motion” (paruulum motum), though in this
case toward God.902 In addition to the fact that Biel does not define synteresis as a
motus animi,903 what is potentially confusing about this use of “motus”-language is the
fact (as we have seen at some length) that Luther elsewhere adopts this very same

900
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language in its technical Augustinian and “Stoic” moral-psychological sense and
identifies sinful concupiscence as that bundle of evil motus animi, i.e., psychologically
experienced emotions, impulses, desires, affections, etc., against which the regenerate
person must struggle to refuse the consent of his will. This being the case, if Luther
thinks the scholastics define “sin” as motus animi, what’s the problem?
In this instance, it appears that the very same phrase means nearly the opposite
of what Luther usually takes it to mean in positive presentations of his own position.
For here, “motus” is not an essentially passive experience, but the (I think to our
modern ears) more normal sense of motion as an active movement. More importantly,
this is also the primary meaning of “motus” in high and late medieval interpretations
of Aristotle: rich and intricate traditions which Dieter has superbly exposited and set
in relation to Luther’s early thought.904 For in this passage, Luther takes the
“scholastic” motus animi to mean an inner consensual or volitional movement or act of
the soul, which Jacob Preus conveys well with his rather free English translation of
Luther’s Latin text as “some very minute activity of the soul.”905 Biel, citing Thomas’
Summa Theologiae I/II q. 109 a. 1 in the Collectorium, can in fact speak in the same
breath of an inner psychological act as a motus spirituale, an actus, and an actio
intellectus et voluntatis.906 This seems to be what Luther has in mind.
Two factors within the scholion itself argue for this interpretation. The first
emerges from what Luther says about synteresis. The will (voluntas) has this basic
904
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orientation to the good: weak as it may be, inclinatur ad bonum. This faint but
inexorable inclination to the good—Tauler would call it the soul’s grunt—is the “small
motion toward God” that Scotus and Biel “dream is the actum diligendi Deum super
omnia.” Now, if Luther’s analysis here leaves something to be desired—just to begin,
Biel e.g. locates synteresis in the intellect, not the will; and for Thomas, Tauler, Biel et
al., synteresis is not an act, but the orientation that guides the soul to act rightly if the
soul so chooses—what matters for our purposes is that he ascribes two things to his
opponents vis-à-vis righteousness that together help to explain his puzzling remark
about their definition of sin as an evil motus animi. First, Luther asserts that for die
Sawtheologen the soul’s orientation to the good is anthropologically basic. Therefore, a
contrary bent or inclination to evil, such as is set forth in an Augustinian theology of
original sin and natura vitiata, is logically excluded from the start. This is indeed the
stuff of Biel’s doctrine of postlapsarian natura integra. For Biel, as for Luther the
fledgling sententiarius in 1509/10, there is no room in the system for a definition of
“sin” as an enslaving and pathological affective motus animi luring the unregenerate
soul irreversibly toward evil, death, and damnation: apart, that is, from the
intervention of radical Augustinian grace, for which the only praeparatio is
praedestinatio.907 But in the second place, Luther asserts that the good inclination
afforded homo naturalis by virtue of his synteresis is identical to the act of loving God
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above all things, which Scotus and Biel posit as within one’s power to achieve and
therefore postulate as the “half-merit” requisite for earning the first grace of
justification. This, I think, is one of the weakest points in Luther’s analysis: for how
can the natural inclination toward the good (synteresis) be identical to the act of
loving (actus diligendi) that one chooses to perform in accord with the inclination that
guides him?908 But that is beside the point I am arguing for; or rather, in an odd way it
supports it. For what counts is this: Luther’s identification of the good motus animi (or
synteresis) with the elicited act of loving God argues that his similar claim about his
opponents’ definition of sin as a bad motus animi should be interpreted in the same
way, i.e., it too is a minute actus animi, an actual sin. This, of course, fits well with
what we have seen to this point regarding Luther’s polemics against the scholastic
reduction of “sin” to actual sinful deeds, be it earlier in the Rom. 4:7 scholion itself or
twenty years later on in the Smalcald Articles.
Thence we arrive at the second reason to find Luther’s use of motus animi
language at this juncture pretty anomalous. For as he carries on the argument, the
fulcrum point for his polemic is the contrast between (a) the kind of Augustinian
penitential spirituality Wicks has emphasized, with its twin foci on “sin” as a heartdeep affective disorder and “grace” as gratia sanans providing the remedy for this
disease, and (b) a mistaken and, in Luther’s eyes, spiritually disastrous piety focused
908
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primarily on actual sin. “Our theologians have deflected sin to works alone.”909 “To be
sure, they implore God’s grace: though not rightly, but only in order that the work of
sin (opere peccati) may be forgiven.”910 That, for Luther, is sheer folly, because the
pathology of sin is so grave that forgiveness isolated from healing grace is not enough
to deal with the problem at its root. Not incidentally, this makes for another point of
contact between Luther’s opponents and Augustine’s. For neither Biel, Julian, nor
Pelagius denied the importance of forgiveness, at least the first granting thereof in
baptism and/or penance.911 But all alike downplayed or denied the necessity of gratia
sanans for renewed moral and spiritual being, life, and action (to say nothing of holy
suffering). One way or another, for pelagiani antiqui et moderni virtue could be
attained—and thus merit accrued—without the help of healing grace, since human
nature with its innate powers remained basically sound after Adam’s fall. Therefore, as
Henri Strohl observed in the 1920s comparing Luther’s theology and Augustine’s vis-àvis their respective opponents: at bottom “the adversary is the same.”912 This being so,
when Luther attributes to his opponents the initially surprising definition of sin as
motus animi, the “psychological movement” in question must be understood as a
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freely willed and consensual peccatum actuale, however minute, inward, and hidden
this sinful act of the will may be in a given case.
(2) This leads to the second point I wish to highlight in this portion of the
Rom. 4:7 scholion, namely, the predominance of Luther’s late medieval Augustinian
spirituality, with its interrelated emphases on: first, unfeigned humility, which is
evinced by confession of one’s sinfulness and the principled lack of assurance arising
therefrom; second, incessant warfare against one’s evil desires; and consequently
third, a desperate—if not quite despairing—longing for healing grace or “justification.”
This present earthly life is not a life of sinless perfection, but “a life of being cured
from sin” (Vita curationis a peccato); and the Church, following the Augustinian
interpretation of Luke 10:25-37, is “the inn and infirmary for those who are sick and
need to be healed.”913 Perfect sanitas and iustitia await the new heavens and new earth
that St. Peter teaches about in 2 Pet. 3:13. Righteousness dwells there, not here, but in
the meantime “it prepares for itself a dwelling place by healing sins.”914 What kind of
sins? In context, Luther clearly refers to residual evil desires in the saints’ hearts,
which gratia sanans progressively heals. Because his opponents teach only about
external good works—and do so on the supposition that virtue is attainable by doing
what lies within one’s natural ability to achieve—their doctrine necessarily produces
“proud people” (superbos) who, convinced of their own righteousness, are not
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concerned to declare war on their evil desires.915 And this, laments Father Martin, has
now led in the Church to a great falling away (recidiuatio) after confessions:
For they do not know that they need to be justified (Iustificandos), but are
confident that they have been justified (Iustificatos se esse confidunt) and thus,
through their own security, are overthrown without any effort on the Devil’s
part.916
Students of the “reformational” Luther will, I think, quickly perceive the deep irony
here. In 1515, the spiritual malady that Luther sees pervading the Church is not too
little assurance, but too much of it: and that, on the false basis of one’s own
righteousness. The real problem Luther diagnoses in the Bielish penitent is that he
leaves the confessional presuming that he has been “justified,” blissfully unaware of
his deep need to be continually justified further and—for this very reason—
terrifyingly susceptible to the great sin of spiritual pride. Martin Luther, fretting over
souls being confidently assured of their justification? Yes indeed, for at this point in
his development iustificari primarily means sanari—not forgiveness, nor non
imputatio peccati—and to teach an absolved penitent to think that he no longer needs
to be healed of the evil affective disease that afflicts him is nothing less than to spoonfeed a deadly poison into his already sin-sick soul.917
Instead, penitents ought to be taught how, through “groaning” (gemitum, cf.
Rom. 8:23-6), to humbly seek “healing grace” (gratiam sanantem) and acknowledge
that they are “sinners.”918 For then, rather than swelling with pride, they will
solicitously “declare war” on their concupiscentiis, sigh endlessly to God in prayer, and
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rightly beg God for that “grace” which not only pardons sin but heals the forgiven
sinner’s heart.919 This “sin”-confessing penitence, explains Luther, is the way of all the
saints (omnes sancti), “just as David prophesied in Psalm 31,” i.e., Ps. 32:6.920 In v. 5,
David confesses his delictum and iniustitiam to God, and praises God for forgiving the
impietatem peccati mei. In v. 6, he declares that “for this”—pro hac, i.e., the impiety of
one’s sin—“every saint (omnis sanctus) will pray to you.” Thus Luther finds David
prophesying in the Psalter that every saint confesses that he is a sinner. These later
verses in the Psalm form the immediate context for the earlier vv. 1-2, which St. Paul
cites as a proof-text for his doctrine of justification in Rom. 4:5-8. Once again, we find
Luther urging that the context in the prophetic Psalm must inform a proper
interpretation of the apostolic gospel.
In 1515, Luther is also ever eager to attest the harmony of St. Paul and
Augustine, and thus continues: “Therefore, all the saints confessed that they were
sinners, Vt patet in libris b. Augustini.”921 In his footnote to this line in the WA,
Johannes Ficker suggests that Augustine’s writings “in general” are to be understood.
On the basis of my argument thus far, I propose both that a more specific reference to
Augustine’s writings against Julian—überhaupt, to be sure—is in order, and that with
his confessing sinner-saints Luther intends neither more nor less than what Augustine
argued regarding the real but embattled holiness of Rom. 7-patterned sancti in these
books against Julian.
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Thus far the young Luther expanding upon nupt. conc. 1.25.28 within the
broader contours of an Augustinian theology of renewal, and putting it to work over
against a—if not the—dominant theology and piety of his day.

4. Impletio legis, gratia sanans, and Brautmystik
In a rich corollarium farther on in the Rom. 4:7 scholia, Luther develops his major
theme of healing grace amidst allusive adumbrations of his evangelical theology of
justification, for he sets it in relation both to real law-keeping and to the monastic
theology of Christ’s mystical union with the soul. He first rehearses the now familiar
doctrinal and spiritual contentions against the late medieval theology and piety in
which he was reared and trained. According to Biel, Johannes von Paltz, the Erfurt
philosophers, and sundry other moral optimists of the period, graceless filii Adae are
able—by virtue of their incorrupt natural powers—to keep the law according to its
substance through a freely elicited act of the will. Indeed, they may do so not merely
in the sense of an “external operation,” viz., an external good work or pious deed, but
“for God’s sake and from the heart.” And if they do so, they merit de congruo the first
grace of justification.922
The anti-Pelagian Augustine had taught Luther to know better: “The will, if it
were allowed, would never do what the law commands: for it is unwilling (Inuita)
toward the good and prone toward evil.”923 That is to say, the fallen, vitiated, selfenslaved will, unaided by God’s gift of healing grace: for Luther quickly adds that
grace transforms the law-averse will and “makes it willing and cheerful (libentem ac
922
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hilarem) toward the law.”924 This marks yet another succinct statement of Augustine’s
theology of the will’s renovation through grace: a gratia sanans so powerful in its
renewing effects that the very same will that once shuddered in aversion to the law
now delights in it. Following the insightful lead of Andreas Wöhle,925 I argued in
chapter 2 that this will-renewing “joy in God’s law” comprises the inner spiritual
marrow of Luther’s mature theology of the Spirit’s nature-renovating gift; and in
chapter 3 we saw its centrality in Luther’s exposition of Rom. 7. I shall return to it
below, in section 5 of this chapter.
First, we need to attend to the unique way in which Luther develops the
Brautmystik he inherits from Bernard and Staupitz vis-à-vis his own pressing concern
with residual sin in God’s law-delighting saints. In the course of elaborating a doctrine
of justification in Christ through union and exchange that is very similar to the one he
will famously celebrate in the 1520 tractate on The Freedom of a Christian, Luther
shifts back and forth between emphases on the “external” and “internal” goods
bestowed upon the soul (or the Church) through union with Christ. Referring back to
the contrast between intrinsic and extrinsic justification in the first lines of the Rom.
4:7 scholion,926 Luther follows up his clear statement of the will’s inner renovation into
joyful law-keeping with a claim that jars the reader because it seems to tug in the
opposite direction:
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Therefore there is need for grace, which makes the will willing and cheerful
toward the law. Therefore I rightly said that all our good is extrinsic to us (Extrinsecum
nobis), because it is Christ.927
Luther supplies 1 Cor. 1:30 as a proof-text to this effect: Christ became for us wisdom,
righteousness, sanctification, and redemption.928 This is why Luther states that Jesus
Christ is himself all our good. Thus while Christ is (pro) nobis, he is—as the Son of God
in our flesh, the real living Person who is the Church’s Bridegroom—necessarily
Extrinsecum nobis. But as soon as Luther has quoted 1 Cor. 1:30 to explain the
“external” nature of omne bonum nostrum, he shifts swiftly back to its “internal”
reality: “These things”—i.e., wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption—
“are in us (in nobis sunt), but only through faith and hope in Him.”929 This, I suggest,
goes a long way in explaining the at first puzzling “therefore” that links the two
sentences cited above. The gratia that transforms the vitiated will in its inmost
affective being is “external” to the believer in the sense that it comes to him from
without, ab extra. But through faith and hope in Christ, this grace does indeed enter
into the depths of the believer’s soul. For grace—omne bonum nostrum—is Jesus
Christ (1 Cor. 1:30), and Christ dwells in the Church through faith (Eph. 3:17): “In the
Song of Songs, all the Church’s praise is of Christ, who dwells in her through faith.”930
We thus arrive in decidedly Finnish territory. In discussing the same apparent
tension between gratia ab extra and gratia in nobis in chapter 2, I pointed to an article
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by Eero Huovinen that illuminates this point well.931 For the moment, I wish to
highlight the second of the two inseparable functions or roles that the indwelling
Christ (or “grace”) plays vis-à-vis both the residual vitiation and intrinsic guilt of
indwelling sin. In the first place, “grace” as gratia sanans heals the will and restores it
to cheerful law-keeping. But in the second, “grace” as the indwelling Christ—the
mystical Bridegroom of the Song—covers the poverty, emptiness, and ugliness of his
Bride with the free gift of his righteousness. Indeed, for Luther this mystical theology
of union with Christ and joyful exchange fleshes out the spiritual “mechanism” (if you
will) that lies beneath the Augustinian (nupt. conc. 1.25.28) theology of sinful desire’s
non-imputation which has dominated the Rom. 4:7 scholia to this point. Mystical
union and forensic non-imputation, the mellifluous Bernard and the polemical
Augustine, King Solomon’s erotic poetry and the Apostle Paul’s epistolary dogmatics,
are thus united to form a dogmatic whole that coheres intimately with Luther’s
penitential spirituality:
In the Song of Songs, the Church often confesses that she is naked and is
described as having no other desideria except for the Bridegroom, saying:
“Draw me after You, we will run to the odor of your ointments” [1:4]. Always
she seeks, always she desires, always she praises the Bridegroom. By this, she
shows plainly that she herself is empty and poor within herself (intra se), and
that her own fullness and righteousness is outside herself (extra se). For if the
confessions of the saints are only to be understood as referring to past sins, and
in the present they are pure, then why do they confess not only past sins, but
also present ones? It’s because they know that sin is in them, but that for
Christ’s sake it is covered and not imputed: so that they may declare that all
their good is outside themselves in Christ (extra se in Christo), who
nevertheless is in them through faith (per fidem in ipsis est).932
931

Eero Huovinen, “Der infusio-Gedanke als Problem der Lutherforschung.”
WA 56.279.27-280.4: Sic Ecclesia in Canticis se nudam sepius confitetur et non nisi sponsi
desideria scribitur habere, dicens: ‘trahe me post te, in odore vngentorum tuorum curremus’. Semper
petit, Semper desiderat, Semper commendat sponsum. Quo manifeste sese vacuam et pauperem
ostendit intra se esse, et extra se esse plenitudinem et Iustitiam suam. Si enim solum pro preteritis
932
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The Bride’s plaintive cries of longing in the Song for the Bridegroom attest her own
emptiness and poverty. For Luther, the Bride’s frank recognition of her ugliness
supplies further scriptural proof for his advanced Augustinian doctrine of the residual
sinfulness of the saints. Real honest sancti desire Christ’s beauty, riches, fullness, and
righteousness all the more earnestly precisely because they know that the “sin” still
dwelling within them makes them unrighteous, empty, poor, and misshapen. But
propter Christum, this sin is not imputed to their account: and extra se in Christo, all
his wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption has become their very own
good. Yet the Christ for whose sake the saints are forensically pardoned, the Christ in
whom the saints find their righteousness extra se, is the Christ who dwells within
them through faith.933

5. An “Augustinian” phrase, c. Iul. 2, and Luther’s covenant theology circa 1515
In the strength of this excursus toward a “Finnish” mystical theology of justification
through union and exchange, Luther now returns to his major themes of true

peccatis intelligendȩ sunt confessiones sanctorum et in presenti esse puros Vt quid non solum
preterita, Sed etiam prȩsentia confitentur? Nisi quod sciunt in se esse peccatum, Sed propter
Christum tegi et non imputari, Vt omne suum bonum extra se in Christo, qui tamen per fidem in ipsis
est, protestentur. Cf. LW 25.267.
933
In the sequel (WA 56.280.8-9), Luther reprises this mystical theology of righteousness in Christ
through a christological reading of Ps. 45:1-4, concluding: Nos regnum eius [viz., Christi], Sed
pulchritudo in nobis non est nostra, Sed ipsius, Qua tegit nostram fȩditatem. A few pages prior to the
text under consideration here, Luther develops the same theology in an exposition of Ps. 32:1-2.
There he employs a rich christological interpretation of Ruth 3:7-9 plus Ezek. 16:8, Ps. 45, and Ps.
63:7 (WA 56.278.1-10, cf. LW 25.265): Tegitur, inquam, per Christum in nobis habitantem, Sicut in
figura dixit Ruth ad Boos: ‘Expande pallium tuum super famulam tuam, quia propinquus es.’ ‘Et
leuato pallio proiecit se ad pedes eius’ i. e. anima proiicit se ad humanitatem Christi et tegitur ipsius
Iustitia. Item Ezech. 16.: ‘Et expandi amictum meum super te et operui ignominiam tuam.’ Et psalmo
62.: ‘Et in velamento alarum tuarum exultabo.’ Item psalmo 44.: ‘filiȩ regum in honore’ i. e. decore tuo,
vnde honorantur a te et tu in illis. Et ‘Specie tua et pulchritudine tua intende’ etc., dimisso itaque malo
opere et residuo peccati i. e. fomitis non imputato, donec sanetur.
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repentance and healing grace. Once again, he is worried about spiritual laziness; only
this time, a text Luther clearly regards as pseudo-Augustinian is part of the problem:
Hence also many hand themselves over into sluggishness and security by virtue
of confidence in that word, which blessed Augustine is supposed to have said:
“A great part of righteousness, is wanting to be righteous.”934
Magna pars iustitiae, velle esse iustum: the way Luther introduces the phrase suggests
that it was something of a proverbial commonplace, a stock-in-trade maxim of
monastic lore. As it happens, he was right to doubt its Augustinian provenance. In the
WA apparatus, Ficker points to Augustine’s ep. 127.5; but though the gist of its sense is
there, the phrase itself is not.935 Where then did it come from?
In antiquity, two intriguing possibilities emerge. In the course of treating
confession and repentance in book 2 of his Sententiae, Isidore of Seville (c. 560-633)
writes: “Now, it is a great part of righteousness (Magna iam iustitiae pars est) for a
man to know himself, that he is depraved, in order that he may be more humbly
subject to divine virtue by God’s help, from whom he recognizes his own infirmity.”936
Like his predecessors Prosper of Aquitaine and Fulgentius of Ruspe, Isidore gathered
and organized patristic florilegia, including to be sure numerous texts from Augustine
himself. His Sententiae served as a basic reference work for early medieval theologians
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WA 56.280.10-12: Vnde et illius Verbi fiducia multi se in torporem et securitatem tradunt, Quod b.
Aug. dixisse fertur: ‘Magna pars Iustitiȩ, Velle esse Iustum.’ Cf. LW 25.267.
935
Augustine, ep. 127.5, PL 33.485: Iusta vero vita, cum volumus, adest, quia eam ipsam plene velle,
iustitia est; nec plus aliquid perficienda iustitia, quam perfectam voluntatem requirit. Vide si labor
est, ubi velle satis est.
936
Isidore, Sententiae 2.13 (CCSL 111.120.1-3): DE CONFESSIONE PECCATORVM ET PAENITENTIA. 1.
Ex eo unusquisque iustus esse incipit, ex quo sui accusator extiterit. Multi autem e contra semetipsos
peccatores fatentur, et tamen semetipsos a peccato non subtrahunt. 2. Magna iam iustitiae pars est
seipsum nosse homo quod prauus est, ut ex deo diuinae uirtuti subdatur humilius, ex quo suam
infirmitatem agnoscit. 3. Bene se iudicat iustus in hac uita, ne iudicetur a Deo damnatione perpetua.
Tunc autem iudicium de se quisque sumit, quando per dignam paenitentiam sua praua facta
condemnat.
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and, as such, was a major precursor to Peter Lombard’s more famous textbook by the
same title.937 The broadly Augustinian and monastic ethos of penitential humilitypiety is unmistakable in Isidore’s text, which resonates deeply with Luther’s spiritual
teaching. Isidore’s magna iustitiae pars may lie near the origins of a phrase that came
to circulate in late medieval monasteries under Augustine’s name and eventually
reached Luther through (say) Johannes Greffenstein, the Erfurt Augustinian novicemaster, as early as summer 1505.938
Farther back of Isidore’s magna pars are two instances in the letters of Seneca.
In ep. 34 he writes: pars magna bonitatis est velle fieri bonum, “a great part of goodness
is wanting to become good.”939 Then, in ep. 71, he likewise writes: magna pars est
profectus velle proficere, “it is a great part of making progress to want to make
progress.”940 Now, what is especially intriguing about these two magna pars phrases in
Seneca is their substantial similarity (when combined together) to an adage in
Bernard’s ep. 91 that became quite popular in subsequent medieval piety:
Minime pro certo est bonus, qui melior esse non vult, et ubi incipis nolle fieri
melior, ibi desinis etiam esse bonus.
To be sure, that man last of all is good who does not want to be better, and at
the point where you begin to not want to become better, there you cease even
to be good.941
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See Ulrich G. Leinsle, Introduction to Scholastic Theology, trans. Michael J. Miller (Washington:
Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 31-33.
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On Greffenstein and Luther’s novitiate, see Brecht, Road to Reformation, 57-61; Saak, 633.
939
Seneca, epistulae morales ad Lucilium 34, par. 2, LLA 335.PH (Tuebner, O. Hense, 1938), p. 110.
940
ep. 71, par. 35, ibid. p. 252: Instemus itaque et perseveremus. Plus, quam profligavimus, restat, sed
magna pars est profectus velle proficere. Huius rei conscius mihi sum: volo et mente tota volo.
941
Bernard, ep. 91, par. 3 (Bernardi Opera, ed. J. Leclerq and H. M. Rochais, 1974-77, vol. 7-8):
Vidit Iacob in scala angelos ascendentes et descendentes: numquid stantem quempiam, sive
sedentem? Non est stare omnino in pendulo fragilis scalae, neque in incerto huius mortalis vitae
quidquam in eodem statu permanent. NON HABEMUS HIC MANENTEM CIVITATEM, nec futuram
adhuc possidemus, sed inquirimus. Aut ascendas necesse est, aut descendas: si attentas stare, ruas
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We know that Bernard’s aphorism made a deep impression on brother Martin.
Sometime in the period 1513-16, he inscribed it on the inside of the front cover of his
copy of the Opuscula Anselmi,942 and it factors critically in his 1516 scholion on Rom.
12:2.943 In itself, however, this gets us nowhere with respect to explaining the
provenance of the pseudo-Augustinian magna pars iustitiae known to Luther.
But the plot thickens. In a fifteenth-century sermon series attributed to the
Czech reformer Jan Hus (c. 1369-1415), Bernard’s aphorism and the crucial line from
Seneca’s ep. 34 appear in tandem:

esse
in

Unde Bernhardus in quadam epistola: “Minime pro certo est bonus, qui melior
non vult; et ubi incipit nolle fieri melior, ibi desinit esse bonus.” Unde Seneca
Epistolis: “Magna pars bonitatis est velle fieri bonum.”944

The modern editor of this text thinks it unlikely to originate from Hus himself, though
its author was certainly Czech and possibly a Hussite. Much of its substance appears
to have been drawn from the Postilla studentium of Konrad Waldhauser (c. 1320/251369), a leading preacher in Bohemia and a predecessor of the Hussites. Had Luther
read either Waldhauser’s Postilla or the fifteenth-century sermons based thereupon?
Probably not, given the strong animosity toward Hus and the Bohemians prevalent
amongst German Catholics in the early sixteenth century for both theological (the
necesse est. Minime pro certo est bonus, qui melior esse non vult, et ubi incipis nolle fieri melior, ibi
desinis etiam esse bonus.
942
WA 9.107.22-3.
943
WA 56.441.14-21: Hoc pro profectu dicitur. Nam loquitur iis, qui iam incȩperunt esse Christiani.
Quorum vita non est in quiescere, sed in moueri de bono in melius velut egrotus de egritudine in
sanitatem, vt et Dominus ostendit in homine Semiuiuo in curam Samaritani suscepto. Sic Genes. 1.
Spiritus Domini non quiescebat, Sed ‘ferebatur super aquas’. Et Deu. 32.: ‘Quasi aquila prouocans ad
volandum pullos suos et super ipsos volitans.’ Psalmo 17.: ‘Ascendit et volauit, Volauit super pennas
Ventorum.’ Vnde B. Bernardus: ‘vbi incipis nolle fieri melior, desinis esse bonus.’ Cf. also WA 1.649.18,
3.46.41.
944
Dicta de tempore magistro Iohanni Hus attributa, sermo 60 (dominica XXI post trinitatem),
CCCM 239A pag 1284.
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specter of heresy) and political (war) reasons. Luther himself did not begin to realize
the affinity between Hus’ theology and his own until John Eck pinned him in a
Bohemian corner at the Leipzig debate in summer 1519. By February 1520, Luther
confided to Spalatin: “I have taught and held all the teachings of Johannes Huss, but
thus far I did not know it.”945 In 1515/16, St. Paul, Augustine, Staupitz, Tauler, and
Bernard supplied the resources that fueled Luther’s explosive theological
development; and if Bohemian theology ever did enter his field of vision, I suspect it
did so as the dreaded Hussite heresy and not as a potential comrade-in-arms.946 All to
say: Luther did not acquire the pseudo-Augustinian aphorism from a Czech source.
This, however, does not diminish the importance of the Czech sermons for our
purpose. For what counts is this: Bernard is the premier monastic theologian, and
Seneca nearly supplies the exact phrase as it appears in Luther, once bonitatis/bonum
are exchanged for iustitiae/iustum. Their convergence in an obscure fifteenth-century
Czech sermon suggests exactly the kind of widespread, commonplace, proverbial, and
piety-theological provenance for the magna pars iustitiae, velle esse iustum that
Luther’s way of framing its appearance in the Rom. 4:7 scholion reflects. In short: the
saying was “in the air,” and at some point Luther heard it attributed to Augustine.
945

Luther to George Spalatin, 14 Feb. 1520 (#254), WA Br 2.42.22-3, LW 48.153. Luther continues (ll.
23-9): “Johannes Staupitz has taught in the same unintentional way. In short, we are all Hussites
without knowing it. Even Paul and Augustine are Hussites ad verbum. See the monstrous things
into which we fall, I ask you, even without the Bohemian leader and teacher. I am so shocked that I
do not know what to think when I see such terrible judgments of God over men, that the most
evident evangelical truth was already publicly burned more than one hundred years ago and
regarded as condemned. Neither is one allowed to confess this. Woe to the earth! Farewell.”
946
We find a typical statement of Luther’s own prejudice in a 1514 sermon, where he sets the
contemporary contrast between Catholics and Hussites in parallel to the biblical contrast between
Jews and Samaritans. WA 4.614.22-25: Et perinde fuit ut hodie nobiscum et Bohemis in
administratione eucharistiae non convenit. Atque ita exprobrabant eis nomen exosum
Samaritanorum, ut nos hereticum Boemicum nuncupamus obiurgando quenquam et demonibus
refertum.
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But now to the aphorism itself. Luther dislikes it if interpreted within the
theological and penitential framework of die Sawtheologen, for thus understood it
encourages spiritual sloth. The decisive question is this: what qualifies as “wanting
(velle) to be righteous”? Luther says his opponents locate it in the minute self-elicited
act (actum elicitum minutissimum)947 that I discussed in section 3 above. Here,
Luther’s discussion is less technical and more overtly pastoral in nature. The Bielish
theology of penance and half-merited justification is spiritually pernicious for two
reasons. First, it summons the penitent to a once-off mustering of his spiritual efforts
in order to make sacramental penance efficacious (facientibus quod in se est, deus non
denegat gratiam) by keeping the law. But St. Paul and Augustine have shown that this
is impossible, for the law works wrath (Rom. 4:15) and, weakened as it is by the flesh, it
cannot accomplish justification (Rom. 8:3). In the second place, Sawtheologie
encourages spiritual laziness after one has in fact done what was in his power to do
and thus received the infusion of justifying grace. For after the momentarily
heightened spiritual intensity involved in eliciting the inner act of loving God super
omnia, the justified person relapses into spiritual relaxation. This, for Luther, is a
delusional and dangerous pitfall, for it encourages fiducia and securitas at the very
moment when the pastor ought instead to instruct the penitent to continue in the way
of repentance and to go on humbly begging for increased supplies of healing grace.
The pseudo-Augustinian aphorism short-circuits this laborious and lifelong
process. For if “wanting to be iustus” is interpreted as eliciting the small act of the will
requisite for iustificatio; and if this minimal velle is thought to be not only adequate
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WA 56.280.12, cf. LW 25.267.
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for getting into a state of grace, but itself a magna pars iustitiae; then the “justified”
penitent, possessed as he is of a great part of righteousness, has no reason to regard
himself a sin-sick person in need of gratia sanans for the deepened healing of his soul
and the progressive increase of his righteousness. So Luther:
They equate this “wanting” with the minutest elicited act: but then it relapses
and begins nothing (nihil incipientem), and they go out from it snoring most
securely.948
That is to say: Bielish penitents elicit the act, go to confession, come out “safe”—and
take a break, at just the moment when they ought rather to begin to seek healing,
humility, and holiness afresh. Now, for earnest brother Martin—his head full of
monastic wisdom about never ceasing to “begin” (ubi incipis nolle fieri melior, ibi
desinis etiam esse bonus; proficere, hoc est semper a novo incipere)949 and his heart set
on the pursuit of holiness—the pastor of the Church who counsels a penitent soul in
this way does nothing less than plunge him into the spiritual destruction of security,
sloth, and presumption.

948

WA 56.280.12-14: Itaque hoc Velle ponunt actum elicitum minutissimum, cȩterum mox relabentem
et nihil incipientem, quo tamen securissime eunt stertentes. Cf. LW 25.267-8.
949
WA 56.441.21 (on Rom. 12:2) and 486.7 (on Rom. 13:11). As noted above, at Rom. 12:2 Luther is
quoting Bernard’s ep. 91. At Rom. 13:11, Luther has just cited a different place in Bernard to the same
effect (Sermo 2 in Vigilia nativitatis Domini, PL 183.90), and is continuing himself in the same vein
of humility-oriented monastic theology (ll. 1-14): De quibus B. Bernardus: ‘Qui non assidue festinat
ad penitentiam, facto dicit se non indigere penitentia.’ Si non penitentia, ergo nec misericordia; si non
misericordia, ergo nec salute. Quod non potest facere, nisi qui sit sine peccato sicut Deus et angeli.
Ideo Bene Apostolus Christianis loquens exhortatur, vt surgant, cum tamen non essent Christiani,
nisi surrexissent, Sed quia stare in via Dei, hoc est retrocedere, Et proficere, hoc est semper a nouo
incipere; Vnde Ecclesiasticus Non dixit: Cum profȩcerit, Sed ‘cum consummauerit homo, etiam tunc
incipiet’. Sicut Sanctus Arsenius orabat Deum quottidie: ‘Adiuua me, Domine, Vt incipiam tibi viuere.’
Sicut enim Apostolus de scientia dixit, Quod ‘si quis sibi videtur scire, nondum cognouit, quomodo
oporteat eum scire’, ita de singulis Virtutibus inferendum: Qui se putat apprehendisse et incepisse,
nescit, quomodo oporteat eum incipere. In addition to the biblical texts, note that Luther cites
Arsenius’ saying from the Vitae Patrum: standard reading in the Augustinian cloister. On Bernard’s
aphorism vis-à-vis Luther’s Ockhamist theory of motion, see Dieter, 311-12, 317-18.
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But abusus non tollit usum, and Luther thinks the pseudo-Augustinian
aphorism is patient of an orthodox and spiritually wise interpretation. Indeed, when
read properly in light of a genuinely Augustinian theology of real renewal and
embattled holiness, the aphorism can be ratcheted up a notch further: “True it is that
willing is righteousness, but it is not a great part but the whole righteousness (tota
Iustitia) which one can have in this life.”950 This Velle is not, however, the stuff of Biel’s
elicited act, but of St. Paul’s imperfectly renewed will in its Rom. 7-style struggle
against the desires of the flesh:
Not that [i.e., the Bielish] Velle, but what the Apostle calls for below: “To will
(Velle) lies at hand for me, but to complete (perficere) I do not find” [Rom.
7:18b]. For this whole life is a time of willing (volendi) righteousness, but never
of completing (perficiendi) [righteousness]. But [completion is] in the future
life.951
Grane discusses this text at several turning points, and pits Luther and Augustine
against one another. For Augustine, velle esse iustum refers to the grace-renewed will
successfully resisting the residual concupiscence which holds it back from perfection.
For Luther, it speaks of the Christian’s unconditional agreement with God’s will, on
the basis of which he confesses he is a total sinner and takes refuge in Christ’s alien
righteousness and God’s merciful reputatio.952 To will to be righteous is to recognize
that one cannot fulfill the law ex viribus suis—whether or not he is aided by grace—
and therefore to long and pray for “grace,” which Grane equates with mercy,
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WA 56.280.14-15: Verum est, Quod Velle esse Iustitiam, non est magna pars, immo tota Iustitia,
que in hac vita potest haberi. Cf. LW 25.268.
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WA 56.280.15-18: Verum non illud Velle, Sed quod infra Apostolus vocat: ‘Velle mihi adiacet,
perficere non Inuenio.’ Tota enim hȩc Vita est tempus volendi Iustitiam, perficiendi vero nequaquam,
Sed futura vita. Cf. LW 25.268.
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Grane, Modus loquendi, 99.
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forgiveness, and/or non-imputation.953 It is to confess one’s sin, renounce one’s
righteousness, and trust in Christ’s instead.954 In short, for Grane’s Luther “wanting to
be righteous” amounts to a near equivalent of the “total simul,” and as such it
expresses a non-sanative, imputational theology of justification.
Now, for Grane—who asserts this interpretative axiom fairly early in his
argument—Luther’s novel reinterpretation of the traditional velle esse iustum supplies
the key to grasping why his seemingly Augustinian exegesis of Rom. 7 is in reality of
another kind altogether: the hands are the hands of Augustine, but the voice is Paul’s
and Luther’s.955 To take the most important instance, when Grane sets his hand to
explain the long excerpt from c. Iul. 3.26.62 which effectively comprises the scholion
on Rom. 7:18, he insists we remember that Luther has basically altered the meaning of
Augustine’s velle esse iustum. In light of Luther’s revision of the aphorism’s meaning, it
becomes clear that his intended agreement with Augustine’s facere/perficere
distinction and its theory of consent is only apparent; and therefore, Luther’s
agreement with the Augustinian theology of real inchoate Heilung, for which refusing
to volitionally “complete” the desires that one’s flesh “does” against one’s gracerenewed will is an integral component, is only apparent too. For Luther, non
consentire means saying Nein to one’s self and giving way to God’s judgment—i.e., just
what Grane asserts “wanting to be righteous” means. But for Augustine, nonconsent—and by extension, velle esse iustum—means “that the already justified
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person resists the inclinations which are still present even after the forgiveness of
original sin.”956
In fact, Luther himself intends exactly the position which Grane urges as the
merely apparent Augustinian alternative. This is why he refers infra to Rom. 7: if you
want to understand the aphorism, Luther is saying, you need to read Paul on velle. As
an eager student of the “420s Augustine,” to want to be righteous—or simply to want
righteousness—is for Luther to want to be perfectly or completely righteous, without
remainder. This finds paradigmatic expression in St. Paul’s desire—his “wanting”—to
bring to whole-hearted completion that delight in the law which already truly
characterizes his renovated heart (Rom. 7:22) to the extent that it has been renovated
into spiritus by the Spirit’s grace. But in this life, so long as Paul’s residual flesh
remains to be reckoned with in the combat—for it “does” things (facere) against his
holy will—his renewed will can at best “do” (facere) imperfectly the holy spiritual
actions it longs to execute in the flawless perfection of love. Constricted in his spiritual
affections by the contrary desires of the flesh, Paul cannot yet “complete” (perficere)
the things he longs for and delights in, though he emphatically refuses to permit his
flesh to bring its desires to completion either. So far Augustine—and Luther. For in
Luther’s modus loquendi augustinianus, “wanting to be righteous” (Rom. 7:18b: velle
adiacet mihi) names the graced possibility in the present age that ruefully
compensates for the present impossibility of “completing the good” (Rom. 7:18c:
perficere autem bonum, non invenio). This entire life is a time of grace-produced
wanting to be unreservedly righteous. Only in the life to come will the saints bring
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their present longings to completion in the perfections of glory. It is this Augustinian
eschatological reserve, not some alleged indifference to real growth in holiness, that
explains why Luther can modify the pseudo-Augustinian aphorism in what seems to
Grane’s twentieth-century eyes an innovative direction: velle iustitiam is not just pars
iustitiae, but tota iustitia. In fact, Luther’s insistence that velle esse iustum is—under
the conditions of the present life—the apex and sum of Christian righteousness is of a
piece with his broad program of Augustinian ressourcement, as exemplified above all
in his exegesis of Rom. 7.
The context bears this out plainly. Not coincidently, it includes the sweeping
reference to c. Iul. 2 that I mentioned in passing above, on the heels of which Luther
composes a rich statement of his Augustinian theology of indwelling sin, healing
grace, and merciful non-imputation as they intersect in the spiritual experience of the
true monastic:
“To will (Velle) lies at hand for me, but to complete (perficere) I do not find”
[Rom. 7:18b]. For this whole life is a time of willing (volendi) righteousness, but
never of completing (perficiendi) [righteousness]. But [completion is] in the
future life. Therefore, to will (Velle) is to show by all powers, pursuits, prayers,
works, sufferings that we desire righteousness (desideremus Iustitiam), but that
we do not yet have it perfectly. Regarding these matters, see blessed Augustine
writing most beautifully and richly in many books, especially book 2 against
Julian, adducing St. Ambrose, Hilary, Cyprian, Chrysostom, Basil, Nazianzus,
Irenaeus, Reticius, Olympius. Therefore the mother of hypocrites and cause of
hypocrisy is security itself. Thus God leaves us in this sin, in the tinder, in
concupiscence (in peccato isto, in fomite, in concupiscentia), so that he may
keep us in the fear of Him and humility, in order that thus we may always flee
to his grace (gratiam): always frightened lest we should sin, i.e., always praying,
lest He impute it to us and permit sin to rule (peccatum dominari sinat [Rom.
6:14]). To be sure, by the very fact that we do not fear, we sin. Obviously, since
this evil in us is sin per se, because on its account we do not fulfill the love of
God above all things. By this alone does it become venial and is not imputed,
that we groan for it and—lest God perhaps should damn us because of it
(propter ipsum), lest he impute it to us—we anxiously implore his mercy
(misericordiam) and pray that it be taken away through his grace (gratiam) and
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thus confess that we are sinners because of it (ex ipso) and regard ourselves as
sinners by weeping, by repenting, by grieving, by shedding tears. For when this
fear and anxiety cease, straightaway security sets in; when security sets in,
straightway the imputation of God in peccatum returns. For this reason: God
has decreed (statuerit) that he wills to not impute [sin] only to the person who
groans and fears and assiduously implores his mercy. By this most merciful
counsel (consilio), our most godly God drives us to weariness of this life, to
hope of the future life, to desire for his grace (desiderium gratiȩ suȩ), to hatred
of sin, to penitence, etc.957
In the first place, contra Grane, Luther clearly does not limit velle esse iustum to
confessing one’s sinfulness and accepting God’s judgment. “To will” in the full-bodied
Pauline sense of the term—omnis viribus—means to evince one’s deep longing as
homo spiritualis for the perfect righteousness he cannot yet attain, and to do so
concretely through the central practices of monastic piety: pursuits (studiis: either
spiritual endeavors broadly or monastic studies more narrowly), prayers, works,
sufferings, weeping, grieving, groaning, repenting, tears, abasement, confession,
humility, the fear of God. The influence of Luther’s spiritual Sitz im Leben upon the
text is unmistakable: “wanting righteousness” evidently entails the kind of hard
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WA 56.280.15-281.21: Verum non illud Velle, Sed quod infra Apostolus vocat: ‘Velle mihi adiacet,
perficere non Inuenio.’ Tota enim hȩc Vita est tempus volendi Iustitiam, perficiendi vero nequaquam,
Sed futura vita. Velle itaque est omnibus viribus, studiis, orationibus, operibus, passionibus ostendere,
quod desideremus Iustitiam, nondum autem perfectum habeamus. De quibus Vide pulcherrime et
locupletissime in multis libris b. Aug⌊ustinum, precipue li. 2. contra Iulianum, allegantem S. Ambro.,
Hila., Cyprian, Chrisost., Basilium, Nazianz, Hireneum, Reticium, Olimpum. Mater igitur
hipocritarum et Causa hipocrisis est ipsa securitas. Deus enim ideo nos in peccato isto, in fomite, in
concupiscentia derelinquit, Vt nos in timore sui et humilitate custodiat, vt sic ad eius gratiam semper
recurramus, Semper pauidi, ne peccemus i. e. semper orantes, ne nobis imputet et peccatum dominari
sinat. Immo eoipso peccamus non timendo, Quippe cum hoc malum in nobis per se sit peccatum, quia
non implemus propter ipsum dilectionem Dei super omnia. Hoc solo autem fit veniale et non
imputatur, Quod pro ipso gemimus, et ne forte Deus propter ipsum nos damnet, ne nobis imputet,
misericordiam ipsius solliciti imploramus et auferri per gratiam eius oramus ac sic peccatores nos ex
ipso confiteamur ac pro peccatoribus nos habeamus flendo, pȩnitendo, dolendo, lachrymando.
Cessante enim isto timore et sollicitudine mox ponitur securitas, posita securitate mox redit
Imputatio Dei in peccatum, eo quod statuerit Deus nulli velle non imputare nisi gementi et timenti ac
assidue misericordiam suam imploranti. Quo consilio misericordissimo nos piissimus Deus cogit ad
tedium huius vitȩ, ad spem futurȩ vitȩ, ad desiderium gratiȩ suȩ, ad odium peccati, ad penitentiam etc.
Cf. LW 25.268.
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spiritual work—and intense spiritual sufferings—which by 1515 Luther himself had
zealously undertaken for some ten years as an observant Augustinian friar.
In the second, and in line with his apt if broad appeal to Augustine contra
Iulianum, Luther sets out his dogmatics of sin and grace, holiness and mercy. The “sin”
that God wisely leaves his saints in, is evil desire: fomes/concupiscentia. This malum is
“obviously” peccatum per se: not because it eliminates real holiness in the saints
altogether, but because it keeps them back from the perfect dilectio Dei super omnia
that the law demands and that their own renewed hearts desire to fulfill. But this
painful state of affairs is actually to the saints’ great advantage, for the ongoing
presence of evil desire humbles them. This counteracts the most dangerous vice of all,
spiritual pride, and keeps them in a state of fear before God. Thus forestalled from
lapsing into laxity and securitas, the saints’ “sin” spurs them on to seek increases of
“grace.” By this “grace,” Luther means gratia sanans: for it actually takes away (auferri)
the sin that remains in the saints, and stops whatever bits of it God in his wisdom has
left behind for their humiliation from gaining the upper hand (dominari, an allusion to
Rom. 6:14). To be sure, the saints are frightened by the real and present danger of
falling into sin; but empowered by this grace, they do not actually succumb to the evil
affective impulses which they are forced to suffer. So long as they keep up the fight,
groaning against sin and begging God for both gratia and misericordia—that is, for
healing grace and pardoning mercy—God declines to impute the “sin” that thus
remains to their account. What is intrinsically damnable sin becomes pardonable,
veniale, by God’s mercy—but only under certain conditions. The non-imputation of
the saints’ sinful concupiscentia is contingent upon their continuance in the way of
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real holiness begun by God’s grace. Since their healing is real but fragile, their
attainment of mercy is precarious and uncertain. If humble fear gives way to
presumptuous security, God reverses his judgment of mercy and imputes what had
once been venial sin in peccatum. Residual affective “sin,” grace-produced healing and
renewal, merciful non-imputation contingent upon the refusal of consent to the sin
that remains: these are the consistent Augustinian components of Luther’s theology of
holiness circa 1515/16.
One final point remains to be considered. The spiritual usefulness of “sin” for
killing pride, inducing humility, and driving the penitent to seek grace—think of St.
David, or St. Peter—is classic Augustinian wisdom: virtus, Augustine never tired of
lecturing Julian, infirmitate perficitur (2 Cor. 12:7-10).958 But in the last sentences of the
above-cited paragraph, there are hints of the way Luther is restating this Augustinian
inheritance in terms of the late medieval “covenant” or pactum theology he had read
in Biel.959 For the conditional relationship that obtains between the sinner-saint’s
penitence, non-consent, and “yearning for grace” on the one hand, and God’s merciful
non-imputation on the other, is itself the result of God’s free determination. He might
(de potentia absoluta) have decreed otherwise: but in his mercy, God has chosen not
to impute sin when the appropriate conditions are met; and having resolved to act
thus (de potentia ordinata), his decrees are very trustworthy (Ps. 93:5). “God has
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See e.g. c. ep. Pel. 3.7.18, c. Iul. 2.4.8, 4.2.11, 4.3.28. Cf. Thomas F. Martin, O.S.A., “Paul the Patient:
Christus Medicus and the “Stimulus Carnis” (2 Cor. 12:7): A Consideration of Augustine’s Medicinal
Christology”; Hombert, Gloria Gratiae, 310-12.
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Berndt Hamm, Promissio, Pactum, Ordinatio: Freiheit und Selbstbindung Gottes in der
scholasticschen Gnadenlehre (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1977).
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decreed (statuerit) that he wills to not impute [sin] only to the person who groans and
fears and assiduously implores his mercy.”960
Against prevalent caricatures of Ockhamist covenant theology, it should be
said that this resolution on God’s part is not arbitrary in a capricious sense: for it is the
fruit of his wise and merciful counsel (consilium), and he is a God piissimus.961
Furthermore, as students of the Dictata have long recognized, Luther is refashioning
these theories in several respects. For one thing, he does not describe the condition for
obtaining mercy in terms of a half-merit: that door, as we have seen, is firmly shut for
Luther once he has digested the bracing Augustinian doctrine of fallen human nature
as vitiated in all its powers. For all the flaws in his interpretation, Grane is still helpful
in this regard: contra Gabrielem, the sinner contributes nothing to his justification
apart from his sin; and if he does what lies in his power to do, additional sin is the only
possible outcome. But in the present instance, the doctrinal and spiritual context for
Luther’s nascent covenant theology is not the prima gratia of initial justification—as
for Biel’s doctrine—but rather the question of how a graced or justified person
remains a beneficiary of God’s mercy and grace once he has already received it. For
Luther, such a person is in fact capable of acting in the spiritually requisite manner—
refusing to consent to residual sin, begging for increased grace in prayer, pleading for
mercy, etc.—because gratia sanans really has begun to heal and restore his wounded
soul. And as I argued in chapter 2, such Spirit-empowered non-consent to residual
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WA 56.281.18-19: statuerit Deus nulli velle non imputare nisi gementi et timenti ac assidue
misericordiam suam imploranti. Cf. LW 25.268.
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WA 56.281.19-20: Quo consilio misericordissimo nos piissimus Deus cogit ad tedium huius vitȩ, ad
spem futurȩ vitȩ, ad desiderium gratiȩ suȩ, ad odium peccati, ad penitentiam etc. Cf. LW 25.268. At
civ. dei 10.1.3 (Bett. 373), Augustine explains that since pietas often refers in vernacular Latin to the
works of mercy commanded by God, “from this custom of speaking it has come about that even
God himself is said to be pius.”
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“sin” very much remains the conditio sine qua non for abiding in a state of grace (and
gift) for the duration of Luther’s theological career.
I will return to this matter in Part III below. But to head off the charge of
synergism which I anticipate from some corners, I wish to be clear about two points.
First, from 1515 right into the 1540s, Luther holds that the conditions which the
renewed person must fulfill to remain in God’s grace lie outside the reach of his
natural powers to accomplish. The believer depends entirely on renovating grace—
gratia sanans in 1515/16, donum Spiritus Sancti later on—in order to fight and conquer
residual sin’s allurements (not to mention the world’s and the devil’s) and to hold fast
to Jesus Christ. The Christian warrior triumphs over sin and temptation, not ex suis
viribus but ex gratia. But grace really does empower him to triumph, renewing the
faculties of his vitiated soul in order that he may believe, hope, and love, come what
may. Second, the very fact that the regenerate person has received this gift of new life
in Christ is itself the outworking in time of God’s eternal election: for against Biel et al.
and with the old Augustine, predestination is the only preparation for grace.962 In
1515/16, this sola gratia is meant to be a fearful reality: for in line with Augustine’s
doctrine and the medieval consensus, no Christian—apart from a few notable
exceptions, e.g., St. Mary or Paul—may know whether or not he is in the number of
God’s elect. The Prädestinationsanfechtung that might result from contemplating this
fearful reality was, of course, one of the knots that tied up Luther’s anxious soul. But in
the lectures on Romans, he still views this uncertainty, and the fear it produces,
largely positively, for it is a potent remedy for spiritual pride. Despite the marked
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Staupitzian reorientations in his own spirituality and pastoral practice, away from
“speculation” into the hidden mystery of one’s election and toward the manifestation
of God in Christ crucified, this fearful and humbling element in Augustine’s spiritual
theology of predestination remains a component of the older Luther’s teaching as well.
Once the promissio-fides correlation has given birth to reformational assurance—
according to Bayer, in early summer 1518—the gospel sets the believer free to rest in
the grace of forgiveness and justification in Christ. But this assurance of grace through
God’s promise in Christ, and the freedom it bestows, only holds true of the present
moment. No believer knows whether he will persevere in true faith to the end,
perseverance itself being a free gift of God’s grace that flows from the hidden font of
his eternal predestination. Since present regeneration and justification may be lost,
the godly Christian lives poised between fear and hope, and the riddle of
predestination remains unresolved till the wayfaring pilgrim passes by grace through
death into glory.
For these reasons, Luther goes on in the next pages of the scholion to explain
the deep identity of presumption and despair as twin forms of self-obsessing egoism,
and to commend instead the “royal road” (regia via) that passes safely between those
shoals of destruction.963 This is the path of humility—humilitas fidei—which takes
root in the heart that fears God and hopes in his mercy at the same time.964 Luther’s
regia via reflects an ancient monastic exegesis of Num. 20:17 and 21:22 which he
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WA 56.281.22-284.8, LW 25.269-71; for regia via, WA 56.283.7.
Explaining Paul’s paradox 1 Cor. 5:7—cleanse out the old leaven, because you really are
unleavened—Luther writes (WA 56.282.9-15): Quis enim eorum intelliget ista duo simul, quod sint
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humilitatem fidei in timore, in spe et non-Imputatione Dei consistit. Fermentum habent, Sed dolent
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probably acquired from Bernard.965 It does not disappear after the reformational
Durchbruch: we find it, for example, in the 1532 lecture on Ps. 2:11966 and the 1544
lecture on Gen. 38:26.967 When Luther ends his 1537 lecture on Gen. 12:20 with the
exhortation and prayer “that in patience and hope we may work out our salvation,
Amen,”968 his allusion to Phil. 2:12 is not adventitious. Neither is the plea with which
the old Doctor brought his lectures on “the dear Genesis” to a close on 17 November
1545, just a few months before his death: “Pray God for me, that He may grant me a
good, blessed last hour.”969 This is not pious rhetoric. The gospel of free justification in
Christ did not free Luther from the fear that he might not continue in this grace. For
Luther, young and old, stood firmly within the medieval consensus in dogmatics and
in piety that a great “if” hangs over the Christian life. The believer must accept this “if,”
fear God, and humbly work out his salvation (Phil. 2:12)—trusting to be sure that
God’s grace is at work in him, both to will and to work for his good pleasure (Phil.
2:13). But for Luther as for Augustine, the resolution of this “if” does not ultimately lie
in the believer’s hands, but in God’s, hidden in the mystery of predestination.
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6. Virtue, Vice, and Imputation: Augustine’s Ep. 167
The last Augustine citation in the scholia on Rom. 4:7 is the longest and, in a way, the
most decisive for my argument: a paragraph from one of Augustine’s letters to Jerome
(ep. 167 by the modern enumeration, ep. 29 by Luther’s).970 The letter concerns the
interpretation of James 2:10: “For whoever has observed the whole law, but offends in
one point, has become guilty of all.” Written in 415, it reflects—without actually
discussing—the anti-Pelagian controversy in its first phase, and directly engages
Jerome’s distinct controversy with Jovinian. To the philosophical ear, St. James’
teaching appears to resonate with the extreme Stoic version of the commonplace
ancient doctrine of the unity of the virtues, i.e., the necessity of possessing all virtue to
possess any virtue at all (qui unam uirtutem habuerit, omnes habet eique nulla est, cui
una defuerit).971 Augustine is keen to address this philosophical doctrine critically, and
to reshape it in light of his (by 415) well-established theory of virtue as ordered love
and his maturing understanding of the flaws or vices that continue to mar the saints’
holiness even as they make real progress in this love. In his usual manner, Grane
asserts that Luther was wrong to cite Augustine’s letter in defense of his theology; but
he does well to associate the tenor of the passage with Luther’s Antilatomus, for the
same scriptural texts and arguments surface there in great abundance, as does the
same paragraph from ep. 167.972
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For the text, see CSEL 44.586-609, WSA II/3.95-104. Luther excerpts material from paragraph
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The Augustine citation is nestled in the midst of the second to last corollary in
the scholion, which canvasses the familiar themes of righteousness, residual sin, and
mercy or non-imputation in their interrelation. Luther first reiterates his contrast
between scriptural and philosophical definitions of iustitia. “The philosophers and
lawyers”—I think it safe to say that here Luther lumps scholastic theologians together
with the philosophi—“assert that it is a quality of the soul, etc.”973 By contrast, in the
Bible righteousness “depends more on the imputation of God than on the being of the
thing (esse rei).”974 True righteousness as scripturally defined is not to be found within
the soul, as the fruit of infused grace transforming the qualitates animae from vice to
virtue. Rather, righteousness depends on God’s reckoning an unrighteous person as
righteous in his sight.
For that person has righteousness, not who has the quality alone—indeed that
one is a sinner altogether and unrighteous—but whom God, on account of the
confession of his own unrighteousness and the plea for the righteousness of
God, mercifully reputes and wills to be held righteous before him. Therefore,
we are all born in iniquity i.e. unrighteousness, we die, but by the reckoning
alone of the God who has mercy [Rom. 9:16], through faith in his Word, we are
righteous.975
Read out of context, Luther plays right into Grane’s hand; and Grane seizes the
opportunity. Against the philosophical definition of righteousness as a real “quality”
inhering in the being of the transformed soul—together with all the niceties of sins
merely venial and works truly meritorious that follow from it—Luther sets the Pauline
gospel of iustitia through mercy and imputation alone, passively received by faith in
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the Word. For the justified person is a confessing sinner (peccator est omnino et
Iniustus!) and all his righteousness is alien to his being and imputed to his account
and unknown to him, except by faith. Grane concludes his comments upon the
present text thus: “The righteousness of God, with which He makes us righteous, has
no footing in the person himself (keinen Anhalt am Menschen selbst hat), neither in
his works nor in his properties.” This being so, the last word goes to the simul peccator
et iustus taken in its post-Hermann sense, which Grane suggests Luther himself
viewed as a kind of “summary” of Rom. 1-4.976
But let us attend to the immediate context of Luther’s decidedly “Lutheran”sounding claims in this text. First, looking back and recalling Luther’s sustained
polemics against self-righteous monastics in this scholion, we need to clarify the
intended referent of the person whom Luther calls “a sinner altogether and
unrighteousness.” This person is not the justified sinner, nor the appropriate subject of
the “simul” as Luther actually held it (and to be clear, the phrase does not appear in
this corollary in so many words; Grane imports it as a heuristic tool, in the event
unhelpfully). Luther is once again describing the Luke 18:9-14-style contrast between
the specious righteousness of the Pharisee and the real justification of the publican.977
The person “who has the quality alone,” i.e., the self-righteous person who knows that
his grace-infused soul possesses the qualitas iustitiae and therefore does not confess
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that he is a sinner, immo ille peccator est omnino et Iniustus—that kind of person
above all is a sinner full stop. Thus the person who “has the quality alone,” and who
presumes that his possession of this quality justifies him before God, does not have
righteousness at all. If the self-righteous is unrighteous in the core of his rotten heart,
who then is the truly righteous person? Precisely the heart-broken penitent whose
character and actions Luther has already described at some length, and sketches again
here: the true monastic, who confesses his unrighteousness, begs for God’s
righteousness, and trusts in the Word that promises this mercy as a free gift of the
merciful God.
In light of this penitential monastic theology, notice the central role that
“Holl’s propter” plays in this text. It is because of the penitent’s confession and plea
that God grants him mercy, and the humble soul that prays in this truthful way cannot
be a peccator omnino. Indeed, the more he humbly insists on the reality of his
sinfulness, the more he evinces (perhaps to his own irritation) the reality of his
renewal in holiness. Luther’s true penitent confesses that he is a sinner, trusts in God’s
mercy, and does not presume that he has righteousness on account of the fact that a
virtuous qualitas inheres in his soul. But the spiritual fact that he does not rely on
possessing “a quality alone” to establish his righteousness coram deo does not mean
that he has no righteous qualities at all. To the contrary: his humble confession of sin
is the first and foremost proof of his regeneration out of the deceitfulness of his
inherited flesh into the truthfulness of the renewed spiritus that is brought to life in
Christ.
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In the second place, we need to look forward from Luther’s focus on original
sin in the last sentence of the above-cited paragraph to the catena of scriptural prooftexts for the universality and depth of human sinfulness that follows it. Luther’s omnes
In iniquitate i.e. Iniustitia nascimur reflects the language of Ps. 5o:7 Vg. (in
iniquitatibus conceptus sum, etc.) and the apposition of morimur with nascimur
strongly signals St. Paul’s teaching in Rom. 5:12-21 and 1 Cor. 15:20-22. These are, of
course, classic scriptural loci for Augustine’s theology of original sin. Within the
excerpted paragraph itself, this again shows that for Luther the object of God’s
merciful non-imputation in the saints is not actual, but original sin in the residual
form it assumes as their “flesh.” On account of its unwanted operations in and as their
flesh, the saints truly confess that they are sinners, refuse to rely on their own
righteousness, and take refuge in the promise of God’s mercy in Christ. This is the
force of Luther’s last sentence; and it explains why he proceeds to catalogue scriptural
proofs in demonstration of original sin and, therefore, of the continuing sinfulness of
regenerate saints: “Therefore, let us heap up authorities from Scripture, in which all
are asserted to be in sins,” omnes in peccatis matching the earlier omnes In iniquitate
i.e. Iniustitia nascimur.978
The catalogue of proof-texts is impressive, and anticipates similar collections in
the 1518 Heidelberg Disputation, the 1521 Defense and Explanation of All the Articles,
and the great Antilatomus of the same year: Gen. 8:21, Ex. 34:7, Rom. 3:20, 1 Kgs. 8:46,
Eccl. 7:20, Job 7:20-1, 9:2, 9:15, Ps. 32:6, 143:2, 130:8, 72:14, Isa. 64:6, Jer. 30:11, 1 Tim. 1:15,
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Rom. 7:19 (“etc.”), Phil. 3:13, James 3:12, 1 John 1:8, Rev. 22:11.979 In passing, Luther
acknowledges Job 27:6 and 1 John 5:18 (cf. 3:9) as counter-texts. St. John’s qui natus est
ex Deo, non peccat etc. is especially important for the reasons I explored above in
chapter 2: for Luther, the flesh-bearing and thus “sinful” regenerate person does not
consent to the impulses of his flesh, and therefore does not sin. This first Johannine
text immediately precedes the second, Rev. 22:11, with which Luther concludes his
catalogue. Between them both, the overall stress on sinfulness (in particular, with
respect to our origin in vitiated Adam) gives way to a marked emphasis on the reality
of regeneration (1 John 5:18) and the necessity of progressive justification (Rev. 22:11).
As I have argued throughout this book, it is this dual emphasis on residual sinfulness
and real renewal in righteousness “simul” that occupies Luther’s prodigious energies
both spiritually and dogmatically, and this as penitent and mystic, pastor, exegete, and
catholic reader of Augustine all in one. So it is that after citing St. John’s qui iustus est,
Iustificetur adhuc, Luther shifts promptly to Augustine’s ep. 167 as an illuminating
comment on his scriptural catena, three verses of which factor in the Augustinian
excerpt itself:
Hence blessed Augustine, Epist. 29 to blessed Jerome: “Virtue is the charity
(Virtus est Charitas) by which that which ought to be loved, is loved (diligitur).
This is greater in some, less in others, in others there is none at all; but the
fullest love [or: virtue], which could no longer be increased, is in no human
being so long as he lives here. However, as long as it is able to be increased,
assuredly that which is less than it ought to be is from vice (ex vitio est).
Because of this vice (Ex quo vitio), ‘there is not a righteous person on earth who
does good and does not sin’ [Eccl. 7:20]. Because of this vice (Ex quo vitio), ‘no
living person will be justified in God’s sight’ [Ps. 143:2]. On account of this vice
(Propter quod vitium), ‘If we say that we do not have sin, we deceive ourselves
and the truth is not in us’ [1 John 1:8]. On account of this vice (Propter quod
vitium), regardless of how much we advance, it is necessary for us to say:
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‘forgive us our debts’ [Matt. 6:12], though already in baptism everything said,
done, thought has been forgiven.” That’s Augustine.980
It is indeed: Luther’s text compares quite favorably with a large portion of §4.15 as it
stands in our best modern edition.981 To evaluate whether (and to what extent) Luther
was right to appeal to it in support of his theology, we need first to grasp what
Augustine himself was arguing for. In the lines that immediately precede the
excerpted material, Augustine tells Jerome that he is about to explain what he
embraces in his theory (notio) of virtue (§4.15).982 Then in the paragraphs that follow
the excerpt, Augustine returns to the problem raised by Jas. 2:10 and/or the Stoic
doctrine of virtue. His solution turns on relating his virtue theory to Rom. 13:9-10 and
Matt. 22:37-40, i.e., the “Love Commandment” in both its Pauline and dominical
forms: Plenitudo legis caritas est, qua deus proximusque diligitur. The “fullness” of the
law is love. But love in its fullness, caritas plenissima for God and neighbor, is precisely
what Augustine—in the preceding §4.15 excerpted by Luther—has just forsworn as a
possibility in this life. For Augustine, this helps explain the meaning of Jas. 2:10 in a
way that embraces the real element of truth in the Stoic virtue theory: anything less

980

WA 56.289.1-12: ‘Virtus est Charitas, qua id, quod diligendum est, diligitur. Hȩc in aliis maior, in
aliis minor, in aliis nulla est, plenissima vero, quȩ iam non possit augeri, quamdiu hic homo viuit, est
in nemine; quamdiu autem augeri potest, profecto illud, quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est. Ex
quo Vitio “non est Iustus in terra, qui faciat bonum et non peccet”. Ex quo Vitio “non Iustificabitur in
conspectu Dei omnis viuens”. Propter quod vitium “si dixerimus, quia peccatum non habemus,
nosmet ipsos seducimus et veritas in nobis non est”. Propter quod vitium etiam, quantumlibet
profecerimus, necessarium est nobis dicere: “dimitte nobis debita nostra”, cum iam omnia in
baptismo, dicta, facta, cogitata, dimissa sint.’ Hec ille. Cf. LW 25.276.
981
CSEL 44.602. Apart from slight changes in spelling and punctuation, I count three variations: 1.
Luther’s version of Eccl. 7:20 differs slightly from Augustine’s: the latter’s “there is not a righteous
person on earth who will do good and will not sin” shifting to “there is not a righteous person on
earth who does good and does not sin.” 2. In the 1 John 1:8 citation, Augustine has nos ipsos
decipimus and Luther nosmet ipsos seducimus. 3. In the final “propter quod” which comes on the
heels of 1 John 1:8, to Augustine’s propter quod Luther adds the clarifying propter quod vitium.
982
CSEL 44.602: ut generaliter breuiterque complectar, quam de uirtute habeo notionem, quod ad
recte uiuendum adtinet, uirtus est caritas, qua id, quod diligendum est, diligitur.
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than the richest and most perfect love renders the flawed lover guilty of the whole law,
because acting thus he sins against the total love on which all the commandments
depend (§5.16).983 At the same time, Augustine suggests that this scripturally revised
theory of virtue enables the theologian to avoid the most notorious implication of the
Stoic doctrine, viz., the equality of all vices and sins. “Why then are sins not said to be
equal? Is it perhaps because one does more against love who sins more gravely, and
less against love who sins more lightly?” et hoc ipso admittat magis et minus, to wit,
varying degrees or intensities of love in different persons or actions, and therefore
diverse gradations of guilt, can be admitted with scriptural faithfulness and
philosophical coherence. The “man of apostolic grace”—St. James—can therefore
truthfully say that we all offend in many things (Jas. 3:2) and that failing in one point
renders one guilty of the whole law (2:10) without contradicting the fundamental
commitments of Augustine’s Pauline theology of sin and grace, flesh and spirit,
present hope and future perfection in glory. The emptier (inanior) one is of love, the
fuller (plenior) he is of iniquity, and vice versa; only in the future glory, when nothing
more remains of the present weakness (ex infirmitate), will the saints be exceedingly
perfect in love (§5.17).984
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CSEL 44.603, cf. WSA II/3.102.
CSEL 44.604: cur ergo non dicantur paria peccata? an forte quia magis facit contra caritatem, qui
grauius peccat, minus, qui leuius, et hoc ipso admittat magis et minus, quo fit quidem omnium reus,
sed grauius peccans uel in pluribus peccans magis reus, leuius autem uel in paucioribus peccans
minus reus tanto maiore scilicet reatu, quanto amplius, tanto minore, quanto minus peccauerit,
tamen, etiam si in uno offenderit, reus omnium, quia contra eam facit, in qua pendet omnia? quae si
uera sunt, eo modo et illud absoluitur, quod ait homo etiam apostolicae gratiae: in multis enim
offendimus omnes; offendimus enim, sed alius grauius alius leuius, quanto quisque magis minus ue
peccauerit, tanto in peccato committendo maior quanto in diligendo deo et proximo minor et rursus
tanto minor in peccati perpetratione quanto maior in dei et proximi dilectione, tanto itaque plenior
iniquitatis quanto inanior caritatis et tunc perfectissimus in caritate, quando nihil restat ex
infirmitate. Cf. WSA II/3.102-3.
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Augustine’s ex infirmitate at the end of §5.17 corresponds conceptually to ex
vitio in Luther’s excerpted §4.15. Vitium can be translated either as “defect” or as “vice”
depending on contextual considerations and, perhaps at times, the translator’s
theological commitments. In terms of its conceptual substance in Augustine’s
thought, this is really a case of six of the one or a half-dozen of the other, as the close
connection between vitium and infirmitas itself suggests: after all, a basic meaning for
virtus is simply “power,” and to lack moral strength and to suffer moral weakness is to
be marred by vitium, vice. It is due to a lack of what is owed in a human person’s
being, affections, and actions—a defect, weakness, wound, or vitium—that he falls
short of the moral power and excellence of “virtue” and is therefore possessed of “vice”
to varying degrees. In any case, in §4.15 Augustine plainly draws a contrast between
the virtus of love, on the one hand, and its lack or imperfections ex vitio on the other.
Whatever is lacking in the regenerate person’s love; whatever is less than the fullness
of love which he hopes his small beginnings in the present will one day become by
grace in glory; whatever is less than the plenitudo legis which is caritas, and therefore
“less than what is owed” (quod minus est quam debet)—is from vice (ex vitio est).
Augustine then reinforces his position with the four proof-texts on sin that form the
heart of the paragraph, introducing the first two (Eccl. 7:20, Ps. 143:2) with ex quo vitio
and the second pair (1 John 1:8, Matt. 6:12) with propter quod vitium. Real progress is
made in the Christian life of holy love for God and neighbor. But on account of the
“vice” (§4.15) or the “weakness” (§5.17) that remains in the saints—in St. Paul’s terms,
their “flesh,” “law of flesh,” or “sin”—perfection in righteousness, plenitudo legis, is in
this life unattainable.
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Now, in §4.15 and in light of Jas. 2:10, Augustine does not shy from drawing the
conclusion suggested by his virtue theory and intimated by his carefully chosen catena
of proof-texts from the Bible. On account of the vitium that remains in the saints,
there is not a righteous person on earth who does good and does not sin; no one living
will be justified in God’s sight (this is one of the occasional forensic instances of
iustificari that one does come across in Augustine); Christians who claim sinless
perfection deceive themselves; and regardless of how far one has advanced in the way
of love, he never outgrows the need to pray for daily forgiveness through the Lord’s
Prayer. But apart from the fleeting affirmation of complete forgiveness in baptism that
concludes the excerpted material from §4.15, in ep. 167 Augustine does not enter upon
the question why the vitium that restricts and mars the wayfaring saint’s love—and
thus makes him guilty of the whole law, which requires nothing less than
wholehearted love—nevertheless does not make him guilty in God’s sight. In the
language of the Psalm, if ex vitio no saint living will be justified before God, how then
is the saint forgiven, accepted, or justified before God? As we now know, Augustine
elsewhere engages this question with great interest: and it is just such texts, above all
from the writings against Julian, that especially interest Luther in his lectures on
Romans.
If we turn now to examine the role of ep. 167.4.15 in the Rom. 4:7 scholion,
three things are readily apparent: (1) first, that Luther adopts Augustine’s theory of
love vis-à-vis the fullness and fulfillment of the law; (2) second, that Luther bites the
bullet and names as “sin” the lack of perfect love which Augustine usually—though
not always—refers to as vitium, weakness, flesh, evil desire, the law of sin, etc.; and I
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note that in §4.15, Augustine combines both usages by virtue of his citations of Eccl.
7:20, 1 John 1:8, and Matt. 6:12; (3) third, that Luther draws once again on his “420s
Augustine”-inspired theology of residual sin’s non-imputation to resolve the question
begged by—but left unanswered in—Augustine’s letter to Jerome. Earlier on in this
scholion, when Luther made his broad-brush reference to c. Iul. 2, we saw each of
these three points on display in concert: the “tinder” of evil desire left in the
regenerate is “sin” per se, argued Luther, “since propter ipsum we do not fulfill the love
of God above all things”985 (#1 and #2); but to those real saints who confess that they
are sinners ex ipso, and pray for healing grace to take away and pardoning mercy to
overlook the tinder, concupiscence, vice, and indeed “sin” that remains in their flesh,
God does not impute it in peccatum (#3).986 In the comments that immediately follow
the excerpt from ep. 167, Luther exhibits the same grasp of the Augustinian theory of
virtue as love in its relation to the law; the same intensification of the logic of this
theory (or perhaps, as Steinmetz has it, “the more perfect embodiment of a
tendency”987) vis-à-vis the Bielish doctrines of natura integra, self-elicited love for God
super omnia, and half-merited justification; and the same nascent attempt to think
through the implications of fusing together a handful of interrelated Augustinian
985

WA 56.281.9-11: Quippe cum hoc malum in nobis per se sit peccatum, quia non implemus propter
ipsum dilectionem Dei super omnia. Cf. LW 25.268.
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WA 56.281.11-21, LW 25.268.
987
Steinmetz, Luther and Staupitz, 15. To be clear, Steinmetz was not discussing this precise issue,
but rather the general question of the nature of Luther’s “Augustinianism.” In his lucid discussion,
Steinmetz distinguishes five senses of the term “Augustinian” (and “Pelagian”), the fifth being “not
so much agreement with the teaching of Augustine and Pelagius in their original form as the
embodiment of a theological tendency which in special cases may go beyond their original
thinking. In one sense it is possible to say that Thomas Aquinas is more Augustinian than Luther
on the question of merit, if the standard is fidelity to the original teaching of St. Augustine. But one
can also hold, without taking an absurd and indefensible position, that Luther is more Augustinian
than Thomas, if the frame of reference is the more perfect embodiment of a tendency. It all
depends what you mean by ‘Augustinian.’”
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inheritances (viz., his virtue theory, his eschatological reserve, his doctrine of grace,
and his theology of non-imputation) with his own fresh reading of the Bible. The
outcome is novel in certain real but limited respects, for at bottom Luther is
advancing the logic already present in ep. 167 and nupt. conc. 1.25.28 etc. Here it is:
From this it is plain to see that there is no such thing as venial sin ex substantia
et natura sua, but neither is there merit. Because even good works, since the
tinder and sensuality resist, do not happen with as great a concertedness and
purity as the law requires: for they do not happen by our whole powers (ex totis
viribus), but only by the powers of spirit, with the powers of the flesh fighting
back (tantum ex viribus spiritus repugnantibus viribus carnis). Therefore, even
when we work well, we sin, unless God through Christ covers this imperfection
for us and does not impute it; thus it becomes venial through the mercy of the
God who does not impute it, on account of faith and groaning for this
imperfection, which is taken up in Christ.988
Note well that Luther’s comments begin with the back-reference to §4.15: Ex quo patet,
Quod etc. Employing a typical mode of scholastic argumentation, Luther aims to
elucidate the implicit implications of an authoritative text in order to draw further
conclusions from it. In this case, he does so by placing one set of Augustinian data in
relation to another. If in the event Luther fails to reproduce Augustine’s doctrine
exactly—more on this shortly—he may nonetheless achieve “the more perfect
embodiment of a tendency” by carrying Augustine’s argument forward to a more
robustly “Augustinian” conclusion: just as, for example, Thomas Aquinas’
understanding of the persons of the Holy Trinity as “subsistent relations” may be seen
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WA 56.289.14-21: Ex quo patet, Quod nullum est peccatum Veniale ex substantia et natura sua,
Sed nec meritum. Quia etiam bona opera, quia renitente fomite et sensualitate, non tanta fiunt
intensione et puritate, quantam lex requirit, cum non ex totis viribus fiant, Sed tantum ex viribus
spiritus repugnantibus viribus carnis. Idcirco enim bene operando peccamus, nisi Deus per Christum
nobis hoc imperfectum tegeret et non imputaret; fit ergo Veniale per misericordiam Dei non
imputantis, propter fidem et gemitum pro ista imperfectione in Christo suscepta. Cf. LW 25.276.
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as a deeply “Augustinian” theology based upon the argument in trin. 5-7 and at the
same time advancing beyond it.
Now to the matter at hand. On the surface, Luther’s denial of a real distinction
between venial sins and mortal, his rejection of merit, and his claim that the
regenerate person sins even when he does a good work—all hugely controversial
positions from 1518 on—stand in manifest opposition to Augustine’s doctrine; for
Augustine upheld the first two interrelated points, and at the least never affirmed the
third in so many words. But there’s the rub: in Luther’s first sentence, he is making the
claim that what Augustine wrote in ep. 167 about love, virtue, vice, the law, and sin
itself leads to the evident conclusion that no sin, in its essence, nature, or definition, is
pardonable in and of itself. For anything less than perfect love is a vicious falling short
of the fullness of virtuous love that God requires of his humans in his law. However
great in love a regenerate person may become by God’s grace, since in the conditions
of this present life he cannot but fall short of the fullness of love, he therefore fails to
fulfill the law. And to fail to fulfill the law is the essence of “sin” ex substantia et natura
sua, regardless of how slight a deviation from the law’s perfection a given failure may
in fact amount to. For it is not the slightness of the flaw in one’s love that renders it an
intrinsically “venial” sin, but the nature of the relation that obtains between that flaw
and both (a) the flawed lover’s will, i.e., does he consent to and acquiesce in the
imperfections of his love, or does he suffer these imperfections unwillingly; and (b)
the mercy of God in Christ, for God does not impute this “sin” in peccatum to those
who believe and groan for help, and “Christ succors them from the fullness of his
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purity, and covers over this imperfection of theirs.”989 For the same reasons, Luther
rejects merit and hazards the claim that the regenerate sin when they do good works:
and while the conclusions are novel, the reasons themselves are drawn straight from
Augustine. The wholeheartedness, the concertedness (intensio), the unblemished
purity of perfect love required by the law is lacking in the best of works: for the
regenerate person’s heart is divided in its “powers” between spirit and flesh, the new
and holy vires spiritus fighting to love in purity and the old sinful vires carnis
vexatiously fighting back. This is Augustine’s spiritual theology of real but embattled
holiness, complete with one of his choice proof-texts for the same (Gal. 5:17); and
when Luther now states that the righteous “sin” even when they do good works, his
rhetorically charged and seemingly novel claim is in fact a pointed restatement of
Augustine’s spirit/flesh “simul.” Because of their residual flesh, ex vitio/infirmitate, the
saints continue to fall short of the perfection of love. They therefore “sin” even when
they do the good works of love, for they do not love ex totis viribus with as great an
intension and purity as the law requires (and as grace will one day free them to
accomplish in glory). “On account of this vice, regardless of how much we advance, it
is necessary for us to say: ‘forgive us our debts’”—so Augustine; so Luther. No good
deed is without “sin” in this precise and mutually agreed upon sense (in rei veritate
and sometimes also in verba, not least when Augustine takes his words directly from
the Bible). No sin is intrinsically venial: this is, I think, a justifiable conclusion to draw
from a close reading of ep. 167, especially at those points in the argument where
Augustine weaves his virtue theory together with Rom. 13:10 and Jas. 2:10. No good
989

WA 56.289.29-31: … succurrit eis Christus de plenitudine puritatis suae et tegit eorum hoc
imperfectum. Cf. LW 25.277.
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deed, therefore, is intrinsically meritorious. On the contrary, the saints themselves
stand in constant need of the mercy of God in Christ; and this mercy is theirs to have,
so long as they refuse to consent to the “sin” which—having been instructed by Ps.
143:2, Eccl. 7:20, 1 John 1:8, and Matt. 6:12—they do not refuse to confess before God.
Therefore, even when we work well, we sin, unless God through Christ covers
this imperfection for us and does not impute it; thus it becomes venial through
the mercy of the God who does not impute it, on account of faith and groaning
for this imperfection, which is taken up in Christ.990
If Luther’s conclusion marks a material advance beyond the combined force of
Augustine’s ep. 167 and the theology of sin, grace, and mercy formulated with
increasing clarity in the works against Julian—and I have given reasons to think that it
does not—I submit that it is an “Augustinian” advance nonetheless.

7. Conclusion to Part II—Augustinus si anno gratiae 1515/16 viveret, gauderet Lutherum
in Romanos legere?
In a Table-Talk from 1532, Luther declared that Augustine would have rejoiced to read
Melanchthon’s recently published commentary on Romans: so great was the church
father’s love for the truth that Master Philipp’s strong criticisms of his exegesis surely
would not have prevailed over his joy at discovering the fullness of the truth of the
gospel.991 By 1532, the differences between the evangelicals’ exegesis of St. Paul and
Augustine’s had in fact grown in both number and significance: but in 1515/16,
substantial points of divergence distinguishing Luther from Augustine are not so easy
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to discern. How might Augustine have responded to Luther’s reading of his antiPelagian theology circa 1515/16? Or for that matter, how might Augustine have taken
to Luther’s own distinctive theology, deeply indebted as it was to Augustine’s but rich
with other influences (the Bible, Bernard, Peter Lombard, Tauler, Biel, Staupitz,
humanism, experientia, etc.) and thus necessarily advancing beyond it? Turning
Luther’s 1532 saying at table into a question posed to his own early theology is a
fascinating and massively intricate thought experiment; and it probably leads whoever
dares ask it out of the realm of historical theology and into the sphere of confessional
dogmatics. All the same, the question is irresistible: Had Augustine lived in 1515/16,
would he have rejoiced to read Luther’s comments on Romans?
I think he would have, and I shall return to this question in the conclusion of
this book. 992 But my argument in Part II has not concerned the hypothetical question
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At civ. dei 10.30 (Bett. 419), in the course of polemicizing against Apuleius, Plotinus, and
Porphyry, Augustine pauses to credit the last-named Platonist for daring to correct their common
master in a particular point of the doctrine of metempsychosis: “We have here a Platonist departing
from Plato, for the better. Here we have one who saw what his master failed to see; and though he
was a disciple of a teacher of such eminence and authority, he did not shrink from correcting his
teacher, because he preferred the truth to the man.” I think Luther was right to believe that
Augustine too preferred the truth to the man, and to think that in playing the Porphyry to
Augustine’s Plato in certain points of doctrine, he was himself carrying out the theological task in a
profoundly Augustinian way. This formed a major plank in Luther’s defense of the catholicity of the
Reformation. See esp. On the Councils and the Church Part I, where Luther appeals to several
Augustinian texts (as well as Bernard) to demonstrate the patristic credentials for the sola scriptura
Prinzip. For example, after appealing to ep. 82.1.3 to Jerome (PL 33.277: solis eis Scripturarum libris
qui iam canonici appellantur, didici hunc timorem honoremque deferre, ut nullum eorum auctorem
scribendo aliquid errasse firmissime credam… Alios autem ita lego, ut quantalibet sanctitate
doctrinaque praepolleant, non ideo verum putem, quia ipsi ita senserunt; sed quia mihi vel per illos
auctores canonicos, vel probabili ratione, quod a vero non abhorreat, persuadere potuerunt.) and trin.
3.2 (Noli meis litteris quasi Scripturis canonicis in servire, sed in illis et quod non credebas cum
inveneris incunctanter crede, in istis autem quod certum non habebas nisi certum intellexeris noli
firme retinere), Luther states: “St. Augustine must have felt many shortcomings in the fathers who
preceded him, because he wants to be free, and to have all of them, including himself, subjected to
the Holy Scriptures” (WA 50.524.12-525.6, LW 41.26). He then argues: “What should we do now? If
we should take the churches back to the teaching and ways of the fathers and the councils, there
stands St. Augustine to confuse us and thwart our plan because under no circumstances does he
want reliance placed on the fathers, bishops, councils, be they as holy and learned as they can be,
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whether Augustine would have rejoiced to read Luther, but the historical question
whether Luther succeeded in his (as it happened, heart-gladdening) reading of
Augustine. With ep. 167, the last Augustine citation in the scholia on Rom. 4:7, I rest
my case that he did. In the scholia on Romans 7 and 4:7, Luther not only read
Augustine with the highest esteem, but in the event did so with insight and skill. He
understood Augustine’s anti-Pelagian theology well. But humanist though he was, he
was no Patristiker in the modern sense (but neither, for that matter, was the great
Erasmus). For one thing, he read Augustine’s works generally in light of the positions
that the old doctor gratiae came to take in the works against Julian, which Luther
believed to evince the real marrow of scriptural orthodoxy and thus to represent the
“real” Augustine. But even more importantly, Luther read Augustine in order that he
might read the Bible, pray, teach, preach, write, and pastor in the Church as a true
theologian in his own right. In other words, like most readers of Augustine prior to
quite recent developments in the history of thought, Luther read the great church
father as a committed Christian and as one apprenticed to the catholic tradition of
theology. This does mean that there are nuances, details, and developments in
Augustine’s works which Luther—just like Fulgentius, Bernard, Peter Lombard,
Thomas, Bradwardine, Rimini, Staupitz, Cranmer, Contarini, Peter Martyr, Calvin,
Seripando, Davenant, Jansen, Pascal, Owen, et al.—overlooked, nuances which the

or on himself. Instead, he directs us to the Scripture. Outside of that, so he says, all is uncertain,
lost, and in vain” (WA 50.525.31-6, LW 41.27). Cf. the 1539 Preface to Luther’s German Writings, WA
50.658.21-8, LW 34.285: Und folge hierin dem Exempel S. Augustin, der unter andern der erst und fast
allein ist, der von aller Veter und Heiligen Buecher wil ungefangen allein der heiligen Schrifft
unterworffen sein, Und daruber kam in einen harten straus mit S. Hieronymo, der jm furwarff seiner
Vorfaren buecher, Aber daran er sich nichts keret. Und hette man solchem Exempel S. Augustini
gefolget, der Babst were kein Antichrist worden, und were das unzeliche unzifer, gewuerm und
geschwuerm der Buecher nicht in die Kirchen komen und die Biblia wol auff der Cantzel blieben.
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modern patristics scholar will carefully observe and account for. But perhaps this also
means that there are aspects of Augustine’s theology and spirituality which Luther
(and not only Luther) grasped with a depth of insight, sympathy, regard, and affection
that the modern researcher, as a reader detached from the object of his study, cannot
attain. If love sometimes diminishes the perspicuity of one’s sight, detachment—not
to mention hostility—tends rather to blind it altogether than to purify it. Regard is not
the enemy of historical knowledge, and Augustine urges that it is essential for real
knowledge of the truth. Rigorous and ecclesial historical theology, combining aspects
of both kinds of scientia, will best lead holy Church into wisdom when it is
undertaken as a work of friendship, truth, and love in the midst of the sanctorum
communio.
In the next and last Part III of the present work, I shall have first to set this
positive conclusion to Part II in relation to the works of Luther’s maturity which I
exposited in Part I, in order to assess what is new and what is old in his mature—and
persistently Augustinian—dogmatics of holiness.
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PART III
RECONSIDERATIONS
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5. THE BIG PICTURE (1514—1546): CONTINUITIES AND
DISCONTINUITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LUTHER’S THEOLOGY OF HOLINESS
1. Can this chapter be written?
Is it advisable, or even possible, to give an account of the “big picture” of Luther’s
theology that reckons seriously with the complexities of his development over time?
Thomas Kaufmann has written of the “theological problem” posed by that
scholarly convention which contrasts the young Luther and the old.993 Not unusually,
the problem began in Luther’s own lifetime: first Roman Catholic polemicists, then
dissenting voices from within the churches of the Reformation looked for
inconsistencies in Luther’s positions over time in order either to discredit him or, as in
Agricola’s case, to defend their own doctrine as authentically “Lutheran.” Kaufmann
documents how already in the 1520s, Luther began to distance aspects of his maturing
theology from positions he himself had held not long before, or else—to put a more
charitable construction on Luther’s recollections—to explain his real meaning and
intention over against his opponents’ mistaken or malign misinterpretations of his
teaching. Since for Luther the pursuit of doctrinal truth is a life and death struggle
between the clear Word of Jesus Christ and the obfuscating lies of the Devil for the
soul of the Church,994 this sometimes rose ex necessitate to the level of setting forth a
“definitive” confession that would demarcate the genuine doctrina evangelii from
deviant traditionalist, sacramentarian, and enthusiastic alternatives. Thus, for
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example, the 1528 Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper against Zwingli and
Oecolampadius: which, despite Luther’s adamant and repeated protestations of
finality,995 he then followed up first with the Smalcald Articles in 1536/7 and then, in
1544, the Brief Confession Concerning the Holy Sacrament. (Neither should the 1527
Visitation Articles, the 1529 Catechisms, nor Melanchthon’s work in 1530/1 be
overlooked in this regard.) At other times, Luther offered authoritative advice about
which of his works ought to be read in perpetuity. His canon varied: the Catechism, de
servo arbitrio, the 1531 Galatians, or the 1537-40 sermons on John; or perhaps none of
his works at all, just die Bibel and Master Philipp’s surpassing Loci. At still others,
Luther narrated his gradual progress as a theologian out of the darkness of “the Pope”
and into the light of the gospel—most famously, in the 1545 Preface to his Latin works:
Above all else, I beg the sincere reader, and I beg for the sake of our Lord Jesus
Christ himself, to read those things judiciously, yes, with great commiseration.
May he be mindful of the fact that I was once a monk and an utterly mad
papist when I began that cause… So you will find how, in these my earlier
writings (scriptis prioribus), I conceded much and with great humility to the
pope, which in my later writings and in these times (posterioribus et istis
temporibus) I hold and execrate as the highest blasphemy and abomination.
You will, therefore, pious reader, ascribe this error, or, as they slander,
contradiction (antilogiam) to the time and to my inexperience. At first I was all
alone and certainly most inept and unlearned in conducting such great
affairs.996
Thus in several genres the interpretive paradigm of the “young” versus the “old”
Luther originates in Luther’s own “Selbsthistorisierung.” Plainly, as such it is not a
value-neutral periodization (though one might justly question whether there ever is
such a thing) but an aid to reading Luther’s earlier works with discrimination in light
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of what he later came to regard as sound catholic and evangelical doctrine. For the
aged Luther engaged in identity formation via self-retrospection, “young” means
immature, incomplete, undependable, and at times just plain wrong, while “old”
means wise, orthodox, truthful, and trustworthy. The pastors and theologians who
decisively shaped the processes of confessionalization in the Lutheran territories (c.
1530—80) looked to this “old Luther” as the premier Luther, and that quite specifically
as a teacher of Christian doctrine. For them, “Dr. Luther, of holy and blessed memory”
was a—probably the, if Lutherans are honest—doctor ecclesiae.997
Kaufmann argues that this pretty much held up through the ascendancy of
Lutheran Orthodoxy in the seventeenth century. Confessional theologians showed
little or no interest in a disjunction between the “two Luthers,” and in general evinced
the same strong affinities for the old doctor that characterized the initial period of
confessionalization. Eighteenth-century pietists like Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff and
Gottfried Arnold first stirred interest in the religious experience of the “young Luther”
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as opposed to the right confession of the old. Then in the nineteenth century, this
divergence between Orthodoxy and Pietism/Enlightenment (via Kant and
Schleiermacher) evolved into two competing factions within the nascent field of
modern Lutherforschung. The orthodox Theodosius von Harnack (1862/86)
championed the search for “the whole Luther” and aimed to explain “the earlier
Luther on the basis of the later.”998 But I think Köstlin’s was probably the greatest
exposition of Luther’s theology which assumed the fundamental diachronic unity of
his thought and focused on the “old Luther” (and the Lectures on Genesis) in the
systematic presentation of his dogmatics. Later in that brilliant and fateful century,
Theodosius’ renowned son Adolf (1886/90) ridiculed his father’s work and instead
focused on what he called the “glorious episode” of 1519—23, when
… power (Macht) was given to Luther, as to none before, to form his Ego into
the spiritual/intellectual center-point of the nation (sein Ich zum geistigen
Mittelpunkt der Nation zu bilden) and to summon his century into the lists
armed with all weapons
to fight in autonomous reason’s battle against tradition, authority, medievalism, etc.999
(In addition to their plain silliness from the dogmatic standpoint, I find these
disturbing words to read after the great darkness of 1933-45.) Karl Holl, under the
influence of Wilhelm Dilthey’s ideas about the decisive formation of geniuses in their
youth, carried forward the junior Harnack’s emphasis on the epoch-making genius
and heroic individualism of the “young Luther” into the mainstream of twentiethcentury Luther scholarship. Relatedly, as James Stayer has shown, leading students of
Holl like Emmanuel Hirsch and Erich Vogelsang were to become ardent National
998

Kaufmann, “Der ‘alte’ und der ‘junge’ Luther,” 190-1, citing the senior Harnack’s Luthers
Theologie 1/12.
999
Kaufmann, “Der ‘alte’ und der ‘junge’ Luther,” 191, citing the junior Harnack’s Lehrbuch 3/811.

407

Socialists in the 1930s who undergirded their fascist politics with the religious icon of
the “German Saviour” which the junior Harnack (himself a liberal) and Holl (a
vigorous opponent of the Weimar Republic, who died in 1926) had paved the way for
in their dispassionate works of history.1000
More recently, in a suggestive essay that echoes Köstlin’s great work, Gordon
Rupp defends the “inner coherence and consistency” of Luther’s thought and lavishes
effusive praise on the Genesis lectures (“one of the most impressive of [Luther’s]
theological feats”).1001 Bernhard Lohse’s introduction to Luther’s theology proceeds
from a similar conviction of consistency and continuity amidst traceable
developments.1002 Other scholars, interested on historical and dogmatic grounds in the
relatively uncharted territory of Luther’s Leben und Werk after 1530 or so, have begun
the project of understanding the old Reformer on his own terms.1003 But this is hardly a
trend. In his compelling biography, Volker Leppin has reasserted that the real action is
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in the young Luther,1004 and some of the most visible and influential Finnish studies
gravitate to the earlier period when most of Luther’s explicit references to deification
are to be found.1005 The festivities of 2017 will probably serve to reinforce the
instinctive modern bent toward the young innovator, the rebel, and his (we are told)
epoch-making cry for “freedom.” For his part, Kaufmann sensibly urges that talk of the
“young” and the “old” Luther, if used at all, ought to be tethered to a more objective
chronological periodization (as in Brecht’s three-volume biography: 1483—1521, 1521—
32, 1532—46). Because Luther’s thought progressed, sometimes but not always
dramatically, over time, and because much if not all of his theology was occasioned by
the tumultuous circumstances in which he lived and carried out his theological work,
responsible historical research is wise to attend to the particular moment rather than
the universal story, a text rather than der ganze Luther, the tree rather than the
forest—or maybe just a single leaf. In process, the real “theological problem” lies in
tracing the material shifts and developments in Luther’s theology over time, and in
discerning the motives and occasions for the same.1006
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In this, Kaufmann breathes the spirit of the age; and I have no choice but to
draw my breath from the same air as he, uneasy as I am with our collective and I
suspect shortsighted rebound from the confident universalism of the prior age to the
despairing particularism and perspectivalism of the present moment. For if the
limitations of the present which we inhabit, and the distance that separates us from
Luther (or any other historical person or event) in the past, means that “the whole
Luther” is inaccessible to us—and this I take as granted—the more advanced
historicists are wrong to think that there is no Luther “there” at all, i.e., that the real
Luther is simply beyond our ken. For though God alone knows the whole truth of our
stories, he does know it (1 Cor. 13:12), and he makes it known piece by broken piece to
those who receive both the humility and the courage to ask for it. The Psalter, and
Augustine’s Confessions, might have taught us this, and kept us from both our former
arrogance and our present despair. By analogy, I believe something similar takes place
in good historical-theological work: however imperfectly, Luther’s story, and the story
of Luther’s theology, may be known and told. This work is at once an intellectual and
spiritual discipline, and it requires not only technical skill but deep regard for the
objective reality of an actual human person who lived in a past that the historical
theologian can enter into only indirectly at best, through the medium of the textual
data (and gifts they are) which attest in the present the reality or truth of that past.1007
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Above all, the historical theologian can read these texts with sobriety, humility, and
patience; and the closer he or she sticks to the letter, the better he is positioned to
listen in on conversations, debates, teachings, and kerygma that once possessed spirit
and life.
This is hard to do well. It is much, much harder than if I were to set out (as
many others have done before) to paint the “whole Luther” as a kind of hidden selfportrait, either as a guarantor of true doctrine or as a genius of religious experience.
Like the questers for the historical Jesus whom Schweitzer unsettled, that picturesque
path has often resulted in very clever books that explain eloquently what their authors
saw reflected back to them in the water at the bottom of the wells they sought to
drink from. Thus Ebeling’s Luther might more accurately be subtitled Einführung in
meinen Denken, whereas Bayer’s introduction to Martin Luthers Theologie is qualified
by the more forthright eine Vergegenwärtigung. The whole Luther, Luther’s dramatic
story and complex theology “wie es eigentlich gewesen” (Ranke), is as such beyond our
grasp; and a Luther conveniently useful to the intents and purposes of the “pure
historian” is to a real extent unavoidable. Kaufmann is therefore right to insist that in
the historical approach to the Reformer, there is no alternative to the work of
painstakingly “reconstructing the afflicted, fissured, notoriously overworked figure of

far Webster, himself a rather eloquent theologian and the leading teacher of Christian dogmatics in
the Anglican tradition today. Now, for the historical theologian, the positum is at least one step
removed from the astonishing reality of God. For his or her object is rather a particular theologian’s
more or less adequate attestation of the truth. If one’s object of study is well-chosen, a trustworthy
doctor of the Church, the historical enterprise may overlap with the dogmatic. But even (or perhaps
especially) in such cases, it is of vital importance that the historical theologian keep in mind both
the responsibilities and the limitations of his office, and the finitude and fallibility of his object’s
wisdom. Ps. 94:10-12, Isa. 40:6-8, Jer. 23:28-9, 1 John 4:1-6. Augustine, Thomas, Luther, and Calvin
each knew the meaning of these verses, but many Augustinians, Thomists, Lutherans, and
Calvinists have not.
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a wrongly condemned heretic” from the material we have at hand and from the
perspectives we can never quite overcome.1008 A salutary confession, that, which gives
rise to a sobering methodology.
But even so: if confession and truth go hand-in-hand, might it not be possible
to go about this arduous work with hope, thankfulness, and even joy, provided that
the historical theologian—as a servant of Jesus Christ and his Church—repents? and
therefore, prays? The penitent historical theologian forsakes fashionable “academic”
despair and abandons the vain modern presumption of mastery; for these, as
Augustine, Newman, Polanyi, and Newbigin knew, are but the two possible outcomes
for little humans who try to know big things in a divine way (Gen. 3:5). His work is just
one modulation of holy abiding in the sanctorum communio through faith, hope, and
love: one limited but vital form for invoking the presence of the Spirit of truth in order
to serve in a truthful Church. The spiritual conditions for the possibility of knowing
historical truth are not beyond the reach of confessing reason chastened and
sanctified by grace (cf. John 3:27, Jas. 1:17). And if it must be confessed from the outset
that “the big picture” of Luther’s (or Thomas’, or Augustine’s, etc.) life and theology
cannot be represented with the flawless precision of a Baroque masterpiece, perhaps
we will find that a more impressionistic portrait, precisely by refusing the pretension
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of mastery in representation, is able to attest the truth in a smaller and therefore more
genuinely human way.
In this impressionistic chapter on the “big picture,” I wish to be clear from the
start that I harbor no such pretentions of systematic mastery of and/or over Luther’s
theology of holiness conceived as a whole. In right proportion, exercised within the
spiritual context of repentance and hope, I am convinced of the usefulness of the
skepticism of that historical mentalité and method which Kaufmann represents. But
this new and in many respects welcome emphasis on the limits of our knowledge has
limits of its own; and for both historical and dogmatic reasons it is necessary to give
some account of how the pieces fit together into a whole. For we limit not only the
scope, but the depth of our historical knowledge of Luther’s theology when we restrict
our researches to only one period of his life, or one text from his pen, or one portion
from one text.1009 It is, of course, useful to know (for example) what Luther’s theology
was like in 1515/16, and what sources influenced his teaching during that formative
period. This is what I have attempted to describe in Part II of this book. But if this
knowledge is not set in relation to where Luther eventually took his early theology, it
remains incomplete: rather like intensively studying an acorn without bothering to
take a look at the oak it grows into. On the other hand, if we study only the “exciting”
and controversial Luther of the 1517—25 period, or (as I did in Part I) the later and to
many readers less inspiring works of his last decade, our inattention to the roots of the
Reformer’s subsequent theology in both his own prior stages of development and in
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the tradition of the Church will frustrate our knowledge of his ripening, mature, and
last theology.
My object in the rest of this chapter is to overcome these pitfalls by following
Rupp’s and Lohse’s leads and attending to both the continuities and the
discontinuities that mark the development of Luther’s theology from the 1510s to his
death in 1546. To this end I must also, as Kaufmann rightly asserts, attend to texts
from the middle-period in Luther’s theological career, i.e., the 1520s.1010 Of course, this
requires that I select which texts to focus on: and such selection is itself an act of
interpretation, which peculiarly exhibits my limitations both as a knower and as a
sharer of historical knowledge. It would seem that try as we may, our limits just
cannot be avoided! But I will do the best I can, and select short but rich excerpts from
writings that are well known and generally regarded as representative of Luther’s
theology in that decade of his life. After briefly demonstrating the fundamental
“Augustinian” continuity of Luther’s dogmatics of sin, grace, and holiness in section 2,
I will draw upon texts from spanning from 1518 to 1544 in section 3 in order to illumine
the continuities and discontinuities that characterize the enduringly Augustinian
Luther’s theology as it assumes its mature creedal shape and its relentless focus on the
glad tidings of the gospel. This will afford us a textually sound and historically rich
understanding of what first the maturing (in the 1520s) and then the old Luther (in the
30s and 40s) set forth in his dogmatics of residual sin, free grace in Jesus Christ, and
the renewing gift of the Holy Spirit as those realities intersect in the lives of saints
sojourning toward the courts of God’s glory.
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As to dogmatics: if Luther is to be received in some real sense as a common
teacher of the Church (Willebrands), it is a matter of first importance to establish
what it is that he actually taught. Since the risen and exalted Jesus Christ, through his
Word and Spirit, is himself the sole Teacher—capital “T”—of the Church (Deut. 18:1520, Matt. 15:6-7, 17:5, 23:8-12, Luke 24:25-49, John 1:14-8, 1:33, 3:29-35, 5:39-40, 8:31-2,
14:26, 15:26, 16:13-15, 17:17, 1 Cor. 2:7-16, Col. 1:18, 1 John 2:20, 27, 4:1-6, Rev. 1:16),
spiritual exegesis is the master of dogmatics. But in support of this magisterial and
miraculous act of listening to the Bible, historical theology has its own role to play as a
servant useful in all God’s house (2 Tim. 2:21). I happen to live in an age that worships
the young and the sexy and forgets and marginalizes the old. In addition to being
wicked, this is a way of great folly, for “gray hair is a crown of glory” (Prov. 16:31). As an
historical reader of theologians in the tradition, I am just as interested in (say) the
young Augustine’s Platonism as in the old Augustine’s theology of grace. But as a
pastor and teacher in the Church, I listen to the old Augustine with a greater intension
and a deeper regard. For he has acquired wisdom: past errors have been overcome,
new light from the Scripture has shone forth, and Monica’s newly converted wild
child, puffed up by the vanity of philosophy (1 Cor. 8:1-3, Col. 2:8), has grown up into a
Vater im Glauben (Eph. 4:12-16). The same holds for the way I approach Thomas
Aquinas or John Owen; the same for how I approach Luther. His early battles with the
Devil, his breakthroughs into scriptural truth and evangelical freedom and joy, the
drama of his controversy with the Papacy, the courage of his stand at Worms: these
are all objects of great fascination to me, and of real importance for any historical
account of Luther’s life and thought. But as a teacher of Christian doctrine in the
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Church, I want to listen to the wise old pastor who has read and preached the Word of
God, counseled souls, taught theology, and engaged in controversy with demons and
men for some twenty or thirty years. What Rupp wrote of the Genesis lectures in
particular is true, I think, of his writings generally in the 1530s and 40s: into them
Luther “crammed the experience of a lifetime, and the great affirmations about the
gospel of grace.”1011 Paying careful historical attention to how Luther gained this
experience—and with it, sapientia experimentalis—over the course of his career is
essential for grasping the mature positions he eventually arrived at; and it is this old
Luther, not the young hero, who stands the best chance of sharing wisdom with the
catholic Church. Then, all that remains is the risky task of evaluating, on the basis of
Holy Scripture, whether what the old Doctor held and confessed as evangelical truth is
in fact true. But more on this in the conclusion to this book.
To begin, let us compare two sermons, one from 1514, the other from 1546.

2. The Basic “Augustinian” Continuity
(1) In part II, I had occasion to refer briefly to Luther’s 1514 sermon “On the Feast of
Blessed Mary the Virgin, and about Congenital Sin.” From what I can gather, it marks
the first time Luther excerpts nupt. conc. 1.25.28 with approbation. In it, the thirty-one
year old preacher and theologian also incorporates two further direct references to
Divus/b. Augustinus, which I will pass over here,1012 as well as vital Augustinian
exegesis and doctrine that will occupy our attention shortly. In 1527, when Stephen
Roth prepared Luther’s Festpostille, he incorporated a long excerpt from this early
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treatment of the doctrine of original sin, baptism, and grace into the 8 Dec. sermon
“Am tage der Empfengknus Marie der mutter Gottes.”1013 Roth entitled this excerpt,
which he translated into German, “Von der Erbsünde” (pp. 282ff), and that does
capture the central issue at stake in this fairly typical late medieval homily on the
Feast of St. Mary’s Conception (typical apart from Thomists, that is).1014 In the original
sermon of 8 Dec. 1514, Luther quite logically devotes his first two paragraphs to the
question quid sit peccatum originale.1015 Formally, his thesis suggests the more
optimistic theory of Anselm, Scotus, and Ockham; materially, however, it resonates
with the mature Augustine and Peter Lombard. Perhaps, then, it reflects the
mediating position held by Thomas and Biel: and if it does, it would seem Luther got
the shape of his doctrine from the latter (Coll. 2 d. 30 q. 2), though he has now infused
it with the Augustinian substance he has recently become acquainted with through his
readings in the Amerbach Opera vol. 8.1016 Thus Luther first states that “by the
consensus of all the doctors, original sin is the lack of original righteousness (carentia
1013
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originalis iustitiae) by which we have been punished through the first sin of Adam in
paradise.”1017 But our young Prediger then fleshes out his “consensus” position in the
bracing terms of Augustine and Peter.
Adam was created just and holy by God, without any propensity
(propensionem) toward evil, pride, anger, or libido, being ordered rather toward the
good alone, to chastity, gentleness, charity, and humility. Then, it was as easy for him
to preserve naturaliter all the virtues he had received in his creation as it is for us to
see, hear, drink, eat, walk, touch, and speak now. Had Adam stood fast, he would have
done all possible good works with pleasure and ease (voluptate et facilitate), free of all
the labor, temptation, danger, sin, and difficulty we now experience. And he and Eve
would have reproduced children of a like holy nature as themselves: original
righteousness would have been the natural inheritance of the filii Adae. For in the
unfallen sexual act, husband and wife would not have experienced an evil inclination
toward one another (non sentiebant malam inclinationem adinvicem), such as all
people now feel; and thus the God-ordained natural process for the propagation of the
human race would have been free from the contagion of sin.1018
This is all preparatory for Luther’s discussion of the holy and spiritual
conception of Jesus Christ by the Spirit in Mary the Virgin’s womb, and for his
intricate speculations as to Mary’s own conception. But first, Luther sets forth what
Oberman calls the “strict Augustinian” doctrine of the first sin and the ensuing
vitiation of human nature by original or (as in this sermon’s title) “congenital” sin.
When Adam ate from the forbidden Tree, “immediately that original righteousness
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perished and was corrupted.”1019 Instead, all manner of evil desires (omnia mala
desyderia) began to sprout up and grow (pullulare et succrescere) in just the opposite
direction of Adam’s lost purity and holiness, viz., “toward pride, libido,
concupiscentiam carnis, etc.” Now Adam had flesh “infected” by sin; and all the
children generated from his fallen flesh are born with the same sin-sick flesh.1020 Citing
Gen. 6:5 and 8:21 and Matt. 15:19 and 12:34, Luther defines this congenital sin-disease
in terms of an affective propensity toward evil (ad malum propensus). All sins come
forth “from the evil inclination of our heart” (ex mala inclinatione cordis nostri), and
“it is from the abundance of the heart (ex abundantia cordis) that the mouth
speaks.”1021 In short, original sin is nothing but “that malice and propensity for evil
(propensio mali), which all people experience in themselves both toward pride and
toward the anger and libido that is born in them.”1022
Thus far the robust Augustinian doctrine of original sin, as to both its
definition as an evil affective infection corrupting the fallen human heart and its
natural propagation through the fallen sexual act. In the next two paragraphs, Luther
turns to present the good news of the remedy for the fallen sons and daughters of
Adam; and atonement through Christ’s cross, the healing grace of the Good
Samaritan, and nupt. conc. 1.25.28 stand at the center of this gospel. Here is the
relevant portion of the sermon:
3. Now it has been established that no one will be saved unless he becomes
pure from this sin. Therefore, God has given commandments by which he
1019
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prohibits this sin, and he wills that we should be righteous again, just as Adam
was before sin. Now, since we are not able to do them, he therefore handed
over Christ to die for us [cf. Rom. 8:32], in order to set us free from this original
sin and all the sins that come forth from it through Christ’s blood [cf. Rev. 1:5,
Gal. 5:1, also Zech. 9:11, Matt. 26:28, Rom. 3:25, Eph. 1:7, Col. 1:20, Heb. 2:14-15,
9:12, 10:19, 13:20, 1 Pet. 1:18-19, 1 John 1:7, etc.]. To that end, he teaches us to
believe in him and to pray for the grace (gratia) by which such sin is purged.
Just as he says in the last chapter of Mark: “He who believes and is baptized”
(16:16). For when we are baptized and believe, we receive grace (gratiam),
which fights against the evil propensity (propensionem) in us and takes the
birth-sin by storm. Then good and upright desires (desyderia) toward
submission and chastity, toward gentleness, begin; and good works come
about. Thus it is written in John 15[:5]: “I am the vine, you are the branches
etc.” And to this end he has given the Creed and the Lord’s Prayer, so that we
may be exercised daily in faith and prayer, always praying for his grace
(gratiam) against the birth-sin. For as long as we live, we are not without the
birth-sin, evil desires (desyderia) always remain in us, which incite us toward
sins, against which we must fight. Just as Peter teaches, saying at 1 Pet. 2[:11]:
“Beloved, I adjure you etc.” Thus it [sc. grace] must always be exercised and
prayed for, even unto death: then indeed the whole flesh is put to death.
4. Since it is said that original sin is forgiven in baptism, how then do you say
that it remains and that one has to fight with it? The divine Augustine
responds: “The birth-sin is indeed forgiven in baptism, not so that it longer is,
but so that it is not imputed.” Just as that Samaritan in Luke chapter 10[:33-5],
when he poured oil and wine into the wounds of the half-dead man, he didn’t
heal him immediately, but set him in the inn. So through baptism all sins are
taken away, but in this way, that God does not impute: but not, then, that they
no longer exist, rather they are going to be healed and they have begun to be
healed. But in death, absolutely all sins will be healed. Therefore, as often as
you feel that you are being moved toward impatience, pride, libido and other
evils, so often you must know that you are feeling the fatal wounds of the
birth-guilt, which the devil inflicted in Adam’s flesh (whence your own flesh
was propagated); and right away you must consider how you ought to resist
and pray the Lord Jesus, so that this sin will not prevail over you, but will be
conquered through his own grace (gratiam). Thus Paul says, Gal 5[:17]: “The
flesh lusts against the spirit etc.” Rom. 13[:14]: “And make no provision for the
flesh, in its desires (desideriis).” For he who thus fights with his own vices
(vitiis)—to such a one, not only is it not imputed by God, however much he
lives in it, but he will even merit the crown [cf. 1 Cor. 9:24-7, 2 Tim. 4:8, Rev.
2:10], and he will be set free from them [cf. Rom. 7:24, 8:21]. But they who do
not fight, but consent (consentiunt) to them, they return completely into the
birth-sin and become such as they were before baptism.1023
1023

WA 4.691.12-692.12: 3. Nunc statutum est, ut nemo salvetur, nisi fiat purus ab isto peccato. Ideo
Deus praecepta dedit, quibus peccatum hoc prohibet et vult, ut simus rursum iusti, sicut Adam fuit
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This will, I hope, sound familiar, for its substance is virtually identical to the
“Augustinian” theology of sin, mercy, grace, and holiness that I exposited in Part II on
the basis of Luther’s Romans lectures. And not just the substance! The same words
and phrases, the familiar verses from St. Paul, Christus Samaritanus with his healing
oil and wine, and last but not least, the excerpt from nupt. conc. 1.25.28: one would be
hard pressed to differentiate between the presentation of these doctrines in this festal
sermon from Dec. 1514 and that of the lectures on Rom. 4:7 in late 1515 and 7:17 in early
1516.1024 I offer here a brief recapitulation.
The original, birth, or congenital “sin” inherited from Adam is a bundle of
wicked desires or vices, an irresistible propensity in the unregenerate person toward

ante peccatum. Quare quia non possumus facere, ideo tradidit Christum pro nobis morti, ut per
sanguinem suum nos ab isto originali peccato et omnibus inde provenientibus liberaret. Idcirco docet
nos in eum credere et pro gratia invocare, qua tale peccatum purgatur. Sicut dicit Marci ultimo: ‘Qui
crediderit et baptizatus fuerit’. Nam cum baptisamur et credimus, gratiam accipimus, quae contra
malam propensionem pugnat in nobis et expugnat peccatum natalitium. Tunc incipiunt bona et
honesta desyderia ad submissionem et castitatem, ad mansuetudinem, et fiunt bona opera. Sic
scriptum est Ioannis 15: ‘Ego sum vitis, vos palmites etc.’ Et ad hoc dedit symbolum fidei et orationem
dominicam, ut nos cottidie exerceremur in fide et oratione, semper invocantes eius gratiam contra
peccatum natalitium. Nam quamdiu vivimus, non sumus sine peccato gentilitio, semper in nobis mala
desyderia manent, quae nos ad peccata sollicitant, contra quae nos pugnare oportet. Sicut docet
Petrus dicens 1. Pe. 2: ‘Charissimi, obsecro vos etc.’ Ideo semper exercendum et orandum est, usque ad
mortem: tunc enim mortificatur tota caro. 4. Cum dicitur in baptismo originale peccatum dimitti,
quomodo ergo tu dicis, quod remaneat et cum eo pugnandum esse? Respondet Divus Augustinus:
‘Dimittitur quidem peccatum gentilitium in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut non imputetur’. Sicut
Samaritanus ille apud Lucam c. decimo, quando infudit oleum et vinum in vulnera semivivi, non
statim eum sanavit, sed in stabulum eum posuit. Ita per baptismum omnia peccata tolluntur, sic
tamen, quod Deus non imputat: sed non ideo non sunt, immo sananda sunt et coepta sanari. Verum
in morte sanantur absolute omnia. Ideo quoties sentis te moveri ad impatientiam, superbiam,
libidinem et alia mala, toties scire debes, quod sentias mortifera vulnera natalitiae culpae, quae in
carne Adae, unde tua propagata, diabolus inflixit, et mox cogitare, quomodo resistas et ores
Dominum Ihesum, ut hoc peccatum non praevaleat tibi, sed per gratiam suam vincatur. Sic Paulus ait
Gal. 5: ‘Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum etc.’ Rho. 13. ‘Et carnis curam non foeceritis in desideriis’.
Qui enim sic cum vitiis suis pugnat, huic non solum non imputatur a Deo, quantumlibet in ipso vivat,
sed etiam coronam merebitur, et ab eis liberabitur. Qui vero non pugnant, sed consentiunt eis, ipsi
redeunt omnino in peccatum gentilitium et fiunt, quales erant ante baptismum.
1024
See esp. WA 56.272.3-273.2, LW 25.260 (on Rom. 4:7), WA 56.351.11-22, LW 25.340 (on Rom.
7:17).
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evil, “flesh.” God in his law forbids this root sin, and all the actual sins that proceed
therefrom; he summons Adam’s children to become pure and righteous just as Adam
had been before the disaster of his rebellion. But because of the vitiation of human
nature in Adam, no one can keep God’s law by his own resources. No one can purify
his own heart. Seeing that we could not lift a finger to save ourselves, God in his great
love and mercy handed over Christ to die for us (cf. Eph. 2:1-5, Rom. 5:6-11, 8:32).
Through his blood, we are set free from all sin, original and actual: in this instance,
Luther seems to have the guilt and curse of sin especially in mind, for his language
evokes the nexus of atonement/redemption through Christ’s cross and the freedom of
the blood-washed redeemed in texts like Rev. 1:5, Rom. 3:24-28, Gal. 2:15—5:1, etc. The
gift of redemption in Christ is received through faith and baptism; and in addition to
being set free from the bondage of guilt (cf. Col. 2:14), the baptized receive the “grace”
that fights against their inherited evil desires and indeed takes them by storm. Here,
“gratia” means gratia sanans: the gift of union with Christ (John 15:5), the Samaritan
who heals the sin-wounds of the man left for dead beside the road through the
bestowal of those good and upright desyderia which renovate the heart itself and begin
to reverse its inveterate bent toward evil. Now, the Christian, as 1 Pet. 2:11 and Rom.
13:14 make clear, has a role to play in this ongoing healing process. Once the grace of
regeneration has brought the dead to life, the reborn person must—and may—fight
against the deadly desires that vexatiously remain as his “flesh” right up to the point of
death. The main way of carrying on the fight against one’s residual flesh is by begging
for increased supplies of healing grace; enlivened, renovated, and empowered by this
grace, he is able as “spirit” to refuse consent to the vicious desires that constitute his
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“flesh” (Gal. 5:17). Whenever he feels himself being moved (moveri) by evil desire, he
must redouble his efforts, fight back, and pray. So long as he keeps up this holy war
against his own old self, God in his free mercy declines to count against him the sinful
desires that remain within him: thus Luther’s constant interpretation and use of nupt.
conc. 1.25.28 from 1514 on. If, however, the Christian consents (consentire) to the
desires he still experiences or feels (sentire) in his flesh—then, the erstwhile believer
becomes one with his flesh, returns completely to his birth-sin, forfeits God’s gifts of
mercy and healing grace in Christ, and becomes just as he was before his baptism.
In sum: atonement through Christ’s blood; healing grace to renovate the
deepest affections of the heart; the merciful non-imputation of the affective “sin” that
remains after baptism; the contingent nature of this mercy, which depends upon the
condition that the graced person refuses to consent to the residual sin that makes this
mercy needful;—these are the characteristic elements of Luther’s Augustinian
theology of holiness c. 1514—16.
(2) Now let us turn to the last sermon Luther ever preached in Wittenberg. On
17 Jan. 1546, Luther was sixty-two years old: a little over thirty-one years had passed
since he had preached de peccato gentilitio on the feast of St. Mary’s conception in late
1514. In the interim, Luder had become Luther; the Church in Europe had bitterly
divided over the teaching of this “drunken German,” as Pope Leo X is reputed to have
called him; the Reformer had made his stand at Worms, and Leo had excommunicated
him as an obstinate heretic; all manner of theological breakthroughs, writings,
conflicts, etc. had taken place; the peasants had revolted and the princes had
slaughtered them; brother Martin had married sister Katharina as a work of corporal
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mercy, grown to love her deeply, and had six children, two of whom had died; first his
spiritual father, Staupitz, and then Hans Luder had died too; Luther had broken with
Karlstadt, Erasmus, Oecolampadius, Zwingli, Agricola, and Bucer; Leo, Adrian VI, and
Clement VII had come and gone, and Paul III sat in St. Peter’s chair; the emaciated
monk had grown into the fat doctor; the long-anticipated general council, which
Luther had called for in 1520, had just gotten under way at Trent in Dec. 1545; und so
weiter. In short, almost everything had changed about Luther’s life, and not a little
had changed in his theology too. Nonetheless, as his swansong in the Stadtkirche
shows, the baseline content of Luther’s dogmatics of sin, grace, and holiness had
remained virtually the same.
The epistle reading for the day (the second Sunday after Epiphany) is Rom.
12:3ff, but Luther will eventually focus on v. 6 and the analogia fidei. First, he
summarizes Rom. 1—15 in short order. It is St. Paul’s custom to teach the great chief
articles of Christian doctrine first, that is, “about the law, sin, faith, how one is to
become righteous before God and live eternally.”1025 This teaching concerns faith in
Christ, viz. how “we are redeemed through the blood and death of the Son of God,”1026
and it occupies the Apostle in Rom. 1—11. Then Paul turns, in Rom. 12—15, to instruct
“the good tree” brought about through this faith regarding the good fruits and works it
ought to bring forth (Matt. 7:17).1027 He does this because he does not want us to be
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falsi Christiani, but real and true believers in Christ.1028 Since God’s Son has redeemed
us by his blood,
… we ought to consider that we should live in a godly way, as those who do not
belong in this transitory life, but in heavenly life [cf. 2 Cor. 4:17-18, Phil. 3:20].
After faith [cf. Gal. 3:23-5], we should not become the world, as he says a little
before: “Be renewed in the sense of your mind” (Rom. 12:2). “Amongst
yourselves” (cf. Phil. 2:5), that is, who are Christians.1029
Take to heart God’s great and free mercies in Christ crucified (Rom. 12:1), and
Renovamini sensu mentis (Rom. 12:2). This is the right order to be observed in the
pursuit of true gospel holiness, as opposed to the cultivation of merely moral virtue.
But St. Paul, and the dying Luther as his expositor, is keen to urge the imperativeness
of this renewal as it is concretely evidenced in good works. These Paul describes in
great detail from Rom. 12:3 forward, first with respect to the corporate life of the
baptismal Church (Rom. 12:3-21), then in regards to the Christians’ relation to the
magistrate (Rom. 13). Finally, he admonishes the strong in faith to bear with the weak
(Rom. 14—15:7). These, proclaims Luther, are the works of real Christians: that is, the
good fruits brought forth by those who are being renewed in the depths of their souls,
since Jesus Christ has enriched them (2 Cor. 8:9) and transferred them from the dark
kingdom of the devil and of this world into his own kingdom or Church (Col. 1:1314).1030
But for Luther the incorrigible Augustinian, those whom the Father has
adopted and redeemed by his Son and begun to renew by his Spirit, in short those
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who nicht gehoren in dis vergenglich leben, sed in coelestem vitam, are still fleshbearing pilgrims in exile from their true home, and they are incessantly tempted by
the devil, the world, and their own sinful desires to re-naturalize here below. (As a
rule, reports of Luther’s “this-worldliness” have been greatly exaggerated1031 and, I
suspect relatedly, the profoundly evangelisch Bonhoeffer has been much
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commendably of the Reformer’s “guestly spirituality” in “Martin Luther’s Reformation of
Spirituality,” in Timothy J. Wengert, ed., Harvesting Martin Luther’s Reflections on Theology, Ethics,
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plus inveniant in monasteriis, quam in domo parentum reliquerunt, Sed quem mihi cum hoc Monacho
Abraha conferes, qui deserit patriam, cognationem, fundos paternos, domum et omnia, et simpliciter
sequitur in exilium vocantem Deum? … Quid igitur inquies, nonne David rex erat, et Dominus terrae,
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tanquam diversorio, ex quo emigrandum brevi sit, non apponunt cor ad huius vitae negocia, sed
tanquam sinistra manu corporalia curant, dextram levant sursum ad aeternam patriam: ac si quando
accidit, ut turbetur aliquid, vel in Republica vel Oeconomia, nihil aut parum moventur. Satis enim est
eis, utcunque in hoc diversorio tractentur, quod norunt aeternas mansiones a filio Dei paratas.” Note
Luther’s references to Ps. 39:12, 1 Cor. 7:31, Heb. 11, and John 14:1. In his 1537 sermon on John 14:1-4,
the Reformer’s “otherworldliness” is again on full display. See WA 45.483-88, LW 24.25-31, e.g. WA
45.484.36-485.6, cf. LW 24.27: “If you have nothing here (hie), you will surely receive richly there
(dort). For God still has such a great store that he can give every one of you a hundred dwellings for
one. Therefore retain your courage, and do not hesitate to surrender what the world can take away
from you. The dwellings of life are far more spacious than the dwelling of death. Even if they throw
you in a dungeon or prison here (hie), or drive you away, do not let it bother you. These are houses
that belong to the world; but you look upon another home, a home which you have to look forward
to which you will receive and possess there (dort).”

426

misunderstood.1032) The reborn of God, the redeemed in Christ, have eternal life now
by faith (John 1:12-13, 3:3-8, 13-18, 36, 5:24-5, Rom. 3:21—6:23). They experience the
advance of this new life through the Spirit’s operations described in Rom. 8, and they
do the good works of love set forth in Rom. 12—15. But even so, in this life they never
surpass the angefochtene holiness of the flesh-fighting, law-loving saint confessed so
frankly by St. Paul in Rom. 7. At sixty-two, the irascible and corpulent Doctor, weary
of countless battles and eager to depart and be with Christ (Phil. 1:21-3), knew this
better than ever before. To describe this vision of Christian life and holiness one last
time for his difficult, unruly, and largely impenitent flock in Wittenberg, Luther
turned again to the Augustinian theology he had set out in the same pulpit three
decades earlier:
After baptism, much from the old Adam remains. As has often been said, sin
was completely forgiven in baptism, but they are not yet completely pure
(peccatum in baptismo prorsus remissum, sed nondum sind gantz rein). As in
the parable about the Samaritan, who carried the man wounded by the robbers
into the inn. For he did not do this in such a way, that he healed him at once,
but he bound up his wounds, pouring (infundens) etc. The man who fell among
the robbers had received two injuries. Everything that he had, they took from
him, they robbed him, they wounded him, so that he was half-dead and had to
have died if the Samaritan had not come. Adam has fallen among murderers
and has propagated sin into us all: but Christ the Samaritan has come, who
binds us up and carries us into the Church and heals us. Thus we are under the
Physician’s care, for sin indeed has been forgiven, but it has not yet been
purged out, neither are we pure (peccatum quidem gar remissum, sed nondum
expurgatum nec rein). If the Spirit does not rule a man, he becomes rotten
again. But he must purify the wounds daily. So this life, in this world, is a
hospital. Sin indeed is forgiven, but not yet healed (peccatum quidem
remissum, sed nondum heil).1033
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Here Luther sallies forth into his exposition of Rom. 12:6 and the way “the devil’s
bride, reason, the lovely whore, comes in and wants to be wise,” cooks up conceited
schwermerey, and draws people away from the true faith into heresy (in this
paragraph, that of the south German and Swiss Reformed in mysteriis; later in the
sermon, Rome).1034 The problem with heresy is that it is not an obvious sin like
fornication: “Other gross sins are seen, but no one is able to judge reason.”1035 So it is
useful to explain how to fight against the subtle sin of heresy (which is born of
tinkering with God’s Word, in order to make it fit with what one takes to be
reasonable or pious apart from the revelation of that Word) by analogy to how one
fights against “the sin of sexual lust, which everybody understands.”1036 Therefore, the
experienced Pfarrer fleshes out the logic of postbaptismal evil desire, graced nonconsent, and forgiveness one last time for the Wittenbergers in familiar Augustinian
terms:
An objection arises: I am a Christian nevertheless? Well stated. Take heed, take
heed to yourself. Sin has not yet been purely healed, purged out (nondum
peccatum pure sanatum, expurgatum). As I say to a young man, to a girl: That
you would not feel the sickness of your father and mother (fuelest patris,
matris kranckeit)—that is impossible. If you follow lust, you will become a
whoremonger, a fornicator. There the Gospel admonishes you: “Don’t do it!
Don’t follow your concupiscentiae!” [Ecclus. 18:30]. Sin indeed has been
forgiven and purged, now see to it that you remain in grace (modo ut maneas in
gratia). In this way the leftover misfortune in the flesh has been forgiven, but
sed verband im seine wunden infundens &c.. Is, qui inciderat in latrones, hat ij schaden empfangen.
Alles, was er hat, haben sie im genomen, Spoliarunt, vulnerarunt, das er halb tod war, hette muessen
sterben, nisi Samaritanus venisset. Adam ist unter die Morder gefallen et in nos omnes propagavit
peccatum, nisi venisset Christus Samaritanus, qui verband und tregt uns in Ecclesiam, heilet an uns.
Sic sumus sub Medico, peccatum quidem gar remissum, sed nondum expurgatum nec rein. Si spiritus
non regieret hominem, wuerde er wider faul. Sed mus die wunden teglich reinigen. Sic vita haec in hac
terra ist ein Spital, peccatum quidem remissum, sed nondum heil.
1034
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not yet purely swept out. Rather the filthy relics are to be purged, like that man
who fell among the robbers. I speak about sexual lust, a gross evil which all
people feel (sentiunt). If a believer does not follow God’s admonition, to stand
against the Devil who tempts him [1 Pet. 5:8-9], sin has not been forgiven for
him (ei non est peccatum remissum).1037
Again, what’s true of sexual sin holds for that “more hideous harlotry” which is
idolatry: and how the prophets raged against “der Abgotterey… der schonen hur”!1038
But that is the stuff of Reformation polemics; let us attend to the mature
Augustinian theology of sin, grace, and holiness still being preached by the oldest
Luther. Much from, though not all of, the old Adam remains in the Christian saint
after baptism: and these base reliquiae are rightly called “sin.” This residual sin is a
deadly affective disease, and its malignant operations, suffered by the patient soul in
the form of evil desires, feelings, and impulses, cannot be entirely done away with in
this life. For the wounds of the holy soul are not yet wholly healed. But even though
the saint is not yet fully healed of the cancer of sin, all his sins, including the remnants
of Adam’s sin that still infect him, have been completely forgiven in baptism. For
Christus Samaritanus has taken him up and brought him into the Church; and in this
hospital Christus Medicus has begun to heal his wounded soul. So long as Christ’s
redeemed patient continues in his care, all is well, and the hope of full healing is well
founded. His sins, and the bits of Adam’s sin still in him, have been blotted out, and
what remains will be healed in time, for the Spirit binds up and purifies his wounds
1037
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patris, matris kranckeit, hoc est impossibile. Si sequeris lust, fies hurer, scortator. Ibi Euangelium
monet: thue es nicht, folge nicht concupiscentiae. Peccatum quidem est remissum et purgatum, modo
ut maneas in gratia. Sic das ubrig ungluck in carne condonatum, sed nondum rein ausgefeget, sed
reliquae sordes sunt purgandae, ut is, qui incidit in latrones. Ut loquor de libidine, crasso malo, quod
omnes homines sentiunt. Si credens non sequitur Dei admonitionem, wider zustehen dem Teuffel, qui
tentat, ei non est peccatum remissum. Cf. LW 51.374.
1038
WA 127.5.-128.3 [A], cf. LW 51.374-5.
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daily. But the patient, for all his suffering, is not merely a passive recipient of Christ’s
(and the Spirit’s) gracious ministrations in the Church. He must see to it that he
remains in Christ’s grace; and, healed and empowered by Christ’s grace and Spirit, he
does in fact abide in Christ by refusing to consent to the residual sinful desires he
inherited from Adam. True, he cannot help but “feel” the persistent effects of his
congenital disease. But the Gospel—not the law!—admonishes him to refuse to follow
his feelings, with the promise that if he resists them God’s grace in Christ covers the
“sin” that necessitates this resistance, and the threat that if he gives way to his evil and
pathological desires the forgiveness he once enjoyed will vanish. Luther’s allusion to
Ecclus. 18:30, a central text (as we saw in Part II) in Augustine’s explication of his
theory of consent but by 1546 no longer part of Luther’s canon, is especially striking in
this connection: as I argued in chapter 2, for the mature Luther non-consent is (from
the human perspective, not sub specie praedestinationis aeternae) the absolute
conditio sine qua non for abiding in a state of grace and gift. Maneas in gratia! Thue es
nicht! Folge nicht concupiscentiae! So far the old and dying doctor iustificationis
gratuitae, brimming with imperatives which he believed both could be kept by Christ’s
grace and Spirit and had to be kept in order to continue in that grace.
Set alongside one another, the two sermons vividly demonstrate the basic
continuity that marks Luther’s “Augustinian” dogmatics of sin, grace, and holiness
from 1514—16 to his death in 1546. Residual sin from Adam; grace in Christ the
Samaritan; healing in the Church by the Spirit, ordered toward increasing purity of
heart; the utter needfulness of refusing consent to the evil affective pathology that still
infects and affects Christ’s convalescent saints; the merciful gift of forgiveness/non-
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imputation, the main object of which is this evil desire in the saints; the contingency
of this mercy upon the refusal of consent to sinful desire (or else upon its renewal in
repentance): these are the characteristic, fundamental, and consistent components of
Augustine’s theology of sin, grace, and sanctification in the 420s, and of Luther’s from
1514 to 1546.
Now let us see about some of the noteworthy developments in that stretch of
time, bearing in mind that the shifts which take place in Luther’s theology occur
within the context of this core and enduring Augustinian doctrine.

3. Continuities and Discontinuities: Luther’s creedal and evangelical Augustinianism
My goal in this section and the next is to render systematisch an account of how the
embryonic dogmatics of holiness examined in Part II relates in continuity-anddiscontinuity to the mature dogmatics set forth in Part I. Of course, my selection of
the word “embryonic” signals my interest in the gradual development of Luther’s
theology over time. But here, I am not in the hunt for the dates, causes, circumstances,
and effects of breakthroughs, let alone “the” Durchbruch or Wende to “Reformation
theology.” (One index of just how hard that distinguished project is, is the realization
that if Luther’s supposed turn from Augustine’s gratia sanans to the Reformer’s
promissio gratiae is the standard for determining who does and does not count as an
evangelical theologian, Luther in 1546 himself fairs rather poorly.) Rather, I hope
simply to offer an historically sensitive dogmatic description of select points where the
maturing and mature Luther’s theology either upholds, advances, or departs from
positions held in 1514—16. For two reasons, I join “continuity-and-discontinuity” with
dashes and an “and.” There is, first, the fundamental “Augustinian” continuity
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established above in section 2. This ought to inform, and moderate, asseverations of
Luther’s novelty; it urges us to look for the ways his fresh exegetical and spiritual
insights cohere with the traditions he inherited, traditions which profoundly and
permanently shaped his theology. In the second place, it is one my basic operating
assumptions that the real discontinuities apparent in the thought of some major
thinkers in the tradition (e.g., Plato, Augustine, Thomas, Luther, Barth) are thrown
into the greatest relief when set in relation to the continuities that persist amidst, and
in some sense enable, the often more perceptible shifts, modifications, or
developments in one’s thought. This is true even of the great and dramatic reversals
that sometimes take place, for example of Luther against Biel or Barth against
Schleiermacher. For the old teacher continues to shape the renegade pupil precisely as
the latter rebels against the former. I am looking for discontinuities-in-continuity, for
nova in vetere and for vetera in novo.

3.1. From sin, grace, and mercy (c. 1514—16) to sin, gift, and grace (1521—46)
To begin, let us consider the terms that oriented my study of Luther’s mature
dogmatics in Part I: residual indwelling sin (peccatum/caro), the grace of free
forgiveness and justification in Christ (gratia), and the gift of new life and progressive
renewal in holiness by the Spirit (donum). Rolf Schäfer has argued that Luther’s use of
“gratia” as a quasi-technical term for the wrath-removing favor and pardon of God in
Christ, and “donum” for the nature-renewing power of Christ present within the
believer by the Spirit, dates to the Antilatomus of June 1521. He was probably
convinced of the usefulness of this distinction by Melanchthon, who had borrowed it
from Erasmus’ 1516 Novum Instrumentum. In the winter 1515/16 lecture on Rom. 5:15
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(gratia Dei et donum in gratia, etc.), which Luther wrote prior to receiving his copy of
Erasmus’ work later on in 1516, he identifies “grace” and “gift” as equivalent terms used
to name the one ipsa iustitia gratis donata per Christum;1039 and as recently as the
lectures on Galatians published in 1519, after Luther became familiar with Erasmus’
distinction, he had argued against it.1040 But Master Philipp’s writings (and personal
conversation?) in 1520/1 seem to have won Luther over to it. Grace and gift, in their
proper distinction and inseparable interrelation, factor prominently in the
Antilatomus,1041 and when the Galatians lectures were republished in 1523, Luther
deleted his earlier critical remarks.1042 As I trust chapter 2 has demonstrated, Luther
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WA 56.318.12-32: Gratiam et donum, quasi differant, Apostolus copulat, Sed hoc ideo facit, Vt
formam futuri, quam dixit, clare ostendat, Scil. quia licet ex Deo Iustificemur et gratiam accipiamus,
Eam tamen gratiam non merito nostro accipimus, Sed est donum, Quod Christo dedit pater
hominibus dare, secundum illud Eph. 4.: ‘ascendens in altum captiuam duxit captiuitatem, dedit dona
hominibus.’ Hȩc ergo dona sunt gratiȩ Dei, quȩ a patre accepit per meritum et gratiam suam
personalem, vt daret nobis, Vt Act. 2.: ‘Accepta promissione spiritus sancti a patre effudit hoc donum,
quod videtis.’ Sensus ergo: ‘Gratia Dei’ (qua nos Iustificat, immo que est in Christo sicut in principio,
Vt peccatum hominis in Adam) ‘et donum’, sc. quod diffundit Christus a patre in suos credentes.
Quod donum ‘in gratia vnius hominis’ i. e. merito et gratia personali, qua Deo placuit, Vt donum illud
daret nobis. Illud ‘in gratia vnius’ de personali gratia Christi intelligitur, respondenter ad peccatum
proprium et personale Adȩ, ‘donum’ autem ipsa Iustitia nobis donata. Sic et peccatum originis (si
liceret dicere) donum est in peccato vnius hominis Adȩ. ‘Gratia Dei’ autem et ‘donum’ idem sunt sc.
ipsa Iustitia gratis donata per Christum. Et addit eam Gratiam, quia et amicis donari consueuerunt.
Sed hoc donum etiam inimicis ex misericordia donatum est, Quia non fuerunt digni hoc dono nisi
misericordia et gratia Dei digni facti ac reputati. Cf. LW 25.306.
1040
On Gal. 3:7, WA 2.511.11-21, LW 27.252: Dicit enim, spiritum tributum et virtutes factas ex auditu
fidei, et hoc probat, quia sic Abrahae fides est reputata ad iusticiam. Ergo ne fidem reputari ad
iusticiam est spiritum accipere? Aut ergo nihil facit, aut accipere spiritum et reputari ad iusticiam
idem erit. Quod et verum est, et ideo refertur, ne divina reputatio extra deum nihil esse putetur, ut
sunt, quibus verbum Apostoli ‘gratia’ magis favorem quam donum significari putatur. Nam favente et
reputante deo vere accipitur spiritus, donum et gratia. Alioquin ab aeterno gratia fuit et intra deum
manet, si tantummodo favorem significat, eo quo in hominibus modo favor est. Deus enim sicut
diligit reipsa, non verbo tantum, ita et favet re praesente, non tantum verbo.
1041
See esp. WA 8.105.36—108.18, LW 32.26-30, e.g. WA 8.107.13-16 (LW 32.229): Iustus et fidelis
absque dubio habet gratiam et donum: gratiam, quae eum totum gratificet, ut persona prorsus
accepta sit, et nullus irae locus in eo sit amplius, donum vero, quod eum sanet a peccato et tota
corruptione sua animi et corporis.
1042
Rolf Schäfer, “Melanchthon’s Interpretation of Romans 5.15: His Departure from the
Augustinian Concept of Grace Compared to Luther’s,” in Timothy J. Wengert and M. Patrick
Graham, eds., Philip Melanchthon (1497—1560) and the Commentary (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic
Press, 1997), 79-104, here esp. 82-5, 95-104.
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runs with the distinction-in-relation of gratia et donum, Gnade und Gabe for the rest of
his life. Once these terms are cemented in his mind as a kind of shorthand for
describing the trinitarian work of redemption (which seems to be the case already in
1521) “grace” and “gift” take on a life of their own, rarely tethered to their original
provenance in Rom. 5:15 but always charged with the creedal gospel of God’s free gifts
of forgiveness in Christ and new life in the Spirit.
Luther’s famous “Preface to Romans” in the 1522 Septembertestament is one of
the instances where both the roots of the distinction in Erasmus’ and Melanchthon’s
exegesis of Rom. 5:15 and Luther’s own mature dogmatics are on full display:
Between grace and gift (Gnade vnd gabe) there is this difference: grace really
means God’s graciousness or favor (hulde odder gunst), which he bears in
himself toward us, out of which he was pleased to pour Christ and the Spirit
with his gifts (seynen gaben) into us. This becomes clear from the fifth chapter,
for there he says gnad vnd gabe ynn Christo etc. (Rom. 5:15). Though now the
gifts and the Spirit (die gaben vnd der geyst) increase in us every day, they are
not yet perfect, since evil lusts and sin still remain in us which struggle against
the spirit, as he says in [Rom.] 7 and Gal. 5, and as the feud between the
woman’s seed and the serpent’s seed is foretold in Gen. 3[:15]. Even so, grace
(gnade) does so much that we are reckoned wholly and fully justified before
God, since his grace is not divided and parceled out, as are the gifts (die gaben).
Rather, he takes us wholly and indeed into favor (ynn die hulde), for the sake of
Christ our intercessor and mediator; and for that reason, the gifts (die gaben)
have begun in us.1043
Gnade, hulde, and gunst refer to God’s kind favor toward sinners in and for the sake of
his Son Jesus Christ, the Mediator. Gabe means Christ, the Holy Spirit, and his gifts,
1043

WA DB 7.8.10-22: Gnade vnd gabe sind des vnterscheyds, das gnade eygentlich heyst, Gottis hulde
odder gunst, die er zu vns tregt bey sich selbs, aus wilcher er geneygt wirt, Christum, den geyst mit
seynen gaben ynn vns zu gissen, wie das aus dem funfften Capitel klar wirt, da er spricht, gnad vnd
gabe ynn Christo etce. Ob nu wol die gaben vnd der geyst ynn vns teglich zu nehmen vnd noch nicht
volkomen sind, das also noch bose luste vnd sund ynn vns vberbleyben, wilche wider den geyst
streytten, wie er sagt am .7. Gala. 5 vnd wie Gen̄. 3. versprochen ist der hadder zwisschen des weybs
samen vnd der schlangen samen, So thut doch die gnade so viel, das wyr gantz vnd fur voll rechtfertig
fur Gott gerechnet werden, denn seyne gnade teylet vnd stucket sich nicht, wie die gaben thun,
sondern nympt vns gantz vnd gar auff ynn die hulde, vmb Christus vnsers fursprechers vnd mittelers
willen, vnd vmb das ynn vns die gaben angefangen sind. Cf. LW 35.369-70.
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poured (gissen) into the heart by the Father in order to renovate it into the new
“spirit” who struggles against the old flesh and its desires.1044 The gifts have not yet
been perfected in the saints, owing to their residual sinfulness; St. Paul’s battle against
his old self, described in Rom. 7 and Gal. 5, attests this well. But seeing as the
outpoured (or “infused”) gifts originate in the gracious kindness of God, the remaining
flaws in the saints’ renewal do not hinder them from being taken entirely into his
favor. For God’s grace is so strong that the really but imperfectly holy are already
reckoned as wholly and fully justified in his sight for the sake of Jesus Christ, their
Serpent-Crusher, Mediator, and Intercessor. Thus far Luther’s theology of residual sin,
grace and justification in Christ, and daily increasing renewal in holiness by the
Spirit’s outpoured gifts c. 1522, replete with the rich creedal and evangelical substance
and stated in the same dogmatic shorthand which will crop up so plentifully in the
1530s and 40s. Held alongside the dogmatics of sin, grace, and gift set forth in the
Smalcald Articles or On the Councils and the Church, the thirty-eight year old
Reformer’s pronouncements on the same loci appear to be virtually indistinguishable.
How does this mature dogmatics, blossoming in 1521/22 and bearing rich fruit
in the later years, relate to the younger professor’s exegetical ruminations (and
Augustinian appropriations) in 1514—16? I think Schäfer is right to locate a
terminological shift in the vicinity of early 1521. But that does not, in itself,
1044
Luther’s oft-cited paean to the divine work of a true lively faith follows just three paragraphs
later on in the Preface, WA DB 7.10.6-15: Aber glawb ist eyn gotlich werck ynn vns, das vns wandelt
vnd new gepirt aus Gott, Johan. 1. vnd todtet den allten Adam, macht vns gantz ander menschen von
hertz, mut, synn, vnd allen krefften, vnd bringet den heyligen geyst mit sich, O es ist eyn lebendig,
schefftig, thettig, mechtig ding vmb den glawben, das vnmuglich ist, das er nicht on vnterlas solt gutts
wircken, Er fraget auch nicht, ob gutte werck zu thun sind, sondern ehe man fragt, hat er sie than, vnd
ist ymer ym thun, Wer aber nicht solch werck thut der ist eyn glawbloser mensch, tappet vnd sihet
vmb sich nach dem glawben vnd gutten wercken, vnd weys widder was glawb odder gutte werck sind,
vnd wesscht vnd schwetzt doch viel wort von glawben vnd gutten wercken. Cf. LW 35.370.
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demonstrate a shift in doctrinal substance. It may be that in early summer 1521, Luther
first recognized just how useful Melanchthon’s Erasmian verba could be for describing
the dogmatic res he had already held and taught for some time. This is not at all to
downplay the significance of Melanchthon—or Erasmus—for the formation of
Luther’s maturing theology in the early 1520s: as an Anglican, I don’t have a dog in
that old Lutheran fight. Terminological precision and clarity is a great boon for all
intellectual work, and especially for the Church’s dogmatics, and I think Melanchthon
helped Luther in this regard. But it was Dr. Luther who helped Master Philipp arrive at
a profound grasp of the res magna evangelii, not the other way around. His deepest
convictions regarding the sin-sickness inherited from Adam, the gifts of forgiveness,
regeneration, and healing that are in Christ, and the merciful non-reckoning of
residual sin that God grants for Christ’s sake had assumed their mature shape and
substance by 1516: Augustine, St. David, Paul, John, and Staupitz, probably in that
order of importance, had led Luther to them a few years before the prodigious “Greek”
assumed his professorship in Wittenberg in fall 1518.
On several occasions in Part II, I suggested that the young Luther’s
Augustinian dogmatics of sin, grace, and holiness anticipates in embryonic fashion
what we find full-grown in the works of his maturity. Prior to the terminological input
of Melanchthon, Luther generally stuck closer to the Augustinian litterae in describing
how “sin,” gratia sanans, non-consent, and non-imputation relate to one another in
the Christian life. After that input, Luther still holds essentially the same theological
judgments, but now in part uses different theological words and concepts to describe
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them.1045 In part only, I say, for two reasons: first, because Luther’s language about
“sin” does not really advance beyond what he wrote in 1515/16; second, since right up
to 1546, the oldest Luther can still preach the gospel using the same Augustinian
words, scripture verses, and images that he had adopted ex ipso Augustino half a
lifetime before. But let us attend now to the developments.
First, in general Augustine’s renovating “grace” evolves into the mature
Luther’s renovating “gift.” But as it does so, the reality of vitiated nature’s spiritual
regeneration in the saints, and of their ongoing renovation, restoration, healing,
sanctification, or “justification” (Gerechtmachung) by Christ and the Spirit, remains
unaltered in its substance despite the shift in the terms Luther uses to describe this
great gift. For the Lutheran donum Spiritus is really the old Augustinian gratia sanans
passing under another name. This is why it is highly misleading to speak, as Schäfer
does, of Luther’s (or Melanchthon’s, for that matter) “departure from the Augustinian
concept of grace.”1046 For, on the one hand, Luther invests his Melanchthonian
concept of the Spirit’s sanctifying “donum” with the same dogmatic content that the
earlier “Augustinian” gratia infusa et sanans had possessed; and on the other hand,
Augustine himself uses the word “gift” to describe the Spirit’s gracious bestowal of
renovating spiritual delight in the soul: delectatio non litterae, sed spiritus donum
est.1047 (Furthermore, it will be remembered that the scriptural language of the Spirit
as God’s “gift” plays a decisive role in Augustine’s trinitarian pneumatology: see, e.g.,
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On words, concepts, and judgments, see David S. Yeago, “The New Testament and Nicene
Dogma: A Contribution to the Recovery of Theological Exegesis,” Pro Ecclesia 3 (1994): 152-64.
1046
This is his subtitle: “Melanchthon’s Interpretation of Romans 5.15: His Departure from the
Augustinian Concept of Grace Compared to Luther’s.”
1047
sp. litt. 15.26, CSEL 60.180.22-181.4, WSA I/23.161. See above, chapter 2 section 2.2.1.
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trin. 5.12—17, 6.11, 15.29, 33—6.) In 1520, Luther is still defending gratia infusa in public
disputation.1048 In May 1521, commenting on Ps. 68:24 in the Wartburg, he defines “die
gnade” as “der glauben in unß, die… nit auß uns noch von uns, ßondern von got uns
geben ist.”1049 In the next month’s Antilatomus, “grace” and “gift” are distinguished in
the Melanchthonian manner for the first time. But Luther continues to speak of the
“gift” being “infused” into the soul (Donum etiam infusum est),1050 and he ascribes to it
the same healing, renovating, and sin-fighting operations that infused “grace” had
once performed. Moreover, the old Luther sometimes uses “grace” in the earlier
manner if it suits his purpose as exegete or preacher.1051 It is not, then, altogether
helpful to first enumerate instances of gratia/Gnade in works after 1521 (or 1530, in
Lowell Green’s case) which have to do with the abolition of God’s wrath through his
mercy and Christ’s blood, and then contrast them to the spiritual transformation that
the same term names in the earlier period. For from 1514 to 1546, Luther consistently
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WA 6.85-98; e.g., 85.7, 20-1: 2. Fides acquisita sine infusa nihil est, infusa sine acquisita est
omnia… 11. Fides… infusa est spiritus vitae. 12. Etiam sola fides infusa satis est ad iustificationem
impii.
1049
From “Der lxvij Psalm von dem Ostertag, Hymelfart, unnd Pfingstag,” WA 8.28.20-22. Luther is
commenting on Ps. 68:28, “O gott gepeutt deyner krafft, o gott bekrefftige das du ynn unß gewirckt
hast.” Here are ll. 17-25: Bißher ist beschrieben alß was Christus gethan hat durch sich und seyn
Apostelln. Nu hinfurt bit er, das alßo bestehen mug und erhalten werde, wie es anfangenn ist, davor
auch alle Apostell, ßonderlich Paulus, sorgfeltig geweßen sind. Und die krafft ist die gnade odder der
glawben in unß, die heysset gottis krafft, darumb das sie nit auß uns noch von uns, ßondern von got
uns geben ist, da durch wir krefftig seyn zu allem guttem, widder allis boeße, drumb spricht er ‘wilche
du yn uns wirckist’, das ist, durch wilche krafft du ynn und durch uns wirckist, die selbe ist Christus
krafft und doch vom vatter gepotten wirt. Cf. WA 8.34.13-15 on v. 34: ßo thut alßo: gebt yhm die
krafft, bekennet, das nit ewer werck, ßondern seyne gnade euch krefftig, gerecht und selig mache. I am
thankful to Schäfer for pointing me in the direction of these texts (“Melanchthon’s Interpretation of
Romans 5.15,” p. 98, n. 97).
1050
Antilatomus, WA 8.107.22, LW 32.229.
1051
See, e.g., the 29 Sept./6 Oct. 1537 sermon on John 1:17. In it, Luther develops a law/“grace”
contrast much in keeping with Augustine’s sp. litt. The law reveals sin, but doesn’t have the power
to save us from it or rid us of it; it is a mirror in which we may perceive the hard truth that we lack
righteousness and life. This is salutary, for it impels us to cry: “Oh come, Lord Jesus Christ, and help
us and give us grace (gnad), so that we may be able to do what the law demands from us.” WA
46.661.22-38, cf. LW 22.143-4.
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upholds his hard-earned Augustinian doctrine of affective “sin” in the saints, and his
no less Augustinian doctrine of the progressive renewal of their sinful affections by
inner healing “grace.” But after 1521, “donum” is the word he more typically uses to
describe the free gift of this renewal through the Spirit’s operations in the heart. The
shift from one Augustinian (and broadly scholastic) verbum to another in order the
better to describe the Spirit’s gift of growth in holiness does not in fact signal any
material alteration on Luther’s part in his understanding of the dogmatic and spiritual
res which either term can ably attest.1052
How does the mature Luther’s “gratia” relate to his earlier theology? Once
again, I think that a deep substantial continuity obtains beneath the surface-level
(though not superficial) shift in words. Of course, as I just discussed, “grace” often
refers to gratia sanans for the young Luther and for the old Augustine; and what the
young Augustinian Luther often named as God’s mercy, forgiveness, and/or nonimputation, the older Luther often calls “gratia” or “Gnade.” But two points need to be
made in this regard. First, and quite evidently, the mature Luther continues to speak
the older Augustinian (and Staupitzian) language of misericordia, remissio, and nonimputatio/reputatio. Second, and less well-known, Augustine by no means limits
himself to one way of talking about “grace.” To the contrary, in the works against
Pelagius and Julian c. 411/12—30, “gratia” consistently unfolds as a rich and threefold
gift comprising forgiveness, spiritual renewal, and bodily resurrection that reaches in
its effects from sacramental initiation in baptism to the final glory of the Last Day.1053
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Hence Calvin’s duplex gratia, or Owen’s retrieval of habitual sanctifying “grace.”
For example: (1) Pecc. mer. 2.27.44, CSEL 60.115, WSA I/23.106: adtendere ac meminisse debemus
tantummodo peccatorum omnium plenam perfectamque remissionem baptismo fieri, hominis uero
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The heart’s inner renovation through infused charity is central to this theology of
grace and justification, to be sure: but it forms one part of it, not the whole.1054 Failing
to recognize this point is a major vice in much of both Augustine and Reformation

ipsius qualitatem non totam continuo commutari, sed spiritales primitias in bene proficientibus de die
in diem nouitate crescent commutare in se quod carnaliter uetus est, donec totum ita renouetur, ut
animalis etiam infirmitas corporis ad firmitatem spiritalem incorruptionemque perueniat. (2) sp. litt.
33.59, CSEL 60.218, WSA I/23.183 (on Ps. 103:3-4): qui propitius fit omnibus iniquitatibus tuis: hoc
agitur in baptismatis sacramento. qui sanat omnes languores tuos: hoc agitur in hac uita fidelis
hominis… qui languores uetustatis, si perseuerante intentione proficimus, de die in diem crescente
nouitate sanantur ex fide, quae per dilectionem operatur. qui redimit de corruptione uitam tuam: hoc
fit in ultima resurrectione mortuorum. qui coronat te in miseratione et misericordia: hoc fit in iudicio.
(3) gr. et pecc. or. 2.39.44, CSEL 42.202, WSA I/23, 442: donec omne uitium, cui consentiendo
peccatur, regeneratione nouissima consumatur, id est ipsius etiam renouatione carnis, quae in eius
resurrectione futura promittitur, ubi non solum nulla peccata faciamus, sed nec habeamus ulla
desideria uitiosa, quibus consentiendo peccemus, ad quam beatam perfectionem huius quod nunc
datur sancti lauacri gratia peruenitur. qua enim regeneratione spiritus modo fit, ut peccata omnia
praeterita remittantur, eius merito fiet etiam regeneratio carnis in aeternam uitam, qua in ipsa carne
incorruptibiliter resurgente peccatorum omnium incitamenta sanentur. sed ea salus adhuc in spe
facta est, non tenetur in re neque per praesentiam possidetur, sed expectatur per patientiam. (4) nupt.
conc. 1.25.28, NBA I/18.60, WSA I/24.46: dimitti concupiscentiam carnis in baptismo, non ut non sit,
sed ut in peccatum non imputatur. Quamvis autem reatu suo iam soluto manet tamen, donec sanetur
omnis infirmitas nostra proficiente renovatione interioris hominis de die in diem, cum exterior
induerit incorruptionem. (5) nupt. conc. I.33.38-34.39, NBA I/18.74, WSA I/24.51f: eodem lavacro
regenerationis et verbo sanctificationis omnia prorsus mala hominum regeneratorum mundentur
atque sanentur, non solum peccata quae omnia nunc remittuntur in baptismo, sed etiam quae
posterius humana ignorantia vel infirmitate contrahuntur, non ut baptisma quotiens peccatur,
totiens repetatur, sed quia ipso quod semel datur fit, ut non solum antea, verum etiam postea
quorumlibet peccatorum venia fidelibus impetretur… [34, 39] non solum omnia peccata, sed omnia
prorsus hominum mala christiani lavacri sanctitate tolluntur, quo mundat Ecclesiam suam Christus,
ut exhibeat eam sibi non in isto saeculo, sed in futuro, non habentem maculam aut rugam aut aliquid
eius modi. (6) c. Iul. 2.4.9, NBA I/18.526, WSA I/24, 312: Dei gratia nos regenerante non imputandum,
Dei gratia iuvante frenandum, Dei gratia remunerante sanandum. (7) c. Iul. 6.13.40, NBA I/18.912-14,
WSA I/24.501: Nunc etiam perfecte innovat hominem, quantum attinet ad liberationem ab omnibus
omnino peccatis, non quantum ad liberationem ab omnibus malis… Sed ad illam, quoque
perfectionem quae speratur, eodem Baptismate, quod hic accipitur, pervenitur. (8) c. Iul. 6.14.44, NBA
I/18.920, WSA I/24, 505: Absit ut ego inanem dicerem gratiam lavacri illius, in quo renatus sum ex
aqua et spiritum, qua liberatus sum a reatu omnium peccatorum, vel quae nascendo traxeram, vel
quae male vivendo contraxeram: qua liberor ut sciam ne intrem in tentationem, a concupiscentia mea
abstractus et illectus, atque ut exaudiar dicens cum consortibus meis: Dimitte nobis debita nostra;
qua liberabor, ut spero, in aeternam. Cf. c. Iul. op. imp. 2.71, 2.84, 2.97, 2.217, 6.11, 6.15, 6.29, 6.31, 6.41.
1054
One finds passing references to Augustine’s triplex gratia in: “Notes Complémentaires. 36.
L’importance du baptême,” in Œuvres de Saint Augustin 23. Premières Polémiques contre Julien, eds.
F.-J. Thonnard, E. Bleuzen, and A.C. de Veer (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1974), 798-800; Vittorino
Grossi, “Baptismus,” in Cornelius Mayer, ed., Augustinus-Lexicon vol. 1 (Basel: Schwabe, 1986-1994),
583-591, here 590f; Agostino Trapè, Saint Augustine: Man, Pastor, Mystic, trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Co., 1986), 206f; Hombert, Gloria Gratiae, 164, 265f;
William Harmless, S.J., “Baptism,” in ATTA, 84-91, here 90; Mathijs Lamberigts, “Competing
Christologies: Julian and Augustine on Jesus Christ,” AugS 36:1 (2005), 159-194, here 176.
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scholarship, and it handicaps those few intrepid souls who try to grasp the nature of
the Reformers’ project of Augustinian ressourcement. In, for example, one of Timothy
Wengert’s learned articles, he cites a 1545 introduction to Augustine’s life and theology
by Melanchthon to this effect:
… [Augustine] everywhere called the Churches back to the true doctrine of the
Prophets and the Apostles, showed how horribly Pelagius erred by denying the
sin of the origin, demonstrated the distinction between the law and the Gospel,
taught that sins are forgiven freely because of God’s Son, not because of our
worthiness, and affirmed that the Gospel is the ministry of the Spirit, and that
the Holy Spirit is received by faith…1055
—then gently chides his hero’s “glowing (Lutheranized) review of the divine
Augustine,” which forced him to explain “what might seem to be flaws in the good
bishop’s work.”1056 On the next page, Wengert notes Melanchthon’s admission that
Augustine “often states that human beings are justified through grace (iustificari
homines per gratiam), when the Holy Spirit is given who enkindles love in our
hearts.”1057 This is part of the picture for evangelical theology, but not the whole;
accordingly, Melanchthon shores up Augustine’s sanative theology of justification
through infused charity (favored by Johannes Brenz and Andreas Osiander) with a
concise statement of the genuine Lutheran forensic doctrine. In process, Philipp
asserts that
… elsewhere, Augustine distinctly and openly affirmed that remission of sins is
received by faith and that we are pronounced righteous because of the
1055

From Philipp’s preface to an edition of Augustine’s sp. litt. published by Joseph Klug in 1545. CR
5.805: Sed tunc adversus Pelagii venena excitatus est divinitus Augustinus, qui Ecclesias passim ad
veram doctrinam Prophetarum et Apostolorum revocavit, ostendit, horribiliter errare Pelagium
negantem peccatum originis, monstravit discrimen legis et Evangelii, docuit, remitti peccata gratis
propter filium dei, non propter dignitatem nostrum, adfirmat, Evangelium esse ministerium spiritus,
ac fide accipi spiritum sanctum. I have revised Wengert’s translation slightly.
1056
Timothy J. Wengert, “Philip Melanchthon and Augustine of Hippo,” LQ 22 (2008): 249-67, here
259.
1057
CR 5.806.
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Mediator. And by this faith, minds which in acknowledging God’s wrath are
terrified of and flee God should be consoled. For there are many extant
statements of his that inculcate this view without any ambiguity.1058
Melanchthon might say this, Wengert wryly observes, but he does so without
specifying “where the elsewhere in Augustine might be.”1059 In fact, the historical
Augustine never said anything quite that Lutheran; and Wengert therefore proceeds
to meditate on the peculiar Wittenberg manner of traditioning Augustine in light of
the gospel.1060
Here, I think, is a prime case of an unavoidable misreading of a Reformer that a
prior misreading of Augustine has set up. For Melanchthon was actually right, partly.
If Augustine does not hold a doctrine of declarative righteousness—and
Melanchthon’s suggestion to the contrary is surely an unhistorical Lutheranization—
the good bishop does indeed frequently inculcate his doctrine of undeserved
forgiveness, freely granted for the sake of Jesus Christ and his blood, bestowed upon
faith in baptism by the Spirit,1061 and flowing from the font of God’s free mercy and
election. It is the first part, enduring in its effects,1062 of his theology of threefold
baptismal grace. In addition to the texts exposited in Part II and cited in footnote 1053
just above, I would like to draw attention here to a luminous paragraph in the 421
1058

CR 5.807.
Wengert, “Philip Melanchthon and Augustine of Hippo,” 260.
1060
Wengert, “Philip Melanchthon and Augustine of Hippo,” 261-3.
1061
Note, for example, the role of Rom. 5:1 at the head of Augustine’s summary of his theology of
threefold grace at c. Iul. op. imp. 6.8, CSEL 85/2.306, WSA I/25.615f: Nunc ergo nostra iustitia est, ut
iustificati per fidem pacem habeamus ad deum, contra carnis vero concupiscentiam nos
oppugnantem per ipsius dei auxilium repugnante spiritu dimicemus. Non est ergo huius vitae iustitia
vitium non habere, sed vitia non eis consentiendo minuere eisque resistendo temperanter et iuste et
pie vivere, nullum autem cui resistamus habere vitium posterioris est vitae, quae bene gestae
praesentis est praemium, sanatione nostrae, non… alienae separatione naturae.
1062
On the enduring Kraft of baptismal forgiveness, see Ekkard Sauser, “Baptismus—Baptismus
cottidianus—und Sündenvergebung in der Theologie des heiligen Augustinus,” in H. auf der Maur,
ed., Zeichen des Glaubens. Studien zu Taufe und Firmung. Festschrift B. Fischer (Zürich, 1972), 83-94.
1059
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“handbook” in doctrine and piety which Augustine wrote for Laurentius. In ench.
10.33, the old bishop is instructing his junior pupil in the saving work of Jesus Christ.
The human race, by nature children of wrath and bound by a just damnation, stand in
need of a Mediator or Reconciler to rescue them from God’s wrath—his just
judgment—against their sins. Jesus Christ, the Mediator, placates this wrath by the
oblation of his unique sacrifice on the cross. Thus, in St. Paul’s words taken up here by
Augustine, we who once were enemies have been reconciled to God by the death of
his Son (Rom. 5:10): and having been reconciled by his blood, we will also be saved
from God’s wrath through him (Rom. 5:9).1063 This bloody theology of redemption by
Christ’s death is the objective salvation-historical sine qua non for the first part of
Augustine’s threefold grace: the removal of condemnation by the forgiveness of
sins.1064
Augustine immediately follows up this summary of his theology of
reconciliation with a complex and rich sentence that unites the salvation of sinners
from God’s wrath through the Mediator (viz., grace’s first part) with their adoption by
the Spirit as God’s children (in effect, its second):

1063

ench. 10.33, BA 9.164-66: Tenebatur itaque justa damnatione genus humanum, et omnes erant irae
filii… in hac ira cum essent homines per originale peccatum, tanto gravius et perniciosius, quanto
majora vel plura insuper addiderant, necessarius erat mediator, hoc est reconciliator, qui hanc iram
sacrificii singularis, cujus umbrae omnia sacrificia Legis et Prophetarum, oblatione placaret. Unde
dicit Apostolus: Si enim, cum inimici essemus, reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii ejus, multo
magis reconciliati nunc in sanguine ejus salvi erimus ab ira per ipsum.
1064
See J. Rivière, “Notes Complémentaires. 27. Économie de la Rédemption,” BA 9 (1947), 370: for
Augustine, “toute l’économie de la Rédemption se déroule essentiellement dans l’ordre objecif. Ce
n’est pas de convertir le pécheur qu’il s’agit… mais de lui obtenir au préalable, en fléchissant la
justice divine irritée contre lui, la possibilité de son pardon, et c’est à quoi tend essentiellement la
médiation du Fils de Dieu. Rien, d’ailleurs, n’est plus ferme dans la doctrine d’Augustin que cette
valeur du sacrifice de la croix.” Cf. c. Iul. op. imp. II.172, CSEL 85/1.291, WSA I/25.239f, on Rom 5.9:
de reconciliatione agebat, quam tu quoque per mediatorem Christum ex inimicitiis quas cum deo
habuimus, factam esse concedis.
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Therefore: that we are reconciled to God through the Mediator and receive the
Holy Spirit, that from enemies we may be made sons—for as many as are led
by the Spirit of God are sons of God [Rom. 8:14]—this is the grace (gratia) of
God through Jesus Christ our Lord [Rom. 7:25].1065
Only the very first part of this sentence relates directly to what Augustine has been
treating in the previous section, but he characteristically moves quickly from the work
of the Son on the cross to its effects in the redeemed, namely, that through the
Mediator, by the reception of his Spirit, the filii irae become filii dei. Reconciliation to
God by Jesus’ wrath-placating blood, and—thereby—the transformation of the
children of wrath into the children of God by the Spirit: this, says Augustine, is the
grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom. 7:25). In short, Wengert is wrong to
smile at what he assumes to be Melanchthon’s patristic naiveté. But more to my
present purpose: Augustine knew well indeed the gospel of redemption and free
forgiveness through Christ’s shed blood which the mature Luther sometimes
encapsulates in the word “gratia.” And as an astute reader of the Bible, it came as
naturally to him to describe this forgiveness-through-redemption as the gift of God’s
“grace” as it would for his better-known pupil in the 1520s—40s.
In sum: sin, “grace,” and mercy in 1515/16 become sin, gift, and grace from 1521
on. The first term (with its near associates concupiscence, flesh, desire, etc.) remains
unaltered in form and content over the course of Luther’s career after his
“Augustinian” turn in 1514/15. Healing grace becomes renovating “gift” in June 1521,
retaining its Augustinian substance under another name. Forgiveness or nonimputation through God’s mercy in Christ, while often spoken of in the old terms, is
1065

Ench. 10.33, BA 9.166: Quod ergo per mediatorem reconciliamus Deo, et accipimus Spiritum
sanctum, ut ex inimicis efficiamur filii : Quotquot enim Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii sunt Dei : haec est
gratia Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum.
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frequently designated by the quasi-technical term “grace.” Right up to 1546, these are
the dogmatic and spiritual realities which together form an inseparable threefold cord
that cannot be broken in this life without falling away from God’s grace in Christ. This,
I think, argues for profound substantial continuity in Luther’s theology of sin, grace,
and holiness even after the important terminological shift in June 1521, and it fits well
with the striking Augustinian parallels between the early and the late sermons which I
exposited above in section 2.
I turn now to suggest points of greater substantial discontinuity and
development in Luther’s theology over the course of his career. In the main, they have
to do not with his theology of renewal in holiness through the Spirit’s donum—which
remains virtually unaltered to his death—but rather with his deepening scriptural
understanding of the gratia that is in Christ, that is to say, of the grace, forgiveness,
and/or “righteousness” which the Father freely lavishes (for Christ’s sake) upon those
whom the Spirit is making new. At the outset, I again emphasize the impressionistic
character of my theses in this regard. Without departing from solid footing in actual
texts grasped in their historical context, I do intend to paint with a bigger brush for
the remainder of this chapter.

3.2. The joyful gospel of Christ’s victory for us
One of the main reasons Luther’s mature theology remains so compelling for the
Church today is its relentless focus on the good news of Jesus Christ, the Son of David,
and his complete triumph over all the enemies of his people, chiefly sin, death, the
devil, and hell. In the next two subsections 3.3-4, I will flesh this out further with
respect to the great themes of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness and the
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promise/faith nexus. For the time being, we need to tarry with the gospel itself and,
therefore, with the irrepressible joy it enkindles in the depths of the believing heart
and in the work of the verus theologus. This evangelical joy is, I think, a real
Charakteristikum of the Reformer’s mature theology. When Luther, commenting on
Gal. 1:4 in 1531/5, declares that St. Paul “sounds forth nothing besides Christ” (Nihil
aliud sonat quam Christum),1066 it is hard not to think that he is speaking more than a
little autobiographically. Likewise on Gal. 1:1:
Paul burns so ardently here that he isn’t able to wait till he comes to the issue
itself, but immediately in the very title of his letter he erupts and says what he
has in his heart. For in this letter, he wants to speak about the righteousness of
faith, and to defend it and to overthrow the law and the righteousness of
works. He is full of these thoughts, and his mouth speaks out of this marvelous
and inexhaustible abundance of the most excellent wisdom and of the thought
of Christ in the heart [Matt. 12:34]. This flame, this huge burning of the heart,
cannot be hidden, neither can it let him be silent [Jer. 20:9]. Therefore he says:
‘And through God the Father, who raised him from the dead’ (Gal. 1:1)…1067
St. Paul’s—and Luther’s—resolute and glad obsession with Jesus Christ and his gospel
springs forth from the very nature of that gospel as the proclamation of Christ’s
decisive triumph. On the next page of the Galaterbrief, Luther explains:
Thus straightaway, at the first word, the whole matter which he intends in this
letter
erupts for Paul. For he has to do with the resurrection of Christ, who rose again
for our righteousness, Rom. 4[:25]. His victory, therefore, is the victory over the
law, sin, our flesh, the world, death, hell, and all evils, and he has given this his
victory to us. To be sure, these tyrants and enemies of ours accuse and terrify
us. Nevertheless, they are not able to drive us into despair and condemn us.
For Christ, having been raised from the dead, is the Victor over them, and he is
our righteousness. Therefore thanks be to God, who has given us the victory
through our Lord Jesus Christ (1 Cor. 15:57), Amen.1068

1066

WA 40/1.82.31-2 [B], cf. LW 26.32.
WA 40/1.64.14-21 [B], cf. LW 26.21.
1068
WA 40/1.65.10-18 [B], cf. LW 26.21-2.
1067
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So Luther on Paul in 1531/5, in just the first pages of that most joyful book which
helped John Bunyan to begin to trust in “grace abounding to the chief of sinners.” The
question is: did the young Luther c. 1514—16 have this joy in Christ the Victor?
There are hints of it. In a remarkable 1514 sermon on “The Foundation of
Theology,” Luther speaks of Christ’s substitutionary penal death in a manner hard to
distinguish from that of his later years. Christ did and suffered nothing for himself,
but for us, indeed for me; and when I cling to him through faith, “so great is the grace
given to me” that his obedience, passion, righteousness, and works become my very
own.1069 In 1515/16, a number of texts in the Romans lectures evince the great exchange
between Christ and the sinner, the co-relativity of the promise and faith, and the
imputation of iustitia Christi aliena.1070 And in April 1516, there is Luther’s rightly

1069

WA 4.652.3-20: Sic enim Christus dicit: ‘Ego sum ostium: qui per me ingressus fuerit, pascua
inveniet’. Item: ‘Ego sum via, veritas et vita’. Item: ‘Et nemo venit ad me, nisi pater traxerit eum’, und
das geschihet per verbi praedicationem. Und das gehet alßo zcu, Das hertz sall hangen In Christo,
desperemus de nostris, trosten uns allein des, quia satisfecit pro peccatis nostris, quia passio sua et
poena, sanguinis effusio et mors, das gildt mir, Ehr ist sunst ein her des hymmels, allein das ehr sein
ehre tregtt, ut vitaremus omnia nostra. Voluntatem dedit, voluntatem reddamus. Sic esse oportet. ‘Jha
wo findt man den meister?’ Christus est magister, ipse vitam habet et perdit, gibtt das leben vor den
todtt, perdit etiam famam, iustitiam und alßo vill schoner wergke, ut esset in eo virtutum thesaurus,
omnia reliquit, ut amaret patrem, iussus est trucidari ut scelestus homo, wie ein boßer bube. Unde
dixit: ‘Vide, pater, haec omnia facta, ut quanto te amore prosequar videas’. Item omnia perdit, etiam
matrem, klebt und hengkt gar bloß in patris voluntate. Ille voluntatem Dei nobis reddidit, qui et solus
servavit. Nuh hatt ers fur sich nichtt gethan, sed pro nobis. Ergo cum in Christo haereo, sua
oboedientia, passio, iustitia opera mea sunt per fidem. Et tanta est mihi data gratia, ut per fidem
omnes Christi actiones mihi propriae sint.
1070
For iustitia aliena in 1515, see, e.g., (1) the scholion on Rom. 1:1, WA 56.158.10-14, LW 25.136: Deus
enim nos non per domesticam, Sed per extraneam Iustitiam et sapientiam vult saluare, Non que
veniat et nascatur ex nobis, Sed que aliunde veniat in nos, Non que in terra nostra oritur, Sed que de
celo venit. Igitur omnino Externa et aliena Iustitia oportet erudiri. (2) On Rom. 2:15, WA 56.204.1528, LW 25.188: Cor enim credentis in Christum, si reprehenderit eum et accusauerit eum contra eum
testificans de malo opere, Mox auertit se et ad Christum conuertit dicitque: Hic autem satisfecit, hic
Iustus est, hic mea defensio, hic pro me mortuus est, hic suam iustitiam meam fȩcit et meum
peccatum suum fȩcit. Quod si peccatum meum suum fecit, iam ego illud non habeo et sum liber. Si
autem Iustitiam suam meam fecit, iam Iustus ego sum eadem Iustitia, qua ille. Peccatum autem
meum illum non potest absorbere, Sed absorbetur in abysso iustitiȩ eius infinita, Cum sit ipse Deus
benedictus in sȩcula. Ac sic ‘Deus maior est corde nostro’. Maior est defensor quam accusator, etiam
in infinitum. Deus defensor, cor accusator. Quȩ proportio? Sic, Sic, etiam Sic! ‘Quis accusabit
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cherished letter to his Augustinian confrère, Georg Spenlein: “Learn Christ and him
crucified [1 Cor. 2:2]… Beware of aspiring to so great a purity that you do not wish to
be looked upon as a sinner, or to be one; for Christ dwells only in sinners.”1071 In short,
the substance of the gospel of Jesus Christ as Luther himself would later come to
confess and preach it is in place by 1514. And I would suggest that any Protestant
Augustinian who wishes to deny this needs first to think carefully about whether he or
she can do so while maintaining the catholicity of his confession with any real
historical seriousness. For if Luther is not preaching the gospel in 1514—16, then
Augustine never did at all.1072
That said, when such powerful adumbrations of Luther’s mature evangelical
teaching as these come to the fore in mid 1510s, my impression is that they do so as

aduersus electos Dei?’ q. d. Nullus. Quare? Quia ‘Deus est, qui iustificat. Quis est, qui condemnet?’
Nullus. Quare? Quia ‘Christus Ihesus est’ (qui etiam Deus est), ‘qui mortuus est, immo qui et
resurrexit’ etc. ‘Si ergo Deus pro nobis, quis contra nos?’ (3) On Rom. 3:27, WA 56.267.1-7, LW
25.254: Restat igitur in peccatis nos manere oportere et in spe misericordie Dei gemere pro liberatione
ex ipsis. Sicut Sanandus, qui nimium festinat sanari, certe potest grauius recidiuare. Paulatim ergo
sanari oportet et aliquas imbecillitates aliquamdiu sustinere. Sufficit enim, quod peccatum displicet,
etsi non omnino recedat. Christus enim omnia portat, si displiceant et iam non nostra, Sed ipsius sunt
et Iustitia eius nostra vicissim.
1071
WA Br 1.35.15-36, #11 (8 April 1516): Caeterum quid agat anima tua, scire cupio, utrumne tandem
suam pertaesa propriam iustitiam discat in iustitia Christi respirare atque confidere. Fervet enim
nostra aetate tentatio praesumptionis in multis, et iis praecipue, qui iusti et boni esse omnibus viribus
student; ignorantes iustitiam Dei, quae in Christo est nobis effusissime et gratis donata, quaerunt in
se ipsis tam diu operari bene, donec habeant fiduciam standi coram Deo, veluti virtutibus et meritis
ornati, quod est impossibile fieri. Fuisti tu apud nos in hac opinione, imo errore; fui et ego, sed et nunc
quoque pugno contra istum errorem, sed nondum expugnavi. Igitur, mi dulcis Frater, disce Christum
et hunc crucifixum, disce ei cantare et de te ipso desperans dicere ei: tu, Domine Ihesu, es iustitia
mea, ego autem sum peccatum tuum; tu assumpsisti meum, et dedisti mihi tuum; assumpsisti, quod
non eras, et dedisti mihi, quod non eram. Cave, ne aliquando ad tantam puritatem aspires, ut
peccator tibi videri nolis, imo esse. Christus enim non nisi in peccatoribus habitat. Ideo enim
descendit de coelo, ubi habitabat in iustis, ut etiam habitaret in peccatoribus. Istam charitatem eius
rumina, et videbis dulcissimam consolationem eius. Si enim nostris laboribus et afflictionibus ad
conscientiae quietem pervenire oportet, ut quid ille mortuus est? Igitur non nisi in illo, per fiducialem
desperationem tui et operum tuorum, pacem invenies; disces insuper ex ipso, ut, sicut ipse suscepit te
et peccata tua fecit sua, et suam iustitiam fecit tuam.
1072
A bitter pill which John Maxfield, Luther’s Lectures on Genesis, 74-7, 115, 139-40, appears willing
to swallow.
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pretty isolated beams of sunlight momentarily breaking through a dark and ominous
sky.1073 In hindsight, the evangelical theologian (I refer to conviction, not
denomination) can switch the metaphor slightly and see these shafts of light as the
dawning of the sun of righteousness (Mal. 4:2). But brooding brother Martin,
convinced as he was that fiducia was a sign of spiritual presumption and that
insecurity was conducive to humility, did not enjoy the luxury of this hindsight. In this
early monastic period, already firmly “Augustinian” but not yet fully “evangelical,” the
overall tenor of Luther’s writings is one of penitential sorrow; and his driving concern
seems to be less “How can I find a gracious God?” as “How can I live faithfully as a
humble monk, and teach others to do the same?” Luther of course knew, believed, and
taught that Jesus Christ, the Son of God and David, had won the victory for us by his
incarnation, death, resurrection, and ascension.1074 But then, so did all major patristic
and medieval theologians: and lecturing on Gen. 28:12 in 1542, e.g., Luther would still
single out not just Augustine and Ambrose but Bernard and Bonaventure too as
especially praiseworthy for their glad delight in the incarnation of God’s Son.1075

1073

Bayer (Promissio, 140-2) acknowledges these texts to some extent but in the end argues them
away, the better to fit his thesis of a Wende in summer 1518. I prefer to let the texts stand, and to
posit instead an inconsistency in Luther’s theology as it develops (rather like a Christian saint) in
fits and starts.
1074
See esp. the 1515 scholion on Rom. 1:3-4, e.g., WA 56.168.33-169.3: Igitur Epilogemus. Euangelium
est de filio suo facto ex semine Dauid, manifestato nunc filio Dei in potestate omnium per spiritum.
sanctum datum ex resurrectione mortuorum, Ihesu Christo domino nostro. Ecce sic habes, Quod
Euangelium est sermo de Christo filio Dei primum humiliato et postea glorificato per spiritum
sanctum. Cf. LW 25.148.
1075
WA 43.580.38-581.4, 11-13: haec est illa ingens et inenerrabilis dignitas humani generis, quam
nemo potest eloqui, quod Deus hac miranda coniunctione copulavit sibi humanam naturam.
Ambrosius et inprimis Bernardus admodum delectantur hoc loco prae omnibus dulcissimo, et opere
isto incarnationis, et quidem recte et pie. Nam talis delectatio erit gaudium supra omne gaudium, et
beatitudo aeterna, cum illic vere intuebimur nostram carnem per omnia similem nobis, et in summo
pariter et infimo loco. Haec enim omnia fecit pro nobis, descendit ad inferos, et adscendit ad coelos…
Bernardus valde dilexit incarnationem Christi, item Bonaventura, quos duos maxime laudo propter
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Furthermore, by 1515/16 Luther clearly believed that the victory of Christ, and its spoils
in righteousness, was given freely to faith: as did Augustine and arguably a few other
fathers like the author of the Epistle to Diognetus, Polycarp, Irenaeus, Hilary, Marius
Victorinus, Ambrosiaster, Ambrose, Prosper, Leo, and Fulgentius,1076 together with at
least some medieval catholics (not least Bernard, and some luminaries in the
remarkable succession of teachers in the O.E.S.A. unearthed by Müller, Stakemeier,
Zumkeller, Trapp, Oberman, and Saak). But as I argued in Part II, in 1515/16 Luther
does not yet consistently hold that the believer is free to trust that he possesses the gift
of Christ’s victorious righteousness by faith. On the contrary: if the devout monk
thinks he is righteous, that is a surefire proof that he isn’t. Whereas during the 1518—
20 period, Luther begins to teach that apart from this assured resting of the heart in
Christ, there is no real faith at all. On this point, farther in section 3.4.
For my present purposes, I want to relay—with minimal comment—a handful
of texts from Luther’s middle and late career which illustrate the joyful gospel of
Christ’s victory with admirable clarity. (1) In the first place, a classic “Finnish” excerpt
from the 1520 Freedom of the Christian:
… faith bodily unites (copulat) the soul with Christ as a bride with the
bridegroom. By this mystery (as the Apostle teaches) Christ and the soul are
made one flesh (Eph. 5:29-32, Gen. 2:24). For if they are one flesh, and there is a
true marriage between them—indeed, by far the most perfect of all is
consummated, since human marriages are but tenuous figures of this single
illum articulum, de quo tam libenter et praeclare cogitant, et magna laetitia et pietate in se ipsis
exercent. Cf. LW 5.220-1.
1076
For overviews, see Robert Eno, “Some Patristic Views on the Relationship of Faith and Works in
Justification,” Recherches augustiniennes 19 (1984): 3-27; D. H. Williams, “Justification by Faith: a
Patristic Doctrine,” JEH 57/4 (Oct. 2006): 649-67. For narrower studies: C. P. Bammel, “Justification
by Faith in Augustine and Origen,” JEH 47/2 (April 1996), 223-35; J. Warren Smith, “Justification
and Merit before the Pelagian Controversy: The Case of Ambrose of Milan,” Pro Ecclesia 16/2
(2007): 195-217; D. H. Williams, “Hilary of Poitiers and Justification by Faith according to the Gospel
of Matthew,” Pro Ecclesia 16/4 (2007): 445-61.
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true marriage—it follows that everything they have, both good and evil,
becomes common. So that whatever Christ has, the believing soul is able to
presume and glory about these things as if they were his own; and whatever
belongs to the soul, these Christ arrogates to himself as if they were his own.
Now let us compare these things, and we will see incomparable things. Christ
is full of grace, life, and salvation. The soul is full of sins, death, and damnation.
Now let faith come between, and it will happen that sins, death, and hell are
Christ’s, but grace, life, and salvation are the soul’s. Indeed, it is necessary that
he, if he is the bridegroom, accept the things which the spouse has and, at the
same time, impart to the spouse the things which are his own. For if he gives
her his own body and his own self, how will he not give her all his own things?
[cf. Rom. 8:32] And if he receives the body of the bride, how will he not receive
all the bride’s things?
Now this brings forth a most sweet spectacle, not only of communion but of a
saving war and of victory and salvation and redemption. For since Christ is God
and Man in the same person, which neither sinned, died, nor was damned,
neither is he able to sin, die, or be damned, and his righteousness, life, and
salvation is unconquerable, eternal, omnipotent; since, I say, such a person
made the sins, death, and hell of his bride common to himself, indeed proper
to himself, on account of faith’s wedding-ring, and in these matters he does not
act otherwise than if they were his very own and if he himself had sinned,
laboring, dying, and descending to hell in order to conquer them all; and sin,
death, and hell were not able to swallow him up; these were necessarily
swallowed up in him in an amazing duel (stupendo duello). For his very
righteousness is greater than all sins, his own life is more powerful than all
death, his own salvation is more invincible than all hell. Thus the believing
soul, through the pledge of its faith in Christ her bridegroom, becomes free
from all sins, secure from death and safe from hell, since the eternal
righteousness, life, and salvation of Christ her bridegroom have been given her.
Thus he presents to himself a glorious bride without spot or wrinkle, cleansing
her by the washing of water in the word of life [Eph. 5:25-27], that is through
faith in the word of life, righteousness, and salvation. Thus he weds her to
himself in faith, in mercy and in compassion, in righteousness and judgment,
as Hos. 2 [:19-20] says.
Who, therefore, sufficiently esteems these royal nuptials? Who comprehends
the riches of the glory of this grace [Eph. 1:6-7, 12, 14, 2:7]? Here this rich and
pious bridegroom, Christ, considers this poor little woman, this ungodly harlot,
redeems her from all her evils and adorns her with all his good things. Now
indeed it is impossible that her sins should destroy her, since they have been
set upon Christ [Isa. 53:6] and swallowed up in him, and she has the very
righteousness in Christ her bridegroom of which she may presume as her very
own, and against all her sins, against death and hell she is able with confidence
(cum fidutia) to set this righteousness and say: “If I myself have sinned, and my
Christ in whom I believe has not sinned, all his things are mine and all my
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things are his,” as in the Song of Solomon: “My beloved is mine, and I am his”
(2:16). This is what Paul says, 1 Cor. 15[:57]: “Thanks be to God, who has given
us the victory through Jesus Christ our Lord.” Victory, that is, over sin and
death, just as he also says there: “sin is the sting of death, but the power of sin
is the law” (15:56).1077
All the telling marks of Luther’s mature theology of Christ’s victory and the believing
soul’s participation therein are present in this great Reformation tract: the orthodox
doctrine of the two natures united in Christ’s person; his marvelous duel with sin,
death, the devil, and hell, and his unequivocal triumph over the same, which triumph
is possible precisely because of the character of his person as the invincible God-Man
(Luy); the believer’s mystical union with Christ through faith (the Finns); the
exchange of all the sinner’s propria with Christ’s (and vice versa) in faith’s marriage;
the joy and freedom of the sinner saved thus and clothed with Christ and his divine
righteousness, life, and salvation; the Augustinian boasting, not in one’s self but in
Christ and in gloria suae gratiae (Hombert); St. Paul’s shout of victory at 1 Cor. 15:56-7,
the climax of his “sprawling masterpiece on the resurrection” (as N.T. Wright styles 1
Cor. 15). Looking back, we see the ripening seeds of Luther’s theology of the gospel in
the 1516 letter to Spenlein now fully flowered into Reformation theology; looking
ahead, we have here the lineaments of the gospel that Luther will preach, teach,
confess, and struggle to believe right up to the end of his life.
(2) In the second place, a passage from the 1537—40 Saturday sermons on St.
John’s Gospel which Luther preached during Pfarrer Bugenhagen’s errand to
Denmark. The whole series is an exercise in the kind of patristic/homiletical and
scholastic/technical christology that Yeago and Luy have illumined in their researches.

1077

WA 7.54.31-55.36, cf. LW 31:351-2.
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In order to prime his readers for the rich feast of scriptural exegesis, patristic
orthodoxy, scholastic precision, and Reformation soteriology which is to follow,
Luther ranges freely through John 1:1-18 and 29-34 in the first sermon, of 7 July 1537. I
pick up here near the end:
In sum, in the first place we must have such a Savior who can deliver us from
the power of the god of this world, of the Devil, likewise from sin and death,
that is: he must be the true, eternal GOD, through whom all who believe in
him become righteous and blessed. For if he is not more and higher than
Moses, Elijah, Isaiah, John the Baptist, etc., then he is not our Redeemer. But if
he, as the Son of God, shed his blood for us to redeem us and purify us from
sin, and we believe it, and rub it in the Devil’s nose when he terrifies and
plagues us because of sin, then the Devil is defeated quickly; he has to go away
and leave us in peace. For the fishhook, that is: the divinity of CHRIST, was so
hidden under the earthworm, under his humanity (which the Devil gobbled up
in his throat when Christ died and was buried) that it tore open the Devil’s
belly, so that he couldn’t keep him down with justice, but had to give him up
again. And thereby he ate death, which is our highest consolation: for just as
little as he was able to keep Christ in death, so little can he also keep us in it,
who believe in Christ.
On the other hand, we must have a Savior who is also our Brother, of our flesh
and blood, who became like us in all things sin only except [Heb. 4:15]; and
that, we sing, confess, and say also in our Children’s Creed: “I believe in Jesus
Christ, the one only Son of God the Almighty Father, who was conceived by the
Holy Spirit,” not by Joseph, “born of Mary,” a true, natural Man, “who suffered,
was crucified, died, on the third day rose from the dead, ascended into Heaven,
is sitting at God’s right hand,” in the same power and glory with the Father.
That, therefore, I may say with a joyful heart: “I believe in Jesus Christ, GOD’S
only Son, who sits at his right hand and intercedes for me [Rom. 8:34, Heb. 1:34, 8:1-2, 9:11-28, 10:11-14, 1 John 2:1-2], he who is even my flesh and blood, Ja, he
is my brother! For us men and for our salvation he has come from heaven,
become Man, and died for our sins.” Therefore John too has begun his Gospel
with the eternal divinity of Christ, saying: “In the beginning was the Word”
(1:1), and “this same Word,” he says later on, “has become flesh” (1:14)… So now
this article, that Christ is true natural God and Man, is our Rock [Matt. 16:16-18,
1 Cor. 10:4], and our salvation and blessedness is established upon it. On this
we were baptized; on this we live and die.1078
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WA 46.556.25-557.16, 31-3, cf. LW 22.24-5.
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Here, I think, three or four currents flow together into a remarkable whole: first, a
doctrinal defense, in the face of alarming Anabaptist aberrations, of the orthodox duae
naturae in una persona christology; second, a rhetorically charged proclamation of
redemption through the blood of Jesus Christ, the worm-enfleshed Fishhook, which I
suspect Gregory of Nyssa would have recognized as his own; third, an insistence that
the gospel of redemption and creedal orthodoxy are mutually interdependent and
inseparable; fourth, an earthy, rambunctious sense of Devil-defying joy, since the
believer shares by faith in the invincible triumph of the Savior who tore open the
Devil’s belly and sits at the Father’s right hand interceding for us in our own flesh and
blood. “Come sin and death, Devil and hell, do what you will! for Jesus Christ, true
God and Man, my Brother, has defeated you one and all: and by faith, his victory is
mine!” That is the joyful battle cry to which the mature Luther’s creedal, kerygmatic,
and exuberant theology of gospel grace gives rise. Gottes Sohn uns gegeben wird, der
siegsmann und uberwinder des Teufels—therefore, rejoice, fight, triumph, be free.1079

1079

Cf. parallel texts from the same sermon series at WA 46.677-84, LW 22.162-170 (3 Nov. 1537, on
John 1:29) and WA 47.78-85, LW 22.353-61 (19 June 1538, on John 3:16), e.g., WA 47.79.40—80.28:
Kan ich aber alhier gleuben und diese artznej annemen, das Gott uns seinen Sohn gibt und nicht der
gemeinen Sohnen einen als Abraham, Jsaac und David, derer Sohne ehr sonst viel hat, sondern seinen
eingebornen Sohn, So ist gewiss, dieweil ein solcher Sohn uns gegeben wird, das er eine neue
Widergeburt anrichte, das er ein siegsmann und uberwinder des Teufels sej. Den das ist die ursache,
das Gottes Sohn weith, weith grosser ist dan der tod und stercker den die Sunde, der Teuffel, und uns
freundlicher ist, und wir mehr gnade gottes den Zorn durch in haben, oder, was sonst mehr sein mag.
So du dich nun druber verwunderst, wie ein mensch aus des Teuffels in Gottes reich moge gebracht
werden, So ist das noch grosser verwunderns werth, das Gott uns seinen Sohn gegeben hat. Do du nun
das gleubest, so wird das ander verwundern wohl auffhoren. Den wen wir den Sohn Gottes haben, der
fur uns stehet wider den Tod und sich widder den Teuffel leget, so sei dan der Teuffel so boese, als ehr
wolle, ist der Sohn gottes fur mich gestorben, so fresse mich der tod hin und verschlinge mich, ehr soll
mich wohl widergeben, und ich will fur ihme wohl bleiben. Christus ist gestorben und hatt der Tod den
Sohn Gottes verschlungen, aber der tod hatt an ihme einen angel geschlungen, das er ihnen hat
mussen widergeben, den es wahr unmuglich, das ehr im tode bleiben soltte. Den die person ist gott,
und do Gott und Mensch in einer person, unzertrennet, in des todes und Teuffels bauch gefharen ist,
so hatt der todt ein bisslein an ime gessen das ihme den Bauch zureist. Das ist auch Gottes des vaters
rath von ewigkeit gewesen, das ehr also den tod verschlingen und des Teuffels reich zerstoren woltte
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(3) Third and last, a fascinating paragraph from Luther’s 1545 lecture on Gen.
48:15-16 which Peter Manns would hail as patristisch-reformatorischer Theologie.1080
Luther observes that as St. Jacob blesses Joseph’s sons, he invokes each of the persons
of the Holy Trinity distinctly: First, “the GOD before whom my fathers Abraham and
Isaac walked,” that is the Father; second, “the GOD who has led me all my life long to
this day,” viz., the Holy Spirit; third, “the ANGEL who has redeemed me from all evil,”
that is the Son of God, who conversed familiarly with the patriarchs, wrestled with
Jacob at the Jabbok, and “was to be sent by God into the world, to announce to us
liberation from death, the forgiveness of sins, and the kingdom of heaven.” But as the
risen Jesus juxtaposes the word “name” in the singular with the three personal names
Father, Son, and Spirit at Matt. 28:19, so here Jacob skillfully pairs his rather more
subtle indications of the three divine persons with the singular subjunctive verb “let
him bless” (Benedicat). Since the three persons share in the one common work of
blessing, an operation proper to the divine nature alone, both the utter unity of their
divinity and the reality of their personal distinctions are equally attested.1081 This

und dem Teuffel ein kleine pillen geben, die ehr mitt lust fressen soltt, aber darmit in seinem bauche
und in der welt ein solch gerumpel anrichten. Nun will der herr sagen: Lieber Nicodeme, du sihest
recht ein Mirackel, das Gott einen solchen grossen, theuern schatz an unser Widergeburtt wendet.
Den ist es nicht ein wunderwerck, das ich des menschen Sohn und Gottes Sohn bin, in einer person,
und in den todt dahin gegeben, das ich dem Teuffel und tode in rachen fhare? Aber ich werde nicht
drinnen bleiben und nicht allein wider heraus fharen, sondern ime auch den bauch zerreissen, den die
gifft ist zu starck, das der tod mus dran sterben.
1080
Peter Manns, “Zum Gespräch zwischen Martin Luther und der katholischen Theologie.
Begegnung zwischen patristisch-monastischer und reformatorischer Theologie an der Scholastik
vorbei,” in Vater im Glauben, cp. 11.
1081
WA 44.698.23-699.6: Sicut hic Angelum vocat eodem modo, quo supra post luctam dixit: ‘Vidi
Dominum facie ad faciem’. Nam hic Angelus Dominus ille, sive filius Dei est, quem vidit Iacob, et qui
mittendus erat a Deo in mundum, ut annunciaret nobis liberationem a morte, remissionem
peccatorum et regnum coelorum. Et hic Angelus noster Goel seu vindex est, qui iustissimo iure nos
adserit, et vindicat a potestate Diaboli, qui obnoxius est legi, propterea quod occidit filium Dei,
iamque lex et mors et Sathan coguntur obmutescere, ac victas manus porrigere victori et triumphanti
Christo Diligenter igitur observandum est, quod loquitur Iacob de Christo filio, qui solus est Angelus,
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trinitarian exegetical logic is broadly “Pro-Nicene,” to use a useful if malleable
scholarly convention,1082 though it is likely that Luther acquired his grasp of this logic
(as opposed to this exegesis) through Lombard and Biel. But vis-à-vis its role in
interpreting Gen. 48:15-16, we can specify at least a step further than this.
The inspiration for Luther’s identification of “the Angel/Messenger of the Lord”
with the Son of God was probably Hilary of Poitiers, an excellent theologian in
Luther’s estimation,1083 who himself inherited and carried forward this ancient
exegetical tradition (trin. 4.23—42). Hilary’s friend Athanasius was of the same mind:
and he cites and interprets Gen. 48:15-16 much in Luther’s manner. “In saying, ‘He
delivered me from all evil,’ Jacob showed that it was no created angel, but the Word of
seu missus, natus homo in tempore ex virgine Maria, non pater, non Spiritus sanctus. Diserte enim
discernit tres personas, et tamen addit: Benedicat pueris istis. Istud benedicere clare tribuit soli Deo.
Non dicit benedicant, pluraliter, nec repetit, sed coniungit in uno opere benedicendi tres personas,
Deum patrem, Deum pastorem et Angelum. Sunt igitur hi tres unus Deus et unus benedictor. Idem
opus facit Angelus, quod pastor, et Deus patrum. Ita hunc articulum Trinitatis probe cognitum
habuerunt patres, quem nos hodie docemus. Et Iacob in eadem et perfectissima fide et verbo incedit
super omnes coelos. Non ego, inquit, sed Deus per os meumbenedicit pueris istis, Deus patrum, Deus
pastor et Angelus ille trinus et unus benedicit. Intellexit igitur Iacob, quod filius incarnandus et
mittendus sit in mundum, quod sit crucifigendus et resuscitandus. Etsi non tam clare haec
pronunciat, sicut hodie docetur, tamen satis significanter dicit, et alii quoque, qui crediderunt hunc
articulum, non obscure intellexerunt. Cf. LW 8.163-4.
1082
See Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
1083
On Gen. 1:1, WA 42.4.26 [Dr], LW 1.4: Hilarius et Augustinus, quasi duo maxima Ecclesiae
Lumina. That Luther is set to criticize Hilary and Augustine’s theory of the instantaneous creation
of the world does not take away from his regard for them both. Cf. WA 42.17.8 [Dr], LW 1.21-2:
optimus vir Hilarius, ll. 31-2: Huiusmodi cogitationibus boni Patres Augustinus et Hilarius quoque se
oblectarunt. At Gen. 1:20, WA 42.37.41-38.14 [Dr], LW 1.50-1, it is clear that in some respects Luther
reads Hilary in light of Augustine’s (trin. 6.11-12) critical reception of Hilary’s theology: Ad hunc
modum D. Hilarius distinguit aliis attributis. Aeternitas est in Patre, species in imagine, usus in
munere. Dicit Spiritum sanctum esse donum in usu, quod dat usum rerum, ne pereant, et gubernat
res ac conservat. Sic dicunt: Pater est mens, Filius intellectus, Spiritus sanctus voluntas. Non quod
Pater sit sine intellectu, aut Filius sine voluntate, sed sunt attributa, hoc est, dicta, quae distincta non
tribuuntur singulis personis sed diversis, non, quod Pater sit sine sapientia, sed quod nobis ista ita
pingimus ad retinendum et explicandum articulum Trinitatis. Ergo, quando textus dicit: ‘Et vidit
Deus, quod esset valde bonum’, significat ipsam conservationem, quia creatura non posset stare, nisi
Spiritus sanctus diligeret eam, et ista complacentia Dei in suo opere conservaret opus. Neque enim
Deus ita creavit res, ut creatas deserat, sed amat eas et approbat. Igitur simul est: agitat, movet, et
conservat singula pro suo modo. Hoc existimavi brevibus attingendum. Dignae enim sunt cognitu
tam piae cogitationes eorum, qui nos praecesserunt in eodem stadio, in quo nos currimus.
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God, whom he joined to the Father in his prayer; through him, God delivers whomever
he wills” (c. Arianos 3.12). Against the grain of my argument for Luther’s indebtedness
to Augustine in other loci, in this respect it would seem that he actually opposes his
great mentor head-on: for in his trin. 2—3, a text well-known to the Reformer,
Augustine severely chastened the received optimism regarding the exegete’s ability to
parse out which of the divine persons manifests himself in a given OT theophany.
Here, then, is evidence of the free and eclectic manner in which Luther appropriates
trinitarian and exegetical insights from the tradition, contra Augustinum if that is
where the text leads him.
Regardless of its provenance, what counts for my present purposes is the old
Doctor’s preferred interpretation of the Malach Adonai as the pre-incarnate Son of
God.1084 For it sets the stage for a staggering celebration of Jesus Christ’s triumph over
death, sin, the law (in its accusing function), and the Devil. He is Jacob’s “Redeemer”
()גֹּ אֵ ל, as in the “kinsman-redeemer” or “avenger” who possesses the legal right either
to liberate/redeem an enslaved person or a lost inheritance (Lev. 25:25-6, 48-9, Ruth
2:20, 3:9, 12, 4:1, 3, 6, 8, 14) or to bring vengeance upon a manslayer (Num. 35:12, 19,
Deut. 19:6, Josh. 20:3). Luther, aware of both senses of the word in the Hebrew, cites
Deut. 19:6 and Job 19:25—“I know that my  גֹּ אֵ לlives!”—to explain its rich meaning in
Jacob’s prophecy. Jesus Christ is not only a “ransom” ()פָּדָ ה. Though he is that (Hos.
13:14), Christ is more: as the invincible Son of God in our flesh, innocent, sinless, and
1084

Cf. Luther’s 29 Sept. 1544 sermon on Rev. 12:7-12, WA 49.578.33-9 [Dr], LW 58.179: Denn er hat
sich auch den heiligen Vetern erzeigt und sehen lassen als einen Engel, sonderlich Abraham und
Jacob, und daher hin und wider auch den namen des Engels Gottes furet, Nemlich darumb, das er von
Gott gesand, aber doch ein solcher Engel, der da Gott gleich ist, das ist: HERR aller Creaturn und selbs
Schepffer. Solcher ist der andern keiner, welche daher Engel heissen, das sie gleich wie wir Menschen
von Gott geschaffen sind aus nichts.
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holy, he possesses the ius redimendi and therefore redeems condemned sinners with
full justice as our avenger (vindex), liberator, and kinsman (propinquus).1085 For Luther,
in the deep mystery of Christ’s triumph over the Devil and Death through his atoning
suffering and death for sin on the cross—a major NT theme: cf. John 12:31, Col. 2:13-15,
Heb. 2:14-17, Rev. 5:5-6—the two prophetic shades of ’גֹּ אֵ לs meaning in the OT converge
as they are fulfilled in the promised redemptor:
Christ the Lord became our  פָּדָ הand גֹּ אֵ ל. For he not only redeemed us, but
claimed us for himself by right (iure sibi nos asseruit), so that the Devil and hell
were forced by strict justice (stricto iure) to release him, since they had killed
the innocent Son of God. Therefore the Law got burned, Death shit itself, the
Devil, hell, sin have gone too far (Lex hat sich verbrant, Mors hat sich
beschissen, Diabolus, infernus, peccatum haben sich vergriffen)! There, all of
them became guilty and debtors to God, to this Son Jesus Christ, who now
possesses the right (ius) against his enemies. For what reason, O Law, have you
crucified the Son of God? Why have you killed the innocent, O Devil, death,
hell? “We have a law,” they say, “and according to the law he ought to die, sine
he has made himself the Son of God” (John 19:7). Well then, take a good look at
him rising from the dead and triumphing over you, saying, “I am the Son of
God: I am an invincible person (invicta persona).” What now Satan? What law,
what death, what hell? “Death is swallowed up in victory, etc.” (1 Cor. 15:54-7).
“I have lost,” they all shriek; together they acknowledge that they have been
conquered with the highest and full right and most justly (summo et pleno iure
ac iustissime victos esse). And after his resurrection, Christ commanded that
these things be announced to the whole world, and the Gospel preached to
everyone. “Come!” he says, “believe in Me, be baptized. I will give you my own
victory. You will not be condemned, but even when you die you will live in my
name. You will never die, because I am the resurrection and the life; he who
believes in Me, even if he dies, lives” (John 11:25-26). This One, therefore, is our
גֹּ אֵ ל, whom Jacob calls the Angel in this passage. “He is the Angel or redemptor
who was able to redeem me with all right (omni iure potuit me redimere) and to
keep me safe from all evils of conscience, of the law, sin, death, brother Esau,
etc., and all the troubles with which I have been afflicted in my life.”1086
In short, Jesus Christ, invincible God in innocent humanity, pulverized the Devil and
scared the shit out of Death. But he did so with full regard paid to the claims of justice

1085
1086

WA 44.697.17-23, cf. LW 8.162.
WA 44.697.23-698.6, cf. LW 8.162-3.
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that stood against hell-condemned sinners—a judgment manifested by the law in its
usus elenchus—for he the innocent God-Man suffered its sanctions for them in their
place (cf. Isa. 53:4-6, 8, 10-12, Matt. 20:28, Rom. 3:24-6, 8:3, 2 Cor. 5:14, 19-21, Gal. 1:4,
2:21, 3:13, 4:4-5, Col. 2:14, 1 Tim. 2:5-6, Heb. 9:15, 26-8, 10:10-4, 1 Pet. 2:24, 3:18, 1 John 2:2,
4:10, Rev. 1:5). Having satisfied the law’s just claims against sinners by his undeserved
death, Jesus took just vengeance upon the Devil and Death when he rose from the
grave and crushed them beneath his nail-pierced feet. For his payment of the  פָּדָ הby
his blood on the cross invested him with legal authority to act as our  גֹּ אֵ לin his
resurrection, and to claim us for himself by right rather than by an act of sheer power
(cf. Augustine’s trin. 13). Being a majestic and invicta persona, the risen Jesus gives his
hard-fought victory personally and freely to all who trust in him: ego dono tibi
victoriam meam. In scriptural rather than scatological terms, the promise of eternal
and invincible life in Christ by faith in John 11:25-6 gives rise to the glad shout of
triumph at 1 Cor. 15:54-7, upon which cognate NT texts the dying old Doctor’s
ebullient Death- and Devil-mocking romp in this lecture on Gen. 48:15-16 is in effect
an extended paraphrase.
This is the joyful gospel of Christ’s victory for us as the mature Luther preached
and exposited it.

3.3. Not Just Forgiveness: The Imputation of Christ’s Righteousness
In this section we have to do with the inner content of the grace of forgiveness-andrighteousness given freely to faith by, through, in, and for the sake of Jesus Christ. My
object here is not to exposit Luther’s mature doctrine of the iustitia Christi (or Dei, or
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fidei) passiva, aliena, externa, Christiana, imputata, etc. in any real depth,1087 only to
make a few simple observations about how the “free gift of righteousness” (Rom. 5:17)
in Christ c. 1520—46 relates to the earlier teaching on mercy, forgiveness and nonimputation set forth in 1515/16 after the manner of the “420s Augustine.” In so doing, I
am simultaneously highlighting one of the major differences that distinguishes the
mature Augustine’s theology of grace-qua-forgiveness in Christ from the mature
Luther’s theology of grace as forgiveness-and-righteousness in Christ.
The gist is this: in general, it can be said that in 1515/16 the young Luther
follows the old Augustine closely in stressing the reality and the gratuity of God’s
mercy in Christ, manifest in the forgiveness of actual sins and the non-imputation of
residual sinful desire. The mature Luther teaches this too, but in addition he
maintains that in the justification of the ungodly the “positive” imputation of Christ’s
righteousness is given to faith together with the “negative” non-imputation of sin. In
more concrete terms: Augustine and the young Luther generally hold that the guilt of
the forgiven and/or “justified” person is removed as far from him as the east is from
the west. The mature Luther agrees, but adds that on top of this the forgiven person
stands before God clothed in Jesus Christ’s very own righteousness; and for this
reason, the justified believer, united with Christ by faith, is just as righteous coram deo
as the Righteous One himself (Isa. 53:11, Acts 3:14, 1 John 2:1).
I stress my qualifying adverbs on generality for two reasons. First, as I noted
above, Augustine himself on rare occasions does speak of the imputation of Christ’s
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On this point, see chapter 2 above.
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righteousness, mainly vis-à-vis baptized children,1088 and in 1514—16 the young Luther
is already elaborating freely on iustitia imputata without Augustine’s specific
restriction of it to infant baptism.1089 Second, the mature Luther often speaks simply of
forgiveness or non-imputation in the “Augustinian” manner of his youth, without any
hint of the Reformation iustitia Christi imputata. From what I can gather, and as one
might expect, the lion’s share of such occurrences are to be found in passages that
concern the “Augustinian simul” of renewed spiritus and old flesh/“sin” in the
regenerate person.1090 Still, the thesis of an advance from mere forgiveness/non-

1088

c. Iul. op. imp. 1.57, CSEL 85/1.55 (cf. WSA I/25.85): … sic imputari generatis parvulis iniustitiam
primi hominis ad subeundum supplicium, quemadmodum imputatur parvulis regeneratis iustitia
secundi hominis ad obtinendum regnum caelorum; c. Iul. op. imp. 3.148, CSEL 85/1.454 (cf. WSA
I/25.350): Si autem parvuli propter iustitiam secundi hominis, qui regenerationis est auctor,
deputantur iusti, cur non propter peccatum primi hominis, qui generationis est auctor, deputantur
iniusti? Also: c. Iul. op. imp. 3.49, 6.22-3.
1089
See the texts from 1514—16 cited in full at the start of section 3.2 above: WA 4.652.3-20, WA
56.158.10-14, WA 56.204.15-28, WA 56.267.1-7, WA Br 1.35.15-36.
1090
See, e.g., the 1531/5 lectures on Gal. 5:16-17. (1) On Gal. 5:16, WA 40/2.79.22-80.15 [Dr] (cf. LW
27.64): Deberemus quidem implere legem et impletione eius iustificari, sed peccatum obstat.
Praescribit et praecipit quidem lex, ut ‘Deum ex toto corde etc. et proximum ut nos ipsos diligamus’,
sed ideo non sequitur: Hoc scriptum est, ergo fit, Lex praecipit dilectionem, ergo diligimus. Non dabis
aliquem in terris, qui ita diligat Deum et proximum, ut lex requirit. In futura autem vita, ubi plane
mundati ab omnibus vitiis et peccatis et puri ut sol erimus, perfecte diligemus et perfecta dilectione
iusti erimus. In illa vero vita impedit puritatem illam caro, in qua, donec vivimus, haeret adhuc
peccatum. Hinc tam potens est amor nostri viciosus, ut longe superet amorem Dei et proximi. Interim
tamen, ut et in hac vita iusti simus, habemus ‘Propiciatorium’ et Thronum gratiae Christum, in quem
credentes, peccatum nobis non imputatur. Est igitur fides iusticia nostra in hac vita. In futura autem,
ubi perpurgati et prorsus liberi erimus ab omnibus peccatis et concupiscentiis, non amplius opus
habebimus fide et spe. (2) On Gal. 5:17, WA 40/2.92.31-93.14 [Dr] (cf. LW 27.73-4): Sancti enim non
nituntur sua iusticia, sed cum Davide canunt: ‘Ne intres in iudicium cum servo tuo, quia non
iustificatur in conspectu tuo omnis vivens’, Item: ‘Si iniquitates observas, Domine, Domine, quis
sustinebit?’ Intuentur igitur Christum, Propiciatorem suum, qui vitam dedit pro peccatis ipsorum.
Deinde si quid est reliquum peccati in carne, noverunt hoc non imputari, sed per remissionem
condonari sibi. Interim tamen Spiritu pugnant contra Carnem, non quod omnino eius
concupiscentiam non sentiant, sed quod eam non perficiant. (3) On Gal. 5:17, WA 40/2.94.28-95.25
[Dr] (cf. LW 27.75-6): Istam luctam Carnis cum Spiritu habuerunt et senserunt omnes Sancti,
Eandem et nos experimur. Qui consulit conscientiam suam, modo non sit Hypocrita, certo inveniet
ita geri rem in seipso, ut Paulus hic describit, scilicet, quod Caro concupiscat adversus Spiritum.
Unusquisque igitur Sanctus sentit et fatetur Carnem suam resistere Spiritui et ista duo ita sibi
invicem adversari in seipso, ut, quae velit, etiamsi maxime hic laboret et sudet, tamen non possit ea
facere. Itaque Caro obstat, quo minus praecepta Dei servemus, quo minus diligamus proximos ut
nosipsos, multominus ut diligamus Deum ex toto corde etc. Ideo impossibile est nos legis operibus
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imputation in Augustine and the younger Luther to the non-imputation of sin plus the
additional imputation of Christ’s righteousness in full-grown Reformation theology is
more than defensible.1091 I realize that for some critics, this interpretation of the
mature Luther draws perilously near to the orthodox doctrine of free justification in
the later evangelical Confessions, both Lutheran and Reformed.1092 But this cannot be

iustificari. Voluntas bona quidem adest, quam oportet adesse (est enim Spiritus ipse rebellans Carni),
quae libenter vellet facere bonum, implere legem, diligere Deum et proximum etc., Caro autem non
obsequitur isti voluntati, sed resistit ei. Sed Deus non imputat hoc peccatum, est enim propicius
propter Christum. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod debeas peccatum extenuare aut contemnere, quia
Deus illud non imputat. Non imputat quidem, Sed quibus et propter quid? Non duris et securis, sed
poenitentiam agentibus et fide apprehendentibus Christum Propiciatorem, propter quem ut
remittuntur eis omnia peccata, ita et reliquiae peccati eis non imputantur. Illi non extenuant
peccatum, sed amplificant, quia norunt illud nulla satisfactione, operibus et iusticia elui posse,
praeterquam per mortem Christi, non tamen propter magnitudinem eius desperant, sed certo
statuunt illud ignosci sibi propter Christum. (4) On Gal. 5:17, WA 40/2.96.17-97.16 [Dr] (cf. LW
27.76-7): Ex his etiam intelligi potest, qui veri Sancti sint. Sunt autem non trunci et lapides, ut
Sophistae et Monachi somniant, qui prorsus nulla re afficiantur aut nunquam concupiscentiam
carnis sentiant, sed, ut Paulus ait, ‘caro ipsorum concupiscit adversus Spiritum.’ Ideo peccatum
habent et peccare possunt. Et Psalm. 32. testatur, Sanctos confiteri iniusticiam suam et orare pro
remissione impietatis peccati sui, cum inquit: ‘Dixi, confitebor adversum me iniusticiam meam
Domino, Et tu remisisti impietatem peccati mei. Pro hac orabit ad te omnis Sanctus’ etc. Deinde orat
tota Ecclesia, quae certe sancta est, Remitti sibi peccata et credit Remissionem peccatorum, Et
Psalmo 143. orat David: ‘Ne intres, Domine, in iudicium cum servo tuo, quia non iustificatur in
conspectu tuo omnis vivens’, Et Psalm. 130.: ‘Si iniquitates observas, Domine, Domine, quis
sustinebit? Apud te propriciatio est’ etc. Sic loquuntur et orant maximi Sancti, David, Paulus etc. Ergo
idem loquuntur et orant eodem spiritu omnes sancti. Sophistae Scripturas non legunt, aut si etiam
legunt, tamen obducto ob oculos velo legunt, ideo, ut de nulla prorsus re, ita neque de peccato neque
de sanctitate recte iudicare possunt.
1091
In his article “Was There a ‘Reformation Doctrine of Justification’?” HTR 103/2 (2010): 205-36, my
friend David C. Fink argues that forgiveness and imputation are roughly synonymous in the “first
wave” of evangelical confessions in the 1520s and 30s, and that this earlier usage then evolves into
the two-part formula remissio peccatorum et imputatio iustitiae Christi in the “second wave” of
confessions in the 1560s and 70s. I think Fink has put his finger on an important imprecision in the
first few decades of the Reformation. That said, to me it seems that however imprecisely stated in
verba, the dogmatic res signified by the two-part formula is already in place in the mature Luther’s
theology of “grace” as forgiveness and righteousness in Christ.
1092
See, for example: (1) The 1559 Confessio Gallica, written by Calvin with Beza and Viret’s help, art.
18: “We believe that all our righteousness rests upon the remission of our sins, in which is also our
only felicity, as David says (Ps. 32:1-2). We therefore reject all other means by which we could
justify ourselves before God, and without presuming any virtue or merit, we hold simply to the
obedience of Jesus Christ, which is imputed to us (nous nous tenons simplement à l’obéissance de
Jésus-Christ, laquelle nous est allouée) as much to cover all our faults as to make us find grace and
favor before God.” Schaff, 3.369-70, alt. (2) The 1561 Confessio Belgica, the witness of the martyr
Guido de Brès, art. 23: “We believe that our blessedness consists in the remission of our sins for
Jesus Christ’s sake, and that therein is contained our righteousness before God, as David and Saint
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helped! For on my reading of the texts, the old Doctor would have it no other way:
even if, as I think the Finns have rightly argued, he might have hoped for a stronger
emphasis on union with Christ in the tradition that bears his name, such as one finds
amongst notable French, Dutch, and English Reformed theologians of his century and
the next.1093
Since I have already exposited the “grace” of Christ’s righteousness fully in Part
I, and indeed again at some length in section 3.2 of this chapter, I will be brief here.
The free and merciful bestowal of the full and complete iustitia dei—“die
Gerechtigkeit, die vor Gott gilt,” Rom. 3:21—upon justly condemned sinners is the just
reward of Christ’s obedient suffering and death in our place on the cross, and the
spoils of his triumph; and the risen Jesus gives it freely to whoever believes his gospel.
I think Oberman was right to argue that Luther broke ranks with scholastic theologies
of justification at just this point: the law-crushed sinner’s empty-handed reception of
Christ’s righteousness as his own by faith, and the identification of this freely given
iustitia Christi with the righteousness that God requires at the sinner’s hands in order
Paul teach us, declaring the blessedness of that man, to whom God counts righteousness apart from
works (à qui Dieu alloue justice sans oeuvres, Ps. 32:1, Rom. 4:6). And the same Apostle says that we
are justified freely or by grace, through the redemption which is in Jesus Christ (Rom. 3:24-5). And
this is why we always hold fast to this foundation, giving all glory to God, humbling ourselves, and
recognizing ourselves such as we are, without presuming to trust in anything in ourselves or our
merits, and relying and resting upon the sole obedience of Christ crucified, which is ours when we
believe in him (nous nous appuyons et reposons en la seule obéissance de Christ crucifié; laquelle est
nôtre, quand nous croyons en lui).” Schaff, 409, ECRC, 100. (3) The 1577 FC, Ep. 3, thesis 2: “We
believe, teach, and confess that our righteousness before God consists in this, that the Lord forgives
us our sins out of sheer grace (Dominus nobis peccata remittit ex mera gratia), without any respect
at all to our forgoing, current, or consequent works, dignity, or merit. For he gives and imputes to
us the righteousness of Christ’s obedience (Ille enim donat atque imputat nobis iustitiam
oboedientiae Christi). Because of this righteousness, we are received by God into grace and
accounted righteous.” BSELK 1237.11-16, cf. BC 495.
1093
But cf. David Yeago, “A Lutheran Contribution to Spiritual Theology: The Doctrine of the
Mystical Union,” Lutheran Forum 18/4 (Advent, 1984): 18-22; Martti Vaahtoranta, “Unio und
Rechtfertigung bei Johann Gerhard,” in Matti Repo and Rainar Vinke, eds., Gott und Mensch in der
nachreformatorischen Theologie (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola, 1996), 200-45.
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to escape eternal condemnation in hell, meant that full justification came at the
beginning of the Christian pilgrimage, not the end; and for this reason above all, the
heart of the sinful but Christ-trusting viator had been set free to enjoy peace with God
in Christ now (as St. John and Paul are especially given to say, John 3:14-18, 5:24, 6:54,
10:27-30, 11:25-6, 1 John 2:1-2, 3:1-2, Rom. 5:1-11, 8:1, 8:31-39, Gal. 5:1, Eph. 2:4-8, Col. 1:1214, 2:13-15, 1 Thess. 1:4-10, 5:9-10, 2 Tim. 1:8-10).1094
In the 1520—46 period, Luther proclaims, exposits, and defends this doctrine of
the iustitia fidei using all the various and vivacious scriptural terms and images I
examined closely in Part I. For it stands at the heart of his mature theology of “grace”
(gratia/Gnade). At times, as we saw above, “imputation” as a legal mechanism and
metaphor set in foro divino is very much front and center; our sin is reckoned to Christ
crucified, and Christ’s obedience is reckoned to faith as righteousness (2 Cor. 5:21). In
other places, the believer’s union with Christ and his invincible righteousness, and the
great exchange that follows upon this union, takes the lead. In many works, not least
the great Galaterbrief, forensic imputation and union with Christ stand side by side.
For complex reasons that cannot detain us here, not least the Osiandrian controversy
and its one-sided settlement,1095 many later Luther scholars and theologians have felt
compelled to pick between either unio-texts inspired by the likes of Gal. 2:20 and 3:268 or imputatio-texts rooted in Gal. 3:6-25 and 3:29—4:7. But perhaps modern
perplexities over this phenomenon have more to do with a lack of scriptural depth and
catholic breadth on our part than with an imagined inconsistency in Luther’s
1094

Heiko Oberman, “‘Iustitia Christi’ and ‘Iustitia Dei’: Luther and the Scholastic Doctrines of
Justification,” HTR 59/1 (Jan. 1966): 1-26.
1095
Timothy J. Wengert, Defending Faith: Lutheran Responses to Andreas Osiander’s Doctrine of
Justification, 1551—1559 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012).
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theology. Might not the simple fact that such texts are so intricately interwoven in the
thread of St. Paul’s argument have urged upon us the goodness to be had in holding
the two motifs together in their apostolic richness and unity? I think the mature
Luther tried his hand at just this, and in the event did rather well:
Therefore: the Christ who is grasped by faith and dwells in the heart is the
Christian righteousness on account of which God counts us righteous and gives
us eternal life.1096
These three are joined together: faith, Christ, acceptance or imputation. For
faith grasps hold of Christ and has him present and encloses him as a ring
encloses the gem; and whoever is found having this faith in the Christ who is
grasped in the heart, God reckons that person righteous.1097
In my judgment, such efforts to hold together St. John’s “patristic” doctrine of saving
unio cum Christo with St. Paul’s “Reformation” emphasis on saving iustitia in Christo
per fidem sine operibus mark one point where the late medieval Augustinian pupil
surpasses his ancient master as an exegetical theologian. But regardless of one’s
dogmatic evaluation of the shift, I think it is beyond dispute that with his doctrine of
the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, the mature Luther takes a step past the old
Augustine’s doctrine of the non-imputation of sin: this, amidst their deep agreement
that forgiveness/non-imputation is God’s free gift through and for the sake of his
incarnate Son and his shed blood.

3.4. Promissio evangelii in Evae semine omnibus credentibus

1096

On Gal. 2:16, WA 40/1.229.28-30 [Dr]: Ergo fide apprehensus et in corde habitans Christus est
iustitia Christiana propter quam Deus nos reputat iustos et donat vitam aeternam. Cf. LW 26.130.
1097
On Gal. 2:16, WA 40/1.233.16-19 [Dr]: ista tria, Fides, Christus, Acceptio vel Reputatio, coniuncta
sunt. Fides enim apprehendit Christum et habet eum praesentem includitque eum ut annulus
gemmam, Et qui fuerit inventus cum tali fide apprehensi Christi in corde, illum reputat Deus iustum.
Cf. LW 26.132.
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In his 1971 monograph Promissio: Geschichte der reformatorischen Wende in Luthers
Theologie, Oswald Bayer argues forcefully that Luther’s Augustinian theology of sin
and grace was already in place by the 1515/16 Romans lectures, but that this did not
make Luther a Reformation theologian.1098 Neither did the Disputation against
Scholastic Theology (4 Sept. 1517), the Ablaßthesen (31 Oct. 1517), or the Heidelberg
Disputation (26 April 1518, with its celebrated theologia crucis) mark a real, decisive,
and “reformational” departure from the broad spectrum of acceptable theological
opinion within medieval Catholicism. The theology of these writings represents a
rock-ribbed mystical Augustinianism (think Gregory of Rimini with a twist of John
Tauler—or John Staupitz) which, if not ever really popular, at least held its rightful
place at the table.
The “turn” to Reformation theology came in early summer 1518, when Luther
broke through to his prodigiously biblical theology of God’s saving promise (cf. Gen.
3:15, 12:1-3, 15:1-6, 17:1-14, 18:10, 21:1, 22:18, 26:1-5, 28:13-15, 49:8-12, Exod. 2:23-5, 3:17, 6:18, 12:25, 32:13, Num. 10:29, 14:17, Deut. 1:11, 9:3, 11:25, 26:18, Josh. 1:3, 21:43-5, 23:5, 10, 1415, 2 Sam. 7:21, 28, Neh. 9:8, Ps. 77:8, 105:9, 42, 106:24, 108:7, 119:38, 41, 50, 58, 76, 82,
116, 123, 133, 140, 148, 154, Jer. 29:10, 32:42, 33:14, Luke 1:72, 24:49, Acts 1:4, 2:33, 39, 7:17,
13:23, 32, 26:6, Rom. 1:2, 4:13-14, 16, 20-21, 9:4, 8-9, 15:8 2 Cor. 1:20, 7:1, Gal. 3:14, 16-22,
29, 4:23, 28, Eph. 1:13, 2:12, 3:6, 2 Tim. 1:1, Tit. 1:2, Heb. 4:1, 6:12-17, 7:6, 8:6, 9:15, 10:23,
36, 11:9-13, 17, 33, 39, 12:26, Jas. 1:12, 2:5, 2 Pet. 1:4, 3:9, 13, 1 John 2:25). The first text that
clearly manifests the reformational doctrine of justification by faith in the promise of
grace is an (at least before Bayer) obscure set of disputation theses c. May/June 1518,

1098

Bayer, Promissio, 140.
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Pro veritate inquirenda et timoratis conscientiis consolandis conclusiones.1099 Here are
the crucial theses:
8. The forgiveness of fault (Remissio culpe) does not depend upon the
contrition of the sinners, nor upon the office or power of the priest.
9. Rather, it depends on faith, which is in the word of Christ saying: “Whatever
you loose, etc.” (Matt. 16:19).
10. For it is true that it is not the sacrament of faith, but faith in the sacrament
(i.e., not because it takes place, but because it is believed) that justifies.
11. Christ does not want the salvation of men to consist in the hand or the
choice of a man,
12. but as it is written: “he bears up all things by the word of his power” (Heb.
1:3), and: “purifying their hearts by faith” (Acts 15:9).
13. They err even to the point of infidelity who assert that the forgiveness of
fault is uncertain because of the uncertainty of contrition.
14. No matter how uncertain either the priest or the sinner may be about
contrition, absolution is valid if he believes that he has been absolved.
15. It is therefore certain that sins are forgiven if you believe they are forgiven,
because the promise of Christ the Savior is certain (certa est Christi salvatoris
promissio).
16. A man absolved through the keys ought rather to die and deny every
creature than to doubt about his own absolution.
17. By doubting whether his absolution is pleasing to God, at the same time he
doubts whether Christ was truthful when he said: “Whatever, etc.” (Matt.
16:19).
18. By building forgiveness on top of contrition, they build on sand, i.e., they
build faith in God on top of the work of man.
19. Not believing the absolution until contrition is certain is injurious to the
sacrament and the engine of despair.
20. Indeed: to want to build confidence of conscience (fiduciam conscientie) on
top of contrition in this way is to set up God for a liar and oneself as truthful.
21. Such people presume upon their own works and powers most desperately,
not upon the mercy and word of Christ.
22. Indeed: they want to strengthen the word and faith themselves, rather than
being strengthened by the word and faith.
23. Priests are not the authors of forgiveness, but ministers of the word to the
end of faith in forgiveness (ministratores verbi in fidem remissionis).
24. The power of the keys works a strong and infallible work by the word and
commandment of God, except in the event that you are a deceiver.
25. The priest has a sufficient and manifest sign of contrition, if he perceives
that the sinner asks for and believes the absolution.
1099

WA 1.629-33. On which see Bayer, Promissio, 166-7, 172, 182-202; Brecht, Road to Reformation,
235-6. On the Augustinian and medieval backcloth to thesis 10, see Jarod Wicks, S.J., “FIDES
SACRAMENTI—FIDES SPECIALIS: Luther’s Development in 1518,” in idem, Luther’s Reform, 117-47.
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26. Indeed: it is better by far to inquire of him whether he believes that he is
absolved than whether he grieves worthily.
27. Take care, then, that the priest does not probe for contrition alone, so that
a man believes that he must be absolved because of it.
28. Rather, for him that saying of Christ must be insisted on: “Courage, son!
Your sins are forgiven you” (Matt. 9:2), instead of inquiring about his
worthiness.
29. It follows that that word of Christ: “whose sins you forgive, etc.” (John
20:23) are to be understood not about penalties, but about fault.
33. For nothing justifies except faith only in Christ (Nihil enim iustificat, nisi
sola fides Christi), for which faith the ministry of the word through the priest is
necessary.
34. Without this faith, contrition over sins is the operation of despair and
offends God rather than reconciling him.
48. Not one human being knows how often he sins mortally, even in good
works because of empty boasting (propter vanam gloriam).
49. Only those things should be confessed, which either to himself or to others
are certain to be mortal, i.e., grave sins (crimina).
50. Despairing over the rest, let him cast himself with confidence into the abyss
of the mercy of God, who faithfully promises (cum fiducia in abyssum
misericordie dei fideliter promittentis).
The sum of it all (Summa summarum): The righteous lives not by works nor by
the law, but by faith. Rom. 1[:17].1100
1100

WA 1.631.3-632.8, 15-18, 633.5-12: 8 Remissio culpe non innititur contritioni peccatoris, nec officio
aut potestati sacerdotis, 9 Innititur potius fidei, que est in verbum Christi dicentis: Quodcunque
solveris &c. 10 Verum est enim, quod non sacramentum fidei, sed fides sacramenti (id est, non quia fit,
sed quia creditur) iustificat. 11 Non voluit Christus, in manu vel arbitrio hominis consistere salutem
hominum, 12 Sed sicut scriptum est: portans omnia verbo virtutis sue, et: fide purificans corda eorum.
13 Usque ad infidelitatem errant, qui remissionem culpe incertam asserunt propter incertitudinem
contritionis. 14 Quantumlibet incertus sit tam sacerdos quam peccator de contritione, rata est
absolutio, si credit sese absolutum. 15 Certum est ergo, remissa esse peccata si credis remissa, quia
certa est Christi salvatoris promissio. 16 Absolutus per clavem potius debet mori et omnem creaturam
negare quam de sua absolutione dubitare. 17 Dubitans, absolutionem suam deo gratam esse, dubitat
simul, Christum fuisse veracem dicendo: Quodcunque &c. 18 Super contritionem edificantes
remissionem super arenam, id est super opus hominis, fidem dei edificant. 19 Iniuria est sacramenti et
desperationis machina, non credere absolutionem, donec certa sit contritio. 20 Immo sic velle
fiduciam conscientie edificare super contritionem est deum mendacem, se veracem constituere. 21
Tales non de misericordia et verbo Christi, sed de suis operibus et viribus perditissime presumunt. 22
Immo perversissime volunt verbum et fidem firmare ipsi, et non potius firmari verbo et fide. 23
Sacerdotes non sunt authores remissionis, sed ministratores verbi in fidem remissionis. 24 Potestas
Clavium operatur verbo et mandato dei firmum et infallibile opus, nisi sis dolosus. 25 Evidentia
contritionis signa satis habet sacerdos, si peccatorem sentit petere et credere absolutionem. 26 Immo
longe magis exquirendum est ab eo, an credat sese absolvi quam an digne doleat. 27 Cavendum
quoque sacerdoti, ne adeo exploret solam contritionem, ut homo credat propter ipsam sese
absolvendum. 28 Illud Christi potius est inculcandum ei ‘confide, fili, remittuntur tibi peccata tua’,
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To begin at the end: Luther’s concluding “the sum of it all” is no innocent peroration,
but a pointed jab at the Summa summarum which his bitter opponent, Sylvester
Prierias Mazzolini, had first published in 1514. The “Sylvestrina,” as it was called, was
one of the most popular sixteenth-century manuals for confessors, and belonged to
what Thomas Tentler calls “an identifiable genre” stemming from the work of the mid
thirteenth-century canon lawyer, Raymond of Peñaforte. These “summas for
confessors” aimed to assist priests in evaluating the gravity of a penitent’s sins and the
depth of his contrition in order to make a sound judgment about whether to absolve
him and, if so, about the appropriate penance to assign him.1101 The doctrine of
absolution which Luther sketches in Pro veritate constitutes a Reformation broadside
against this entire genre, against Prierias’ thorough and best-selling Summa, and
indeed—as Cajetan insightfully recognized at Augsburg in fall 1518—against central
aspects of the medieval sacramental system itself et eo ipso, the Roman Catholic

quam dignitas eius exquirenda. 29 Consequens est, quod verbum illud Christi ‘quorum remiseritis
peccata &c.’ non de penis, sed culpa intelligitur… 33 Nihil enim iustificat, nisi sola fides Christi, ad
quam necessaria est verbi per sacerdotem ministratio. 34 Sine qua fide contritio peccatorum est
desperationis operatio et plus deum offendens quam reconcilians… 48 Nullus hominum novit, quoties
peccet mortaliter, etiam in bonis operibus propter vanam gloriam. 49 Ea tantum debet confiteri, que
vel sibi vel aliis certa sunt esse mortalia, id est crimina, 50 De reliquis desperando seipsum cum
fiducia in abyssum misericordie dei fideliter promittentis proiicere. Summa summarum: Iustus non ex
operibus neque ex lege, sed ex fide vivet. Ro. 1.
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Thomas N. Tentler, Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1977), 31-9. Tentler observes (241-3, 271-3) that most confessional
manuals were decidedly less rigorous in their contritionism than was Luther’s primary scholastic
teacher, Gabriel Biel; for most—including Prierias—the Scotist doctrine of the adequacy of attrition
(on the conviction that the sacrament transformed it into contrition) sufficed. For Biel’s doctrine,
see Oberman, Harvest, 146-60, who concludes thus: “The strictness of Biel’s contritionism
necessarily would enhance scrupulousness and despair. Biel is aware of this problem and would
have liked in view of this to accept Scotus’ parum attritus solution. But Biel’s doctrine of the facere
quod in se est and a high estimate of the natural capacities and dignity of man forced him to reject
this solution.”
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Church.1102 For Luther, by mid 1518 an ardent theologus promissionis gratiae, the power
of absolution no longer resides in the sacramental authority of the priest. Neither does
its efficacy depend upon the purity of a contrite heart. Rather, absolution rests
exclusively on Christ the Savior’s sure promise of forgiveness (theses 1, 2, 4-6, 8, 9, 13,
15, 18, 23, 28, 29), justification (10, 33), and salvation (6, 7, 11, 15), a promise efficaciously
conveyed in the verbum externum of absolution and received as a free gift by faith.
Trust in God’s promise of grace in Christ overcomes penitential uncertainty and
despair, and issues in assurance of heart, peace, joy, thankfulness, and courage. For
Christ’s clear and certain word steels the penitent per fidem promissionis to rip his
eyes off his insufficiently contrite no less than his abundantly sinful self, and to stake
everything instead on the infinite abyss of God’s mercy manifest and graspable in the
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The new evangelical Promissiotheologie surfaced prominently as the Grunddifferenz between
Luther and Cajetan at the Diet of Augsburg, 12-14 Oct. 1518. In the course of their impromptu
debate, the German Augustinian defended his controversial doctrine of assurance through faith in
the promise of forgiveness. When admonished by the formidable Italian Thomist to recant, Luther
confessed: “I do not want to become a heretic by contradicting the conviction through which I
became a Christian; I would sooner die, be burned, chased out, cursed etc.”—as he reported to
Karlstadt, 14 Oct. 1518 (#100), WA Br 1.217.59-63: … wenn ich dies einig Wort spräche: ‘revoco’, das ist:
“Jch widerrufe.” Aber ich will nicht zu einem Ketzer werden mit dem Widerspruch der Meinung, durch
welchen ich bin zu einem Christen worden; ehe will ich sterben, verbrannt, vertrieben und
vermaledeiet werden etc. Luther had explained his non sacramentum, sed fides sacramenti iustificat
doctrine earlier on in the letter, WA Br 1.215.12-22: Aber am allermeisten ist über diesen zweien
Artikeln gefochten worden: Zum ersten, daß ich gesagt hab, daß der Ablaß nicht sei der Schatz des
Verdiensts unsers lieben Herrn und Seligmachers Christi. Zum andern, daß ein Mensch, das zu dem
allerhochwürdigsten Sacrament gehen will, gläuben müsse etc. Dagegen der Legat gesetzt hat die
Extra vagans in Sexto Decretalium, die sich anhebt: Unigenitus. Darauf er sich feste verließ und
gänzlich vermaß, als wäre ich dadurch überwunden; wollt mich derhalb zu einem Widerspruch
dringen. Er zog für sich an die gemeine Opinion und Wahn der Scholasticorum oder Schullehrer von
der Kraft und Wirkung der Sacrament und von der Ungewißheit deß, der das hochwürdig Sacrament
empfähet. In retrospect, Cajetan replied in lapidary fashion: “This is to set up a new Church.” See
Cajetan’s tractate “Utrum ad fructuosam absolutionem in sacramento poenitentiae exigatur fides,
qua poenitens credat certissime se esse absolutum a Deo,” which he prepared ahead of his meeting
with Luther by 26 Sept. 1518, but then edited afterwards in light of their arguments: “The sacrament
of penance exists sine certa fide effectus in suscipiente. Hoc [viz., Luther’s assertion to the contrary]
enim est novam Ecclesiam construere.” In his collected Opuscula (Lyon, 1575), 111a.7-8, as cited by
Bayer, Promissio, 183 n. 135.
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promise. In short: the penitent sinner is righteous by faith in Jesus Christ, and
therefore lives in the freedom and courage of the gospel.
I think Bayer is right to urge that this biblical theology of promise and faith is
the consequence of the Ablaßstreit rather than its cause.1103 But in itself, this does not
prove that Reformation theology did not exist prior to the disputation Pro veritate. For
all such claims depend upon one’s prior dogmatic account of what counts as
Reformation theology, and are therefore inadjudicable on purely textual or historical
grounds.1104 That said, it is beyond question that the controversy engulfing Europe in
1518 was the causa occasionalis for the subject matter and argument of this
disputation. Starting with thesis 1, Luther begins to attack the natural preference for
remissio poenae over remissio culpae that stands at the center of all concupiscent
desire for indulgences. One can be saved well enough without the former so long as he
has the latter (thesis 6). And regardless: when there is forgiveness of guilt, “there is no
penalty even in penalty, but joy in tribulations [cf. Rom. 5:3, Jas. 1:2-3]” (thesis 5)1105—a
sturdy plank in Luther’s mystical theology of sanctification through the cross, to
which I will return below. Now, in the famed Ablaßthesen of 31 Oct. 1517, Luther had

1103

Bayer, Promissio, 164.
Cf. Bernhard Lohse (Martin Luther’s Theology, 88) on the circularity involved in scholarly
searches for the Durchbruch to Reformation: “In the debate over the breakthrough one cannot
avoid the impression that the definition given the content of this discovery is at times a personal
confessio of the given researcher.”
1105
WA 1.630.5-631.2: 1 Inter duas ecclesiasticas illas remissiones pene et culpe longe precellit remissio
culpe. 2 Remissio culpe quietat cor et maximam omnium penarum, scilicet conscientiam peccati,
tollit. 3 Remissio pene quandoque auget conscientiam malam, quandoque peiorem nutrit
presumptionem. 4 Remissio culpe reconciliat hominem deo, remissio pene reconciliat hominem
homini, id est ecclesie. 5 Remissa culpa et conscientia, nulla pena est in pena, sed gaudium in
tribulationibus. 6 Sine remissione pene potest homo salvus fieri, sed nequaquam sine remissione
culpe. 7 Magis prodest ad salutem, si absolutus a culpa omittat redemptionem penarum.
1104
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(in good taulerisch fashion, as Leppin has shown1106) already denounced indulgences
for taking away from the faithful the most powerful means of sanctifying grace
available to them, to wit: penal, purgatorial suffering. Eight months into the public
controversy, Luther is singing the same tune in regards to the hidden blessing of the
holy cross, as indeed he will for the rest of his life. But now in June 1518, his theology
begins to resound with the new evangelical song of the promise and, therefore, with
the assurance which the believer may enjoy by faith. If extra-sacramental indulgences
were pernicious prior to the advent of the new theology because they robbed
Christians of the holy cross—alongside which, for Luther if not perhaps for his
princes, the loss of the Germans’ hard-earned Gulden was nothing—by summer 1518
the sacrament of penance in its medieval form has itself become baleful. For its
“Babylonian captivity” has buried the promise of free absolution in Jesus Christ under
intolerable burdens and veiled it beneath impenetrable distractions. Instead of
directing sin-heavy souls to the promise of grace, and lifting up hearts through faith in
this gospel, penance as the Reformer’s arch-nemesis Prierias (et al.) taught it fixed
crushed hearts upon false objects of hope: the adequacy of the penitent’s contrition,
the intricacy of his confession, the authority of the priest, the sufficiency of
satisfactions. In Luther’s judgment—long-since preformed in his heart and mind by
the crucicentric piety-theology of Augustine, Bernard, and Staupitz, but now rendered
powerfully lucid through his deepened grasp of St. Paul’s doctrine of blessing,
righteousness, and life by promise and faith (Rom. 4, 9:6-16, Gal. 3:6—4:7, 21-31)—this
is a lie; and therefore, to pastor souls ad modum Sylvestri is to “make them trust in a
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Volker Leppin, “‘Omnem vitam fidelium penitentiam esse voluit.’”
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lie” (as Jeremiah once said of Hananiah and Shemaiah’s false prophecies, 28:15, 29:31),
to their destruction. “The sum of it all,” then, is that handbooks on penance like
Prierias’ Sylvestrina are worse than a waste of time. But—certa est Christi salvatoris
promissio! And if the crushed heart takes hold of the promise of absolution by faith, he
has the reality of salvation which Christ bestows upon him through this very word.
The Summa summarum is not Sylvester’s but St. Paul’s, Rom. 1:17. The righteous shall
live, not by the purity of their contrition, the fullness of their confession, or the
impressiveness of their penitential satisfactions, but by faith: faith which relies, not on
the power of the priest, but on the promise of the forgiveness of sins in Jesus Christ.
(And to be sure, good priests are faithful ministers of Christ and his Word: theses 23
and 33, cf. Eph. 3:7, Col. 1:25.) So far Luther in early summer 1518, the newly minted
Worttheologe.
Pace Bayer, I have made no secret of my preference for Oberman and Leppin’s
step-wise approach to Luther’s development in the 1513—20 period. In the course of
those years, Luther experienced a series of piecemeal but interrelated breakthroughs,
rather than one decisive (or even apocalyptic!) turn to Reformation. And as I have
argued in this book, the “Augustinian” breakthrough that Luther experienced c. 1514—
16 was far more important, and in the event far more enduring, than Bayer recognizes
or allows for. These reservations aside, I find his case for the initial emergence of
Luther’s mature Promissio- or Worttheologie in the vicinity of summer 1518
compelling. Bayer goes on to trace how the new promise theology grew in clarity and
in the extent of its application to other loci over the next two years, culminating in the
great Reformation treatises of fall 1520: The Babylonian Captivity of the Church in
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October, and in November The Freedom of a Christian. This, I think, is also sound. So
too is Bayer’s contention for the lasting centrality of the promise in the Reformer’s
doctrine of justification from 152o to this death. As Asendorf has underscored, Luther’s
irreducibly salvation-historical promise theology, deeply rooted in the Protevangelium
and the promises to the patriarchs that build upon it, first surfaces in a fall 1519
sermon on Gen. 9:91107 but then snowballs into “the organizing principle of Luther’s
middle and late theology” in the 1520s and 30s. The theology of the Promise of the
Seed finds its “monumental expression” in the Genesisvorlesung 1535—45, the
sprawling volumes of which comprise the old Doctor’s last and perhaps greatest
exposition of this impressive and vital scriptural motif.1108
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WA 9.348.8-349.5: Ecce ego statuam pactum. Observa in scripturis vocabula: fedus, pactum,
promissio, Testamentum, Arcus federis, signum federis, Testimonium, calix novi et eterni Testamenti.
His enim omnibus significantur divinarum rerum certa quedam Testimonia. Adam audivit verbum
‘Ecce factus est Adam sicut unus ex nobis’. Ex quo verbo futurum intelligebat Adam, Et si obscure, ut
aliquis sibi in carne similis, tamen deus tolleret iugum, quod ipse sibi suo peccato intulit. Desperasset
Adam statim primo intuitu peccati, nisi verbo isto revocatus. Tegendum erat peccatum, Ideo deus
ipse, id quod amoris erat, pellibus texit eos. Addens cum serpenti loquitur ‘ipse conteret caput tuum’.
Incendens postea holocaustum Noe signum habuit dei faventis et propicii: Arcam, qua salvatus est,
Deinde arcum in nubibus, Item quod odoratus est dominus odorem suavitatis, Ca. 8. In fine Abraham
fuit promissio ‘Et in semine tuo benedicentur omnes gentes’. Signum habuit additum et Sacramentum
Circumcissionem Ro. 4. ‘Signaculum [Iusticie fidei’ &c.] Isaac idem signum habuit, quod precet
eandem promissionem, Iacob quoque promissionem patrum suorum habuit, Quod in semine
Abraham et Isaac dominus esset Benedicturus universe terre, Sed signa diversa. Primum signum erat
scala quam viderat in somnis Gene. 28. Et locum Bethel, idest Domus dei. Secundum signum erat
Visio dei, quando luctabatur cum angelo, A quo Accepit benedictionem, Gene. 32. Filiis Iacob Dixit
Iacob pater ‘non aufferetur sceptrum de Iuda’, Gene. 49. Simul involvens rem et signum, Moses
redempturus Israhelem habet versionem colubris ex virga, Sanguinem ex aqua, Lepram in manu
munda. Filii Israhel faventis dei signum habent Columnam nubis et columnam ignis. Gedeon vellus
habet iam exiccatum, mox rore imbutum. Postea filii Israel Signum habuerunt faventis dei Arcam
federis auream, propiciatorium, idest asserem aureum, quem tenebant duo Cherub mutuo sese
respicientes, quo loci creditus est praesidere dominus, Exodi 37. Item librum legis. David atque eius
Seculi homines habuit Ephoth lineum, quod applicabatur, Deinde habuit Israel Duodecim lapides in
pectore Sacerdotis resplendentes, Salomon templum domini et Nebulam in illo 3. reg. 8. Christiani
verbum Euangelii, Baptismum, ευχαριστιαν. Quibus si vis adde promissionem et divine doctrine
meditationem. Matrimonium, unctio, Confirmatio non sunt sacramentalia signa, quae non habent
annexam promissionem. Ordo figmentum est. Cf. Bayer, Promissio, 161-3.
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The promise of grace in Jesus Christ, the Serpent-Crusher, true God and Man
in one Person, nailed to the tree and risen from the dead; the right distinction of the
gospel as this promise from the law of works; free justification by faith alone;
assurance of salvation;—these are co-extensive doctrines which together lie at the
heart of Reformation theology and piety. No account of Luther’s theology which fails
to attend to them can hope to do him any real justice, and it is to Bayer’s great credit
that his work has brought the theology of the promise from the margins into the
center of the field. However, in addition to the historical reservations I noted above,
Bayer’s Lutherdeutung stands in need of significant dogmatic corrections; and I believe
the argument of this book has positioned us to see these weak points rather clearly,
and to shore them up. In the introduction to chapter 2, I critiqued Bayer’s tendency
toward an “abstract” theology of justification by promise and faith, i.e., one that might
well stand or fall without the scandalous particularity of the flesh and blood of the
Seed promised to Eve, Abraham, Jacob, and David of old, the Son of God and Mary,
the Lord Jesus Christ, with his bitter sufferings, atoning death, and glorious
resurrection. For Luther, this is The Promise, and apart from it there is neither a
gospel to preach nor a truthful evangelical theology to expound. “Every promise of
God includes Christ: for if it is separated from this Mediator, God is not dealing with
us at all.”1109 But I will not reengage that contest here. Instead, I aim to point out four
additional respects in which Bayer’s good account of Luther’s Worttheologie needs to
be adjusted in light of the Reformer’s Augustinian—and “mystical”—theology of sin,
grace, and holiness.
1109

On Gen. 15:6, WA 42.567.23-4, LW 3.26: omnis promissio Dei includit Christum, si enim absque
hoc mediatore sit, Deus nihil nobiscum agit.
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(1) First, Bayer tends to assume a stark contrast between the Augustinian
Luther and Luther the Reformation theologian. “Promissio” names the break between
the former and the latter and, therefore, the advance beyond the Catholic law/grace
distinction (and its doctrine of justification by faith working through love) to the
Reformation law/gospel distinction (and justification sole fide). But this is incomplete.
On the one hand, Augustine himself had his own biblical theology of the promise. To
give just one example: at c. dei 16.43, Augustine first (a) explains that the promise
(promissio) of universal blessing made to Abraham at Gen. 12:3 “was to be fulfilled by
Christ’s coming in the flesh, and not by keeping the old law, but by faith in the gospel
(euangelii fides),” then (b) observes in Moses’ death outside the promised land a
symbol of the law’s salvific impotence, but in Joshua’s victorious conquest a
prefiguring of the promised salvation in the true Joshua, Jesus Christ.1110 So it proves
too much to exaggerate the difference between Augustine’s law/grace contrast and the
mature Luther’s distinction between the accusing law and God’s saving promise,1111 for
Augustine can show himself to be a pretty sound Lutheran, that is to say a careful
reader of Genesis and St. Paul, on just this point.1112 On the other hand, Bayer’s
Augustine/Luther contrast fails to account for Luther’s abiding Augustinianism. As I
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CCSL 48.549, Bett. 709.
Philip Cary, “The Lutheran Codicil: From Augustine’s Grace to Luther’s Gospel,” Logia 20/4
(Reformation 2011): 5-9.
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Cf. Luther on Gal. 3:19, WA 40/1.486.17-28 [Dr], cf. LW 26.313: Evangelium lux est quae illuminat
et vivificat corda; ostendit enim, quae sit Gratia et misericordia Dei, quae sit remissio peccatorum,
benedictio, iustitia, vita et salus aeterna et quo modo ista consequi debeamus. Hoc modo discernentes
legem ab Evangelio utrique tribuimus suum proprium usum et officium. De hoc Legis et Evangelii
discrimine nihil invenis in libris Monachorum, Canonistarum, Theologorum Recentium et Veterum.
Augustinus aliqua ex parte illud tenuit ac ostendit. Hieronymus et similes prorsus ignorarunt.
Summa, mirum de illo fuit multis saeculis silentium in omnibus Scholis et Templis. Quae res adduxit
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argued above, Luther never in fact abandons the law-“grace” contrast. He merely shifts
his preferred terminology from gratia sanans to donum Spiritus. The faith that receives
the promise of “grace” in Jesus Christ is quite alone in the office of justification, and
utterly passive/receptive. But the same faith which grasps Christ in the promise for
justification cries out for increased supplies of the Holy Spirit’s sanctifying gift, and
this to the end of a real and robust—if inchoate and imperfect—renewal of life
evidenced in concrete ex corde law-keeping.1113 In short, Augustine’s sp. litt. is very
much alive in Luther’s mature theology of holiness; by the Spirit and faith, the
Lutheran disciple does real works of love (Gal. 5:5-6). To be sure, these works
contribute nothing to justification forensically construed—that great matter is entirely
and exclusively wrapped up in Christ crucified (Gal. 2:21)—but they very much do
indicate the inchoate beginnings of the real law-fulfillment which one day will come
to its completion in eschatological glory.
(2) With these remarks, I have already stumbled upon my second point: when
grasped within the parameters of Luther’s doctrine of grace in Christ and renewal by
the Spirit’s gift, the “promise” of the gospel is far richer in its content than Bayer
realizes. Without question, there is for Luther (as for any Augustinian theologian) a
real priority to the free gift of mercy and forgiveness in Christ: “grace.” Once an
appropriately bleak account of fallen humanity’s helplessness due to original sin is in
place, and with it a muscular doctrine of predestination as the only hope of salvation,
this must needs be so: John 3:3-8, 6:63, Rom. 3:24, 8:29-30, 9:16, 11:5-6, Eph. 1:3-14, 2:1-8,
1113

On Gen. 15:6, WA 42.566.35-6, 567.1-2, LW 3.25: “We know indeed that faith is never alone (fides
nunquam est sola) but brings with it love and other manifold gifts.” Again: the faith that alone
justifies “brings with it a chorus of the most beautiful virtues (chorum pulcherrimarum virtutum),
and is never alone (neque unquam sola est).”
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2 Tim. 1:9, 1 John 4:19, etc. We love God because he first loved us; and it is precisely the
Lord God’s merciful and lavish gift of forgiveness and righteousness in Christ
crucified—in Luther’s mature terms, “grace”—which astonishes a son of Adam’s heart,
puts away its servile fear, and evokes filial love for such a God as this, who did not
spare his own Son but gave him up for us all. So Luther on Gen. 15:6:
… for he who believes in God, and is sure that he shows favor toward us (certus
est, quod faveat nobis)—if indeed he even gave his Son, and with the Son the
hope of eternal life, how could this man not love God with his whole heart?
how could he not stand in awe of him? how could he not endeavor to declare
the gratefulness of his heart for such great benefits? how could he not prove
obedience to God by bearing up under adversities?1114
God’s grace in Christ comes first, to be sure, but it is itself ordered to the evocation of
responsive faith, trust, fear, hope, and love in the forgiven heart renewed by the
Spirit’s gift; and on top of this, being neither a semi-Pelagian, a Philippist, a French
Jesuit, or an Arminian, for Luther that lively faith which alone grasps hold of God’s
grace in Christ is itself the effect—not the cause—of the Spirit’s renovating gift in the
deepness of an incredulous and self-obsessed heart (Eph. 2:8). In the Reformer’s
mature dogmatics of grace and holiness, it is simply impossible to have the one
without the other.
Prima facie, therefore, one might expect to find the same thing when Luther
casts this same doctrine in the biblical language of God’s promise; and so we do. In the
Reformer’s promise theology, too, “grace” enjoys a certain ascendancy over “gift”:
partly, I suspect, owing to the pastoral and polemical context in which he lived and
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On Gen. 15:6, WA 42.566.36-40: Qui enim in Deum credit, et certus est, quod faveat nobis.
Siquidem et filium dedit, et cum filio spem aeternae vitae, quomodo hic non amaret ex toto corde
Deum? quomodo eum non revereretur? quomodo non studeret declarare pro tantis beneficiis gratum
animum? quomodo non probaret Deo obedientiam in adversis perferendis? Cf. LW 3.25.
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worked, but partly also because key promissio texts in the Bible focus on the grace of
forgiveness through the shed blood of Jesus. Thus, for example, the words of the Lord
at the institution of his Holy Supper, which Luther reads in terms of the promises of a
new covenant scattered amongst the prophets: “This cup is the New Testament in my
blood, which is poured out for you for the forgiveness of sins” (Matt. 26:28). Primarily,
then, the Eucharist is about forgiveness through Christ’s blood—“grace”—for that is
what Christ promises to give his Church in and through it. So Luther in the Large
Catechism (1529): “‘This is my body and blood, given for you and poured out for the
forgiveness of sins.’ That is to say, in brief, that we go to the sacrament because there
we receive a great treasure, through and in which we obtain the forgiveness of sins.”1115
Likewise: “Ja, the whole gospel and the article of the Creed, ‘I believe one holy
Christian Church, forgiveness of sins,’ etc. are included and set forth for us through
the word in this Sacrament.”1116 Chiefly, then, Christ promises forgiveness in the
Supper, and the necessary spiritual correlate of every promise is faith: “Because Christ
offers and promises (verheisset) forgiveness of sins, it can be received no other way
than by faith.”1117 Since through the bread and wine the risen Jesus Christ gives to his
people his body broken and his blood shed for the forgiveness of sins, the principal
(though for Luther not the exclusive1118) gift to be had in the Supper by faith is the
“grace” bestowed through Christ’s word of promise.

1115

LC, On the Sacrament of the Altar (Part 5), BSELK, 1138.15-18, cf. BC, 469.
Ibid, BSELK, 1140.27-30, cf. BC, 470.
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Ibid, BSELK, 1142.11-12, cf. BC, 470.
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Ibid, BSELK, 1138.23—1140.5, cf. BC, 469: “Therefore, [the Eucharist] is appropriately called a food
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baptism we are born again in the first place. However, nonetheless, the old hide (as it is said)
remains in a man’s flesh and blood. There are so many hindrances and attacks (anfechtung) of the
devil and the world that we often grow weary and faint and at times even stumble. Therefore the
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This being so, still it would be a mistake to reduce the content of the promise
to the “grace” of forgiveness and righteousness that is in Christ, for in Luther’s
theology the promise also includes the gift of new life through the Spirit. The promise
of new life comes through more clearly, for example, in Luther’s baptismal catechesis
than in his teaching on the Supper—I gather for basic scriptural reasons. For if in the
Supper the Church proclaims her dear Lord’s atoning death for sin till he comes (1 Cor
11:26), baptism promises and gives not only forgiveness, but death and new life in
Christ: holiness. In baptism, the sin, isolation, sorrow, and death that characterize my
old “self” are put to death and buried with Christ, and the Spirit gives the gift of new
birth into the holy and glad communion of Christ’s risen body (John 3:3-8, Acts 2:38-9,
Rom. 6:3-11, 1 Cor. 6:11, 12:12-3, Gal. 3:27-8, Col. 2:11-12, Tit. 3:5). Again, the Large
Catechism: “In baptism every Christian has enough to learn and exercise his whole life
long. For he can always keep himself busy with firmly believing what it promises
(zusagt) and brings: victory over the Devil and Death, forgiveness of sins, God’s grace
(gnade), the whole Christ and Holy Spirit with his gifts (gaben).”1119 In the terms of this
study, baptism is the sacrament of both gnade and gabe, grace and gift. For together
with the forgiveness of sins in Jesus Christ, baptism promises a share in den gantzen
Christum, that is, in the Church (totus Christus, caput et membra: a classic
Lord’s Supper is given as a daily food and sustenance so that our faith may be refreshed and
strengthened and that it may not fall back in the struggle but become evermore stronger and
stronger. For the new life ought so to be done, that it continually develops and progresses (denn das
neue Leben sol also gethan sein, das es stets zuneme und fortfare). But it must suffer so much against
it. For the devil is a furious enemy; when he sees that we resist him and attack the old man, and
when he cannot rout us by force, he sneaks and skulks about on every side, trying all kinds of
tricks, and does not stop until he has finally worn us out so that we either renounce our faith or
lose heart and become indifferent or impatient. For times like these, when our heart feels too sorely
pressed, this comfort of the Lord’s Supper is given to bring us new strength and refreshment (neue
Krafft und Labsal hole).”
1119
LC, On the Sacrament of Baptism (Part 4), BSELK, 1120.24-8, cf. BC, 461.

480

Augustinian tag) vivified by the Holy Spirit and filled with his sanctifying gifts. It is
well-known, of course, that for Luther lifelong repentance is the right use and proper
signification of baptism:
These two parts, being sunk under the water and coming out of it again, point
to the power and work of baptism, which is nothing else than the slaying of the
old Adam and the resurrection of the new man, both of which must continue
in us our whole life long. Thus a Christian life is nothing else than a daily
baptism (eine tegliche Tauffe), begun once and continuing for ever. For we
must keep at it without ceasing, always sweeping out (ausfege) whatever is of
the old Adam, so that whatever belongs to the new may come forth. What then
is the old man? It is what is born in us from Adam, irascible, spiteful, envious,
unchaste, greedy, lazy, proud, ja unbelieving, beset with all vices and by nature
he has nothing good in him. Now, when we enter into Christ’s Kingdom, such
things must daily decrease so that the longer we live the more gentle, patient,
and meek we become, and the more we break away from unbelief, greed,
hatred, envy, and pride. This is the right use of baptism among Christians,
signified through water-baptizing.1120
But perhaps less well-known is the fact that for Luther this baptismal gift of new life
and continual growth in holiness is not an awkward appendix to the gospel, but a
chief part of God’s saving promise. For in the promulgation of his gospel by preaching,
water, bread, and wine, God promises to lavish not a single but a twofold blessing
upon those who believe what they hear, are drenched in it head to toe, and eat and
drink it with glad and thankful hearts. Grace and gift, forgiveness and new creation,
free justification and real holiness of life: this one great evangelical reality is what the
Father promises to grant, in and for the sake of his Son and by the operation of his
Spirit, to every poor beggar who per fidem promissionis bets the farm on this gospel.
(3) In the third place, we need to adjust Bayer’s interpretation of the kind of
assurance which the promise of grace in Jesus Christ creates in the believing heart. In
chapter 2.1.4, on the 1538 addendum to SA III.3, I introduced Luther’s eminently
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traditional conviction that regeneration is amissible; and on that occasion, I noted
Berndt Hamm’s incorrect conflation of Luther’s doctrine in this regard with that of the
Reformed. In his influential essay on the Reformation doctrine of justification, Hamm
urges that for the Reformers, “salvation means the unconditional and thus final
acceptance of the godless, an acceptance that cannot be reversed.” Following Bayer
(and back of him, Hennig), Hamm asserts that this conception of unconditional and
irreversible salvation first emerged publically at Augsburg in Oct. 1518. Cajetan
accused Luther of wrongly mingling the objective and subjective aspects of assurance:
for the cardinal, the reality of sacramental grace in the Church is sure enough, but a
given person’s share in that grace is uncertain or, at best, conjectural. For his part,
… Luther and the other reformers after him made a connection between the
objective validity of the actions of Christ, of the New Testament and its
promise, and the advent of his promise in the shape of faith’s subjective
certainty in the man who receives it. This connection is possible only in light of
unconditionality.1121
The proper end of salvation’s objective reality in the promise (effectually conveyed in
Word and Sacrament) is to summon, create, and sustain subjective assurance of this
salvation within the heart, which takes hold of it in the promise by faith. Note well,
objective salvation by grace and subjective assurance by faith can only be linked
together inseparably if the grace given in the promise is strictly unconditional. It is
precisely the conditionality of Bielish pactum-theology that drove Luther to the brink
of despair: “facientibus quod in se est,” etc. The Reformation doctrine of justification
puts away fear and anxiousness because it first puts away every condition for achieving
salvation, replacing merit through law by the free grace of the gospel:
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Only because the question of whether the person receiving grace is worthy or
unworthy becomes irrelevant, only because the sinner’s gaze no longer remains
fixed on himself with his imperfect repentance and his inability to love, only
because this subjective uncertainty is no longer necessary and the sinner’s
attention is diverted away from his own potential for works and towards Jesus
Christ as the sole grounds of salvation, does the subjective certainty of
salvation become possible: man is unconditionally accepted by God for
salvation although he is a sinner, indeed as a sinner. Unconditional certainty,
to the Reformers, is thus the outcome of unconditional grace.1122
For the great scholar of late medieval Frömmigkeitstheologie, the experience of
unconditional certainty separates evangelical piety from its Catholic precursors by a
wide gulf. As of 1518, the new promise theology has rendered “the whole typical late
medieval yearning for security and the certainty of grace and salvation” obsolete,
assured peace with God being an integral part of justifying faith in the promise; and
“this certainty of being safe in Christ is the source of all that [the Reformers] call the
peace, calm, joy, and consolation of a Christian life.”1123
Bayer, of course, emphasizes the promise—faith/assurance nexus in a similar
manner, for on his reading assurance born of the promise is what distinguishes Pro
veritate as the first reformational text in Luther’s Werke. In absolution and in the
Eucharist, the promise is spoken anew in order to preserve the believer’s union with
the promising God; but it is in baptism that this unbreakable relation is actually
established, on the basis of “the once-for-all-time nature of the promise.”1124 Hence in
Bayer’s 1989 Thesen zur Rechtfertigungslehre, we find the same stress on
unconditionality and finality highlighted in Hamm’s account:
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7. The gospel is the pure—that is, unconditional—word of forgiveness to the
sinner: “you are set free!”
8. Nothing more is needed for salvation, “for where there is forgiveness of sin,
there is life and salvation” (Small Catechism): salvation is to be understood as
final and total communion with God.1125
But is the promise of the gospel quite as unconditional for the mature Luther as
modern Lutherans like Bayer and Hamm have grown accustomed to think of it?
It all depends on the nature and scope of the unconditionality, and thus the
precise kind of assurance, which one posits. In his 1542 lecture on Gen. 32:3-5, Luther
contrasts the “conditional promises of the law” (conditionales promissiones legis) with
the “simple promise of grace” (simplex promissio gratiae). In his office as the law’s
chosen promulgator, Moses is an “if” man: if you do this, you will live; if you do not do
it, you will die. In the law, the promised blessing of righteousness and life is
contingent upon the condition of one’s law-keeping (Lev. 18:15, Deut. 27:26; cf. Gen.
2:16-17). But the ancient patriarchs enjoyed the simple promise of grace, righteousness,
and life in the Serpent-Crusher sine conditione—as does the semen Abrahae, that is the
evangelical Church in all ages (Rom. 4:13-16, Gal. 3:6—4:7). For in the gospel of his
crucified Son, God promises free mercy to sinners who deserve nothing but
punishment, and freely gives this grace to those who take him at his word.1126 In this
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sense, for Luther the promise is indeed unconditional. For nothing is demanded on
the part of the ungodly sinner: nothing, that is, but his sins, for his spiritual
bankruptcy is the one asset he brings to the bargain. The riches of God’s grace are
given freely in Christ, through the redemption wrought by his shed blood (the
princely sum paid at the cross being itself the outworking in time of the Father’s
merciful resolve to set his chosen people free from sin and death). By means of the
preached Word and sacraments, these riches are bestowed freely and effectually in the
promise itself. Poor beggar that he is, the repenting and believing sinner receives the
free gift of these riches by faith alone, that is, quite apart from any regard to the
spiritual capital he might have built up ex hypothesi by doing works of the law. For
lively faith is nothing but an empty-handed heart grasping hold of Christ crucified in
the promise and refusing to let him go. Since the unconditional promise of grace
overcomes the conditional promises of the law, the believer enjoys assured peace with
God (Rom. 5:1, Eph. 3:12, Heb. 10:22). So long as he abides in Christ by faith—“his
whole life,” like St. Jacob’s, “absorbed in this promise”1127—the most fulsome praise
that Bayer and Hamm could possibly lavish upon the certitudo salutis does indeed
(save for one literally crucial exception: farther on this in a moment) hold water.
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So long as! For as I argued in Parts I and II, Luther consistently teaches that the
believer may fall away from grace (and forfeit the gift of the Spirit) if he consents to
the sinful desires that remain in his flesh. There is therefore an abiding conditionality
to Luther’s theology after all; and to say the least, this considerably complicates his
doctrine of assurance. To take first his position on assurance: Bayer and Hamm—and
Cajetan—are right to argue that Luther’s fiducia promissionis signals a breaking-point
with mainstream medieval Catholic doctrine and piety. But for Luther, the assurance
of faith is a provisional reality limited in its scope to the present moment: one of the
many respects in which his teaching is more medieval than it is modern. The
evangelical believer knows for a certainty that he has been baptized, preached to,
absolved, and communicated. Furthermore, he knows that in the present moment, by
faith, he receives the promise through these means. Even if, for a season, he enjoys no
experiential certainty of this grace, he clings to the sure promise lodged in verba
externa and lets their sheer reality and givenness be certainty enough for him for long
as the darkness may last. Ego baptizatus sum! So then, even the afflicted soul has a
kind of assurance, not to be sure in himself but rather in the Word he grasps by an act
of heroic hope. In time of trial and in time of peace, if the believer grasps the promise
in faith, he is therefore free to rest in Christ with a quiet and confident heart—for the
time being. Trusting in the Word, he sees (with the eyes of faith) that he has been
justified and that he has peace with God. But what he cannot see is whether he will
trust God’s promise this afternoon, or tomorrow, or in the hour of death. That
depends on whether he continues to abide in Christ, persevering to the end in order to
be saved (Matt. 10:22); and David’s and Peter’s great falls stand as an everlasting
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rebuke against souls who nurse the presumption that they will certainly stand fast (cf.
1 Cor. 10:12). In short: by faith in the promise, the believer enjoys (to quote a woman
whose heart could see) the blessed assurance that Jesus is mine in the present. But he
has no guarantee that his present sense of assurance is a certain foretaste of glory
divine. His present salvation is real enough, but it is not final.
Now, behind this principled lack of final assurance (that is, assurance of
perseverance) lies the complex and dynamic interplay of three interrelated loci: first,
the Augustinian doctrine of predestination, which Luther adopts c. 1514/15 and never
abandons despite his grave Prädestinationsanfechtungen and, in the 1530s and 40s, his
pastoral counsel not to think too much about it; second, Luther’s deeply Augustinian
doctrine of sin, grace, and holiness, the main object of this book; third, the Lutheran
doctrine of present assurance through faith in the promise. Perhaps, in the long run,
at least one of these factors has to give way before the others. Reformed theologians
like Calvin, Hooker, and Owen pick up the first and the second but then modify the
third, broadening the scope of assurance to include each link in the catena aurea from
predestination to glory (Rom. 8:30) and thus, arguably, altering it in kind. For their
part, Erasmians, Philippists, et al. who abandon absolute predestination willy-nilly
attenuate sin, enfeeble grace, and misplace holiness in opera hominis by the same
stroke; which means that they too alter the nature of assurance, anchoring it too
confidently in the believer’s free decision to cooperate with grace and thus enervating
that grace (and sapping the strength of assurance) in just the way Luther lamented
near the end of de servo arbitrio.1128 Since Luther’s hard-to-categorize position charts a
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middle way between these alternative stances, describing the exact nature of the
conditionality which he envisions in the Christian life proves a difficult task. If
considered in light of God’s eternal predestination, the elect believer’s continuance in
grace is not conditional at all; or if it is, God has promised to give, by the operation of
his Spirit, the very conditions which he requires for the believer to remain in his grace,
viz., repentance and faith to the bitter end. In this regard, eternal salvation is every bit
as unconditional for Luther as it is for Calvin—or Augustine. But Luther agrees with
Augustine (and with all medieval Augustinians) that with few exceptions, it has
seemed wise to the Lord to hide from the elect the fixed fact of their election, the
better to keep them in a spiritual posture of right fear of God, humility, obedience,
and dependence. In this regard, he is in spiritual practice closer to Erasmus than he
might care to admit. For from the limited vantage point of the viator in lumine gratiae
nondum gloriae, the great matter of his own salvation—dependent as he knows it
really is on God’s election according to free grace (Rom. 9:16, 11:5-6)—appears to be a
profoundly conditional matter. As I put it above, for Luther a great “if” hangs over the
Christian life: if the believer perseveres to the end in faith and repentance, he will be
saved. “If you live according to the flesh, you will die: but if, by the Spirit, you put to
death the deeds of the body, you will live” (Rom. 8:13). In this life, the gift-empowered
refusal of consent to residual sin is utterly necessary to remain in Christ’s grace, and
unconditional certainty is not on the table.
(4) The fourth and last point of correction to Bayer’s promissio-thesis is an
intimate spiritual corollary of the third. For Bayer, the mystical theologia crucis
encapsulated in the April 1518 Heidelberg Disputation is part and parcel of what the
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new theology of promise and faith emerging in May/June 1518 overcomes.1129 I am
convinced that Luther’s promise theology deeply refashions the mystical theology of
sanctification through the cross. But it does not do away with it. Instead, it gives rise
to what Berndt Hamm calls an “evangelical mysticism.”1130 And for the old Luther—
above all as hagiographic lecturer on the Genesis saints—at the heart of the darkest
possible mystical experience of the holy cross is the withdrawal of any felt sense of
God’s grace, kindness, favor, love. To suffer thus is to share in Christ’s desolation on
the cross (Ps. 22:1-2). In the traditional monastic terms which the old Luther
continued to utilize, this is the suspensio gratiae.1131 In the more novel language of the
Reformer’s Worttheologie, the same experience is described as the total eclipse of the
promise in the midst of demonic accusation and attack—or even divine, in the case of
the greatest saints. For in the highest Anfechtungen, of the order holy Jacob endured
that long dark night at the River Jabbok, it is none other than Jesus Christ himself, the
Promised Seed, who rises up in battle against his saint, revokes all former assurances
of his blessing, and assaults him with the threat of certain damnation.1132 In that
instance, by definition, subjective assurance of salvation is gone. But in spite of it all,
the Promise stands fast; and though its sweetness can no longer be tasted in the heart,
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by virtue of the Spirit’s ineffable gemitus (Rom. 8:26) its rock-solid truth can still be
trusted, and the Lord’s deliverance hoped for (Isa. 50:10). And because of Luther’s
Augustinian doctrine of gift-empowered non-consent as the spiritual condition for
abiding in Christ’s grace, the severely afflicted saint not only can but must cling to the
promise. For God will not forsake a believer unless the believer forsakes God first. But
forsake God the saint may indeed do, frail and sinful as he is by virtue of his flesh. And
does not everything in his experience argue that God has already forsaken him? that,
in St. Asaph’s words, the steadfast love of the Lord has forever ceased, and his
promises come to end for all time (Ps. 77:8)? For as long as the hour of darkness
endures, the afflicted saint hangs suspended between eternal death and eternal life: or
rather, he is in process of being plunged into the abyss of death and hell, with just a
slender thread of faith precariously tethering him to the kingdom of grace and life.
Everything hinges (in conspectu credentis, non dei miserentis) on whether he will give
up and cut the thread and fall to his destruction, or else defiantly refuse to let go of
God in his promise of grace, clinging to God’s promised steadfastness in Christ even in
the face of his own wrathful opposition to this promise and indeed, to the saint
himself. So the mystical Worttheologe, lecturing on Gen. 32 in 1542:
This passage is regarded by all as among the most obscure in the whole Old
Testament. Nor is this strange, since it deals with that sublime temptation (de
sublimi illa tentatione) in which the Patriarch Jacob had to fight not with flesh
and blood or with the Devil, but against God himself. But that is a horrible
battle, when God himself battles and in a hostile fashion sets himself against
his opponent as though on the point of taking away life. He who wants to stand
and conquer in this struggle must certainly be a holy man and true Christian.1133
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… moreover, the temptation to despair (tentatio desperationis), which usually
accompanies this experience, increases the pain and confusion of the flesh,
when the afflicted soul complains that it is deserted and cast off by God. This is
the ultimate and heaviest temptation to unbelief and despair, with which the
greatest of the saints (summi ex sanctis) are usually exercised. And he who is
able to stand and endure there, he comes through to the perfect knowledge of
the divine will [Rom. 12:2], so that he is able to say with Jacob: “I have seen the
Lord,” etc. (Gen. 32:30). “I didn’t think that our Lord God meant so well with
me.”1134
In 1515/16, Luther would have counseled a soul suffering thus to resign himself to
damnation, the better to facilitate the purgative work of infused grace.1135 This, of
course, is the spiritual wisdom of John Tauler and the Theologia Deutsch, and I think
Leppin is quite right to insist that Tauler’s influence on Luther is far more important—
and more abiding—than many have recognized.1136 Long after the advent of the new
promise theology, the indisputably evangelical Luther continues to describe the
Deus ipse pugnat, et adversatur hostiliter pugnando tanquam vitam erepturus. In hac lucta qui volet
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mystical experience of damnation in the old taulerisch terms; and he does so because
he fully expects holy Christians (summi ex sanctis) to suffer this ineffable agony as a
crucial component of their sanctification by Christ’s cross. The experience itself is
unaltered from a phenomenological standpoint, and the spiritual end of the
experience is the same as well: Lutheran saints, too, pass through the hellish
purgatorial suffering of the cross en route to holiness and glory. But the Promise has
turned Tauler’s old wisdom on its head. In the midst of hell, the saint of God, that is
“the man of faith who has the promise,”1137 is no longer to resign himself to perdition
even in the event that God in his majesty so wills it. Just the reverse in fact. The
Seelsorger trained in Luther’s evangelical Mystik (and, with Mattox and Maxfield, we
must ever recall that the spiritual formation of skilled pastors is the old Doctor’s main
object in his lectures1138) advises the soul in his care to cling to the divine promise in
faith with such a tenacity and adamance that he might even be forced to hold the Lord
God himself to his word. In scholastic terms, the suffering saint is to reject deus in
potentia absoluta sua in favor of deus in potentia ordinata sua, that is, Jesus Christ and
him crucified as he is present, given, and graspable in Word and sacrament.1139 In
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scriptural terms, even as the Lord Almighty himself seeks to put him to death (cf.
Exod. 4:24), an evangelical mystic like Jacob must defiantly and resolutely refuse to let
go of God in his promise, until he blesses him (Gen. 32:26):
I shall cling to the Word of God and be content with it. There I shall die: there I
shall live. There is sufficiently abundant protection in the promise of God not
only against the devil, the flesh, and the world but also against this sublime
temptation. For if God were to send an angel to say: “Do not believe these
promises!” I would reject him, saying: “Depart from me, Satan, etc.” Or, if God
himself appeared to me in his majesty and said: “You are not worthy of my
grace; I will change my counsel and I will not keep my promise to you,” there I
would not give him ground, but it would have to be fought out bitterly against
God himself. It is as Job says: “Even if he kills me, nevertheless, I will hope in
him” (Job 13:15). If he should cast me off into the depths of hell and place me in
the midst of devils, nevertheless, I believe that I am going to be saved: because
I have been baptized, I have been absolved, I have received the pledge of my
salvation, the body and blood of the Lord in the Supper. Therefore I want to
see and hear nothing else, but I shall live and die in this faith, whether God, or
an angel, or the devil says the contrary.1140
This is to draw near to the gates of hell and to emerge the victor, grace-wounded and
limping as you go. For in the narthex of eternal damnation, when the only certainty is
sheer terror and the only unconditional truth the justice of the saint’s condemnation,
the excruciating lack of assurance and the invincible strength of the Promise go handin-hand—for the sanctification of the saint, and to the great glory of God.

hac speculatione seu contemplatione nascitur vera pax, et verum gaudium cordis. Itaque Paulus dicit:
‘Nihil iudico me scire praeter Christum’ etc. Huic speculationi cum fructu vacamus.
1140
WA 44.97.37—98.9: Ego verbum Dei retinebo, et eo ero contentus. Ibi moriar: Ibi vivam. Abunde
satis est praesidii in promissione Dei non solum contra Diabolum, carnem et mundum: sed etiam
contra illam sublimem tentationem. Si enim mitteret Deus angelum, qui diceret: Non credas
promissionibus his, reiicerem eum: discede a me, Sathana etc. Aut si Deus ipse appareret in sua
maiestate, et diceret: Non es dignus mea gratia, mutabo consilium et non servabo tibi promissum. Ibi
non esset mihi cedendum, sed adversus Deum ipsum pugnandum acerrime. Sicut inquit Hiob:
‘Etiamsi occiderit me, tamen in eo sperabo’. Si abiecerit me in profundum inferni, et posuerit me in
medio Diabolorum: tamen credo me salvatum iri: quia sum baptisatus, sum absolutus, accepi pignus
salutis meae, corpus et sanguinem Domini in coena. Nihil igitur aliud videre, nec audire volo. Sed
vivam et moriar in hac fide, sive Deus, sive angelus, seu Diabolus contrarium dicat. Cf. LW 6.131.
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If the young Luther, with Tauler’s famed nun and not a few other early modern
catholics,1141 saw the very apex of sanctity in the mystical confession, “Let him slay me”;
and if modern Lutherans have tended to disregard sanctity and mysticism alike, saying
simply “I will hope in him” on the basis of a one-sided theology of the Word; in the
mature Luther’s spiritual theology, the greatest of the saints count the whole world as
loss, stake everything on the Promise, endure the purifying cross, dare God to keep his
word, and therefore cry out with Job in the patient, hopeful, holy suffering of faith:
“Even if he kills me, nevertheless, I will hope in him.” Such is the Reformer’s theologia
mystica promissionis, fidei et crucis, and it is most assuredly a theology of holiness.1142
Did not the Lord give Jacob a new name in the struggle? Renewal in holiness is the
object of all God’s marvelous dealings with his saints: “But now I give to you a name
that accords with what I have done with you, just as I have magnified you (cf. Ps. 4:4
Vg.), not as a son of the flesh, but as I have led, governed, afflicted, purged, and
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Otto, Vor- und frühreformatorische Tauler-Rezeption, 11o-14. On p. 113, Otto notes three texts
from 1518 wherein Luther cites Tauler (and alludes to the story from Predigt 13) to prove his lack of
novelty: in his Resolutiones, WA 1.586.16-19; the Asteriscii against Eck, WA 1.298.29ff; and the Ad
dialogum Silv. Prieratis de potet. papae responsio, WA 1.674.33-7, to wit: … quidam e tua secta,
doctissimus Doctor Iohannes Taulerus, ait, si coelum coram te apertum esset, adhuc intrare non
deberes, nisi primum voluntatem dei super introitu consuleres, ut etiam in gloria non quae tua sunt
quaeras. Sed hanc sententiam verissimam et theologicissimam absit ut probet Scholastica Theologia.
1142
For promissio—fides—crux, see the 1544 lecture on Gen. 37:18-20, where Luther states that in the
stories of the fathers the promise and their faith in the promise should be observed, “and
afterwards also their cross. For these three are the principales loci in the legends of the saints.” WA
44.272, LW 6.364. In the 1539 lecture on Gen. 22:1-2, Luther summarizes the Christian life in these
three terms: “If there are some who want to follow allegory, Moriah was the word of God and faith
in the word. For these two are correlatives: there can be no faith or worship of God where there is
no word, and wherever the word is, there it is necessary that there are some people who believe.
Where, therefore, these two are, there follows a third, namely the cross and mortification. These
three make up the Christian life.” WA 43.208.19-22, cf. LW 4.101. Since it names the virtue exercised
under the cross, the spiritual greatness of patience must never be underestimated, WA 44.300.41—
301.2, cf. LW 6.402: “Let patience (Pacientia), says James (1:4), have the perfect work. For he who is
patient (paciens) does not sin: ‘he who is mortified, has been set free from sin,’ Rom. 6[:7]. He who
is patient (Patiens) in faith in Christ is truly a saint. There, nothing of sin remains [cf. 1 Pet. 4:1]. For
whatever he suffers (patitur) is sheer and purest righteousness.” On the cross in the Genesis
lectures, see Forsberg, Das Abrahambild, 91-8.
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sanctified you by many vexations, in order that I might make you a new man and a
new creature (novum hominem et novam creaturam); and now I give to you a new
name, not of the flesh but of the spirit.”1143 This is the old Luther’s mystical theology of
real and indeed heroic holiness, and it is Promissiotheologie to the core.

3.5 The Trinitarian Deepening of Luther’s Theology
In the last place, a brief word on the maturation of the young Luther’s Augustinian
theology sin and grace (Part II) into the mature Reformer’s trinitarian dogmatics of
holiness (chapter 2). The student of Luther’s theology who steps back from this or that
tree to survey the whole forest of his works cannot help but notice the rising profile of
the catholic doctrine of the Holy Trinity. In part, this is because the younger Luther
could simply assume its truthfulness: a luxury he could no longer afford after the
emergence of anti-trinitarianism in the 1530s amongst the likes of Christian Entfelder,
Michel Servetus, and John Campanus.1144 Hence the vigorous assertions of the
Church’s creedal doctrine (and doctrinal theology) that flow steadily from his pen in
the 1530s and 40s. For example: the Three Symbols or Creeds of the Christian Faith
(1538), expositing the Apostles’ Creed, the Athanasian, and the Te Deum; On the
Councils and the Church (1539), which articulates a scripturally-ruled and historically
informed evangelical conciliarism in its first two parts and then culminates in the
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On Gen. 35:9-10, WA 44.192.13-17, cf. LW 6.259.
Cf. WA Tr 1.99.18-21, LW 54.32 (#237, from April 1532): “When an exceedingly virulent book was
published in 1532 contra trinitatem, Luther said: ‘These people don’t think about the fact that other
people too have suffered temptations about this article: ja, but it doesn’t lighten the sting to set my
thought over against the Word of God and the Holy Spirit.” Presumably, Luther and his guests were
discussing the Dialogi de Trinitate which Servetus published that year. See Brecht, Preservation of
the Church, 133-4; for the “Radical Triadologies” of Entfelder, Servetus, Campanus, Claude of Savoy,
and Schwenckfeld, see George Huntston Williams, The Radical Reformation, 3rd ed. (Kirksville, MO:
Truman State University Press, 1992), 459-76.
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third with the trinitarian, grace-and-gift ecclesiology I set forth above in chapter 2.3;
the Promotionsdisputationen of Erasmus Alberus (1543), Georg Major and Johannes
Faber (1544), and Petrus Hegemon (1545), advanced exercises in scholastic
trinitarianism; exegetical works like the Lectures on Genesis (1535—45) and the
Treatise on the Last Words of David (1543), in which Luther champions patristic
trinitarian exegesis of the Old Testament along the lines I sketched above in section
3.2.1145 In short, the old Luther increasingly devoted his attention and skill to
preaching, expositing, and defending the catholic obiectum fidei or fides quae summed
up in the ancient confessions of the Church.
But this is not what I have in mind to underscore here. For the trinitarian
deepening of Luther’s theology was not just a matter of a topical shift due to the
external provocations of false doctrine. The deepening ran much deeper than that, and
it is therefore much harder to document or demonstrate. But a full account of the
development of Luther’s theology of holiness requires that I set my hand to it
nonetheless, unavoidably impressionistic as my observations here must needs be. We
have no reason to suspect that there was ever a time in Luther’s life when he did not
hold the Church’s received doctrine of the Trinity. (To be sure, the Devil attacked this
chief article along with all the others: but Luther fought back against the vanity of his
fallen, finite reasonings by the Word of God and prayer, as does every verus theologus
ecclesiae.) In a life marked by extraordinary upheaval, his creedal faith in the Trinity—
and in the person, natures, and work of Jesus Christ—is a fixed and stable datum, and
1145

On the last point, see esp. Christine Helmer, “Luther’s Trinitarian Hermeneutic and the Old
Testament,” Modern Theology 18/1 (Jan. 2002): 49-73; Mickey L. Mattox, “From Faith to the Text and
Back Again: Martin Luther on the Trinity in the Old Testament,” Pro Ecclesia 15/3 (Summer 2006):
281-303.
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as such a reliable gauge of the Reformer’s abiding catholicity (as Aulén, Piepkorn,
Pelikan, Mannermaa, Yeago, et al. have argued1146). I think there is, however, a
discernible shift from a more formal (not merely formal: more) commitment to
catholic dogma in the earlier stages of Luther’s career to the materially trinitarian
dogmatics of grace and gift that pervades and invigorates his mature Reformation
theology. In other words, the more evangelical and scriptural Luther’s gospel became,
the more deeply catholic his theology grew. As Helmer has cogently argued in her
book, this gradual development from a more formal to a profoundly material
trinitarian commitment was not a matter of abandoning vain theological attempts to
peek into the inner being, life, and glory of the so-called “immanent Trinity” in favor
of an exclusive focus on the redemptive-historical manifestation (sub contrario!) of the
“economic Trinity.” Nor was it quite a matter of leaving off scholastic speculations
about God for a more patristic, exegetical, and kerygmatic theology of Father, Son,
and Spirit. The old professor clearly delighted in thinking about the eternity, majesty,
infinity, and joy of the Holy Trinity in se; and certainly by the time of the Romans
lectures, the young doctor in biblia was well on his way toward the articulation of a
scripturally rich theology of the Trinity’s mighty deeds of salvation ad extra pro nobis.
But as Luther continued along the path which Dr. Staupitz had set for him in 1512, the
trinitarian substance of the gospel itself, that is the Father’s promise of free grace in
his Son and new life by his Spirit, increasingly impressed itself upon his mind.
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In addition to works cited earlier in this book, see Gustaf Aulén, Reformation and Catholicity,
trans. Eric H. Wahlstrom (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1961); Jaroslav Pelikan, Obedient Rebels:
Catholic Substance and Protestant Principle in Luther’s Reformation (New York: Harper & Row,
1964.
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We see this in the great summaries of his teaching which Luther supplied for
posterity in the late 1520s and 30s: in addition to the third part of On the Councils and
the Church, the third part of the Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper (1528) and, in
terms of their impact on the ground in the real life of the Church, above all the two
Catechisms (1529) come to mind. In the Confession, for example, amidst a
workmanlike, matter-of-fact summary of the Church’s faith that follows the outline of
the Apostles’ Creed—and in process, highlights loci in doctrine and piety where, in
Luther’s judgment, Roman Catholic teaching subverts the Creed, e.g., “I therefore
condemn both new and old Pelagians, who do not want to let original sin be sin,
rather it must be a weakness or lack,”1147 likewise the theory and praxis of monastic life
as salvifically meritorious since “to seek a way of blessedness there, that’s the devil’s
doctrine and faith, 1 Tim. 4[:1-5] etc.”1148—amidst, I say, this more formal and
straightforward elaboration of the heads of creedal doctrine, Luther suddenly erupts
into a doxological surge of robust trinitarian faith that is simultaneously an
impassioned proclamation of God’s free gift of nothing less than himself to us poor
sinners in the gospel:
These are the three persons and one God, who has given himself to us all
wholly and completely (der sich uns allen selbs gantz und gar gegeben hat), with
all that he is and has. The Father gives himself to us (Der Vater gibt sich uns),
with heaven and earth and all the creatures, that they may serve us and be
useful. But this gift has become obscured and useless through Adam’s fall.
Therefore the Son himself subsequently gave himself to us (hat darnach der son
sich selbs auch uns gegeben) and has given all his work, sufferings, wisdom, and
righteousness and reconciled us to the Father, so that we, living and
righteousness once again, might also know and have the Father with his gifts.
But since this grace would useful to no one if it remained so profoundly hidden
and could not come to us, the Holy Spirit comes and gives himself to us also
1147
1148

WA 26.503.25-6 [Dr], cf. LW 37.363.
WA 26.504.28-9 [Dr], cf. LW 37.364.
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wholly and completely (kompt der heilige geist und gibt sich auch uns gantz und
gar). He teaches us Christ’s saving deed, shows us how to understand it, helps
us receive and preserve it, to use it to our advantage and to impart it to others,
to increase and extend it. He does this both inwardly and outwardly: inwardly
through the faith and other spiritual gifts, but outwardly through the Gospel,
through baptism, and the sacrament of the altar, through which as through
three means or ways he comes to us and inculcates the sufferings of Christ in
us and brings blessedness for our use.1149
But arguably the trinitarian deepening of Luther’s gospel (and so his evangelical
theology) is even more apparent in texts that are not immediately concerned with the
exposition of the Church’s creedal doctrine. In my mind, the Disputations against the
Antinomians (1537—40) are especially worthy of mention in this regard. If those
passages which feature the mature creedal theology of grace in Christ and renewal by
the Spirit’s gift were cut, Jefferson-style (cf. Jer. 36:23), from the disputations, little
would be left over. Precisely because their subject matter is not the Holy Trinity but
the nature of the law, its right use, its role in justification, its proper distinction from
the gospel, and so forth, the depth of Luther’s mature grasp of the doctrines of
creation, of Adam and Eve’s rebellion with its horrible effects, and of the Father’s
utterly gracious (and in the promise, publically declared) resolve to redeem fallen
humans from sin and death through the grace of his Son and to restore them to life,
holiness, freedom, and joy by the gift of his Spirit is on full display gegen die
Antinomer.
With this, I come to the end of my argument. I hope that it has furnished an
accurate (if admittedly impressionistic) account of how the Reformer carried forward
the insights he gleaned from the “420s Augustine” into the works of his maturity, even
as he clarified, developed, and deepened this basically traditional vision into a robustly
1149
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trinitarian, joyfully evangelical, and persistently mystical dogmatics of sin in Adam,
grace and righteousness in Jesus Christ, and renewal into real holiness of life by the
Spirit.
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CONCLUSION
SUMMARY REMARKS, PROSPECTS FOR THE CHURCHES, AND ONE
DOGMATIC CORRECTION
Two co-extensive arguments lie at the heart of this book.
First, I have argued that in his mature dogmatics Martin Luther sets forth a
vigorous doctrine of progressive renewal in holiness by the “gift” of the Holy Spirit.
This he sets in careful relation both to the persistent “sinfulness” of the saints and to
the “grace” of free forgiveness and righteousness in Jesus Christ. Together, these three
realities—grace, gift, and “sin”—are the components that comprise Luther’s rarely
grasped “simul.” Far from proving his principled indifference to sanctification, rightly
understood the simul peccator et iustus presents a pithy summary of the Reformer’s
creedal, mystical, and “Augustinian” theology of embattled holiness advancing
mirabiliter within the impregnable stronghold of God’s promise of forgiveness, life,
and salvation in Jesus Christ. Indeed, in point of the facts I have urged in this book, it
would seem that the “simul” has occupied too central a place and too high a profile in
twentieth-century accounts of Luther’s theology. The regenerate suffer the ongoing
presence of residual sinful desires in and as their “flesh,” to be sure, and in this sense
the greatest of the saints confess they are poor sinners. But by virtue of the Spirit’s
renewing gift, holy Lutheran (!) believers in Christ refuse to consent to the evil desires
which tantalize, vex, and grieve them all at once. That is, they refuse to stop repenting,
cling by steadfast faith to God’s Word in law and gospel, and shut up their ears to the
devices of the devil. They put the bits of old Adam’s affections persisting within them
to death, beg for increased supplies of the Spirit’s life-giving power, triumph over sin
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amidst great weakness by the Spirit’s strength not theirs, and thus continue in the
path of baptismal discipleship that leads through their appointed share in the holy
cross to the glory of Christ’s resurrection. So long as they keep up the fight, God
ignores the imperfections that mar their real renewal for the sake of the blood and
righteousness of his incarnate Son. For “sinful” as the heart-rent saints in part remain,
this perfect righteousness is theirs by faith in the gospel. Infinite as the Son of God
himself, this divine and victorious righteousness utterly abolishes the debt of original
and past actual sins, swallows up the affective sinfulness that remains in the saints,
and presents them pure and blameless before the Father, as innocent as Christ
himself, their Head and Husband—provided they continue to repent and believe. For
Spirit-given non-consent to evil desire, manifest in the deep repentance of faith, hope,
and love, is the spiritual lynchpin that holds together the three parts of the “simul.” If
the battle for non-consent is lost, and a saint succumbs to his flesh as did David with
Bathsheba, then faith and the Spirit depart and grace and gift are forfeited. In that
tragic case, the erstwhile saint becomes one with his flesh, falls out of righteousness
and life in Christ back into death and damnation in Adam, and is found to be peccator
totaliter, totus caro, nihil nisi caro, etc.—no longer a iustus saint at all. “He who does
not abstain from sin, but persists in his former evil nature, must have a different
Christ, that of the Antinomians; the real Christ is not there, even if all the angels
would cry, ‘Christ! Christ!’ He must be damned with this, his new Christ.”1150
Second, I have argued that this theology of sin, grace, and real renewal in
holiness is deeply “Augustinian.” Despite the genuine novelty of his Reformation
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theology in certain vital respects, the dogmatics of holiness which Luther learned from
the “420s Augustine” in the mid 1510s stayed with him for the rest of his life: and this,
not as a relic of his medieval past awkwardly patched together with his novel
Worttheologie, but as the substance and core of his catholic and evangelical theology
of sin in Adam, grace and righteousness in Christ, and new life by the Spirit.
I thank you for the patience and kindness you have shown me by getting this
far in my book. Perhaps you have found the argument thought-provoking, useful, and
even compelling. But if you haven’t, I suppose there isn’t much I could add here to
convince you. A little like the fighter pilot God in his wise counsel decreed I shall
never become, I’ve done my best to bring this P-51 Mustang back to base with all nine
yards left behind in German-occupied territory. In short, my ammo is spent. All that
remains is the debriefing, and thus the occasion to share insights gained from this
long sortie for use in future contests. These I limit to two areas: first, the implications
of my research for the unity of the divided Churches; second, one point where, in the
course of writing this book, I’ve come to think that Luther’s dogmatics stand in need
of a correction in light of the doctrines of grace set forth in the Word of God for the
infinite consolation of fleshly, frail, tank-empty, bullet-ridden, battle-scarred little
saints like me.
To be quite clear, I am now shifting gears from the (one hopes) more or less
objective historical-theological research of the scholar to the (one also hopes) graceastonished, scripturally-ruled, historically-rooted, deeply committed, glad, hopeful,
and perhaps even wise work of the church theologian. If that’s not your cup of tea, I
assure you I take no offense if you stop reading right here! For the real object of my
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argument in this book is academic and historical. I trust that in good faith my more
critical readers will not “Bulverize” the forgoing four-hundred or so pages of historical
research too severely in light of the honest dogmatic theology which follows.1151 I
realize that in setting my hand to speak of what is in fact true, I leave myself open to
attack from those quarters that have become too clever for old fashioned things like
being, goodness, beauty, and truth—perhaps, I fear, even to mere dismissal as “a
theologian.” But this is a risk I am willing to take. For I am a Christian, and a pastor
too, and I confess I love the Church of God too much to leave the results of my
historical research sitting on the shelf. I have done my best—others, surely, can do
better—to describe Luther’s theology as it developed in the first half of the sixteenth
century. Now, the time has come to harvest the fruit of this research for the benefit of
Church and theology in the twenty-first. I certainly hope that other, more capable
church theologians than myself will indulge my lack of expertise in their field, and
find further areas of application than the two I have chosen. And for their part,
perhaps my pure historian friends will “bear with me in a little foolishness” (2 Cor.
11:1).
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See C. S. Lewis, “‘Bulverism’: Or, the Foundation of 20th Century Thought,” in God in the Dock:
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“… you must show that a man is wrong before you start explaining why he is wrong. The modern
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Some day I am doing to write the biography of its imaginary inventor, Ezekiel Bulver, whose
destiny was determined at the age of five when he heard his mother say to his father—who had
been maintaining that two sides of a triangle were together greater than the third—‘Oh you say
that because you are a man.’ ‘At that moment,’ E. Bulver assures us, ‘there flashed across my mind
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wrong or (worse still) try to find out whether he is wrong or right, and the national dynamism of
our age will thrust you to the wall.’ That is how Bulver became one of the makers of the Twentieth
Century.”
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Reformation Catholicity – Or, Calling All Evangelical Augustinians
Holy Church is that free Jerusalem which is above, our once-barren mother; apart
from her society, no slave-born, orphaned son or daughter of Adam may call upon
God as his Father (Isa. 54:1, Gal. 4:26). In her womb we are reborn by the imperishable
seed of God’s Word, and at her breasts we are nourished through the sacraments of
the gospel (1 Pet. 1:23-5, Isa. 66:10-11). Above, in her eschatological fullness, she is built
as a city that is bound firmly together, for in truth there is but one body and one
Spirit, one Lord, faith, and baptism, one God and Father of all (Ps. 122:3, Eph. 4:4-6).
But here below, the feuding tribes of Israel must find their way up to her (Ps. 122:4).
The safest route up this craggy ascent is the way of the One who came down for her,
who set his face to go to the City of David and shed his blood to ransom and purify her
children: the sons and daughters of the promise, born not of the flesh but of the Spirit,
freely adopted by the Father in love (Eph. 4:8-10, Luke 9:51, Eph. 5:26-7, Gal. 4:21-31,
Eph. 1:4-5). The nearer our fractious tribes come to this nail-pierced Man, who is the
eternal Son of God, the nearer we draw to one another. For he is the King of
righteousness and peace, and is himself our peace by his blood, that through him we
may all have access in one Spirit to the Father (Isa. 9:6, Heb. 7:2, Eph. 2:13-18). Did not
the prophet Micah speak of these things long ago?
“But you, O Bethlehem Ephrathah, who are too little to be among the clans of
Judah, from you shall come forth for Me one who is to be Ruler in Israel, whose
origin is from of old, from ancient days.” Therefore he shall give them up until
the time when she who is in labor has given birth; then the rest of his brothers
shall return to the people of Israel. And he shall stand and shepherd his flock in
the strength of the LORD, in the majesty of the name of the LORD his God.
And they shall dwell secure, for now he shall be great to the ends of the earth.
And he shall be their peace (Mic. 5:2-5, cf. Matt. 2:6, John 10:11-18).
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For in this good Shepherd “all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through
him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by
the blood of his cross” (Col. 1:19). And yet—the tribes are divided! One follows Paul’s
strong grace and free justification, another Apollos’ impressive erudition, another
Cephas’ rock-solid ecclesiology (1 Cor. 1:12). I thank God that I wasn’t baptized into the
name of Paul, or Luther, or Augustine; and I endeavor here to preach the gospel with
all the weakness and folly that it calls for as the verbum crucis (1 Cor. 1:13-25). Still, it
may be that Augustine and Luther—to say nothing of Peter and Paul—may have some
insight into this crucified King of righteousness and peace; and having listened to
them for some time as they listened to the Bible, here I take my own stand on the
Word of God, and hazard to speak a few words to the divided and languishing tribes of
the Lord as they sojourn toward the City of Peace.
To begin with my own tribe, the Anglicans. We are known, with some justice,
for being Augustinians at the prayer-desk and Pelagians in the pulpit; and perhaps
part of the reason for this pitiful reputation is the fact that since the Oxford
Movement we have billed ourselves as a people of Prayer Books, liturgies, laws of
ecclesiastical polity, and “the patristic consensus,” but not of the Reformation
confessions. In fact, apart from the adjustment that I will suggest in a moment, the
doctrines of sin and grace set forth in Articles 9—18 (of the little-studied Thirty-Nine)
is in substance identical to the evangelical Augustinianism of Luther’s mature
dogmatics. In particular Article 9, “Of Original or Birth-sin,” is redolent of the “420s
Augustine” as Luther came to understand him in the mid 1510s:
Original Sin standeth not in the following of Adam, (as the Pelagians do vainly
talk;) but it is the fault and corruption of the Nature of every man, that
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naturally is ingendered of the offspring of Adam; whereby man is very far gone
from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that
the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit; and therefore in every person
born into this world, it deserveth God’s wrath and damnation. And this
infection of nature doth remain, yea in them that are regenerated; whereby the
lust of the flesh, called in the Greek, Φρόνημα σαρκός, which some do expound
the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire, of the flesh,
is not subject to the Law of God. And although there is no condemnation for
them that believe and are baptized, yet the Apostle doth confess, that
concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin (peccati tamen in sese
rationem habere concupiscentiam fatetur Apostolus).
Whether Thomas Cranmer, who drafted the first edition of the Articles in Edward’s
reign, learned this doctrine from his readings in continental Lutheran and Reformed
theology or directly from his own extensive Augustine research I do not venture to
say. But in light of the present study, it ought to be clear that in this Article the
reformed Church of England confesses a Simullehre that is virtually indistinguishable
from Luther’s as I have exposited it in this book. (The same goes for Article 15, “Of
Christ alone without Sin,” which appeals to 1 John 1:8—a classic Augustinian prooftext: “… but all we the rest, although baptized, and born again in Christ, yet offend in
many things; and if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not
in us.”) Finally published in haste in 1553, just prior to his demise and only after his
longsuffering efforts to convene a general evangelical council to draft an agreed
Reformation confession had failed, Cranmer wrote this article with full knowledge of
Trent’s 1546 decree on original sin. The general tenor of the article’s content, the
appeal to Rom. 8:1, the affirmation that concupiscence has the ratio peccati as well as
the pointed jab that St. Paul—unlike Trent!—doth not hesitate to confess that
concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin, all reflect the church-political
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context of the early 1550s.1152 Without ambiguity, the English confession takes its stand
against Trent and with the European Reformers: that is to say, with the “420s
Augustine” and against the “410s.” The original or birth-sin inherited from Adam is an
evil corruption and infection of human nature which, of itself, has the character of a
“fault” and the nature of “sin”—to this point, in the sixteenth century, all were agreed.
But next comes the parting of the ways: for the Anglicans confess that this vicious
“corruption,” “infection,” “flesh,” “lust,” “concupiscence,” and “sin” remains in the
regenerate. Yet despite the ongoing presence of what the Apostle confesses to be
intrinsically sinful, by faith in Christ and baptism there is no longer any condemnation
for them. That is not a bad summary of the argument of this book regarding the
mature Luther’s personal theology. The sobering reality of postbaptismal “sin,” real
but partial regeneration (“gift”), the removal of condemnation through faith and
baptism into Christ (“grace”): these are the components of the great Reformer’s
“Augustinian simul.” But beyond Luther, this doctrine of “sin,” renewal, and
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forgiveness is the shared conviction of the evangelical Churches, Lutheran, Reformed,
and Anglican, as set forth in their public confessions; and the fact that this common
teaching originates in and is elaborated along the lines of the “420s Augustine” argues
strongly in favor of the catholicity of these Reformation confessions.
John Davenant (1572-1641), a moderating voice at the Synod of Dordt (1618/9)
and later bishop of Salisbury, knew this well. Near the start of his 1631 Disputatio de
justitia habituali et actuali, this generous and keen Reformed theologian took up the
aspersions of Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621, in his de iustificatione 2.1) to the effect that,
owing to the doctrine of the persistence of original sin qua sin after baptism, “Calvin,
with the Lutherans, allows that there does not exist any inherent righteousness” in the
regenerate at all.1153 In fact, the bishop protested, “We all, no less than the Romanists
themselves, teach that inherent righteousness, and that grace of sanctification which
is the root of new life, is infused into the justified.”1154 To justify his “we all,” Davenant
supplies concise but apt excerpts from a sampling of evangelical theologians: Luther,
Calvin, Martin Bucer (1491-1551), Melanchthon, Peter Martyr (1499-1562), Martin
Chemnitz (1522-86), and William Whittaker (1548-95). The Luther quote is taken from
the spring 1523 lectures on Jude, and is pretty accurate—as is Davenant’s summary of
Luther’s theology:
Luther, (tom. 5 in Epist. Judae, near the end,) says: We have received the Holy
Spirit through faith, and we have been purified; but notwithstanding, as long as
we live here, that corrupt mass of flesh and blood adheres to us. Here he plainly
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confesses both a certain purification or internal renovation, and the remains of
sin still cleaving to us.1155
Davenant is clear: the Reformers, including Luther himself, agree with Rome
regarding the reality of inner renovation and purity through the Spirit. Rather, the
question in dispute between them is whether the “remains of sin” still cleave to the
purified saints and if so, how they can stand righteous before God despite them.1156
Davenant argues an emphatic Yes to the first question; and in reply to the second, he
consequently urges the necessity of imputed righteousness as the formal cause of
justification. Inherent renewal is real enough, though insufficient to that great end.
But where our righteousness fails, Christ’s is enough. In the course of defending what
he regarded as the common Reformation theology of residual sin, renewal in holiness,
and justification by faith, Davenant turns repeatedly (and with a display of erudition
befitting a one-time Lady Margaret’s Professor of Divinity at Cambridge) to the “420s
Augustine.” In, for example, a chapter that begins by citing Trent’s decree on original
sin and its appeal to Rom. 8:1, Davenant turns to one of Thomas Stapleton’s (1535-98)
arguments in favor of the sinlessness of the saints. In 1 Cor. 3:16, St. Paul teaches that
the Church is the temple of God, filled with his Spirit; but in the Lord’s temple, all
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things are clean and pure; therefore, no sin remains in the regenerate. In his reply,
Davenant appeals to c. Iul. 6.14.42 and 6.15.48:
Answer:—In the perfected and finished temple of God, no sin remains; and we
shall be such temples of God when we come to the state of glory; whilst
however we are in this militant state we are truly esteemed and called temples
of God, but not yet completely built, not yet carried to the height of perfection:
It is, then, by no means wonderful, that some rubbish and dust should be
found in these temples, which are as it were in an uninterrupted course of
building. We therefore answer Stapleton, as Augustine once did Julian: Let no
one be so foolish as to suppose, that every baptized person is therefore perfect,
because it is said—The temple of God is holy, which temple ye are;—We are the
temple of the living God; and other things of this sort. For this name is given now,
even while it is being built. Here our members, which are upon earth, are being
mortified:—there is however in us something to mortify, so that sin should not
reign in our mortal body, &c. And concerning this evil which cleaves to the
justified, he thus speaks in the same chapter: How could it be, that such and so
great an evil should not, by the mere fact of its being in us, hold us in death, and
drag us into final death, if its chain were not broken by that remission of all our
sins which takes place in baptism? Let the Papists show us, why they deny that
evil to have the formal nature of sin, which would condemn only by the mere
act of its inherence, unless its guilt were removed by gratuitous remission.1157
Farther on, busy now with Martin Becanus (1563-1624), Davenant effectively cites c.
Iul. 2.4.8 without fanfare much as Luther had done while exegeting Rom. 7:18 in 1516,
then rounds off this surreptitious citation with an express appeal to the older
Augustine’s doctrine of threefold baptismal grace:
The Jesuit therefore sadly errors in this, that he thinks baptismal grace
produces its entire effect at once, whereas it frees us immediately from the guilt
of sin, but by a gradual process from its pollution. We do not deny then that
the effect of grace is a full and entire purgation from sin; but we teach with
Augustine, that we arrive at this hoped for perfection by the same baptism
which is here received. We enjoy not immediately this perfect cleansing, but at
length we shall attain to it by the benefit and efficacy of Divine grace, operating
continually in us.1158
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Such appeals to Augustine pepper the following chapters in defense of the doctrines
wrapped up with postbaptismal residual sin, which Davenant sums up nicely at the
head of chapter 9: “Baptism frees the person from the guilt of all sins; but it does not
immediately free the nature from the operation, or indwelling of original sin.” He then
adds: “This is the uniform position of Augustine, who teaches that concupiscence is
original sin causing death in the unbaptized; but that it remains in the baptized,
though its guilt is put away.”1159 Davenant devotes the whole of chapter 13 to proving
that this is in fact Augustine’s “uniform position,” first allowing for ambiguity in
Augustine vis-à-vis the sinfulness of concupiscence in the baptized—“Hence arises the
contest between us and the Romanists concerning the two-fold opinion of
Augustine”1160—in order then to argue that the “420s Augustine” is the real and
orthodox doctor of the Church and, eo ipso, that the evangelicals are the real and
orthodox Catholics. Its crowning argument is the hotly-disputed excerpt from nupt.
conc. 1.25.28, taken from c. Iul. bk. 6 and interpreted—in the familiar “Lutheran”
manner—in light of the gains made circa 420/1:
What is truly and in its own nature sin, may nevertheless not be imputed for
sin to the person engrafted into Christ. But as often as this is the case (which
we affirm to be so in all the regenerate) sin, remaining in them, is deserving of
punishment (habet condignitatem ad poenam) by its own innate depravity;
because it is an evil contrary to the Divine law; but it is not adjudged to
punishment (non habet deputationem ad poenam), owing to Divine
compassion; because it has been remitted and pardoned in baptism. Now let us
hear what Augustine himself thinks: Contra Julian lib. 6 cap. 6, he says—

44.679): God in Christ regenerat hominem generatum, sanatque vitiatum, a reatu statim, ab
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Concupiscence is put away in baptism, not as regards existence, but so as not to
be imputed for sin; for although its guilt is now discharged, yet itself remains.1161
Davenant’s numeration differs from ours: the reference is to c. Iul. 6.17.51, a text I
examined at some length above in chapter 3.2.1.1. There I argued that Luther’s
interpretation of c. Iul. 2.5.12 in the Rom. 7:17 scholion reflects the very kind of “420s
Augustine”-style explanation of nupt. conc. 1.25.28 which the old Augustine himself,
having been pushed by Julian toward greater clarity of thought and expression, offered
not just in the huge c. Iul. op. imp. but already in c. Iul. 6.17.51.1162 Had Rudolf Hermann
read Davenant, I think he would have found his theology of sin, grace, and renewal
every bit as “grave”—and as eerily Augustinian—as he found the young Luther’s. For
the Saxon and the Englishman hold the same doctrine, having drawn it from the same
African well.
The question is: does anyone still hold it today? Taking a sober look at the
Anglican Communion, one has to admit that the evangelical Augustinianism of
Luther, Cranmer, and Davenant has seen better days. But in the past century, three
presbyters whom many do not readily think of as specifically “Anglican” theologians
have held and taught it indeed: John Stott (1921-2011), J. I. Packer (1926—), and John
Webster (1955—).1163 These distinguished ecclesial theologians have exerted immense
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influence on the global evangelical Church. In the judgment of the Archbishop of
Kenya, Dr. Eliud Wabukala, the rise of a confessing movement within twenty-firstcentury Anglicanism is due in large part to the impact of Stott’s and Packer’s works
upon the African and Asian episcopate. Wabukala clearly delights to point out that
since the doctrines of sin and grace in the Articles represent a revived Augustinianism,
and since Augustine fought against Pelagius, his own advocacy for their authority in
the Church means that today an African is once again taking the British to school.1164
This is most welcomed. In addition to the doctrinal leadership Wabukala exercises
within the Fellowship of Confessing Anglicans, Ashley Null’s scholarly retrieval of
Thomas Cranmer as a “Protestant Augustinian” theologian holds out real promise for a
better grasp of the theology of the English Reformers in the wider context of the
European Reformation.1165 The same goes for Torrance Kirby and Corneliu Simuţ’s
cogent interpretations of Richard Hooker, Keble’s would-be sixteenth-century
Tractarian, as a Reformed theologian.1166 Still, I am afraid the prospects for an
historically responsible and scripturally rich Augustinian revival amongst us Anglicans
are grim: the revisionist historiography of the Oxford Movement has done its work;
probably in reaction to Anglo-Catholic moralism, the Luther who has been celebrated
in some pockets (namely Zahl and his circle) is the “radical” Luther of Hermann, Joest,
and Use Today (Oxford: Latimer House, 1984); John Webster, Holiness (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2003); idem, The Grace of Truth (Farmington Hills, Mich.: Oil Lamp Books, 2011).
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and Forde whom I have argued never in fact existed; and the New Perspective on
Paul—with its mainly unwitting revival of the rather old perspective of Origen,
Jerome, and Erasmus as well as its less-than-dexterous dismissal of Augustine and
Luther as exegetical theologians—occupies more ground by the day.1167 In short, there
is work to be done: the history of English the0logy in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries needs to be retold from the ground up; the confession and character of
“Anglicanism” fundamentally reconceived in light of that retelling; the holy scriptures
diligently heard, read, marked, learned, and inwardly digested; above all, the gospel
recovered, cherished, preached, and believed. In addition, I think we owe our friends
in the Lutheran as well as the other Reformed Churches a hearty apology for having
told stories about them and about ourselves that are false, all in order to celebrate the
superiority of our polity, and all the while obscuring the glory of the gospel of free
grace for sinners in Jesus Christ which Cranmer, Hooker, Davenant et al. gladly
confessed along with their fellow German, Swiss, French, Dutch, and Scottish
evangelicals.1168
What about the Lutherans? I confess I am very curious to see how my siblings
in the Churches of the Augsburg Confession will receive the argument of this book. In
theory, those pastors and theologians committed to seeking the catholicity of the
Confessions, to receiving Luther as one doctor within the great Church, and to
walking in truth, generosity, and love with the rest of that Church, ought to welcome
it. For I have shown the profound continuity that obtains between Luther’s
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Reformation theology and the wisest and most scriptural of all Augustines, the only
really universal doctor of the Church in the west. Moving forward from 1546, it should
be much easier to fit together this “Augustinian” Luther with the theologies of
Chemnitz, Gerhard, and others, there no longer being any need to sort out how the
“radical” Luther’s theology of justification was tamed and muted by his ecclesial heirs.
Looking beyond Augsburg, if this kind of Lutheran finds my argument about Luther’s
theology compelling, I think he will need to give up whatever inflated claims of
distinctiveness he may still boast of vis-à-vis the Reformed. Calvin & Co. are quite
skilled at distinguishing law and gospel; the Anglicans (!) preach free justification
through the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness; and Dr. Luther proves himself
to be no mean theologian of regeneration and new holy life in Christ by the Spirit, an
evangelical and Augustinian doctor sanctitatis. As for Rome—more in its place below.
Now there are Lutherans, and then there are Lutherans. The gnostic
antinomianism that holds the field in the liberal/old-line Lutheran churches of the
west is only superficially akin to Agricola’s opposition to the preaching of the law, for
as Luther allowed (albeit in the form of back-handed compliments) at least he still
preached the gospel of redemption and forgiveness through Jesus Christ and him
crucified.1169 I suspect that such Lutherans as these will not regard my argument very
highly, being enemies of the cross of Christ, but perhaps it will make them think twice
about calling themselves by Luther’s name. I have more hope for “radical Lutherans”
who have learned their theology from Forde: for amongst them, there seems to be a
real regard for the Confessions (large swathes of them, at any rate), a deep admiration
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for Luther, and a sincere desire to become theologii crucis. If this book compels any
such to rethink their assumptions about Reformation theology, go back to re-read
Luther, and above all to search the Scriptures to see whether these things are so, I will
be deeply gratified. Due in large part, I gather, to Elert and Joest’s pervasive influence,
pretty much the same applies to those “confessional” Lutherans who at times seem to
regard dismissiveness toward both the doctrine and the reality of holiness as a
distinguishing mark of true piety. To all such “radical” Lutherans, whether of the more
edgy or the more stodgy variety, I put the question (with all brotherly affection): if you
will not heed the prophets and the apostles urging that “God has not called us for
impurity, but in holiness” (1 Thess. 4:7), will you lend an ear to your great Reformer as
he summons you to repent and believe, teach, and confess the fullness of the blessing
of righteous and life, forgiveness and holiness, pardon and purity, which God promises
us in the gospel?
Finally, as to the ecumenical Lutherans and the great Church of Rome, that
massive Manasseh amongst all the other smaller tribes of Israel. It’s fascinating to read
the 1999 Joint Declaration and to see in it the “two Augustines” vying with one
another. In section 4.4 on “The Justified as Sinner,” the Lutherans first affirm Joest’s
“totus iustus/totus peccator simul” in a way my argument puts in question, but then
pull back from it by virtue of a sound emphasis on Paul’s indwelling “sin” and Luther’s
peccatum regnans/regnatum distinction, the latter drawn from the Antilatomus and
rooted in the “420s Augustine” (§29). For their part, the Catholics cite Rom. 8:1 (and in
the footnote, Trent) to the effect that the grace of Christ in baptism takes away all that
is properly sin, “an inclination (concupiscence) that comes from sin and presses
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toward sin” being all that is left behind—the “410s Augustine” (§30). The same stances
are reiterated in §B of the Annex. In the agreed statement that precedes these separate
qualifying paragraphs, the Lutherans and Catholics together confess (§28):
… that in baptism the Holy Spirit unites one with Christ, justifies, and truly
renews the person. But the justified must all through life constantly look to
God’s unconditional justifying grace. They also are continually exposed to the
power of sin still pressing its attacks (cf. Rom. 6:12-14) and are not exempt from
a lifelong struggle against contradiction to God within the selfish desires of the
old Adam (see Gal. 5:16; Rom. 7:7-10). The justified also must ask God daily for
forgiveness, as in the Lord’s Prayer (Mt. 6:12; 1 Jn. 1:9), are ever again called to
conversion and penance, and are ever again granted forgiveness.
This remarkable paragraph could have been written by Augustine at any stage in the
long Pelagian controversy, and by Luther at any point in his career from 1514 on. That
speaks to its strength, but also to its weakness. The presenting issue remains the old
question about the status of evil desire in the baptized. In the agreed paragraph, the
two parties employ the scriptural language of “sin” to describe it, and cite the expected
proof-texts. But there then follows the parting of the “two Augustines,” with the
Lutherans still confessing that what Paul calls “sin” is sin indeed in their paragraph,
the Catholics in theirs still upholding that what “the Apostle sometimes calls sin … the
Church Catholic has never understood to be called sin because it is truly and properly
sin in the reborn but because it is from sin and it inclines to sin.”1170 Well, which is it?
Evangelical Augustinian that I am, I confess it greatly troubles me to hear one
of the tribes of Israel—even a big and old one—teach that what the Apostle calls x,
does not really mean x, because that tribe has never understood it to meant x. Is it
possible to teach in this manner and, at the same time, declare with David in the
presence of the true and living God: “My heart stands in awe of your words” (Ps.
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119:161)? If we stand in awe of Paul’s, that is to say God the Holy Spirit’s x, in our
church doctrine should we not confess this same x? and should we not do so with the
simplicity and joy of a child hearing the voice of his dear Father? Is this not the best
way for us to heed Paul’s admonition to the Church (in the person of Timothy) to
“follow the pattern of the sound words that you have heard from me” (2 Tim. 1:13)? In
the agreed paragraph §28, Paul’s scandal-provoking but sound little word “sin” is used,
and surely at this the heart of every Christian who “trembles” at God’s Word (Isa. 66:2)
rejoices. But what are we to make of the Catholics’ claim that the power of sin which
still presses its attacks, the inner contradiction to God, the selfish desires of the old
Adam—evils on account of which the justified must ask for daily forgiveness in prayer,
and struggle against all their lives—are not “sin in an authentic sense” (§30)? Is this
the way to follow Paul’s sound words? This all makes for a truly apostolic “perplexity,”
to be sure (Gal. 4:20).
Perhaps if the Lutherans, convinced by my argument in this book, were to
retreat from their simul totaliter, refocus their right insistence on the enduring
sinfulness of the saints upon evil desire, and rejoice a little more boldly in the gospel
gift of renewal in holiness, the Catholics would not be so hesitant about St. Paul’s (and
John’s) little word “sin.” But in that event, I believe Davenant is right to urge that the
imputation of Christ’s righteousness must be looked to as the formal cause of the
justification of the renewed but still sinful saints before God (Ps. 130:3-4, 143:1-2). Is
this not what the JD itself gestures toward—however tentatively—in its confession
that “righteousness will be reckoned to all who, like Abraham, trust in God’s promise”
(§10), that “justification becomes ours through Christ Jesus, ‘whom God put forward as
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a sacrifice of atonement by his blood, effective through faith’ (Rom. 3:25; see 3:21-28)”
(§10), that “justification … means that Christ himself is our righteousness” (§15), and
that “through Christ alone we are justified, when we receive this salvation in faith”
(§16)? I hope so—indeed, I rejoice at the mere prospect! For then, with the Lutherans
confessing the Church’s doctrine of holiness and the Catholics her doctrines of sin,
grace, and righteousness, a consensus in “the basic truths” of the gospel has indeed
been reached (§14). All that will remain is to begin preaching this gospel, and sorting
out and applying its unique role as “an indispensable criterion that constantly serves
to orient all the teaching and practice of our churches to Christ” (§18)—no small task,
and a task by no means limited to the Church of Rome, as all gospel-loving Anglicans
will be the first to confess. But if this is the case, as I hope it is, I think the Catholics
will need to explain to the rest of us just exactly how these “new insights” into the
nature of justification, won by listening together to the Bible (§8), fit with the
somewhat different yet (we are told) infallible dogma of the Council of Trent. For if
Trent was right to teach that
… the one single formal cause [of justification] is the righteousness of God
(unica causa formalis est iustitia dei): not that by which he himself is righteous,
but that by which he makes us righteous and endowed with which we are
renewed (renovamur) in the spirit of our mind, and are not merely reputed
righteous (reputamur) but are truly named and are righteous, each one of us
receiving individually his own righteousness according to the measure which
the Holy Spirit apportions to each one as he wills, and in view of each one’s
dispositions and co-operation … 1171
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then it is hard not to conclude that Christopher Malloy is also right to call the
catholicity of the JD into question.1172 But if my argument in this book about the
“Augustinian” Luther and the “Lutheran” Augustine is historically sound—and if the
great church father remains a serviceable touchstone for discerning the faithfulness of
Church doctrine—then it is Malloy’s theology (and Trent’s decree) which suffers the
deficit in catholicity. For in light of my research, the JD comes off rather well: it is
deeply “Augustinian” and catholic in its teaching just because it is surprisingly
Lutheran.
Once, Paul was able to bring St. Peter back to the gospel of free righteousness
in Christ by faith (Gal. 2:11-21). This is as it should be. For as it is written in the great
Psalm of Christ’s resurrection and ascension, “Benjamin, the least of them,” is the tribe
that takes the lead in the apostolic train (Ps. 68:27a; cf. v. 18 & Eph. 4:8-10). Peter,
John, and the rest of the Galileans—these mighty men of the Word are, one supposes,
“the princes of Zebulun, the princes of Naphtali” (v. 27c). But it is Paul, and Paul alone,
who descends from the tribe of Benjamin (Phil. 3:5). And this same Paul was “the least
of the apostles” (1 Cor. 15:9), and not only so, but also “the very least of all saints” (Eph.
3:8). For he was the chief of sinners (1 Tim. 1:15): a man set free by the great grace of
God in Jesus Christ, and by that grace alone; a man stripped bare of the slightest
pretension to a iustitia propria of which he might boast; a man who would never
dream of presenting his threadbare, grace-given works (Eph. 2:8-10) before the throne
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of God to collect eternal life as if it were the just reward of his labors.1173 Is it not right
for this humbled Benjamin, the least of the apostles and for that very reason the
greatest of them all, to take the place afforded him by the Spirit of prophecy and to
assume the primacy amongst the Churches? If Malloy still wants to put Campeggio,
Catharinus, de Soto, Vitriarius, and Lainez in the lead, we cannot stop him. But as for
us poor separated brethren, who pray the Psalter in our ecclesial communities, we
prefer to listen to St. Paul with his gospel as he teaches the one great Church ex
cathedra, that is to say, ex scriptura: for example, in the letter to the Romans. Based on
the JD and its confession that Christ alone, with his atoning blood, is our
righteousness, and that this righteousness is reckoned to those who believe God’s
gracious promise, I dare say there are at least some in the Church of Rome who have
learned to sing this Psalm too. For this, I give thanks to the God of all grace, who has
preserved a remnant for himself in every generation (Rom. 11:1-6).
Truth be told, the churches which (by God’s great grace) will remain faithful to
the Lord Jesus in the midst of the barbaric, proud ruins of western civilization face
great perils in the times to come. Has not the hour come for evangelical Augustinians
1173
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in all the tribes to put our past quarrels behind us and prepare to confess together the
truth of the gospel?

The Preservation of the Saints
Throughout this book, I have argued that Luther taught that regeneration and
justification are amissible and provisional: grace and gift may be forfeited if the
believer consents to the residual sinful desires of his flesh. Being an Augustinian in
regards to the doctrine of predestination, Luther believed that the elect would
ultimately persevere in repentance and faith to the end. Deep as they may fall into sin,
God will raise them up again and restore them as he restored the humbled David. But
the elect are not certain of their election, and that lack of assurance is spiritually
useful to them. For it keeps them from becoming smug, from lazily resting in the
grace already received instead of pressing forward in perpetual repentance, faith,
dependence, humility, and prayer. Since present grace is no guarantee of future
perseverance to glory, the godly take heed lest they fall (1 Cor. 10:12) and work out
their salvation with fear and trembling (Phil. 2:12), being zealous to make their calling
and election sure (2 Pet. 1:10): for it is not he who believes for a moment, but the one
who perseveres to the end, who will be saved (Matt. 10:20).
In affliction, the believer clings to Christ crucified present for him in Word and
sacrament. He is free to defy the Devil, assured through faith in the gospel that
Christ’s death is his redemption and that through the blood of this Mediator he has a
gracious Father in heaven. But this present assurance of justification is just that:
assurance in the present. Tomorrow I may grievously fall; and if I do, the game is up …
unless, in his free mercy, God grants the free gift of renewal in the repentance and
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faith I squandered. But that is precisely what I cannot count on. There is no blank
check to sin with impunity. If I have grace today, I must endeavor to persevere in it.
For if I lose it, it may not be given to me again. He might not have admitted it, but had
he lived to read it the old Luther would have substantially (though not entirely)
agreed with the doctrine set forth in chapters 12 and 13 of Trent’s decree on
justification:
Chapter 12. Rash presumption about predestination must be avoided … No one,
so long as he remains in this present life, ought so to presume about the
hidden mystery of divine predestination as to hold for certain that he is
unquestionably of the number of the predestined, as if it were true that one
justified is either no longer capable of sin or, if he sins, may promise himself
sure repentance. For, apart from a special revelation, it is impossible to know
whom God has chosen for himself.
Chapter 13. On the gift of perseverance. Similarly, concerning the gift of
perseverance it is written: He who endures to the end will be saved (and indeed,
the gift can have no other source save him who has the power to uphold one
who stands so that he may continue, and to restore him who falls). Even
though all should place an unshaken hope in God’s help and rest in it, let no
one promise himself with absolute certainty any definite outcome. For, unless
they themselves neglect his grace, as God has begun the good work, so he will
bring it to completion, bringing about both the will and the performance.
Nevertheless, let those who think themselves to stand take heed lest they fall,
and work out their own salvation with fear and trembling, in labors, watchings,
almsdeeds, prayers and offerings, in fastings and chastity. For, knowing that
they are reborn to the hope of glory, and not yet to glory itself, they ought to
tremble about the struggle with the flesh, with the world, with the devil, which
still remains and in which they cannot be victors unless, with the grace of God,
they do what the Apostle says: We are debtors, not to the flesh, to live according
to the flesh, for if you live according to the flesh you will die; but if by the Spirit
you put to death the deeds of the body, you will live.1174
Considered from the human vantage point, the perseverance of a saint depends upon
his Spirit-empowered refusal of consent to residual sin (Rom. 8:13). The believer does
well to place unshaken hope in God’s help, and to rest in it—but he can’t be certain of
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the outcome. Luther might have quibbled a little about the ascetic means of abiding in
grace elaborated by the Tridentine fathers. But upon the necessity of that abiding in
order to continue in grace until the end, and the real and present danger that the
believer will fail to do this and thus fall out of life in Christ back into death in Adam,
he agreed with them entirely.
Now that said, on the vexed point of assurance vis-à-vis the Christian’s election
the matter is less straightforward. From what I can gather, Luther handled this
question in the same pastoral, occasional, or “artful” way that he handled the
distinction of law and gospel. The gospel must be kept as far away from the
impenitent adulterer as heaven from hell. Only the crushing hammer of the law is fit
for him. But once that hammer has done its bitter work, a wise pastor like Nathan
speaks sheer words of grace: “The LORD has put away your sin; you will not die” (2
Sam. 12:13). For Pfarrer Luther, the promise of grace is not a fixed principle in a system,
but a spiritual reality to be preached boldly, applied wisely, and trusted tenaciously in
tentatione: “for the divine promises and consolations are not absolute, but relative,
and universally and most certainly presuppose our temptation … For God does not
buoy up or strengthen men unless they are engulfed in sorrow, at the point of death,
or in despair.”1175 Apart from that trial, the gospel is just a language game—or worse,
an intellectual justification for forgiveness and “freedom” without the cost (and the
gift!) of discipleship. I want to suggest that Luther approached the doctrine of
predestination in a similar manner. Dogmatically, he was a rigorous Augustinian both
as to the substance of the doctrine itself and as to the separation of the gift of
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forgiveness and regeneration on the one hand from the gift of perseverance on the
other. Pastorally, he often enough—far more often than is typically allowed for—
followed Augustine (and medieval Catholicism generally) in upholding the propriety
and usefulness of the disciple’s suspension between fear and hope. I think that in the
specific pastoral context of needing to face down theological antinomianism and
popular licentiousness-cum-Lutheranism in the 1530s and 40s, the old Doctor
emphasized this side of the doctrine more and more. But there were other ways of
handling it, tailored to other situations in the spiritual lives of the real souls Luther
cared for. And in these diverse contexts, variations on the question of assurance come
into view.
For one, consider his 1523 sermon on 2 Pet. 1:10, a locus classicus on election
and assurance. Luther’s interpretation is uncomplicated: by doing good works,
believers steadily grow in their assurance of God’s call and election. “Although the call
and the election (der berueff und die erwelung) is strong enough in itself, yet it is not
strong and firm enough for you, since you are not yet certain (gewis) that it pertains to
you. Therefore Peter wants us to confirm this call and election for ourselves with good
works.”1176 For the more faith is exercised in good works, the stronger it grows, “until it
becomes sure (gewis) of the call and election and can lack nothing.”1177 This is St.
Peter’s patient route to a proper sense of assurance, and “here bounds are fixed with
regard to how one should handle foreknowledge.”1178 Peter’s wisdom stands in stark
contrast to all inquisitive, rash speculation into the mystery of predestination by those
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who lack the spiritual maturity needed to handle it rightly. “Flippant spirits” rush in,
attack the matter “from the top,” and try to reason out whether they are elected “in
order that they may be sure (gewis) of where they stand.”1179 But that’s a surefire way to
fall and break your neck, not to find true assurance. “Get away from this quick—it’s
not the handhold (der gryff) you need to grasp it!”1180 Rather,
If you want to become sure (gewis), then you must come through the way
which St. Peter suggests here … If your faith is well exercised and applied, then
at last you will become sure of the matter (zu letzt der sach gewis), so that you
will not fail, as now it follows further: “For if you do this, you will not fall” [2
Pet. 1:10b]. That is: you will stand fast, you will neither stumble nor sin, but
rather you will go forth rightly and vigorously, and everything will fall out
well.1181
Thus in the course of exegeting 2 Pet. 1:10, Luther teaches a steady maturation into the
assurance of election commensurate with the saint’s growth in faith and holiness. If
the animated denial of this kind of assurance is the preferred pastoral method for
dealing with lazy or impenitent souls, the “Petrine” path to certainty via progress in
sanctification is very much a live option for sincere believers exercising the gift of faith
within (for lack of a better word) the “normal” conditions of everyday discipleship.
But the experiential crucible in which Luther’s pastoral theology of assurance
developed was anything but “normal”—to wit: the acute Prädestinationsanfechtungen
that tormented him in the 1510s. In the 1542 lecture on Gen. 26:9, the old Reformer was
still offering the remedy his wise Beichtvater had given him some three decades
before:
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Staupitz used to console me with these words: “Why do you torture yourself
with these speculations? Look at the wounds of Christ and the blood shed for
you. From these predestination will shine.”1182
In short: if predestination frightens you, then stop thinking about it, and look by faith
to Christ crucified instead. “Kill the other thoughts and the ways of reason or the flesh,
for God detests them. That one thing do: receive the Son, so that Christ is welcome in
your heart in his birth, miracles, and cross. For there is the book of life in which you
have been written.”1183 In particular, the Christian afflicted with the terror of a fixed
damnation must take refuge in the objectivity of the external Word and sacraments:
For God did not come down from heaven to make you uncertain (incertum)
about predestination, to teach you to despise the Sacraments, absolution, and
the rest of the divine ordinances. Indeed, he instituted them to make you
completely certain (certissimum) and to remove this disease of doubt from
your soul, in order that you might not only believe with the heart but also see
with your physical eyes and touch with your hands. Why then do you reject
these and complain that you do not know whether you have been predestined?
You have the Gospel, you have been baptized, you have absolution, you are a
Christian, and nevertheless you doubt and say that you do not know whether
you believe or not, whether you hold as true what is preached about Christ in
word and Sacraments … He has given his Son in the flesh and death, and he has
instituted the Sacraments in order that you may know that he does not want to
be deceitful, but truthful. Nor does he confirm this with spiritual proofs; he
confirms it with tangible proofs. For I see water, I see bread and wine, I see the
minister. All this is bodily, and in these physical forms he reveals himself. If
you must deal with men, you may be in doubt as to the extent to which you
may believe a person and as to how others may be disposed toward you; but
concerning God you must maintain with assurance and without any doubt
(certo et indubitanter) that he is well disposed toward you on account of Christ
and that you have been redeemed and sanctified through the precious blood of
the Son of God. And in this way you will be sure (certus) of your
predestination, since all the curious and dangerous questions about GOD’S
secret counsels have been removed—questions to which Satan tries to drive
us.1184
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Faith’s turn “outward” from the sinful intricacies of one’s “self” to the gracious truth of
the Gospel, which is also a turn “downward” from rationalistic or mystical ascent (and
its vain attempts to grasp the hidden decree of election) to the One who came down
low for us, and makes himself graspable in Word and sacrament, is always the order of
the day. This “outward” and “downward” turn, this resolute focus on Jesus Christ in
the preached gospel and sacraments, is the center of that steady growth in faith and
holiness which brings with it an assurance of its own. But for Luther, this Staupitzian
christocentrism is especially needful in the darkness of afflictions in regards to
predestination itself. When the accuser’s dread attacks rise to this peak, and he fires
the deadly shaft of threatened eternal reprobation into the Christian’s heart—then the
believer fights back, refuses to play the devil’s predestinarian game, stakes his eternal
salvation upon the promise of redemption in Christ given to him in preaching,
baptism, Eucharist, and absolution, and lets this “one little Word” be assurance
enough for him.
Tellingly, however, even in this exceedingly seelsorgerlicher excursus on
affliction and predestination, Luther still admits the provisional nature of assurance:
God says to you: “Behold, you have my Son. Listen to him, and receive him. If
you do this, you are already sure (certus) about your faith and salvation.” “But I
do not know,” you will say, “whether I will remain in the faith? (an maneam in
fide?)” At all events, accept the present promise and predestination
(praesentem promissionem et praedestinationem), and do not inquire curiously
about the secret counsels of God. If you believe in God revealed, and you
receive his word, gradually he will reveal even the hidden God.1185
To be sure, I believe the gospel now—but the haunting questions remain: will I
continue in the faith to the end? have I been chosen in love from before the
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beginning? In this kind of affliction, the final answer to such questions is to refuse
them, clinging quite alone to that predestination which is “present” together with the
promise itself. I suspect that tried souls who read this book will agree with the old
Luther, and with me, that Dr. Staupitz was a wise and good pastor indeed.
Thus far I’ve sketched three distinct “pastoral”-theological stances on the
question at hand: fear, not assurance, must be preached to the impenitent and
indolent; whereas to disciples, the incentive of steadily deepening assurance as a
concomitant to real growth in holiness is to be set forth; but to afflicted souls, the wise
pastor banishes the question of predestination altogether, and sets nothing but Christ
in the gospel before their eyes. There is one final pastoral situation, and with it a
fourth nuance on election and assurance, to consider before I suggest my dogmatic
correction; and I have reserved it for this last place, because it approaches the
Reformed doctrine I intend to defend here. In a word, the Sitz im Leben is the
exhausting, bewildering, and intensely discouraging situation described not just in
Rom. 7, but from the baptismal catechesis of Rom. 6 through the battle with one’s
fleshly “self” in that moral-psychological laboratory to the “sufferings” and “groanings”
and fierce opposition catalogued in Rom. 8.1186 In his 1522 Preface to Romans, Luther
explains that when the Christian has not only read these chapters, but begun to
experience the realities they attest, then at last he is ready to think soberly about the
great matters St. Paul sets forth in Rom. 9—11.
You had better follow the order of this epistle. Worry first about Christ and the
gospel, that you may recognize your sin and his grace. Then fight with sin, as
the first eight chapters here have taught. Then, when you’ve come into the
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eighth chapter under the cross and suffering, this will teach you rightly of
predestination in chapters 9, 10, and 11, how comforting it is. For in the absence
of suffering and the cross and the perils of death, one cannot deal with
predestination without harm and without secret anger against God. The old
Adam must first die before he can suffer this thing and drink the strong wine.
Therefore beware that you do not drink wine while you are still a suckling.
There is a limit, and a time, and an age for every doctrine.1187
When the disciple has become a real theologian through suffering and the cross, when
he has begun to grow up into Christ by sharing in his bitter passion and death, he is
finally ready to drink this strong wine. Indeed, once a chosen soul has borne the cross
all the long way through Rom. 1—8, predestination has morphed from a terrifying
riddle into a deep well of evangelical comfort: an elixir of grace to gladden the battlescarred soul. For predestination is nothing but the promise of a love that is steadfast
and a grace that is strong: stronger than my own flesh, stronger than all the forces of
hell marshaled against my pitiful little soul. Paul, a well-tried man, wants the amici
crucis to know that salvation has been taken entirely out of their frail and treacherous
hands, and put into the merciful, faithful, strong hands of God. “For we are so weak
and uncertain (vngewiss) that if it depended upon us, not even a single person would
be saved; the devil would surely (gewisslich) overpower us all. But since God is sure
(gewis)—his predestination cannot fail, and no one can withstand him—we still have
hope against sin.”1188 Near the end of de servo arbitrio, Luther reiterates the confession
of the embattled saint whose despair has given way to hope’s quiet confidence in the
unshakable purpose of God:
I frankly confess that, for myself, even if it could be, I would not want free
choice to be given me, nor anything left in my own hand by which I would be
able to endeavor after salvation; not only because in the face of so many
1187
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adversities and dangers, and assaults of devils, I could not stand my ground
and hold fast my free choice (for one devil is stronger than all men, and on
these terms no man could be saved); but because, even were there no dangers,
adversities, or devils, I should still be forced to labor in constant uncertainty
(perpetuo in incertum), and to beat my fists at the air. If I lived and worked to
all eternity, my conscience would never become certain and sure (certa et
secura) as to how much it must do to satisfy God. Whatever work I had done,
there would still be a scruple as to whether it pleased God, or whether he
required something more. The experience of all the self-righteous proves that;
and I learned it well enough myself over a period of many years, to my own
great hurt. But now that God has taken my salvation out of my choice and
received it into his, and has promised to save me, not by my own work or
performance, but by his own grace and mercy [cf. Rom. 9:16], I am sure and
certain (securus et certus) that he is faithful and will not lie to me, he who is so
powerful and great that no devils and no adversities can break him or pluck me
from him. “No one,” he says, “shall pluck them out of my hand, because my
Father who gave them, is greater than all” (John 10:28-9). Thus it is that, if not
all, yet some, indeed many, are saved; whereas, by the power of free choice
none at all could be saved, but we all would have perished in the one man.
Furthermore, we are certain and sure (certi sumus et securi) that we are
pleasing to God, not by the merit of our works, but by the favor of his own
mercy promised to us. And if we work too little, or badly, he does not impute it
to us, but with fatherly compassion pardons and corrects us. This is the
boasting (gloriatio) of all the saints in their God.1189
The core Augustinian doctrines are all present and accounted for: destruction in Adam
(… in unum omnes perderemur); election by grace to salvation in Christ; the nonimputation of those flaws which remain in the redeemed, and God’s fatherly
correction of the same; the saints’ wholehearted “boasting” in this gracious God alone.
So too are the more characteristically Lutheran emphases on conscience, certainty,
scruples, devils, and the promise of grace. But here these components are fused
together and recast in a manner that evokes Paul’s boast of certain triumph at Rom.
8:31-39 and opens the door to John 10:28-29 as the matter-of-fact claim of the tried,
tested, steadfast, stumbling little believer in Christ.
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It comes to this: for weary, devil-clobbered, flesh-lugging souls, seemingly
stuck in Rom. 7 forever with no hope of escape, predestination is not the cause of
Anfechtungen, but the remedy. For it assures the saints that not even their worst and
nearest enemies—viz., their own selves—are able to cast them out of the affections of
their Father. He knew far better than they did that they were sinners when he chose
them by grace, and he will not let them go now that the battle for holiness has begun
to bring the depth of their sinfulness to light. For—to switch now to the apostolic
first-person—he is for us, and has bound himself to us in a covenant of love and grace
as steadfast as the perfections of his infinite being. No one, not the devil, not my own
warped will, is strong enough to pluck me out of his hand. If this is true—and the
gospel promises me that it is—then there is hope! That, Luther knew and on occasion
let on to, is what the biblical doctrine of predestination and grace is all about: the
thrilling hope—as potent to cheer the sorrowing heart, and to rouse and refresh it for
battle, as the best of wines (cf. Ps. 78:65, 104:15)—that God is irrevocably for me as my
Father, that he fights for me, and that nothing, neither tribulation, distress,
persecution nor death, life, angel, ruler, present, future, past, etc., will ever separate
me from his strong love in Jesus Christ (Rom. 8:31-39).
What then of my dogmatic correction? I think Luther’s nuanced pastoral
theology of assurance, carefully tailored to each of the four settings in life that I have
set out, is quite wise. Pearls ought not to be cast before swine, and surely assurance of
election (as Thomas Watson probably wrote) is a precious jewel in the Christian’s
crown. Faithful, untroubled disciples do well to be patient in well-doing and to make
use of the means of grace in the Church. The artful pastor does all in his power to tear
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the severely afflicted soul off of his self, point him to Christ alone, and let
predestination shine from his wounds. And the battle-weary pilgrim, in view of the
promised land but without hope of reaching it in his own strength, casts himself upon
the eternal purpose and promised faithfulness of God. In this last respect, it’s hard to
see how Luther’s “spirituality of predestination” differs in any real way from the
Reformed doctrine: grasping hold of texts like Rom. 8:31-9 and John 10:27-30 in
extremis, Luther’s ancient Augustinian wine begins to burst its skins and call for fresh
ones instead. What I propose, then, is that the Reformed spirituality which Luther
himself, in this fourth pastoral situation, occasionally adumbrates be outfitted with
the Reformed dogmatics which is able to sustain it for the long-haul. I lack the space
and the skill required to do this doctrine justice, and point you to John Owen’s
masterful exposition and defense of it in his 1654 The Doctrine of the Saints’
Perseverance Explained and Confirmed. But I do wish to conclude this book by
gesturing toward the way this sturdier dogmatics of election, grace, and perseverance
is profitable for afflicted, Lutheran souls.
The doctrine itself is established on the firm foundation of texts that Luther
did not exposit as often as he might have. In addition to Rom. 8:31-39 and John 10:2730, these include especially the promises of the new, eternal covenant of grace, life,
and peace found in Isa. 44:2-3, 54:10, 61:1-8, Jer.31:31-4, 32:37-41, Ezek. 16:60-63, 34:11-31,
36:22-29, 37:1-28, and Hos. 2:19-20, as well as NT passages like Heb. 8—10, Gal. 3:6—
5:1, and Eph. 1:3-14 which announce the realization of this promised grace in Jesus
Christ for the edification and consolation of the freeborn filii promissionis. In them all,
the twofold blessing of forgiveness and holiness, justification and life, are bound up
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together, promised, realized, proclaimed, and given in Christ by his Spirit, all of it
being the gracious outworking in time of the Father’s eternal purpose of love for his
beloved. Therefore Isaiah and Paul, John and Jeremiah do not hesitate as Augustine
and Luther tend to do. Quite plainly, and in all simplicity and truth, the prophets and
apostles teach the Church: in love, the Father graciously chose to redeem, adopt, and
preserve us for himself forever, and sent his dear Son to see to the purchasing of the
riches of this grace by his blood and his Spirit to lavish these riches upon the
ransomed people of God. Luther, I have argued, adamantly insists on the
inseparability of grace and gift, and sometimes (especially against radical Lutherans)
takes the further step of urging their causal interconnection. But the prophets are not
so modest: “The mountains may depart and the hills be removed, but my steadfast
love shall not depart from you, and my covenant of peace shall not be removed, says
the LORD, who has compassion on you … No weapon that is fashioned against you
shall succeed, and you shall confute every tongue that rises against you in judgment.
This is the inheritance of the servants of the LORD, and their righteousness from Me,
declares the LORD” (Isa. 54:10 & 17).
Of course, all Augustinians agree that in regards to the elect, the covenant of
peace cannot and will not be broken: for “God’s firm foundation stands, bearing this
seal: ‘The Lord knows who are his’” (2 Tim. 2:19). The question is, can the sojourning
saints know that they are his, viz., that they in fact belong to God in Christ by virtue of
this covenant and grace? Paul thought so, for the all-conquering note of triumph at
Rom. 8:31-39 is based on the sober dogmatics of v. 30. The predestined, the called, the
justified, and the glorified are not discrete sets of persons, but the Beloved herself, the
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Church. The saints, therefore, are free to rest—and to rejoice—in the assurance that
God loved and chose them in Christ before the foundation of the world, that he will
faithfully preserve them by his great grace, and that at the last he will bring them to
glory. Or is it better for the called and justified to waver about the promises of God?
Should they hedge their bets, and put some degree of trust (however slight) not just in
God’s faithfulness to them, but in their own faithfulness to God? Perhaps, if not in
one’s holiness per se, at least a little stock should be put in that heroic faith which
defies the “hostile” God himself, refuses his threatened refusal, and demands that he
remain true to his word? I know a man in Christ who once read magnificent lectures
on Gen. 32, and entertained this kind of folly about himself. But as I have shown
above, at his best (that is to say his very weakest) moments Luther knew better, and
rejoiced in the promise of a salvation that is by grace alone from first to last.
So did holy Asaph. For the consolation of the saints, he confesses that when his
soul was embittered and his heart pricked, he was not pious but brutish, ignorant, and
beast-like toward God. “Nevertheless,” he sings to the Lord, “I am continually with
you; you hold my right hand; you guide me with your counsel, and afterward you will
receive me to glory” (Ps. 73:21-24). Why, Asaph, do you fancy this? For in the agony,
did not your heart cast off all hope in God? Didn’t you just admit frankly that you
consented to your despairing flesh, and gave up? Or did you keep up faith in the
gospel even when you behaved like a beast toward the Lord? Were you wrestling with
him then by steadfast faith in the promise, refusing to let go of him until he blessed
you? Admit it, Asaph: in the time of trial, your heart failed you! “Indeed my friends,
not only my flesh but my heart too failed me; but no matter, for my heart is not the
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strength of my heart; God is the strength of my heart, and my portion forever” (Ps.
73:26). Or have you not learned to pray your Psalter?
The steps of a man are established by the LORD, when he delights in his way;
though he fall, he shall not be cast headlong, for the LORD upholds his hand …
For the LORD loves justice; he will not forsake his saints; they are preserved
forever; but the children of the wicked will be cut off (Ps. 37:23, 28)
As for you, O LORD, you will not restrain your mercy from me; your steadfast
love and your faithfulness will ever preserve me (Ps. 40:11)
Love the LORD, all you his saints! The LORD preserves the faithful (Ps. 31:23)
You are a hiding place for me; you preserve me from trouble; you surround me
with shouts of deliverance (Ps. 32:7)
Though I walk in the midst of trouble, you preserve my life; you stretch out
your hand against the wrath of my enemies, and your right hand delivers me.
The LORD will fulfill his purpose for me; your steadfast love, O LORD, endures
forever (Ps. 138:7-8)
To this true and living God, whose promise is faithful and whose grace abounds
because his love is strong, be endless glory now and forever. Amen.
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